ORBIS

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS

Volume XV Summer 1971 Number 2

Technology, Western Europe's Alternative Futures, and American Policy — *Victor Basiuk*

A Political Interpretation of the Technology Gap Dispute — *Henry R. Nau*

Stable Deterrence: A Strategic Policy for the 1970's — *J. H. Kahan*

The Operations Side of Foreign Policy — *Roy M. Melbourne*

A Cautious Verdict in Moscow: The Twenty-fourth Party Congress — *Sidney I. Ploss*

Brezhnev: Ascent to Power — *Paul A. Smith, Jr.*

The Great Purges and "the Prague Spring" — *Barbara Jancar*

Changing East-West Relations in Europe: The Bonn-Moscow Treaty of August 1970 — *Dennis L. Bark*

Soviet Policy in Latin America Since Khrushchev — *W. Raymond Duncan*

The Law of the Sea and U.S. Policy Initiatives — *Ann L. Hollick*

Reviews — *Arthur P. Whitaker, Vladimir Petrov, Ronald R. Pope*

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

in association with

THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY
TUFTS UNIVERSITY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS, a quarterly journal of world affairs
published by the
Foreign Policy Research Institute
in association with
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

EDITOR: William R. Kintner
MANAGING EDITOR: Robert C. Herber
ASSOCIATE EDITOR: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
ASSISTANT EDITOR: Margaret M. Capotrio
CIRCULATION MANAGER: Marsha Palitz

EDITOR EMERITUS: Robert Strausz-Hupé

EDITORIAL BOARD: James E. Dougherty, David C. Jordan, Morton A. Kaplan, Lawrence B. Krause, Norman D. Palmer, Stefan T. Possony, Frank N. Trager, Arthur P. Whitaker.
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD: Loren C. Eiseley, Covey T. Oliver, Sidney I. Ploss, Froelich G. Rainey, J. K. Zawodny.
EDITORIAL RESEARCH STAFF: Nicholas D. Constan, Jr., Wayne H. Ferris, Diane K. Pfaltzgraff, Karl P. Sauvant, Harvey Sicherman, Gerald West.
SECRETARIAL STAFF: Betty Armstrong, Barbara Maser, Marcia Rose.

The Editors welcome articles that examine problems in international relations. Articles should be submitted in the original, accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope if the author desires to have his manuscript returned. Articles should conform to ORBIS style and format; text and footnotes should be double-spaced, and the latter placed at the end of the article. Address editorial communications and manuscripts to the Managing Editor.

Books, monographs and pamphlets for review or listing should be sent to the Managing Editor. Address correspondence relating to advertising to the Assistant Editor and communications relating to subscriptions and bulk orders to the Circulation Manager.

ORBIS is indexed by *Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences and Humanities Index, Current Contents, Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences* and *ABC Pol Sci.* Abstracts of ORBIS articles appear regularly in *Historical Abstracts* and *America: History and Life,* both of which are publications of the American Bibliographical Center, as well as in *International Political Science Abstracts,* published in Paris by the International Political Science Association.

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, or the Editors of ORBIS.

Copyright © 1971 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a Delaware nonprofit corporation.

Out-of-print issues of ORBIS, volumes I-V, are available in reprint editions from the Kraus Reprint Corporation. 16 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017, at $90.00 for the five volumes, clothbound; $80.00, paperbound; and $16.00 a volume, paperbound. Individual issues and complete volumes from Volume VI on are obtainable by writing to the Circulation Manager; please note, however, that Volume VI, No. 4, Volume VIII, No. 4, Volume X, No. 2 and Volume XI, No. 4 are now out of print. Prices for complete volumes are at the yearly subscription rate of $7.50; individual copies are $2.50. Reprints of articles published in ORBIS, as long as they are available, are 25 cents each.

ORBIS is published four times a year, February, May, August, and November, by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Editorial and business address: 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, is located in Medford, Massachusetts 02155. Subscription rates: one year, $7.50; two years, $13.00; three years, $18.00. Single copy, $2.50. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, Pa., and at additional mailing offices.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS

A Quarterly Journal of World Affairs

VOLUME XV SUMMER 1971 NUMBER 2

Reflections on the Quarter 467

Technology, Western Europe's Alternative Futures, and American Policy . . . . . *Victor Basiuk* 485

A Political Interpretation of the Technology Gap Dispute . . . . . *Henry R. Nau* 507

Stable Deterrence: A Strategic Policy for the 1970's . . *J. H. Kahan* 528

The Operations Side of Foreign Policy . . . . *Roy M. Melbourne* 544

A Cautious Verdict in Moscow: The Twenty-fourth Party Congress . . . . . *Sidney I. Ploss* 561

Brezhnev: Ascent to Power . . . . . *Paul A. Smith, Jr.* 576

The Great Purges and "the Prague Spring" . . . . *Barbara Jancar* 609

Changing East-West Relations in Europe: The Bonn-Moscow Treaty of August 1970 . . . *Dennis L. Bark* 625

Soviet Policy in Latin America Since Khrushchev . . . . . *W. Raymond Duncan* 643

The Law of the Sea and U.S. Policy Initiatives . . . *Ann L. Hollick* 670

Reviews:

The Wailing Wall, or a Pan American Tragedy in Two Acts . . . . . *Arthur P. Whitaker* 687

Eastern Europe, a Battleground . . . . . *Vladimir Petrov* 697

Concepts and Terms in International Relations . *Ronald R. Pope* 707

Books Received 709

Contributors to this Issue 721

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Columbia reports on the Pearson Report

THE WIDENING GAP
Development in the 1970's
Barbara Ward, Lenore d'Anjou and J. D. Runnalls, Editors

The 1970's will see a deepening of the social and economic strain in relations between developed and developing countries. This is the conclusion drawn by the distinguished participants of this conference on International Development sponsored by Columbia University in direct response to the Pearson Report. These 37 papers not only serve as a critique but raise new questions about issues to be faced in the seventies.
Cloth, $10.00 paper, $3.95

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

****

What Khrushchev didn't remember...

Khrushchev and Kennedy in Retrospect

by James E. McSherry (I.S.B.N. 0-912162-01-5, L.C. 70-123184)

The first book-length analysis of Khrushchev's foreign policy and of President Kennedy's mistakes in dealing with him. Covers the Syrian "crisis" of 1957, Lebanon-Quemoy-Berlin (1958), the U-2 incident of 1960, the two Berlin crises, and the Cuban missile confrontation and its aftermath. The author also shows how the United States is repeating in Indochina the same blunders that led to the missile crisis. *$8.95*

THE OPEN-DOOR PRESS
Department B, P.O. Box 635, Palo Alto, California 94302

****

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reflections on the Quarter

The Sino-American Rapprochement

ENOUGH time has gone by since President Nixon's surprise July 15 announcement that he would visit Peking in the early months of 1972 for a balanced set of attitudes to emerge from the American public's reaction to this startling diplomatic event. It is no longer regarded as the first phase of a new millennium or as the latest example of Machiavellian power politics. The trip is seen as an exploratory step toward a more "normal" international political order.

The forthcoming meeting between President Nixon and his closest advisers and Chairman Mao, Chou En-lai, *et al.* presents a wide range of possible outcomes. Some argue that the patient Chinese communists will achieve their greatest triumph in the quarter of a century of protracted war (Mao's copyright term) against the United States. In this view, Peking's strategists have already set the stage for a total U.S. withdrawal from Asia at no cost to themselves; *au contraire,* the United States will pay for its exit by offering Peking insurance against Soviet pressure while asking nothing in return. American optimists visualize President Nixon's diplomatic overture to Peking as the prelude to a new day in which the Chinese dragon, the Russian bear and the American eagle will somehow achieve a harmonious triangular relationship, one that will spread warmth and light into every corner of the globe.

Unfortunately, the United States and the People's Republic of China—the latter having recently been accorded superpower status in pronouncements from Washington —will be unable to monopolize the writing of the scenario between now and the time of the visit early in 1972. Autonomous events and the actions of other nations will influence the diplomatic climate and content when the two sides meet in Peking.

From Moscow emerge stilted exhortations against the possibility that the pending Nixon visit will result in an American-Chinese plan to curb Soviet incursions into the Middle East and elsewhere. After an initial silence indicating a profound debate within the Kremlin, Soviet pronouncements have strongly condemned the Sino-American rapprochement. Moscow and New Delhi, concerned about Chinese intervention in the internal conflict in Pakistan, quickly signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship which has all the characteristics of a quasi-alliance. Both the USSR and India have obvious stakes in the containment of China, and Soviet diplomacy along the rim of China may well become more active. At a time when the two communist powers have clearly chosen sides in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Indo-Pakistani confrontation, U.S. efforts to maintain a balanced position toward the protagonists have in the short run earned more censure than success.

The dismay in Tokyo because Japan was not informed in advance of Kissinger's ambassage has strained the Japanese-American alliance, already exacerbated by economic problems centering on tariff and currency matters, and brought difficulty to the Sato Government. American relations with Japan will, of necessity, form a crucial part of any new order in Asia.

Reactions from Taiwan followed a predictable pattern. It is as yet unclear how the Republic of China will seek to meet what it views as a direct threat to its survival, namely, the diminution of its close ties with the United States.

Actions in the United Nations on the China question appear to be the most visible public hurdle before the visit. Secretary of State Rogers' statement on August 2 backing Peking's entry assured an affirmative vote by the UN for the People's Republic, if any final assurance were needed. The continued representation of Taiwan remains uncertain despite the U.S. intention to make the deliberations an important question requiring a two-thirds vote. Finally, whether one China is willing to be seated with the other at the United Nations is doubtful; both Peking and Taiwan have repeated categorical denials that such an arrangement would be acceptable.

The impact of the new China policy on the Viet Nam war and the Paris talks remains clouded. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong representatives have taken pains to emphasize that a solution cannot be imposed by a big-power settlement. From the American side, the desire to undertake expanded links with China would seem to give impetus to a continued reduction in American involvement in Viet Nam. The extent of Chinese influence in Hanoi and the degree to which Peking would use it in arranging a Viet Nam settlement is highly speculative.

It is obvious that the principals in this forthcoming rendezvous have already measured the costs, risks and gains. The tough bargaining position of the Chinese is revealed in their propaganda. Chou En-lai's conversations with foreign visitors, including James Reston of the *New York Times,* are replete with statements about what the Chinese will *not* give up to reach a better relationship with Washington, yet he has carefully refrained from jeopardizing the visit itself or criticizing President Nixon personally. The United States, on the other hand, has acted the role of the conciliatory suitor since the initial easing of some trade and commodity restrictions. Kissinger traveled to Peking; Chou En-lai did not meet him on the neutral territory of a third country. The United States has eliminated even the appearance of hostile actions by ordering the termination of U-2 flights from Taiwan, while Chinese support of sundry communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia maintains its momentum. These differences may only denote preferences for divergent bargaining styles.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But the basic issues still remain to be settled. How much will President Nixon concede to Chairman Mao to obtain a new order in Asia? How much will Peking be willing to pay for a tacit American understanding that might prove useful to China in relation to its northern neighbor? It is the threat of Soviet action which is the primary motivating force behind Peking's interest in improved relations with the United States.

In view of Kissinger's long fascination with Metternich, one might speculate that an element of old-fashioned power politics is interwoven into this new phase of Sino-American relations. We do not cavil at the idea that calculations of power influenced Washington's and Peking's decision to pioneer new diplomatic trails. This mutual decision has introduced a fluidity into the international system that global politics has not known for thirty years. It presents unparalleled risks and opportunities for American diplomacy. If the risks are to be minimized and the opportunities exploited, it is incumbent that both Moscow and Peking believe that the United States possesses sufficient will and power to act the role of the "balancer" without destabilizing the global system.

A New Phase in the SALT Talks

IN a joint announcement on May 20, 1971, the United States and the Soviet Union initiated a new phase in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The announcement marked a significant shift in the U.S. negotiating position. It stated that the participants "have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM)," and that, in addition to concluding an accord to limit ABM's, they will undertake to "agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons." The agreement by the United States to place priority on the limitation of defensive systems was in response to the long-standing Soviet position favoring an emphasis on ABM limitations. The Soviets, in turn, agreed to the carefully worded statement linking an ABM limitation with accord on offensive systems.

Subsequently, the United States set forth in the negotiations detailed proposals covering both offensive and defensive systems. On July 23 it was reported that the United States had proposed to halt construction of both land-based missiles and missile submarines and to limit ABM's to a maximum of 300 under a two-option plan for defensive missile deployment. A cutoff date would be established, after which no new silos or submarines equipped with strategic missiles could be built and work on partially completed projects would be terminated. Qualitative improvements, such as multiple warheads on existing weapons, would still be permitted, partly because of the formidable difficulties in verifying compliance to any international agreement limiting their development. This provision would be de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

signed as an interim arrangement, perhaps with a time clause, while a more comprehensive agreement on offensive systems was worked out. Under this American proposal, each nation would have the option of defending its capital with 100 missiles or deploying up to 300 missiles to protect three offensive missile sites. It is conceivable that the Soviet Union would choose the former option and complete the Talinn line around Moscow, presently containing sixty-four ABM's, while the United States would provide for defense around three Minuteman missile bases in North Dakota, Montana and Missouri by means of the Safeguard program.

These proposals would have the advantage for the United States of stabilizing the existing American lead in submarine-launched missiles and permitting ABM protection of at least a part of the U.S. offensive force. The Soviet superiority in land-based offensive missiles would be ratified, but further deployment of such capabilities would cease. The Soviets may object to an ABM agreement holding them to numerical inferiority if they elect to protect Moscow, as would probably be the case under the options proposed.

Originally scheduled to open in 1968, the SALT talks were delayed until November of 1969 as a result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The first session was devoted to general problems of strategic weaponry, questions of verification and inspection, and the scope of future discussions. A basic disagreement over whether the U.S. forward base system and Soviet intermediate- and medium-range missiles targeted against Western Europe should be included in the negotiations emerged at that time and has remained an issue between the superpowers.

During the second round of negotiations, from April to August 1970, the United States offered for discussion two alternative approaches, both covering offensive and defensive systems. The first called for a fixed ceiling on delivery vehicles and a ban on qualitative improvements, particularly MIRV's, to be verified by on-site inspection. The second alternative proposed a reduction in large ICBM's as a substitute for a ban on qualitative improvements. This proposal was specifically aimed at the large Soviet SS-9 missiles capable of carrying warheads totaling up to twenty-five megatons. Both of these proposals were linked to partial or complete bans on ABM's. Later in the second round, the United States offered a formal proposal allowing some flexibility in the mix of offensive delivery vehicles but with a limit on the number of large ICBM's. Much of the third round, in November and December 1970, was devoted to further discussion of the American proposals. It was also reported that the Soviet Union proposed that ABM's be limited to each nation's capital. The fourth round of SALT, conducted this spring, was marked by the joint announcement emphasizing an ABM limitation.

The Soviet Union's decision to undertake strategic arms negotiations appears to be largely a consequence of its attaining approxi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mate strategic "parity" vis-à-vis the United States. Soviet ICBM's now number approximately 1,500, of which about 300 are the large SS-9's, compared with a U.S. force of 1,054 smaller missiles. Moreover, according to the best available estimates Soviet research and development expenditures are larger and are growing at a faster rate than those furthering the American R&D effort. Moscow is spending the equivalent of $11 billion a year on military R&D, 40 to 50 per cent more than the U.S. outlay, and this figure is growing at about 15 per cent annually.

The strategic posture of the Soviet Union has a substantial bearing on its negotiating position at SALT and on its motives for participation. The Soviet leadership may wish to consider a strategic arms agreement in order to reduce armaments expenditures, "freeze" the existing balance of nuclear forces, slow the U.S. deployment of advanced weapons systems while seeking technological gains for the USSR, and reduce the confidence of West European nations in the U.S. guarantee by establishing negotiating frameworks which exclude European interests. In particular, the Soviet definition of "strategic weapons," covering capabilities that can strike targets in either the United States or the Soviet Union, runs counter to European security interests. Under such a definition, the 800 or so Soviet intermediate-range missiles targeted against Western Europe would be excluded from a SALT agreement. Yet certain U.S. capabilities based in Europe whose range allows at least a one-way mission to the Soviet Union would be included. Thus, Western nuclear capabilities in Europe would be weakened, while the USSR would retain a major nuclear missile force targeted against the United States' European allies.

The Soviets' insistence on defining U.S. fighter bombers in Europe as a strategic system, while refusing to classify their IRBM's and MRBM's similarly, would reduce the NATO deterrent without reducing the vulnerability of Western Europe. Their emphasis on ABM limitations appears designed to maintain the status quo under which the Soviet Union possesses a considerable counterforce potential while the U.S. strategic force has largely countercity capability. Moreover, the Soviets may find it advantageous to press for limitations in ABM systems since this is one of the areas in which the United States retains a small technological lead. The Soviets, on the other hand, have concentrated on offensive missile deployments, which have increased at the rate of two to three hundred new missiles each year for the past five years. During this period the United States has added no new ICBM's to its strategic arsenal.

It is too early to determine whether the political "push" given SALT by the May 20 announcement can be translated into a workable agreement acceptable to both sides. Crucial issues remain, and such matters as verification, definition of strategic systems, achieving balance between the differences in U.S. and Soviet strategic forces,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and coordinating agreements covering the respective offensive and defensive systems may not be easily resolved. Continued U.S. emphasis on the limitation of offensive systems is evidenced in the July proposals, and the Soviet Union may remain reluctant to accept any proposal not clearly weighted in its favor. Soviet perceptions of the American approaches to China may influence SALT in as yet unforeseen ways. Undoubtedly the Soviets' attainment of status as a nuclear power equal to the United States, as symbolized in SALT, will affect the international system by limiting the options available to U.S. diplomacy in the 1970's.

Common Market Membership: Britain's Decision

THE decision on British membership in the European Communities now rests in London. The agreement concluded in late June 1971 in Luxembourg resulted in terms considerably more favorable to Britain than had been deemed possible at an earlier stage in the negotiations. The success of the long and arduous negotiations followed shortly after the meeting between Prime Minister Heath and President Pompidou in Paris on May 20-21. In an atmosphere vastly different from previous British bids for membership, in which a political will for success appeared to be lacking in at least one of the negotiating teams, the two leaders were able to resolve most of the then outstanding issues and pave the way for the compromises reached in Luxembourg.

The focus of the Common Market debate has now shifted to Britain, where Parliament is scheduled to vote on British accession on October 28. Support for entry among the British public had decreased dramatically since the previous British bid; two-thirds to three-quarters of the country were apparently in opposition during the early summer of 1971. Anti-marketeers in the left wing of the Labour Party had found some allies in the Conservative Party in opposing British membership. Of greater significance, however, was the shift by Harold Wilson, culminating in the announcement, on July 28, that he and a majority of the national executive of the Labour Party were opposed to British entry under the terms negotiated.

Despite the fact that his government initiated the current set of negotiations in 1967 and presumably would have been willing to accept the same or even less favorable terms of entry — points stressed by the Conservative government and by former members of Prime Minister Wilson's Cabinet, including Roy Jenkins, Deputy Leader of the Labour Party— Wilson now appears intent on making entry a major political issue. Although his anti-Common Market stance may be motivated in part by a desire to maintain the unity of the Labour Party, the success of this gambit remains uncertain. He faces a challenge from within Labour ranks from pro-marketeers led by Roy Jenkins. While a minority on Labour's left wing would favor committing the party to with-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

drawal from the EEC in the event a Labour government was returned to power, such an extreme position as this is remote. Yet a clear majority of Labour sides with Wilson in opposing entry under present conditions.

The government, for its part, has initiated a strong campaign on behalf of the terms it won. The Heath Cabinet rejected calls for a general election or a national referendum and determined instead to fight the issue out in Parliament. In July, a White Paper set forth the terms of entry as negotiated and urged that Britain "accept the challenge, seize the opportunity and join the European Communities."

It now appears that the Heath Government is to be rewarded for its diligence in the negotiations and its continued commitment to joining Europe. Recent public opinion polls show a large increase in support for Common Market membership on the terms of agreement reached between Britain and the Six, so that now a small majority favors entry. The British government has shown justified optimism that it can succeed both with public opinion and in Parliament.

The issues that proved most formidable at the negotiations included New Zealand's dairy exports and Commonwealth sugar, as well as the British contribution to the Community budget and the role of sterling. The first of these issues led the *Economist* to state: "It is hardly credible that the future of Europe should hinge on a few thousand tons of butter." Yet this was a reasonable approximation of the situation during the hectic final weeks of negotiations. Strong sentimental ties with New Zealand and vigorous lobbying by New Zealand's government had made this more of an emotional issue than an economic one in view of New Zealand's decreased reliance on the British export market during the previous decade. Happily, the agreement that emerged from the Luxembourg negotiations was satisfactory to all parties.

New Zealand would be guaranteed a market for butter and cheese over the five-year transitional period at a favorable price. The butter guarantee would be reduced by 4 per cent per year with a review in the third year to determine future arrangements. Reductions for cheese would be much greater—to 90, 80, 60, 40 and 20 per cent of the present level—with no guarantees after 1977. However, as the White Paper notes, New Zealand produces varieties of cheese which are distinctly different from those of European dairy farmers, and thus is likely to retain substantial markets in Europe. On the sugar issue, it was agreed that British imports from the poorer members of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement would be maintained at least at their present level, and that after a four-year transitional period an agreement would be concluded to ensure major markets in the EEC for overseas sugar producers.

For the developing Commonwealth countries, the possibilities of either full association with the Community, on terms similar to the Yaoundé Convention, or alternative forms of contact, were mentioned. While the details were left

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for future discussion, it was noted that certain of these countries had already begun to work out arrangements with the Community.

Issues in the financial and monetary sector were tabled for future agreement. The United Kingdom agreed to phase out exchange controls over the transitional period and expressed its willingness to eliminate the balances of sterling held by members of the sterling area, and thus to end the reserve currency status of the pound sterling. However, specific agreement on sterling is to come after accession and, presumably, within the context of discussions on a European monetary union.

Perhaps the key issue for British public opinion is that of food prices. The White Paper estimates that they will rise by approximately 15 per cent during the transitional period, a figure notably lower than the 18 to 26 per cent estimate of the Labour White Paper in 1970. It is argued that the difference is due to the considerable narrowing of the gap between British and Community food prices since the earlier calculations. The retail price index as a whole would increase less than one per cent each year over the transitional period as a result of food price increases.

As to structural changes in the agricultural sector, the United Kingdom has agreed to adopt the Community system of supports in the first year of membership, but with lower threshold and intervention prices. These would be raised in six steps over a five-year transitional period until they reached the overall Community level. Britain would also give immediate preference to Europe's farm produce, resulting in some dislocations for present suppliers such as Australia, Canada, Argentina and the United States. British farmers, in many cases the most efficient in Europe, stand to reap substantial benefits from higher prices for their produce.

A closely-related area is that of contribution to the European Community budget. The plan outlined in the White Paper is to set up a percentage or "key" based roughly on each nation's share of the total GNP of the Community. However, through the five-year transitional period the United Kingdom would pay only a part of its "key," thus lessening the immediate burden on its economy. Beginning with 8.64 per cent of the budget in 1973, Britain's contribution would rise to 18.92 per cent in 1977 and to around 25 per cent by 1980 under the GNP formula.

With regard to the industrial sector, Britain would abolish tariffs between herself and the Six in five equal stages from April 1, 1973 to July 1, 1977. The first move toward the common external tariff will be delayed until January 1, 1974, in order to permit arrangements to be made with other members of the European Free Trade Area. The new common tariff will be slightly lower overall than Britain's former national tariff.

Finally, nuclear collaboration between Britain and France was not discussed in the negotiations, although Britain would accede to the now largely moribund Euratom, established in 1957—at the same time

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as the EEC—for European collaboration in the peacetime uses of nuclear energy. The issue of Anglo-French collaboration was apparently not raised at the Heath-Pompidou summit meeting, although it appears to have been a major factor in President de Gaulle's veto of the British Common Market application in January 1963. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Heath's proposal on an Anglo-French nuclear force to be held "in trust" for Europe is well known and there are indications that some form of defense cooperation will be considered. Apart from Britain, the three countries which are applying for Common Market membership—Denmark, Norway and Ireland—are to be invited to join the Western European Union. The present membership of the WEU, created in 1954 by the Brussels Treaty, consists of Britain and the Six. France has recently come to view the WEU as a desirable form of defense cooperation outside the structure of NATO. It is reported that French Defense Minister Michel Debré mentioned proposals for Anglo-French nuclear cooperation, including joint weapons production and targeting, to the defense committee of the WEU in May. Although the British maintain that the issue of European defense collaboration is separate from Common Market entry, the expansion of both the WEU and the Common Market would provide an organizational framework for future collaboration.

The international system of 1971 differs markedly from that at the time of the first French veto in January 1963. Of primary importance is the passing of Charles de Gaulle from the leadership of France. There have been significant shifts in matters of European security during the interim period since 1963. France now possesses the national nuclear force that was its overriding objective in the early 1960's. There is concern in Europe about the possibility of U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe and renewed concern about the U.S. modified defense guarantee under conditions of superpower strategic "parity." In 1962 and 1963, de Gaulle had made Franco-German relations the keystone of his European policy. Germany has now replaced France as the European country most actively pursuing a new relationship with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. France is somewhat apprehensive of the resurgent Federal Republic, as evidenced by the recent monetary crisis in which the German mark was allowed to seek a new exchange level in the face of French objections. It is probable that France now sees Britain as a useful counterweight to Germany in an expanded Community. These factors provide cogent arguments in favor of greater Anglo-French collaboration and the modification by President Pompidou of policies established by his predecessor.

From the British point of view, Europe is now far more crucial to Britain's future than it was a decade ago. The declining proportion of trade with Commonwealth nations and British defense reductions east of Suez have made Britain a far more "European" country than

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at any other time in her modern history. Moreover, persistent domestic economic problems have strengthened the case for British entry into the European Community, with its dynamic markets and investment opportunities.

The implications of British Common Market membership for future European cooperation in other sectors remain uncertain. The increased economic power of the enlarged European Community will become evident in world councils, even if cooperation does not go beyond existing institutions. But the impetus to European integration provided by British entry into the Common Market could lead to discussions about a European technological community, to strengthened interest in monetary union, and to the coordination of European defense and foreign policies. Thus, Europe might take further steps toward the formation of a more powerful unit capable of contributing more effectively to its own security. It would emerge as a greater force in a world which contains several existing and potential power centers.

The Middle East Cease-Fire: One Year Later

A YEAR has passed since warfare along the Suez Canal came to a halt. Before the official cease-fire of August 7, 1970, the Canal was the daily scene of fierce aerial bombardment as the Israeli Air Force sought to destroy Egyptian artillery and troop concentrations and Soviet anti-aircraft missile installations. The cost and implications of Egypt's war of attrition, begun originally by President Nasser in 1969, appeared to be disastrous to all parties. An Israeli "victory" might call forth even more Soviet intervention; an Arab triumph assisted by the Soviets portended an upset in the regional balance of power and perhaps even in the global balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In these perilous circumstances, the United States developed a complicated plan aimed at achieving two objectives. The first was to prevent a U.S.-Soviet confrontation by arresting the war of attrition; the second was to secure an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, and this implied the implementation of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of November 1967 calling for Israel's withdrawal from territories occupied during the Six Day War.

The cease-fire initiative succeeded in arresting the war of attrition. Although the initial agreement was for six months only, the United States felt that precious time was gained to launch the Arabs and Israelis on the path toward a permanent settlement. For this purpose, the Jarring Mission was reactivated to facilitate the implementation of the UN resolution.

The resolution was by nature a vague and pliable formula. Stripped of its qualifications, it required a simultaneous withdrawal by Israel from occupied Arab territories (but not necessarily *all* territory) and Arab assurances that Israel would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not be menaced or treated as an outcast in the future. Since the Israelis would never be satisfied by the Arab word of honor nor the Arabs made happy by even total Israeli withdrawal, the resolution needed two other elements: additional security guarantees for Israel and the settlement of long-standing refugee claims for the Arabs.

It was obvious that an international presence like the United Nations Emergency Force of the pre-Six Day War period was neither credible nor reliable in Israeli eyes as an additional security measure. At the least, only a great-power guarantee could meet the security interests of any of the contending states of the Middle East. The architects of U.S. policy assumed that a large American role in any settlement would be the crucial element in obtaining Israeli consent. Therefore, the United States undertook to provide confidence to the Israelis in the form of guarantees, and hope for the Arabs in the form of the nearly total Israeli withdrawal recommended in the Rogers Plan. The necessary conditions for this task were (1) a cease-fire and military standstill under circumstances that would not lead either the United States or the Soviet Union into additional support for the local states, and (2) both trust and flexibility of position between the United States and the two major contestants, the UAR and Israel.

Neither of these conditions was attained. The cease-fire got off to a bad start because Washington had apparently failed to understand fully the nature of the war of attrition. In the war of attrition, President Nasser was able to parlay Moscow's intervention along the Canal into American pressure for Israeli withdrawal. Without massive military participation in the war, the Soviets could produce the psychological impression of imminent defeat for the Israelis should they persist in their diplomatic and military positions, and this was a prospect likely to lead to a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

Although Soviet intervention in May, June and July of 1970 was not sufficient to turn the tide against Israel, the possibility of heightened Soviet participation in the Middle East conflict posed a growing danger which U.S. diplomacy sought to avert. Increased involvement would mean the end of any pretense of détente between Washington and Moscow and at minimum a step backward into the "era of confrontation." Hence the war endangered the overall foreign policy of the United States and presumably that of the Soviet Union. But if this were the case, what did Soviet participation in the war mean? There were two views: the Soviets were using a general nuclear détente—a "mood in the West"—to great local tactical advantage; or the Soviets had been forced into the war to save President Nasser, whose position had been endangered by Israel's deep penetration raids in "overreaction" to the Soviet-backed Egyptian artillery barrage across the Canal.

The latter view prevailed. It followed logically that both sides should observe the cease-fire and the "standstill" arrangement for-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bidding military improvements immediately adjacent to the Canal. It was a major blow to this reasoning and to the U.S. position when the UAR and the Soviet Union violated the cease-fire agreement by constructing in the "standstill" zone the most elaborate air defense system outside of the Moscow region itself. Thus, the military danger to Israel increased *after* the fighting that marked the war of attrition had concluded.

The Israelis, who yielded their demand for direct talks with Egypt in favor of the indirect negotiations provided by the Jarring Mission, were unwilling to acquiesce in Soviet-Egyptian actions which portended a fundamental shift in the balance of power. They would not negotiate while their military position declined. Washington, embarrassed afresh by Soviet and Egyptian duplicity, brought Israel to the negotiations under the Jarring auspices at the price of supplying her with more arms. As a result, the United States dissipated both its major influence over Israel and its small reservoir of good will with Abdel Nasser. Even more importantly, the cease-fire cost the United States heavily in the crucial quality required by the Rogers Plan: Israeli trust in U.S. guarantees.

If the major immediate effect of the cease-fire was to damage the chance for American diplomacy to create a final settlement, an unexpected consequence of the agreement advanced the prospects for peace. The first casualties of the new armistice were those most opposed to diplomatic solutions: the Palestinian guerrillas. Admired by the Arab public and many foreign radicals, Al Fatah's Arafat and his colleagues were sufficiently powerful in August 1970 to be considered participants in any negotiation. But the guerrilla movements sacrificed themselves and their opportunity by spurning the cease-fire, and challenging through aerial piracy and political threats the national honor and authority of King Hussein.

The Jordanian army shattered guerrilla claims in the resultant civil war, and President Nasser's waning prestige proved insufficient to save them. In the autumn of 1970, Syria's clumsy intervention on behalf of the guerrillas was repulsed by Jordanian armor, ostentatious Israeli maneuvers and American naval demonstrations in the Mediterranean designed to induce caution in Soviet policy. This turn of events gravely weakened the Arab "eastern front" against Israel.

In the midst of these events President Nasser died suddenly at the age of fifty-two. His successor, Anwar Sadat, was thought a mediocrity; to everyone's surprise, he took up Nasser's burden in a fashion that made him seemingly more effective than the dead hero. Sadat agreed to a ninety-day extension of the cease-fire and acted to repair Arab unity. A joint leadership federation among Egypt, Syria, Libya and the Sudan was initiated. The reactivation of the Jarring Mission enabled Sadat to make moves foreign observers had thought only Nasser capable of undertaking. In January, Dr. Jarring requested agreement by the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UAR, Jordan and Israel to an interpretation of the UN resolution of November 1967 remarkably similar to the Rogers Plan. Sadat apparently agreed to many of the features of this plan; while stressing the usual themes of total withdrawal and a refugee settlement, he stated his willingness to sign a document recognizing Israel once these matters had been completed.

This statement astonished all concerned and put the Israeli government on the defensive. Sadat had selected the crucial proposition in the UN resolution: words rather than deeds were required of the Arabs, and deeds rather than words were required of the Israelis. The Israelis were forced to reveal rather unfashionably that Arab words meant nothing to them; recognition could be significant only in a geographical context, and this would be governed by Israeli security rather than verbal Arab assurances. The United States, faced with this "breakthrough," also found itself on the defensive. For neither the UN resolution of November 1967 nor the Rogers Plan could work unless Israel could be convinced that international American guarantees might substitute for the occupied areas.

Hopeful of sufficient flexibility in Cairo and conscious that Moscow's continuing military supplies to Egypt exceeded Egyptian capabilities in some categories, the United States set out to convince Israel of the need for timely concessions. The rest of the winter was spent in a series of painful diplomatic exchanges between Israeli and American officials. The climax occurred on March 12, 1971, when Secretary of State Rogers testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and focused upon international guarantees. In his testimony and in his press conference of March 16, Rogers broached a four-power international force plan, including U.S. and Soviet participation. According to the Secretary, the willingness of the United States to "participate" in such a force represented the best U.S. guarantee for Israeli security. This guarantee plan, designed to reassure the Israelis, implied great-power confrontation if it failed and the legitimization of the presence of Soviet troops in the Middle East if it succeeded. The Israeli government became seriously alarmed at the plan and its implications. Foreign Minister Eban arrived in Washington and briefed a large number of Senators. The resulting public and senatorial clamor led Secretary Rogers to give an extraordinary briefing for the Senators shortly thereafter, emphasizing that none of his guarantees could mean anything without an agreement reached first between Israel and the UAR. This apparently satisfied both Senators and the Israeli government without advancing the acceptability of the guarantee plan.

Meanwhile, the cease-fire expired on March 7, 1971. It was not renewed, but the fighting did not resume either. By the end of March, both the pressure from the war of attrition and the "momentum" of U.S. diplomacy had diminished. The United States decided, in lieu of additional arms to Israel, to try diplomacy again. The best hope

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seemed to be an extension of the cease-fire on a more permanent basis. Once again President Sadat provided an initiative: Egypt would agree to reopen the Suez Canal if Israel withdrew a suitable distance into Sinai. In addition, the UAR would extend the cease-fire and allow a UN force to separate the combatants. A recognized Egyptian military presence in Sinai, a *sine qua non* of the UAR proposal, quickly became the sticking point. Israel's public reaction was "no."

Rogers' trip to the Middle East in May seemed to be aimed at obtaining an extension of the cease-fire and the reopening of the Suez Canal under an interim agreement, thus giving both sides sufficient satisfaction to continue negotiating with U.S. brokerage. The Soviet Union stood to gain substantial strategic leverage from the Canal's reopening. The basic strategy of parlaying Soviet intervention into U.S. pressure for Israeli withdrawal might be confirmed. The Israelis stood to lose greatly in the event a new withdrawal resulted in the movement of Soviet-UAR military forces into Sinai. Both Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf might come under Soviet and Egyptian pressure. The United States felt, however, that the greatest loss of all would be the resumption of the war. Apparently Washington was willing to risk disadvantage to the United States and Israel in hope that the resulting cease-fire period could be used to produce a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Such an agreement would be sufficiently comprehensive and acceptable to Cairo to release the Arabs and especially the UAR from military dependence on the Soviet Union.

Rogers' May journey became more an extensive effort to inspire Egyptian good will than to restore Israeli confidence in U.S. policy. During his trip, he found that: (1) the Israelis would not trust the offering of international or American guarantees against the Arabs over physical possession of strategic territory; (2) they were amenable to reopening the Canal but not to Egyptian military sovereignty on its east bank; and (3) the Egyptians insisted on some military sovereignty on the east bank. On the Canal issue, American diplomacy was faced with a deadlock that touched the essential policies and fears of both sides.

The situation was further complicated by political rivalry within the Egyptian government. Vice President Ali Sabry, who opposed the union with Libya, Sudan and Syria and was known as Moscow's partisan, was placed under house arrest the day Secretary Rogers arrived in Cairo. The subsequent wide purge of Sabry's supporters and Egypt's Communist Party led the Western press to speculate that the Rogers policy was paying off. In this view, American influence and the importance of good relations with the United States forced Sabry's hand.

These theories lost credibility when the Soviet Union and the UAR signed a fifteen-year friendship treaty on May 25. The treaty, hailed as a model for future Soviet relations with "neutral" countries, fell far short of a mutual defense

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pact and primarily formalized what already existed. Its significance lay in its time aspect; "fifteen years" implied that Soviet interests in Egypt compelled close relations regardless of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The treaty also symbolized publicly the end of Cairo's claims to nonalignment. Thus, in the aftermath of the Rogers trip both the UAR and Israel had moved farther from the U.S. position: the Egyptians became publicly aligned with the Soviet Union and Israel grew openly hostile to the Rogers guarantee plans. Subsequent excursions by Assistant Secretary of State Sisco seem not to have changed the deadlock.

In retrospect, the principal result of a year of cease-fire has been more to avoid confrontation than to create peace. Although a major obstacle to peace, the Palestinian guerrilla movements, have been reduced to near impotence, the prospects for final settlement along the lines of the UN resolution of November 1967 or the Rogers interpretation have diminished. American ideas on withdrawal won good will in Cairo but not enough to weaken Soviet influence; in Jerusalem a generous supply of arms was insufficient to restore Israeli faith after the cease-fire violations or to lessen Israel's fears of the potential dangers for her security inherent in American diplomacy.

The cease-fire halted the physical war of attrition but not the psychological battle. A constant flow of Soviet military supplies to the UAR —exceeding what that state can use effectively — and the continuous Soviet naval and missile programs have aroused even greater speculation over the scope of Moscow's aims. That the Soviets may be seeking to extend Moscow's influence in the Indian Ocean and South Asia in order to gain leverage on vital oil supplies to Western Europe and Japan while simultaneously "containing" China through an association of Asian states centered on India, has received new credence. The Soviet-Indian treaty of August 1971 and Kremlin warnings against an anti-Soviet American-Chinese rapprochement confirm Moscow's interest in the reopening of the Canal and the vital importance of the Middle East dispute to the global relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union.

A year without war against Israel revealed the fragility of both the Arab governments and their oft-proclaimed unity. Sadat, by his own estimate, narrowly survived a coup. King Hassan of Morocco nearly lost his throne in a revolt against his rule, assisted by a call to arms against him by Colonel Quaddlafi of Libya. While Sadat tried to moderate the Moroccan-Libyan dispute, his hesitant federation partner, Numieri of Sudan, was overthrown by rival officers and the well-organized Sudanese Communist Party. Imitating Egyptian policy, Numieri had been weakening local communists who opposed federation plans, while maintaining strong ties with the Soviet Union. But the plotters bungled; the coup leaders were seized by Libya as they returned from London to Khartoum. While the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was urging Sadat to support the insurgents, Egyptian and Libyan planes were ferrying the Sudanese Suez Brigade to Khartoum where they restored the fortunate Numieri.

These surprising events represented a significant setback for the Soviet Union. General Numieri proceeded to destroy the Sudanese Communist Party in what *Pravda* called a "bloodbath." Evidence incriminating the Bulgarian Embassy and Soviet advisers in the Sudan must have suggested to Sadat his own fate had Ali Sabry's abortive plot succeeded. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has refrained either from breaking relations with Sudan or from antagonizing Sadat, for Soviet national interests were given precedence over ideological sympathies with Sadat's and Numieri's domestic opponents.

In this atmosphere in which global suspicions and local armaments are rising while the diplomatic prospects are declining, both the Egyptian and Soviet governments apparently realize that their own relationships depend upon gaining a political or military victory over Israel. In the end, a diplomatic deadlock must strain the inter-Arab and Soviet-Egyptian connection more than the U.S.-Arab and American-Israeli juncture.

The alternative to unsuccessful diplomacy is either war or a change in policy. The war of attrition strategy, which induced Washington to pressure Israel for some sort of withdrawal, did not bring the United States to the point of sacrificing the balance of power in the Middle East, upon the preservation of which the Israelis have staked their survival. Now the Soviets and Egyptians must decide upon further diplomatic concessions or a renewal of the war of attrition at a higher level. The question of war is primarily a Soviet decision, for success is inconceivable unless the Soviet Union is prepared to go to much greater lengths than it has already. The question of concession is primarily Sadat's decision, for his domestic position depends on some triumph or the prospect of it.

The question that prompted the cease-fire in August 1970 remains: How far will the Soviets go to strengthen their position in the Middle East? There is general agreement that a military confrontation over the Suez Canal is absurd. But the United States cannot tolerate a situation in which Israel is pressured to withdraw according to Egyptian terms *because* of American fear of Soviet intervention. Hence, the balance of power between Israel and Egypt must be maintained even as the United States attempts to cajole Israel to withdraw on strategic terms more favorable to Egypt and the Soviet Union than to Washington or Tel Aviv. Yet the United States knows now that such cajolery is impossible on the present level of Soviet-Egyptian armaments and diplomatic terms.

In a recent editorial in *al-Ahram,* Mohammed Hassanein Heykal, confidant of both the late President Nasser and Anwar Sadat, wrote that the U.S. problem was its reluctance to pressure Israel. In fact, the only way the United States can pressure Israel is to interfere with the balance of power in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Middle East by restricting arms or implying that it will not act to deter possible Soviet military efforts over the Canal. The purpose of this pressure can only be aimed at altering the Israeli position that territory will not be vacated to Israel's strategic disadvantage. So long as the United States believes that agreement between the local parties on the issue of "recognized borders" is most important and that the Israelis must not be defeated in a war supported by the Soviet Union because they would not agree to Egyptian terms, it will be bound to preserve the balance of power in the Middle East. That this leaves the other side no alternative save war, or what the UAR regards as capitulation, is the real dilemma for the Soviet Union and its client state, Egypt, no less than for the United States and Israel.

For reasons apparently unforeseen when it was initiated, the cease-fire has been an ideal instrument to arrive at both the demise of the Rogers policy and, through its demise, a weakening of the Soviet-Arab relationship. But the experience of the past year should have also led to the realization that only the preservation of a local balance of power means anything to the local contestants. Given the instability of Arab politics and the basis of the Soviet position rooted in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is the balance of power which will be challenged again. U.S. interests, as well as those of the local combatants, will be served by the preservation of the balance of power as a precarious substitute for that permanent settlement which continues to elude all parties to one of the tragic confrontations of our time.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR

An International Research and Study Center, Founded in 1950, with Headquarters in Munich, Germany

In addition to books and monographs, the Institute regularly publishes the following periodicals devoted to all aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign policy:

BULLETIN ..... $12.00 per year
(in English, 12 issues per year)

STUDIES ON THE SOVIET UNION ..... $12.00 per year
(in English, 4 issues per year)

ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA UNIÓN SOVIÉTICA $1.00 per year
(in Spanish, 4 issues per year)

MAJALLAH ..... $1.00 per year
(in Arabic, 4 issues per year)

REVIEW OF SOVIET MEDICAL SCIENCES $4.00 per year
(in English, 2 issues per year)

DERGI ..... $1.00 per year
(in Turkish, 4 issues per year)

PROBLÈMES SOVIÉTIQUES ..... $2.00 per year
(in French, 2 issues per year)

SOWJETSTUDIEN ..... $2.00 per year
(in German, 2 issues per year)

ANALYSIS OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION
(in English, 52 issues per year) ..... $10.00 per year
(in Russian, 52 issues per year) ..... $10.00 per year
(in Spanish, 26 issues per year) ..... $5.00 per year

For information, subscriptions, samples:

Munich Office • Mannhardtstrasse 6 • 8 Munich 22, Germany

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TECHNOLOGY, WESTERN EUROPE'S ALTERNATIVE FUTURES, AND AMERICAN POLICY*

by Victor Basiuk

OUR era is characterized by an increasingly pervasive impact of technology on society. The swift pace of technological change in this and the following decades will have far-reaching political repercussions. Western Europe, in particular, will be affected by the impact of technology which, if it does not evoke an appropriate response by West European nations, might seriously jeopardize the region's security and its viability as a major political center in the international arena. Western Europe's alternatives in a technology-dominated future and the potential role of the United States in influencing European developments is the subject of this article.

Technological Trends and Impact

Before discussing the impact of technology on Western Europe, it will be instructive to examine certain present and future technological trends and developments.[1]

One trend is the decline of the deterministic effect of resource location on economic development and the resulting creation of new power centers. In the past, power centers were built around and depended upon the important resources of the period: coal and iron ore, rivers for hydroelectric energy and a local agricultural base. The impact of chemistry (which produced "resources" from the most ubiquitous materials and made substitution commonplace), progress in transportation (which substantially reduced costs of shipments and thus greatly increased mobility of raw materials), and other technological innovations made the availability of superior technology and the organization

*This paper was written under the auspices of the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, prior to the author's assumption of his present governmental position. The judgments expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Navy or any other agency of the U.S. government.

[1]For a more extended treatment see Victor Basiuk, "The Impact of Technology in the Next Decades," Orbis, Spring 1970, pp. 17-39.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and will to use it — rather than the location of raw materials and energy sources — of primary importance. This has been demonstrated by Japan, which has built the third largest steel industry in the world, yet relies on raw materials that for the most part (88 per cent of the iron ore and 64 per cent of the coking coal in 1965) are imported at an average distance of 5,500 miles.[2] The development of nuclear and controlled thermonuclear energy will further undermine the deterministic effect of the location of resources.

This trend toward the loosening of traditional constraints imposed on industrial development by the location of resources has several implications. The opportunities for organized human will through the use of advanced technology have broadened immensely. On the other hand, the technological superstructure of advanced societies creates rigidity and a deterministic effect of its own. Thus, the factors that will produce differential benefits from science and technology among the advanced nations will be not so much their present levels of development as differences with respect to farsightedness in planning, determination in the pursuit of selected goals, and willingness to reshape existing social institutions and technological superstructures to meet the requirements of the future.

Another major technological trend is the integration of human activity and spatial units into one global geo-technical system. The only areas that have not yet been fully integrated into the global system are the inhabited but underdeveloped regions, the uninhabited or scarcely inhabited regions, and the ocean floor. Major strides will be made in this and the next decade in incorporating these remaining regions through advanced technology such as international television networks using satellites, inexpensive global telephone communications, marine resources development, and weather and climate modification. The integrative process continuously increases the degree of global and regional interdependence. Those nations and regions which are capable of developing and controlling the instruments of the integrative process accrue advantages in the form of international power and influence.

A closely related trend is the growing and increasingly versatile global projection of national influence and power through technology. From such relatively rudimentary instruments as British seapower and transoceanic cable communications of the

[2] "Steel Is Where You Make It—in Japan," *Resources*, January 1967, p. 18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nineteenth century, technology enabling global projection of influence and power advanced to voice broadcasting, ICBM's and the lunar landing (politically if not physically aimed at the earth). The means for projecting a state's power and influence will continue to grow and take the form of highly sophisticated technology for national development (e.g., earth-resources satellites capable of surveying and exploring a country's resources, satellite-based community television networks for educational purposes, agro-industrial complexes based on nuclear energy and capable of providing water and fertilizer for arid regions), for the modification of weather and climate over other states' territory, and for direct beaming of television programs into receivers in foreign countries. Various other technologies will become available on a global scale through multinational corporations. Since World War II the United States and the Soviet Union have been the principal powers projecting their influence globally through science and technology; Western Europe is considerably behind in this respect and tends to be an object of technological influence (as are the less developed countries).

Another trend of technology is its growing magnitude and increasing economies of scale, requiring enormous resources for its development and utilization. The cost and scale of the present advanced technology, such as space exploration, particle accelerators for advanced nuclear research, supersonic transportation, and nuclear weapons development, are gigantic and are imposing a heavy burden even on a country with the wealth and resources of the United States. Future technologies will be even more demanding in this respect. The benefits from the nuclear agro-industrial complexes are expected to be great, but an economic scale of operation requires an investment of between a half billion and one billion dollars for each complex.

Significant progress has recently been made in controlled thermonuclear reaction (CTR). Commercial fusion reactors may have a capacity as large as 10,000 megawatts, and reactors of 20,000 megawatts are conceivable and would be even more economical. (By way of comparison, the total generating capacity of Poland in 1967 was less than 10,000 megawatts.) The magneto-hydrodynamic (MHD) process for generating power is likely to be operational in about fifteen years. This process succeeds, in part, in converting thermal energy directly into electrical energy, thus producing over 25 per cent more power from a given input of thermal energy. However, to achieve an economically attractive level of output,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

huge MHD plants must be built.[3] Large surface-effect vehicles, such as hover-craft, which may have the capability of operating on land as well as at sea, while commercially attractive (no roads or docking facilities needed), would require major financial outlays for research and development and construction. Technologies for the development of marine resources and for climate modification will require the expenditure of billions of dollars.

The new technology promises to be so costly initially that even the superpowers will not be able individually to take full advantage of its potential. This factor will generate increased pressure for international cooperation in technological development among the second-rank powers, between the superpowers and the second-rank powers, and perhaps between the superpowers themselves. The countries that will not be able to pool resources on a large scale to utilize (if not develop) modern technology will fall decisively behind, with concomitant economic and political consequences.

Technological change is rapid, and its tempo is accelerating. More than half of the products manufactured by American industry today did not exist twenty years ago. Major progress is expected in the 1970's and the early 1980's in technologies leading to substantial reduction in the cost of electrical power and in making it abundant and readily available. The use of superconductor metals (pure unstrained lead, tin and others) refrigerated to extremely low temperatures, thus eliminating resistance to transmission of electricity and preventing the loss of energy in transmission, will provide significant economies. Superconductivity has already been applied to *generation* of power, and it is expected to be economical for *transmission* of power as well, perhaps for distances greater than 2,000 miles. Biology, especially in its application to medical science, is on the threshold of multiple and significant breakthroughs.[4] Quite apart from any major technological innovation that may take place in a particular field, synergistic effects involving innovations from various fields which reinforce each other provide a dynamic force in modern technological change.

The acceleration of technological change has two effects. First,

[3]For a state-of-the-art discussion of MHD and projections into the future, see William D. Jackson, *et al.*, "Critique of MHD Power Generation," a paper presented at the Winter Meeting of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, November 16-20, 1969 (ASME, 69-WA/Pwr-12).

[4]See Gordon R. Taylor, *The Biological Time Bomb* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1968), pp. 13-21, 202-231.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries in the forefront of technological development reap disproportionately large benefits from it, economically and politically. The countries only a little behind frequently find themselves manufacturing products already on the threshold of obsolescence. Unless they have a commercial advantage in another respect (e.g., cheap labor or unusually effective marketing techniques), these nations are significantly handicapped in the world market.

Second, while the impact of modern nonmilitary technology on societies has been relatively limited so far, rapid technological change will significantly increase this impact. The changing values of American youth and the resultant domestic turmoil can be traced to the effects (direct and indirect) of technology,[5] thus suggesting that a discontinuity in social and political trends in response to technological impact is taking place in the United States. The late 1970's and the early 1980's will be a particularly crucial period in terms of the effect of technology on institutions and the daily lives of individuals.

The nature and extent of the social discontinuities that emerge will depend on whether effective policies to cope with them are devised. Recognition of the degree to which the change being introduced by new technologies is inevitable and legitimate, and the adjustment of institutions and creation of new ones to meet changing requirements will have great social and political implications. For a variety of reasons, societies will not be equally successful in coping with the impact of technology. The price of failure may be large: it may involve extensive social dislocation, widespread personal insecurity, severe social instability, and a serious weakening, if not collapse, of governmental authority and capability for defense.

A final trend to be noted is the increasing importance of nonmilitary technology as an area of direct relevance to national security. The possibility of altering the distribution of world and regional power through nonmilitary technology is greater today than the possibility of doing this through military technology. Historically, through wars and conquest, qualitative and quantitative gains in weapons have changed the distribution of power much more swiftly and more dramatically than nonmilitary technology; hence, it has been the military sector on which a state's concern for security has been focused. In the long run,

[5]For details, see Daniel Seligman, "A Special Kind of Rebellion," *Fortune*, January 1969, p. 67 ff; Basiuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-35.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

however, nonmilitary technology has accounted for at least as much change in the distribution of world power as has military technology. The military sector still monopolizes attention with regard to national security, but its ability to affect distribution of power in real terms has decreased. A stalemate in strategic nuclear weapons now prevails; any input of resources into the nuclear arsenal by either the United States or the Soviet Union is soon neutralized by the other. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons discourages either protagonist from taking advantage of a temporary superiority.

There are signs that the stalemate characterizing the nuclear balance is also affecting the conventional warfare sector. This development may be traced to the fear of escalation which induces the superpowers to impose constraints on local wars; the growing global projection of Soviet military power which tends to thwart potential American military action at various points around the world; and the tendency of certain conventional warfare technologies to offset each other (e.g., the aircraft versus surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft batteries in Viet Nam). For a variety of reasons the conventional warfare sector can never be fully stalemated, yet the fact remains that – unlike the situation in the pre-nuclear period – only a part of the total military sector now contributes to an effective change in the global distribution of power.

There is no sign of a stalemate – either now or in the future – in the ability of nonmilitary technology to effect a change in the distribution of power. For example, computers provide a major impetus to the growth of other areas of technology and facilitate the economic planning, investment and marketing strategy of corporations, providing advantages for the countries and regions superior in this field. Technological capability for the development of marine resources opens up new vistas in a virtually unexplored and unexploited three-quarters of the globe, with concomitant geopolitical implications. Countries that succeed in reducing the costs of energy sooner than others will enjoy major advantages in world markets and strengthen their industrial capability and leverage in relation to other areas of the world. Global television capabilities and weather control are also important in this connection. For these reasons, nonmilitary technology will grow in importance to U.S. security in general and with regard to Western Europe in particular during the coming decades.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western Europe's Technological Ailments

Despite Western Europe's successful recovery from the effects of World War II, a GNP nearly two-thirds that of the United States, an economic growth rate equivalent to, or greater than, that of the United States, and the development of national policies in science and technology, it continues to have problems in effectively utilizing its scientific and technological potential. Three interrelated factors handicap Western Europe: (1) the lack of coordination and unified purpose among the various national policies in science and technology; (2) the dispersal of resources and duplication of effort; and (3) certain inadequacies in the existing institutional and technological superstructures which make them poorly suited for development and even utilization of advanced technology.

France's science and technology policy has been dynamic, but it has failed to generate enthusiasm and unequivocal support from her neighbors, since it has been aimed primarily at bolstering French power and prestige and using European regional scientific and technological programs to that end. Moreover, in her search for power through science and technology, France seriously overcommitted her resources. The resultant difficulties have led to a thorough policy review by the Pompidou Government.[6] Yet, spurred by such factors as the impetus given by the Common Market, the new generation of business managers educated after World War II, and an expanding industrial labor force, the French economy has been growing briskly in recent years.

Strengthened by a buoyant economy, the West German effort in science and technology is flourishing. Such prestige sectors as space, computers and oceanography are receiving new emphasis, although actual progress here is still relatively modest. The budget of the Federal Ministry for Education and Science is growing at a substantial rate; from 4.7 per cent of the total federal budget in 1969, it is projected to increase to 9.6 per cent or $3.05 billion in 1974. The Germans have given consistent support to regional cooperation in science and technology, but lack of progress in that sector is moving Germany toward bilateral cooperation, e.g., with the United States.[7]

Great Britain's attempt to play the role of a major power in

[6]Cf. Robert Gilpin, "Technological Strategies and National Purpose," *Science*, July 31, 1970, pp. 442-443.

[7]D. S. Greenberg, "Germany: Bombing Research Effort Turning to Space and Computers," *Science*, April 18, 1969, pp. 281-283; "Dr. Leussink's New Ministry," *Nature* (London), June 13, 1970, pp. 1019-1020; "Budget and Planned Expenditure up to 1974," *Science Policy News*, November 1970, pp. 33-34.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military technology for twenty years after World War II significantly strained her resources. Although growing in recent years, allocation of funds to science and technology is once again feeling the effects of financial constraints. Nevertheless, Britain still has, by a wide margin, the strongest general capability in science and technology of any European state.[8] Her absence from the European Economic Community has prevented her from making a major contribution to the European effort.

Europeans have been attempting to overcome the problems of dispersal of resources and compartmentalization by establishing institutions of regional cooperation in science and technology which not only cut across the EFTA-EEC division (and thus include Britain) but also include such countries as Australia. The success of regional cooperation has at best been mixed. Euratom suffered from the initial self-exclusion of Great Britain and later from the highly nationalistic policy of France under de Gaulle, which was echoed by other members and seriously undermined the functioning of the organization. Britain and Australia were charter members of the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO), but ELDO has had a number of crises since its inception in 1962, and the British are pulling out of the organization at the end of 1971. The most successful of all European scientific and technological organizations is the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), and next is the European Space Research Organization (ESRO). Both are engaged primarily in scientific research. Inadequate funding by member states has plagued all of these organizations at various times and in various degrees.[9]

In a number of West European countries there are distinct gaps between the development of science and its application. The enterprising spirit so characteristic of American business and the availability of venture capital are generally lacking. By and large European companies are relatively small, and the existing legal structure, aided by frequently obstructionist governmental policies, creates serious obstacles to mergers across national fron-

[8]For details, see Alan G. Mencher, "Management by Government: Science and Technology in Britain," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* May 1968, pp. 22-27; Christopher Layton, *European Advanced Technology* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969), pp. 61-63; "Fifth Annual Report of Science Research Council (SRC)," *Science Policy News,* November 1970, p. 35.

[9]See Layton, *op. cit.,* pp. 91-100, 107-114, 162-171, and Robert Gilpin, *France in the Age of the Scientific State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 392-400, 403-413.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tiers.[10] There are no suitable institutions to provide the large-scale financing necessary for a modern corporation's scope of operations. Western Europe's several patent systems impede technological innovation. In a number of European countries the educational and scientific institutions lack the flexibility needed to supply the skilled manpower and research and development essential to keep abreast of technological advances.[11]

Moreover, the existing technological superstructure of Western Europe would require a major change to meet the requirements of the future. Britain, France and Italy have national grids for distribution of electric power which can absorb the moderately large capacity of modern nuclear reactors. However, the huge reactors of the future would require grids cutting across national frontiers. Other countries — for example, Germany — have highly fragmented systems that find it difficult to utilize present nuclear reactors, not to mention the larger generating stations of the late 1970's and the 1980's. Another case in point is the relatively undeveloped telephone network of Western Europe, which will require considerable investment of capital, modernization and standardization if it is to cope with the increased volume and speed of telecommunications and computerized data transmission.

The Double Challenge: Rapid Technological Change and the Large Scale of Technology

As a result of these factors, West European countries are facing serious problems on two levels. The first is making timely technological innovations, so important in a period of accelerating change and rapid obsolescence. The second is the utilization of technology on a sufficiently large scale. Even if future technology is developed elsewhere and freely offered to Western Europe, this would not assure that Europeans would be ready to use it. Because the transfer of technology is feasible, the problem of timely innovation is ultimately less critical than that of the ability to utilize technology on a sufficiently large scale, especially since the importance of the latter will continue to increase. As things stand, however, West European nations suffer on both counts and are thus falling behind in the competition for world markets, potential military power and political influence.

[10]See "Towards the European Company," *Economist,* June 15, 1968, pp. 60-61; and "Obstacles to Mergers," *ibid.,* March 1, 1969, p. 67.

[11]Gilpin, *op. cit.,* pp. 17-33 and *passim;* John Diebold, "Is the Gap Technological?," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1968, pp. 276-291.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What, then, is the outlook for Western Europe in the next decades? One may postulate three models determined by differences in the way Europeans meet the challenges of new technological developments. One model assumes that the presently existing inertia to change will dominate and that European governments will pursue basically nationalistic policies with respect to science and technology. Another model assumes that both the potential benefits and the outside pressures of scientific and technological advance will induce West European governments to undertake more cooperative policies and will result in changes in European attitudes and institutions without, however, leading to the establishment of a federal Western Europe. The third model assumes that, motivated by technological as well as other factors, Europeans will decide to establish common political institutions and solve their technological problems within the framework of a common government.

These models are not equally probable. None is likely to materialize in the exact form described here, but an approximation of one model will probably develop, incorporating elements of the others.

Model One: Technological Nationalism

If West European governments pursue nationalistic policies in scientific and technological matters and are apathetic with respect to essential changes in this field, Europe's capability in science and technology will be weakened and its power position will decline. The course of events might run along the following lines:

In the immediate future, the United States and perhaps the Soviet Union effectively develop lasers for industrial application and make major progress in superconductivity. The United States continues to dominate the field of computers and makes further strides in telecommunications and other electronics. The margin between the technological superiority and efficiency of American and European companies widens. American products increasingly penetrate the European market, and American subsidiaries in Western Europe continue to grow.

American investment in Europe results in some transfer of technology, which is beneficial to European enterprise. Pressed by budgetary considerations and motivated in part by the desire to stop the erosion of Western Europe's power position, the United States attempts to establish joint programs in selected areas of ad-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vanced science and technology with European countries. European governments, however, cannot agree among themselves on joint programs with the United States. Accordingly, the United States enters into only a few bilateral programs with certain nations, such as West Germany, Britain and France. The limited transfer of technology from the United States to Western Europe merely slows but does not stop Europe's relative decline. West European nations begin to lose their influence on world markets; this causes increasing unemployment and a partial shift of employment toward service industries. The gap between the standard of living in the United States and in West European countries widens.

This trend is gradual and grows throughout the 1970's but does not reach serious proportions until the late 1970's or the early 1980's. By that time third-generation computers are solidly established in the United States, further strengthening the efficiency of the American economy and its worldwide activities. Either the Soviet Union or the United States — or perhaps both — has a partial capability for modification and control of European weather. The Soviet Union and later the United States begin to beam television programs through satellites directly to Europe and the less developed world. Western Europe has no centralized facilities for beaming television programs into the less developed countries; at best, a few individual states have a partial capability in this respect, sustained through cooperation with the technical facilities of one of the superpowers.

The United States and the Soviet Union develop huge MHD power stations and prototype fusion reactors. Along with Japan, they make the merchant marine of most European nations obsolescent by introducing large high-speed surface-effect ships. The superpowers are also active in exploiting ocean areas for oil and minerals at substantial depths. By 1985 West European nations are hopelessly behind in most areas of advanced technology; their influence in the less developed areas is largely dissipated; they can no longer compete in the world markets, and a high level of domestic unemployment is a chronic problem. The feeling of insecurity is now acute, and unrest in a number of countries results in street riots and frequent governmental crises.

Western Europe is incapable of supporting advanced military weapons systems. Aside from this, budgetary pressures compel governments to reduce their armed forces. NATO is still in existence on paper but is completely ineffective. The Soviet Union

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

achieves some success in extending its influence in Western Europe. The Soviets have gained allegiance of large social groups in some European countries, and a few coalition governments with the communists have been formed. Other West European states actively cooperate with the Soviet Union or the United States in science and technology in an effort to improve their weak positions. Germany is still divided, but the demarcation between the East and the West in Europe is blurred.

The Trends for Change

The above model does not take into account the conflict between two forces in Western Europe: inertia, traditionalism and nationalistic attitudes of governments and individuals versus willingness and desire to adapt to the requirements of modern technology and to use the benefits it offers. The fact that Europeans raised the cry of "the technology gap" as early as 1962, at a time when it was quite insignificant (the gap's full impact is not likely to be strongly felt until the mid- or late-1970's), is a sign of potential change. Except for a variety of individual proposals, the direction of European response has not fully crystallized, although there is a strong feeling in responsible circles that Europeans "have to do something about it." There are a number of specific developments that carry promise of considerably strengthening Western Europe's capability for taking advantage of future technology.

As a result of initiatives by the EEC Commission, two draft conventions are under consideration. One would provide a uniform patent system for the member countries. The other, prepared in 1968, proposes the creation of a new type of company which would be subject to the laws of the convention rather than to the individual states, thus stimulating cross-national mergers. While the approval of these conventions has been delayed for quite some time, it is generally expected that they will eventually be ratified.[12] In June 1970 five of continental Europe's largest aircraft manufacturers agreed to cooperate so that they could compete with American companies. Although the American aviation industry still clearly dominates the multibillion-dollar international commercial market, by the spring of 1971 voices had been raised in the United States expressing concern about

[12]See "Common Company Law," *Economist*, February 6, 1971, pp. 72-73.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Europe's commercial challenge" in aviation.[13] Companies providing venture capital are beginning to be established in Europe. Observers also expect that within the next few years financial institutions (probably backed by governments) will be established for the purpose of providing large-scale capital for European corporations. In the past couple of years, business concerns have become much more merger-minded than previously. Steady progress is being made toward achieving industrial standardization throughout Western Europe. Plans are under way to combine ELDO and ESRO into a single European space agency which, as one European journal put it, "could begin to look NASA in the face."[14]

Perhaps of greater immediate importance to Europe's technological future are the activities of American companies in Europe and the probable entry of Britain into the Common Market. American firms introduce an element of dynamism and competitive spirit which is making inroads into traditional European business practices. Britain's entry would provide the Common Market with a substantial source of advanced technology and would remove a number of obstacles to regional cooperation. It is noteworthy that the three principal technological powers of Western Europe — Britain, France and Germany — are basically complementary in their strong and weak points pertaining to scientific and technological development. If Britain joins the Common Market and cooperation in science and technology follows, each could exert a beneficial catalytic effect on the others. In some five to ten years this could produce a truly major "take-off."

Cooperation with the United States is likely to grow, exerting beneficial effects on Western Europe. Although European regional organizations in science and technology have not displayed unqualified success, their existence provides an institutional framework and a fund of experience for future cooperation. With de Gaulle no longer at the helm of France, the outlook for their success has improved. Efforts are being made to improve their structure and to consolidate their activities. There are also hopeful signs in changed governmental attitudes toward cooperation, in new programs created to bypass existing obstacles (such as that among Britain, Germany and the Netherlands to

[13]Robert Hotz, "Europe's Commercial Challenge," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, May 31, 1971, p. 21.

[14]"Is it Goodbye to ESRO and ELDO?," *Nature*, June 13, 1970, p. 1011.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

develop gas centrifuge technology), and in the relative success of some bilateral undertakings.

Model Two: A Functionally-Oriented Western Europe

Assuming that these cooperative trends prevail and pick up momentum under the impact of the science and technology of the 1970's and the 1980's, how far can Western Europe proceed in augmenting its technological capability and power short of creating a unified political structure? What is a likely scenario for a functional orientation?

Although nonmilitary technology is closely related to power considerations, it does not require an agreed-upon political purpose for its joint development. Indeed, as functionalists are fond of pointing out, technology tends to erode political barriers. Thus, if Europeans want to maintain their economic viability and high standard of living, avoid becoming an object of the growing projection of influence by the superpowers, and minimize the potentially injurious impact of the post-industrial society, they can achieve a great deal through joint utilization of technology without political unification. One hindrance might be created by intra-European commercial competition; each government might continue to support companies of its own nationality, impeding technological cooperation on a European scale. This problem, however, is likely to decrease in importance as the technological pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union grows and as existing trends toward functional integration become stronger.

Thus, in this model, it is entirely reasonable to conceive of the West Europeans setting up a common patent system, institutions providing venture capital, and banking facilities making available large-scale fixed-return capital, all of which stimulate the growth of all-European corporations. Western Europe also creates a European Space Authority by merging ELDO and ESRO. It revitalizes its nuclear energy sector by strengthening both Euratom and CERN and by so reversing priorities as to make regional institutions the focal points for national programs, thereby avoiding waste and duplication. The three technologically strong powers — Britain, Germany and France — exert a catalytic influence on each other, creating a dynamism in science and technology which post-World War II Europe has never experienced. These three, joined by others, eventually evolve a West European body that determines priorities. West Europeans develop their own capability

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in weather and climate modification and join the United States and possibly the Soviet Union in some large-scale intercontinental programs for improving the environment.

As this model develops, however, a point is reached when West Europeans begin to feel the anomaly of having power without political purpose. The availability of a large economic and technological capability increasingly requires political decisions on how it should be used. Western Europe has the capability of beaming television programs into the less developed world, but what should be their message? Economic and political influence frequently go hand in hand, and unless a government follows through with a political strategy, economic influence can decline. The development of a scientific and technological capability inevitably reaches a point when its further growth requires decisions that will be increasingly political. If Western Europe evolves an institutional mechanism that determines priorities in allocation of resources for science and technology, this in itself is a quasi-political body. Eventually, questions of major magnitude arise. Should Western Europe compete or cooperate with the Soviet Union in weather and climate modification technology? Such problems require decisions by the political authorities of European nations and may require changes in political institutions.

In order to develop and utilize future technology in all its ramifications — of which large-scale enterprises and global projection of power are but two of the more important — West European states will eventually have to evolve common political purposes. Short of this, they will be handicapped in the utilization of the full potential of science and technology. In particular, Western Europe will not be able to develop technology as an instrument of power comparable to that wielded by the United States and the Soviet Union. In the last analysis, a central political will is essential for a truly effective utilization of technology as an instrument of power, and this applies to nonmilitary as well as military technology.

Model Three: A Unified Europe

The last model to be considered involves the establishment of central political institutions that pool resources to strengthen Western Europe's scientific-technological capability. Viewing technological factors as an independent variable, one can envisage

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

two sets of circumstances under which the establishment of supranational European institutions might be possible.

One route to a unified Europe takes off from the first model, that of technological nationalism, under which Western Europe is basically incapable of taking advantage of advanced technology. The weakening of the European position and the unrest and political instability that continuously plague Europe produce a reaction. By the early 1980's Europeans feel that they have had enough turmoil, so they establish a supranational government to remedy the situation. The next five to ten years are devoted to overcoming the relative backwardness in science and technology. Cooperative programs with the United States help to accelerate the improvement. In a pessimistic view of the effect of Western Europe's failure to take advantage of advanced technology, unification occurs under the aegis of a totalitarian or dictatorial regime.

A second route to a united Europe takes the second or functionally-oriented model as a point of departure. Western Europe uses regional scientific and technological institutions as the principal mechanism for utilizing modern technology. But by the early 1980's, without central political institutions, it feels increasingly restricted in large-scale development and the global projection of technology. Moreover, the availability of technological and economic capabilities creates the temptation to capitalize on them for political purposes, which in turn requires a further strengthening of the technological potential. Europe-minded groups gain in influence. Their activity is facilitated by the habits of mutual exchange and contact established by European officials and industrialists who for fifteen years or more have been in frequent touch across national frontiers and have worked side-by-side in regional institutions. As a result of these and other factors, Western Europe establishes a supranational structure in the mid-1980's.

If these developments were to take place, there is a distinct possibility that Western Europe by the mid-1990's could catch up with and perhaps even surpass the United States as the foremost technological power. Its success in this respect would depend largely on its ability to capitalize on nonmilitary technology, to forgo the option of diverting resources into strategic nuclear capability (at least for the next ten to fifteen years), and perhaps to curtail its expenditures in the conventional warfare sector.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Modified Functionally-Oriented Western Europe: The Most Likely Outcome?

The most likely outcome in the next ten to twenty years is a functionally-oriented Western Europe with some elements of technological nationalism. The reasons for choosing this model as most probable derive from the signs of change discernible at present and the compelling technological trends. Unlike the situation during the past twenty years when Western Europe could afford to procrastinate and proceed by half-measures in the development and utilization of advanced technology, the alternatives for the future are becoming so divergent that the old policies simply will not do. Western Europe will have to make some hard choices in the near future. Since the alternative to an approximation of a functionally-oriented Western Europe is continued technological nationalism with its grim consequences, a belief that people act rationally when alternatives are clear-cut suggests that the Europeans will choose the functionally-oriented model as a reasonable and necessary solution. However, this is not a foregone conclusion. Second choice for the most likely model — and a close runner-up — is an approximation of technological nationalism. This could well turn out to be Western Europe's real, albeit unattractive, future.

A Functionally-Oriented Western Europe: Directions of Evolution

Another question deserving consideration concerns the directions a functionally-oriented Western Europe might take. A number of influential voices have recently called for cooperation among European nations in response to "the American challenge" in science and technology, emphasizing unilateral European efforts rather than transatlantic cooperation.[15] Viewed in the context of the 1970's, this approach might be a viable one and even has certain concrete advantages.

In light of the West Europeans' decreased concern about the Soviet threat, "the American challenge" in nonmilitary technology provides a convenient rallying symbol for action. At the same time, it directs the attention of the West Europeans to an area of technology highly important to their vitality and security.

[15]See, for example, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, *The American Challenge* (New York: Atheneum, 1968); Layton, *op. cit.;* and Laurance Reed, *Ocean-Space—Europe's New Frontier* (London: The Bow Group, 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Because the catching up, restructuring of institutions (including educational systems), modification of attitudes and values, and development of the necessary manpower will require considerable lead time, Western Europe may need the 1970's to accomplish most of these objectives. It may be able to make significant strides along these lines with its own resources, especially since savings will be achieved through the pooling of resources and reduction of the existing duplication of effort. However, if one looks beyond the 1970's, a policy of hostility toward American superiority in advanced science and technology is definitely shortsighted and might prove self-defeating. No matter how good its intentions and how well they are carried out, Western Europe does not have adequate resources to take full advantage of the technology of the future, with its immense scale and costs. For that matter, neither does the United States.[16]

A number of questions arise in this connection. If Western Europe chooses an approximation of the functionally-oriented outcome as a reaction to America's technological superiority, could West European countries in the late 1970's successfully readjust their policies to large-scale cooperation with the United States in nonmilitary technology in order to avoid the cul-de-sac of resource limitations? This would depend on the specific nature of the European action. If, as proposed by Laurance Reed,[17] Western Europe claims a vast chunk of the Atlantic seabed, begins to exploit it, and thus triggers an American-European rivalry for the resources of the Atlantic Ocean, it might be difficult to switch to eventual cooperation in marine and other technologies, and the rivalry might spill over into the political sphere with repercussions for Western Europe's security. Accordingly, Western Europe's technological progress would seem to depend on the ability to keep the options open for cooperation with the United States while initially pursuing an anti-American policy. This is a thin line which might be difficult to tread.

Why should not Western Europe immediately begin to pursue a course of action involving much more extensive cooperation with the United States? This would certainly be a rational approach advantageous to both Western Europe and the United States, since

[16]Cf. Harold and Margaret Sprout, "The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources," *World Politics*, July 1968, pp. 660-693. The Sprouts' discussion focuses on internal social needs versus external requirements for maintaining a state's position in the world and does not address itself to the trends in and demands of nonmilitary technology in particular. However, the requirements of nonmilitary technology strengthen the Sprouts' analysis.

[17]See Reed, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-49.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the latter is also feeling the pinch of resource limitations for advanced science and technology. However, a rational approach may not necessarily be the most realistic and hence the best approach. Suspicions of American technological superiority probably will persist; commercially and politically motivated obstacles are likely to keep arising on both sides of the Atlantic to hinder effective cooperation. In face of these obstacles, West European countries might fall back on a policy of inadequate intra-European programs, procrastination and palliatives such as compartmentalized bilateral cooperation with the United States. In an age of polarizing alternatives, this policy would result in Western Europe's reverting to an approximation of the technological nationalism model, with its accompanying political perils.

Such a development can be averted. The potential perils and difficulties of a too early and extensive U.S.-European cooperation are real, but the outcome, in the last analysis, would depend on the perception of enlightened self-interest on both sides of the Atlantic. If this perception develops and can be converted into concrete policies, Western Europe could be assured of a viable and secure future in a technology-dominated world.

If Western Europe succeeds in adjusting its legal and fiscal structure, scientific and technological institutions, and values to the requirements of modern technology, and if it enhances its technological capability and weathers or avoids the potentially disruptive effects of the technological impact, political changes in the European picture are likely to follow. A combination of factors — the temptation to translate technological and economic capability into political power, the impact of the quasi-political authority of regional scientific and technological institutions, increased cohesiveness, habits of mutual exchange and contact among officials and industrial leaders, and concepts of European unification — are likely to exert influence for a federal Europe. This might occur by 1990. At about that time Western Europe may have to make a choice between unifying politically or relegating itself permanently to second-rate status vis-à-vis the overwhelming strength of the superpowers as they develop and utilize technology on an immense scale.

Western Europe's Alternative Futures and American Policy

Which of Western Europe's alternative futures will become a reality depends to a considerable degree on what the United States

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

chooses to do. Because of its resources, technological capability, and important stake in European security, America has both the potential for and a vital interest in steering Western Europe into one of the alternative futures — or, certainly, in steering it away from the least desirable alternative. Two principal components of the American national interest are involved: (1) European security and (2) America's own security and vitality to the extent that they depend on effective development and utilization of science and technology.

It is obvious that European technological nationalism is undesirable from an American point of view. Which of the other alternatives is the most desirable and whether it could be realistically implemented with the assistance of an appropriate American policy are complex questions. In general, both a functionally-oriented Western Europe and a unified Western Europe would be desirable alternatives. (A Western Europe unified by a dictatorial regime following a period of instability generated by technological nationalism would not be acceptable.) However, in the next decade or two, the likelihood of a unified Western Europe is small. Therefore, a U.S. policy which opts for a unified Western Europe as a *direct* goal is not likely to be productive. The American choice must be to support a functionally-oriented Western Europe.

It will be necessary to decide which of the two functionally-oriented models to promote: a Western Europe engaged in extensive cooperation in science and technology with the United States or one devoted to countering "the American challenge." The latter model has a certain appeal in that the American policy designed to bring it about might be relatively simple — a narrowly nationalistic science and technology policy (involving, among other things, strong support for subsidiaries of American companies in Western Europe) which would trigger a strong European reaction. While this policy might be effective in achieving a functionally-oriented, anti-American Western Europe, strengthened technologically and capable of avoiding internal instability in the 1970's, it would carry a number of disadvantages: undesirable political repercussions on transatlantic relations, no sharing of the costs of technological development and utilization with Western Europe, and no guarantee of West European success in meeting the requirements of technology beyond the 1970's.

It thus appears that the most desirable alternative is an American policy designed to support a functionally-oriented

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western Europe through the establishment of cooperative scientific and technological programs. This policy has the disadvantage of being difficult to implement. If it is not carefully designed, purposeful and energetic, and lacks adequate allocation of resources by the United States, it may result in a watered-down mix of the two models — a functionally-oriented Europe engaged in some cooperation with the United States but retaining some anti-American elements. Unless given strong emphasis in one direction or the other, such a mix would not differ greatly from the present situation and would eventually degenerate into an approximation of technological nationalism.

On the other hand, if this policy is successfully implemented, it would meet both the medium- and long-range objectives of European security. A dynamic, functionally-oriented Western Europe might attract East European countries (and perhaps even the Soviet Union) in their own search for growth. A suitable climate might thus be created for cooperative programs in science and technology with Eastern Europe in which the United States would have an opportunity to participate. Such cooperation could help to break down divisions between East and West and prove helpful in eventually solving some internal European problems that hinge on East-West relationships.

Present American scientific and technological policy with regard to Western Europe does not appear to have a strong sense of direction; it mainly pursues targets of opportunity. As a result, the United States has been drifting in the direction of bilateral cooperation with European nations — for example, with France. This course of action will not provide an adequate solution. To meet the requirements of future technology and of the huge costs associated with it, Western Europe must develop a mass market and internal institutions capable of coping with technology on a sufficiently large scale. Compartmentalized bilateral relationships between the United States and individual West European nations will not permit attainment of this objective.

Thus, the task of U.S. policy in this decade — a task not yet adequately appreciated in Washington — is to be persistent in trying to induce Europeans to cooperate among themselves as well as to cooperate with the United States. There is no single, foolproof way to achieve this, but the formulation of mutually attractive large-scale programs is one means toward this goal. The U.S. proposal for "post-Apollo" cooperation with Western Europe in space, involving perhaps as much as a $15 billion outlay over the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

next ten years, might be one example. Cooperation in the enrichment of uranium, proposed by Commissioner Wilfred E. Johnson of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in November 1970,[18] might be another. A third major undertaking might be a U.S.-European exploration and R&D program leading to the exploitation of marine resources, an endeavor that has been delayed in the United States because of lack of funds.[19]

If, however, the United States does not pursue the goals of transatlantic cooperation with sufficient foresight and persistence, it will only be postponing, not averting, the peril the impact of advanced technology is likely to pose to the security of Western Europe.

[18]Speech before the 1970 Annual Conference, Atomic Industrial Forum, Washington, D.C., November 16, 1970, *AEC* (Atomic Energy Commission newsletter), November 18, 1970, pp. 4-7.

[19]See Victor Basiuk, "Marine Resources Development, Foreign Policy, and the Spectrum of Choice," ORBIS, Spring 1968, pp. 67-69.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A POLITICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY GAP DISPUTE*

by Henry R. Nau

TO write another article on an issue as belabored and, by now, familiar as the technology gap dispute between the United States and Western Europe requires some preliminary justification. This dispute, which crested in 1967 with the publication of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's best seller, *Le Défi Américain*,[1] has recently taken a back seat to other issues in U.S.-European relations. Rising protectionist trends in trade relations, repeated monetary crises over the last two years, superpower talks on strategic arms limitations and prospects of unilateral or mutual force reductions in Europe have long since replaced concerns about the brain drain and gaps in research and development (R&D) expenditures as primary points of contention in Atlantic political circles.

Yet the purpose of this essay is to show that U.S.-European differences, whether manifested in trade, monetary, strategic or technological disputes, have common roots in a growing divergence of broader political interests between the United States and its West European allies. The climate of diverging interests has been more important than the specific substance of Atlantic disputes which have reflected rather than created the estrangement in postwar alliance relationships. Studies of Atlantic problems over the past decade have noted this estrangement in individual disputes, but the total significance of increasing U.S.-European tensions has been lost in a shortsighted treatment of the separate issues and failure to discern continuity among the rapidly shifting foci of controversy. This is evident in the treatment of the technology gap dispute. Although its concrete elements no longer afflict Atlantic relations (if anything, for example, the brain drain

*This article is an expanded and updated version of one originally published in German in *Europa-Archiv*, the journal of the German Society for Foreign Policy, September 10, 1970, pp. 654-664. The author wishes to thank the Foreign Area Fellowship Program which sponsored the research for the article in Western Europe.

[1]Servan-Schreiber's book appeared in English under the title *The American Challenge*, translation by Ronald Steel (New York: Atheneum, 1968).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and R&D gap may have been reversed by recent cuts in U.S. science expenditures), the respective political interests that prompted it continue to motivate U.S.-European policies. The intention here is to elucidate these political interests and demonstrate the relationship of the technology controversy to previous and present Atlantic disputes.

Economic Myopia and Political Perspective

Our discussion must begin with a definition of the three main concepts addressed — *technology, gap* and what is meant by a *political* interpretation. Technology has been defined by one student of the subject as "the systematic application of scientific or other organized knowledge to practical tasks."[2] With respect to the economic field, this assumes the existence of real and human resources with which to apply scientific knowledge, and the designation of economic goals (practical tasks) toward which this knowledge will be applied. In interstate relations a technology gap, therefore, might refer to disparities in real and human resources between countries (R&D expenditures, scientific manpower, market scale) or to differences in economic values and attitudes (educational systems, social and cultural factors). More likely than not it will refer to both, since values condition the intensity with which resources are applied and resources strongly condition the extensity or scope of values. The important point is that technology, whether in a domestic or international context, does not refer alone to measurable, quantitative factors but incorporates qualitative choices as well.

This being so, why should anyone become disturbed by the existence of a technology gap? Is it not natural in a diverse and pluralistic world for countries to differ from one another in terms of economic values and resources? The oddity would be a perfectly homogeneous world in which values coincided and resources were applied collectively to satisfy common values. Yet because countries differ from one another, they also compete against one another. To uphold their own values, they may seek the same resources — and the resources of power and prestige tend to be limited, largely because they are constantly changing. The development of technology continuously alters the resource base

[2]John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of competition. In these circumstances technological leads and lags may become disturbing.[3]

The above suggests that the concept of a gap becomes interesting and significant only in terms of the context in which it arises. If the setting is conflictive, gaps in technological or other resources may assume a disproportionate meaning.[4] If it is cooperative, they may lose their meaning altogether (as do certain resource gaps within single countries under relatively static conditions). Most often, in national as well as international situations (particularly among Western allies), an intermediate context of competition prevails, and gaps acquire and lose significance as the axes and stakes of competition shift. The only way to appraise the significance of gaps, therefore, is to inquire into the bases of competition among the affected parties.

We call this inquiry into the bases of competition among the Western allies in the field of technology a political interpretation of the technology gap. This kind of interpretation abandons the attempt to measure the significance of the gap in purely economic or vertical (quantitative) parameters — size of R&D expenditures, numbers of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D, patent and license statistics. Without ignoring or disparaging the utility of these empirical measures, it focuses instead on discovering the horizontal or relational significance of resource disparities. For politics, reduced to its essentials, is really nothing more (or less) than the study of social units in relationship. The notion of being "in relationship" implies that social units inevitably measure their goals and their power to implement these goals, at least in part, in terms of the goals and power of one another. The relational sphere

[3]Alastair Buchan has noted this consequence of technological change for political competition: ". . . the products of . . . science and technology have become, for better or worse, the source of a nation's pride, as pig-iron production statistics were in the late nineteenth century or figures of dreadnought launchings in the early twentieth." *The Implications of a European System for Defence Technology,* ISS Series on Defence, Technology and the Western Alliance, No. 6 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1967), p. 3.

[4]This seems to have been the case, for example, in the missile gap controversy pertaining to U.S.-Soviet strategic relationships at the end of the Eisenhower Administration. It was not so much the relative number of missiles each superpower controlled that animated the controversy as the *presumed* or actual disparity in aggressive intentions between U.S. and Soviet policies in this period (the emphasis is added in deference to revisionist interpretations of U.S.-Soviet postwar relations). The possible loss of U.S. missile superiority *in this context* was considered to be destabilizing. That the significance of the absolute numbers of missiles or other strategic armaments may change as the context changes is best illustrated by the recent shift of U.S. policy to parity or, as Administration officials prefer to put it, sufficiency in U.S.-Soviet nuclear relations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in which they exist and act is an integral part of their respective identity.

The relational or political context is the aspect that has been most frequently omitted from the literature on the technology gap.[5] While the gap dispute was still current in the period from 1966 to 1968, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) undertook the most exhaustive of the numerous studies of technology and its role in Atlantic economic relations.[6] Posing the question, "What is the technology gap?," it examined the *economic* evidence to determine whether such a gap existed and, if so, in what specific industrial sectors. Trade and capital flows, patent statistics and innovation patterns were computed to lend quantitative dimensions to this seemingly novel phenomenon.

While one might expect an international organization such as the OECD to omit the political aspects of the controversy, the same omission was made by independent analysts, especially economists.[7] The role of technology in economic growth was a rather new phenomenon in economic analysis,[8] and economists spent most of their energies trying to show that technological disparities were not the simple result of gaps in R&D expenditures

[5]A noticeable exception has been the work of Robert Gilpin, *France in the Age of the Scientific State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) and "European disunion and the technology gap," *The Public Interest,* Winter 1968, pp. 43-54. See also a critique of Gilpin's view and Gilpin's rejoinder in *The Public Interest,* Summer 1968, pp. 119-129.

[6]The OECD study was actually a series of studies of individual industrial sectors. These confirmed the existence of a wide disparity between the United States and Western Europe in both technological capability and performance, but concluded that the disparity had produced as yet "no demonstrable effect on the rate of economic growth of member countries" (p. 23). The consequences for the future were not discussed. For a summary report of these studies, see OECD, *Gaps in Technology: General Report* (Paris, 1968).

[7]Cf., *inter alia,* T. F. Schaerf, "The Technological Gap: Issues, Policies and Trade-offs," Orbis, Fall 1968, pp. 852-872; Richard Nelson, "The Technology Gap: Analysis and Appraisal" (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, P-3694-1, December 1967); and John Diebold, "Is the Gap Technological?," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1968, pp. 276-291. For a similar approach by a European economist, see Achille Albonetti, "The Technology Gap: Proposals and Documents," *Lo Spettatore Internazionale* (English edition), March-April 1967, pp. 139-170, and May-June 1967, pp. 263-289.

[8]Until recently, economic analysis treated technology as a neutral factor, accounting for growth largely as a product of increases of physical and human investment capital. As a result, international disparities in output per worker were explained solely in terms of differences in resource endowments. This approach, as Richard Nelson points out, left "no real room . . . for a meaningful concept of a technological gap." See Nelson's "The Technology Gap," *op. cit.,* Section I. For a further discussion of the recognition and reassessment of the role of technology in economic growth, see W. H. Gruber, "Factors in the Development and Utilization of Technology," paper prepared for the Conference on Transatlantic Technological Collaboration, Deauville, France, May 25-28, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but derived from a complex set of variables including market, management and motivational factors. By demonstrating the complexity of the issues involved, they sought to dispel the disproportionate concern about R&D capabilities. They never addressed the prior question of why this concern arose in the first place. The assumption was that it was due to some misunderstanding which could be easily corrected by the appropriate dosage of expertise.

This essay takes up the prior question of why Europeans became alarmed over R&D expenditures in the mid-1960's. Instead of asking "What is the technology gap?," it queries: "Why did the European states argue in 1966-1967 that a technology gap existed and why did the United States argue that it did not exist, at least not in the form asserted by the Europeans?" The change in phrasing directs our attention to the interests the European states were trying to express in advancing the concept of a technology gap. How were these interests related to Atlantic power relations and how was the technology argument seen to affect these power relationships? Conversely, what American interests were served by the U.S. denial that a technology gap existed or by the insistence of American officials in renaming it, if it did exist, a management or market gap? These questions take us to the heart of a political interpretation of the technology gap and seek to restore to the controversy a political perspective that remains relevant for Atlantic relations today, despite the shift of the political spotlight in recent years to other, seemingly unrelated concerns.

The Antecedents of the Technology Dispute

The issue most widely understood under the term "technology gap" had its origins in the publication in November 1965 of an OECD report showing a 4:1 gap in R&D expenditures between the United States and the major West European states combined.[9] In fact, however, this issue played a role in an earlier Atlantic dispute: the question of the control of nuclear weapons technology in the Atlantic Alliance that came up in the late 1950's when Soviet development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) caused a shift in strategic relationships. This new Soviet capability posed a direct threat to the American mainland and raised doubts in European minds that the United States would continue to defend Western Europe under the same conditions as before.[10] Sensing a potential divergence of interests, Europeans

[9]C. Freeman and A. Young, *The R&D Effort in Western Europe, North America and the Soviet Union* (Paris: OECD, 1965).

[10]France was the first to articulate these doubts, but other European countries

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sought a more significant role in the decision-making process controlling the American nuclear arsenal. The subsequent debate gave rise to a number of proposals for sharing nuclear control, the most relevant one being the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF). This debate was never really resolved. The situation was eased in 1966 by France's withdrawal from NATO's military command and the establishment within NATO of the Nuclear Defense Planning Committee, which gave the remaining European members a greater voice in *contingency* planning for the use of nuclear weapons. But the sole authority to employ such weapons in *actual* situations remained in the hands of the U.S. President.

From a broad political point of view, one might infer that some aspects of this earlier strategic quarrel filtered over into the debate on R&D expenditures, management capabilities, and the like that followed in the wake of the 1965 OECD report. Admittedly, on the surface, the two debates seemed unrelated, the first dealing with *military* technology and the second with *civilian* technology. Yet the emphasis of the second debate on economic issues should not conceal the fact that it embraced the domain of *industrial* technology and spotlighted advanced sectors such as electronics, aviation and nuclear power where the distinction between military and civilian technology is at best tenuous. As will be argued below, Europeans used the language of the technology dispute — R&D expenditures, size of U.S. firms in Europe, and the like — to express concern about the more fundamental political issue of disproportionate American control of key industrial resources in Europe. They raised the question whether the U.S. strategic superiority was not rooted in this broader industrial superiority and whether Europe's backwardness in advanced industrial technologies did not constitute a dangerous mortgage on its political and economic independence in the future.

If there is this thread between the strategic controversy and the more recent technology debate (insofar as they both concerned the issue of control of advanced technology — in the one case, military technology only; in the other, more general industrial technology), why did the debate shift in 1965-1966 from the military to the economic arena? The answer lies in the progressive

shared them as well. See Henry Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965). When speaking of Europeans here and elsewhere in this article, we do not intend to overlook significant differences among the European countries on questions of relations with the United States. Where essential, these differences will be specified. The collective term facilitates a summary discussion of past events and draws attention to the important minimum set of interests European countries share vis-à-vis the United States as a result of their common geographic, strategic and historical ties.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relaxation of East-West relations following the Cuban missile crisis. The Cold War tensions of the 1950's had kept interest and energies in the Atlantic Alliance riveted on military problems. As these tensions subsided, attention shifted to economic questions. The establishment of the Common Market in 1958 had unleashed a massive outflow of American capital to Europe. Moreover, the trade liberalization movement, begun under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), was moving into high gear in the middle 1960's with the Kennedy Round negotiations. As tariff barriers to trade progressively receded, competition sharpened and nontariff factors such as technology necessarily assumed a greater importance in Atlantic economic discussions.[11]

While Atlantic economic and technological ties were becoming physically more intimate, however, political ties were becoming more and more strained. The onset of détente disclosed differences in U.S. and European economic interests with respect to trade with the East and advancing economic integration in Western Europe, especially in the agricultural sector. The significant role of American industries in a number of key European markets became more conspicuous as U.S. strategic export controls prevented these companies in some instances from contributing to the domestic and foreign political goals of host governments[12] and as the strength of American firms in some sectors presented additional problems for European integration.[13] This interference in

[11]Richard N. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 76-77.

[12]U.S. strategic export controls have been relaxed in recent years but are still considerably tighter than those of European governments. They are particularly stringent and annoying to Europeans in the case of the so-called enemy countries—China, Cuba, North Korea and North Viet Nam. While initiatives by the Nixon Administration in June 1971 opened up trade opportunities with China, the export of strategic goods to communist countries remains controversial. The issue provoked a recent dispute with Great Britain when the United States opposed the sale of British computers to the Soviet Union. See *Washington Post,* May 24, 1971.

[13]It became apparent to many Europeans in this period that the principal beneficiaries of the Common Market were American, not European, firms. The former established centralized headquarters to rationalize their operations on a European-wide basis, while European firms continued to suffer from national divisions. Although Europe could blame only itself for this situation, the success of American firms, particularly in the key technological sectors, added to European frustrations and raised doubts about a united Europe which could not support its own basic industries in the sectors most vital for political independence. Growing U.S. involvement in Europe actually led some Europeans to question the basic concept of the Common Market. See results of extensive interviews in Europe by Jay H. Cerf, "European Investment Climate—1967," report to the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Washington, November 2, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe's economic life was doubly annoying since economic options were the principal instruments of leverage for European countries in their relations with the East as well as with the United States.

Europeans also sensed a widening wedge in global interests between the United States and their governments. In the early 1960's, France and, more reluctantly, Great Britain were in the process of disengaging themselves militarily from non-European areas, France from Algeria and Great Britain from the Far East. Meanwhile, the United States was extending its military presence into the vacuum thus created. The exploding Viet Nam situation in 1965 made it clear that Europe's alliance ties with the United States were troublesome, not only to the extent that Europe could not be completely sure of U.S. support in all types of crisis situations in Europe (the main concern in the earlier strategic debate), but also to the extent that the United States might involve its allies in political and even military conflicts outside Europe where European countries had just reduced their interests and commitments. A number of European countries thus felt a need for greater political and psychological distance from U.S. aims and policy. The technology issue served, in a measure, to meet this need, acting as a source of contention in relations with the United States and sharpening distinctions between U.S. and European views.[14]

The R&D Gap and European Interests

This glance at the larger context in which the technology dispute arose throws in relief the political interests at stake. By the middle of the 1960's, certain European states, above all France but later Great Britain, Italy and even West Germany, were "ripe" for an issue to demarcate growing political differences with the United States. Without this background of smoldering discontent, it is difficult to explain the fascination European governments showed with the 1965 OECD statistics on R&D. In themselves, the statistics were innocuous. They indicated a sizeable lag in European versus American R&D efforts, but they contained no inherent cause for a political quarrel with the United States. On the contrary, rough figures showing the same American lead in R&D expenditures had been public since 1963 in a preliminary OECD report;[15] at the time, these had scarcely raised an eyebrow in

[14]European governments, nevertheless, retained their peculiar schizophrenia about U.S. activities. Even as they sought to distance themselves from U.S. policies in the Far East, they complained about the decline of U.S. interest in Europe.

[15]C. Freeman, R. Poignant and I. Svennilson, *Science, Economic Growth and Government Policy* (Paris: OECD, 1963).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western Europe. The use of similar, if somewhat more detailed, figures by European officials in 1966 to accuse the U.S. government of having caused the technology gap through its massive support of R&D in American private industry can only be explained on grounds of the diverging political perceptions of American and European statesmen in the latter half of the 1960's.

France was in the vanguard of this European attack on U.S. R&D policy. De Gaulle had been trying since the winter of 1962 to awaken his European partners to the dangers of American technological and industrial penetration of the Common Market.[16] At that time the French government had invoked protectionist measures to stanch the inflow of American capital into France, and in 1965 French representatives introduced proposals in the EEC urging a common policy to deal with U.S. investments.[17] As long as these attacks were aimed against U.S. investments directly, however, de Gaulle won little sympathy from the partners with liberal industrial policies, such as Germany and the Benelux states.

These countries, and even France itself (liberalizing its policy once again in 1966), could not afford to overlook the economic benefits of American investments. Moreover, a country like Germany could not ignore the political significance of the American economic engagement, especially at a time when U.S. military attention was turning more and more to the Far East. Finally, on the surface at least, the investment issue appeared to be a private sector question and hence no *casus belli* for attacking U.S. government policy. Nevertheless, de Gaulle in his press conference of February 1965 tried to hold Washington responsible for American investments by accusing the United States of exploiting

[16]U.S. investments in Europe are not insignificant. They are concentrated in key growth sectors and come under the control of a relatively few large American companies. Direct investment statistics are still scanty, but roughly the following picture emerges. American investments account for only 2 to 3 per cent of total fixed capital assets in European countries but range up to 6 or 7 per cent of fixed assets in the manufacturing sector (hitting 10 per cent in the Benelux countries and 16 per cent in Great Britain). U.S. firms control 25 to 30 per cent of the automobile market, 60 to 70 per cent of the aircraft and tractor markets, 65 per cent of the computer market, 30 per cent of the telephone market and 25 to 30 per cent of the petroleum products market. Three American firms alone —Esso, General Motors and Ford—account for 40 per cent of American direct investments in France, Germany and Great Britain. Only twenty firms control 66 per cent of total American investments in Western Europe. C. Layton, *Trans-Atlantic Investments* (Second edition; Paris: The Atlantic Institute, 1968), Chapter 1 and Appendix. See also Jack N. Behrman, *Some Patterns in the Rise of the Multinational Enterprise* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Graduate School of Business Administration, Research Paper 18, March 1969), Chapter 2.

[17]Layton, *op. cit.*, Chapter II.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the international monetary system to extract forced loans from countries holding dollar reserves, thus permitting American corporations to finance their acquisitions abroad.[18]

All of this is not to say that France's Common Market partners were not concerned about rising American capital and market control in key European industrial sectors. Even in Germany and the Benelux countries, grumbling was increasing.[19] If these countries could find a way to protest the American invasion without directly confronting U.S. investments, they might be willing to voice their concerns.

The R&D statistics offered them this way. On the one hand, the statistics suggested a reasonable explanation of American investment inflows and industrial dynamism in Europe — higher U.S. R&D expenditures resulting in the development of new products and processes had opened up new sales and investment opportunities for American firms abroad. On the other hand, the figures showed that U.S. government policy was clearly implicated in the industrial advantage, since more than two-thirds of all R&D outlays in the United States came from the federal government and over half of these government funds flowed into the laboratories of American private industries. Thus, in one flash, the R&D gap illuminated the source of European industrial problems and offered a pretext for challenging U.S. economic influence in Europe at the level of intergovernmental (as opposed to private sector) relations.

Before going into the American reaction to this European argument, it may be worthwhile to elucidate further the political justification for European concern over increasing American control of important European industries. Under most circumstances the question of control of economic resources within a nation is less politically-charged than that between nations. While the American South may complain about industrial concentration in the Northeast and Far West, it has not suggested that this issue be solved by imposing capital restrictions on investments flowing into these regions. The resources, whether controlled by the southern

[18] *Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 17, 1964-May 16, 1967* (New York: French Embassy, Press and Information Division), p. 80. De Gaulle's charge was not unfounded and lies at the base of European dissatisfaction today over U.S. monetary and economic policies. But the financial advantage the dollar reserve system gave U.S. firms was not enough to explain the greater technological dynamism of these firms once they were located in Europe.

[19] See observations on this point by R. Hellmann, *Amerika auf dem Europamarkt* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1966), Section I.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

states or their wealthier coastal counterparts, serve the common economic and political goals of the American government. Between nations this common framework of political and economic goals is frequently missing. Given the existence or potential of diverging goals, the issue of who controls economic resources and can therefore employ them for one set of goals or the other becomes critical.

As long as a rather strong consensus of military and political goals tied the Atlantic Community together in the Cold War period, the issue of control of key resources remained dormant. Except during specific incidents such as the Suez crisis, few Europeans expressed concern over the fact that the President of the United States possessed the power of decision over Europe's security or that American industry staked out sizeable investments in Europe even before the Common Market. When interests began to diverge, however, initially in the strategic controversy of the late 1950's, the issue of control, in this case with respect to nuclear weapons, became a topic of sharp debate.

The technology controversy reflected the extension of this debate to the control of key industrial resources, which were important for military but also, and perhaps in the first instance, for economic and socio-technological purposes. Europeans discovered that just as control over their security resided in the decision-making centers of the American White House, control over their economic and industrial performance in leading sectors of advanced technology increasingly resided in the decision-making centers of American global corporations. The multinational firm with headquarters in the United States constituted a new form of international economic control, involving a high degree of centralization in the organization of foreign subsidiaries and affecting the most important decisions of these subsidiaries — e.g., with respect to new investments and R&D activities. To gain this advantage of centralized control had been one of the motivations for establishing the global corporation in the first place.[20]

[20]One of the few studies of decision-making in multinational firms at the time found that, for at least one-fourth of twenty-four American subsidiaries in France, "local management enjoyed little autonomy on many issues of vital concern to France." Allan W. Johnstone, *United States Direct Investment in France* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 72. A more recent study concludes, in a somewhat strained analogy (which the author attributes to an official of an international business), that "the multinational enterprise is becoming like an octopus, with a very large head and arms that can be made to move together in a variety of ways to assist one another and support the entire entity, but always controlled from the center and sometimes without the arm's knowing fully what the brain is thinking." Jack N. Behrman, *U.S. International Business and Governments* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), p. 24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus, European apprehensions derived from the possibility (whether real or potential) that U.S. parent firms, subject to American legislation and American business, social and cultural perspectives, might take decisions resulting in subsidiary behavior in Europe contrary to the best interests of host governments. European governments were exercising one of their most fundamental political rights, if not obligations, by asking whether or not sufficient local control of important resources existed to insure the implementation of local goals and objectives, particularly when these goals appeared to be diverging from rather than converging with those of the United States. At stake was a potential loss of national sovereignty. As a Canadian government study of U.S. investments in Canada pointed out at the time,

> foreign control means the potential shift outside the country of some types of decision-making. The extent to which decision-making within the country is eroded varies with circumstances, and basically depends on the power of the foreign firm and its government relative to the government of the host country.[21]

This relationship between the control of economic resources and political decision-making is what the economic studies of the technology gap regularly missed. Economics takes as its starting point the maximization of the production of goods and services, assuming that the political consensus on goals toward which these resources will be applied already exists. Politics, on the other hand, is concerned with the prior question of arriving at this political consensus. When consensus cannot be reached or when a prevailing consensus begins to fracture, the *distribution* of resources — not in the sense of allocation within a system of fixed goals (with which economics is concerned) but in the sense of a resource struggle to determine these goals — becomes as important as, if not more important than, the *maximization* of resources.[22]

[21] "Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry," report of the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry, Melville H. Watkins, Chairman, Privy Council Office, Ottawa, January 1968. While the problem of American investments is more acute in Canada than in Europe, the fundamental issues are the same.

[22] The ambiguity induced into economic analysis by the implicit assumption that consensus prevails is illustrated by Schaerf's article, *op. cit.* Schaerf correctly notes that "Western Europe experiences the technology gap as a power gap" (p. 859). But then he concludes that "by raising the technological issue, Western Europe sought greater participation in a single economic system and its technology" (meaning the postwar Atlantic system), p. 872. He overlooks the possibility that Europe sensed a power gap not just because it wanted more of the same pie baked under the old recipe of U.S. economic dominance but also because it wanted greater influence in order to change the recipe. This failure of economic analysis to relate resource issues to political goals is stressed by Robert L. Heilbroner, "On the limited 'relevance' of economics," *The Public Interest,* Fall 1970, pp. 80-93.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Management and Market Gaps and American Interests

The American response to the European R&D argument was designed, consciously or not, to circumvent these political implications of European concern. In the period 1966-1967, Americans were preoccupied with their growing engagement in Asia. They were in no position to afford a political row with their European allies. Already U.S. strategic policies directed toward nonproliferation and rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the arms control field were encountering skepticism in Europe. No one wanted to add to these troubles by acknowledging that U.S. policy was responsible for the American capital invasion of Europe or that the U.S. government was somehow obligated to do something about Europe's technological backwardness.[23]

Thus, American officials sought to exculpate U.S. policy from any complicity in causing the technology gap, especially in view of the charge that federal R&D contracts were the basis of the American industrial advantage. They needed arguments to show that Europe's technological lag was really Europe's own fault and that the United States could do little more than tender advice, based on the American experience, on means to strengthen European technology.[24]

The American counterarguments accordingly downplayed R&D as the most significant factor in stimulating industrial growth. Instead, management and market factors were stressed. In a speech in February 1967, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara renamed the gap a management gap.[25] He attributed the American advantage to more advanced managerial techniques and skills in U.S. industries, which, in turn, derived from the broader and more specialized educational system in the United States as well as the more flexible social and cultural attitudes characteristic of the economy. The political thrust of this argument was to divert attention away from U.S. R&D policy as the main cause of the technology gap and to indict in its place European policies for failing to modernize educational structures and break up outdated social and cultural patterns in Europe.

[23]The obligation of U.S. assistance was implied in proposals presented by Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani before the NATO Council in 1966, calling for a U.S. technological Marshall Plan for Europe. For a discussion and analysis of these proposals, see Albonetti, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-170.

[24]For the arguments of various U.S. government officials, see then Secretary of Commerce Alexander B. Trowbridge, "The Facts About the Gap," *Atlantic Quarterly*, Fall 1967, pp. 392-401, and statements by Vice President Hubert Humphrey and others in *Technology and World Trade: Proceedings of a Symposium*, November 16-17, 1966, National Bureau of Standards, Miscellaneous Publication 284 (Washington: GPO, 1967).

[25]*Vital Speeches of the Day*, April 1, 1967, pp. 357-361.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The stress on market factors coincided with the development of a sophisticated thesis by American economists.[26] This contends that technological leads and lags are the natural consequences of different market structures in individual countries. In a country such as the United States, with a large-scale market, high wage costs and high incomes, industry might be expected to concentrate on technological developments in capital-intensive, high-income elastic products. As these products tend to be the most developed technologically, U.S. industry would enjoy an advantage in the pioneer technologies. By contrast, in Europe where markets are fragmented and wages and incomes lower, industry might be expected to focus on technological development in more conventional, labor-intensive product areas.[27]

Without going into the strengths and weaknesses of this thesis, suffice it to note that the argument appealed to U.S. politicians because of its emphasis on private sector rather than public policy factors in explaining technological disparities. This shift of emphasis provided another way of loosening the link between U.S. government policy and the technological lead of American industry.

The management and market gap arguments thus sidestepped European political complaints about advancing American economic control in Europe. To be sure, they reflected valid economic considerations and added perspective to the European fixation with R&D activities. But they constituted debating points rather than constructive responses to the industrial and political power gap which Europeans saw reflected in the R&D statistics. A

[26]Raymond Vernon has done most to develop this thesis. See, in particular, "International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle," *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* May 1966, pp. 190-207.

[27]Another economic explanation of technological disparities between the United States and Western Europe might be formulated in terms of the general theory of "collective" or "public" goods. A "public" good is one that is equally available to all members of a group and may be consumed by one member without subtracting from the supply available to other members. According to this theory, the military and space technologies developed by the United States might be considered as "public" goods available to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance in the form of U.S. nuclear deterrence and the commercial products of U.S. industries in Europe. In these circumstances, the European countries would not find it in their interest to duplicate U.S. technologies but would focus instead on R&D activities promising "private" benefits for specific national purposes.

The difficulty with this thesis is that the U.S. technologies are not pure "public" goods but also offer private returns (e.g., national prestige), which Europeans can acquire only through independent development of such technologies. For an application and critique of the public goods theory in the field of NATO defense expenditures, see Bruce M. Russett, *What Price Vigilance?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), Chapter 4. The author is indebted to Dr. Russett for pointing out this application of the public goods theory.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

statement by the European Communities' Interexecutive Group on Science and Technical Research in 1967 stressed the secondary importance of R&D compared with the broader structural gap dividing the Atlantic partners:

> Whether exact figures confirm or reduce the R&D gap in individual sectors is unimportant. The only significant fact here is that on an overall basis Europe is behind and is obligated to make up this lag.
>
> Moreover, this lag is not solely the result of a temporary aberration which can be overcome by the assimilation of certain techniques. Europe faces today not only the problem of assimilating new techniques but above all the task of altering its structures in order to keep pace with the steadily increasing advance of science and technology.[28]

Thus, what Americans regarded as simple technical adjustments involving the improvement of Europe's management and market capabilities, Europeans sensed as profound political issues going to the heart of the European unification process and the transformation of postwar Atlantic relationships.

The Blurring of the Technology Dispute

Eager to avoid political action, the United States sought to prolong the technical discussions long enough to permit political passions to subside and diplomatic events to shift interest to other subjects. President Johnson set up an expert committee under the chairmanship of his Science Adviser, Donald Hornig, to clarify or, as Administration officials expressed it, de-mythologize, the gap. Hornig's trip to Europe in 1967 appeared to accomplish this objective.[29] Content to let a sleeping dog lie, the White House never released the Hornig Committee report and passed the word to the OECD, after the latter's "definitive" report, that the term "technology gap" should be avoided in subsequent publications.[30]

Moreover, just as the broader political context in the mid-1960's created the technology dispute, diplomatic events after 1968 softened its significance. These events reflected three contemporary trends in relations among industrialized, principally Western countries — pluralism, protectionism and parochialism. The development of pluralism in Atlantic political relations, though dating back to Gaullist policies in the early 1960's, has

[28]"Memorandum ueber die Probleme, die der wissenschaftliche und technische Fortschritt in der Europaeischen Gemeinschaft aufwirft," *EEC Document* No. EUR/C/1711/2/67d, Brussels, March 20, 1967, p. 9.

[29]Upon his return, Hornig expressed satisfaction that the technology gap had been robbed of its "mystical importance." *New York Times*, July 21, 1967.

[30]Interview with OECD official, Paris, December 1, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

become a practical reality only in recent years with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Viet Nam and the Viet Nam-induced retrenchment of American global activities under the Nixon Doctrine. Today, as the rhetoric and, to a lesser extent, the reality of U.S. dominance in the world and in Europe recede, allied partners in Europe feel less need to lean against U.S. interests in order to assert their own or to demonstrate dramatically against U.S. policies, as de Gaulle did by withdrawing from NATO.

Not surprisingly, the softening of the U.S. profile has been accompanied by a noticeable warming of French attitudes toward NATO (without any sacrifice, of course, of the Gaullist principle of independence) [31] and a favorable re-evaluation of French policy toward Common Market membership for Great Britain, which is no longer viewed as an American "Trojan horse." The practical onset of pluralism has also shifted German interests from an exclusive preoccupation with postwar ties with the West, and especially the United States, to a concerted attempt to renew prewar ties with the East. In short, pluralism has reduced the confinement felt by European countries; insofar as one political motivation behind the technology dispute in 1966 was the need in Europe to resist a rigid association with U.S. policies around the world, this motivation has been dissipated by the reassessment of American commitments.

Swelling protectionist sentiments in Atlantic trade relations have also placed the technology dispute in a somewhat altered perspective. Noting the quickening tempo at which American technology is being diffused abroad, American business and labor leaders argue today that the American lead has been shortened, if not eliminated, in certain sectors, such as textiles, automobiles and electronic equipment, where European and Japanese producers have made recent inroads into the American market.[32] Once unsympathetic to European complaints about American expansion in European markets, these leaders now call for protectionist measures to curtail foreign expansion in American markets. The interest in external measures to adjust trade and balance-of-payments accounts (import quotas, export tax rebates, exchange rate adjustments) represents a general shift away from

[31] *Washington Post*, February 12, 1971.

[32] Evidence supporting this claim that the U.S. technological lead has shortened is controversial and rests, for the most part, on the studies of Michael Boretsky, senior policy analyst in the U.S. Department of Commerce. For a discussion of Boretsky's views and those of his critics, see Philip M. Boffey, "Technology and World Trade: Is There Cause for Alarm?," *Science*, April 2, 1971, pp. 37-41.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the focus on internal measures of adjustment, such as technological development, which accompanied the mid-1960's emphasis on reduction of external barriers to trade. At that time, states recognized that, if they could no longer rely on external instruments to affect trade performance, they would have to opt for improving the technological efficiency of trading industries. Now, in a climate of protectionist sentiment accenting immediate and fast-acting measures to correct trade imbalances, they incline once again toward external actions as a way of avoiding more painful and slower-acting internal adjustments. Technological development remains a part of the problem but ceases to be a part of the solution.

In the swing back toward external policies to adjust foreign economic accounts, monetary issues have become the new center of controversy in Atlantic economic relations. The monetary phase began in 1968 with the imposition by the U.S. government of mandatory controls on American capital exports. Though enacted for other reasons, this policy should have contributed to a slowing down of American investments in Europe. Instead, American companies continued to invest and merely changed their source of finance, borrowing in the dollar market in Europe rather than obtaining funds from parent U.S. sources. The result was a severe disruption of European money markets and a series of exchange rate adjustments by European governments, including, most recently, floating exchange rates in Germany and Holland. In the ensuing debate over these disturbances, European governments have become increasingly united in an indictment of U.S. inflationary policies at home and U.S. balance-of-payments deficits abroad as the underlying cause of monetary instabilities. The monetary debate, while ostensibly different from the technology dispute, nevertheless incorporates an expression of many of the same European concerns about U.S. economic (and political) hegemony that formed the basis of Europe's interest in R&D several years before.[33]

Finally, a new parochialism in Western societies focusing on domestic social and economic ills has diminished interest and support for technological pursuits. Sharp cuts in U.S. space and

[33]For a discussion capturing the political significance of the monetary debate, see David Calleo, *The Atlantic Fantasy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), Chapter VI. An eventual showdown with the United States in the monetary field seems assured after the recent Common Market decision to establish an economic and monetary union by 1978. See Commission of the European Communities, "A Plan for the Phased Establishment of an Economic and Monetary Union," Supplement to *Bulletin of the European Communities,* March 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military research expenditures have necessitated a painful readjustment in the American scientific community.[34] Rather than the booming enterprise of five years ago, fueled by massive government outlays, American science today is searching for new priorities and leadership. Faced with similar domestic pressures, a number of European governments have also cut back science programs.[35]

The Persistence of Technological Politics

Is one to conclude from all this that the technology issue is passé? This, unfortunately, is the conclusion of the U.S. government. A quick reading of continuing developments in Atlantic industrial relations, however, suggests that the political struggle over technology persists.

This is evident first in the greater watchfulness with which individual European countries follow U.S. industrial activities in Europe. The new parochialism centering attention on domestic problems has made governments more sensitive to economic and social disruptions caused by foreign investments. The requirement for planning in the management of complex, modern societies places a premium on the effective control of local resources. The new freedom gained in diplomacy also emphasizes independent economic resources. Germany, for example, saw the full implications of the technological issue only when the Nonproliferation Treaty threatened to impose external constraints on German industrial performance. Today, an important shift may be taking place in the attitudes of German private industries, heretofore closely allied with American private firms. In the decisive electronics, nuclear power and aviation sectors, German industrialists, with official support, have shown an increasing interest of late in alignments with European as opposed to traditional American partners.[36]

[34]Layoffs of scientists and engineers have caused many Europeans who were part of the original brain drain to the United States to return to Europe, and an increasing number of American scientists to move abroad. Since 1967 U.S. science expenditures have been falling. The 1972 budget proposes the first increase in five years, but many observers believe this is scarcely enough to offset the inflation of research costs in the interim. *New York Times,* January 30, 1971.

[35]After the riots in 1968, for example, the French government had to cut back sharply on atomic energy expenditures. The reordering of national science priorities has been one of the developments adversely affecting cooperative European projects such as Euratom and the space organizations.

[36]Aside from recent developments in the aviation sector (the merger of Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werke Bremen and Fokker Netherlands) and the German-British-Dutch undertaking in the enrichment of uranium fuel, the big

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The new sense of competition in Europe vis-à-vis U.S. industrial and technological interests is perhaps most evident at the Community level. In the space sector, over the last three years, a united European group has challenged U.S. dominance in the control and management of the International Communications Satellite Corporation (INTELSAT). In May 1971 a new agreement reduced the American voting strength on INTELSAT's board of governors to less than 50 per cent and will gradually transfer management from the U.S. quasi-public firm, the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), to an international office of director general.[37] In the electronics sector, the Commission of the European Communities took a definite stand for the first time in October 1969 on a question of U.S. investments. In face of the planned expansion of Westinghouse in the Common Market, the Commission urged European manufacturers to find a common European alternative to this prospect,[38] warning in a separate report that without cooperation among European firms, Europe would have to abandon all hope of competing with American rivals in this key industrial sector.[39] The Commission's nuclear "white paper" of October 1968 and a Community report on the aviation sector sounded similar warnings for these important industries.[40]

None of this indicates that the European countries are on the verge of overcoming their internal differences and pooling their technological resources to meet "the American challenge." Recent European attempts to sustain cooperation in the nuclear sector (Euratom) and initiate new programs in other sectors (the Aigrain group discussions) give slight hope for significant progress

German electronic firms have been strengthening their positions in the nuclear field vis-à-vis their American licensors. Siemens has bought out North American Aviation's share in the German nuclear firm, Interatom, and urged the French government in November 1969 to reject the bid of Westinghouse (Siemens' licensor in the nuclear field) to take over Jeumont Schneider, thus leaving open the possibility of collaboration between this latter firm and Siemens. (*Le Monde,* November 17, 1969.) In June 1970, Siemens terminated its license agreement with Westinghouse.

[37]*Washington Post,* May 20, 1971.

[38]The position was taken in reply to a question in the European Parliament. *International Herald Tribune,* October 17, 1969.

[39]Commission of the European Communities, *L'industrie électronique des pays de la communauté et les investissements américains* (Brussels, 1969).

[40]Commission of the European Communities, "Survey of the Nuclear Policy of the European Communities," Supplement to *Bulletin of the European Communities,* September-October 1968. For extracts of the Commission's study of the aerospace industries, see *Research and Technology,* bulletin published by the Press and Information Services of the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, March 16, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in this area in the near future. Nor does British entry into the EEC, now assured except for approval by the British Parliament, promise to supply the answer to Europe's technological malaise, as some studies have speculated.[41] The problem is much more complex. As long as science and industry in Europe continue to draw their principal financial and psychological backing from national governments responsive to national goals and national taxpayers, the chances of any significant coordination of Europe's technological resources remain remote.

This is especially true in the absence of any coordination of defense industries, which are closely allied to the civilian technologies under question. For all of its laudable recommendations concerning industrial research cooperation, the Commission's Colonna Memorandum last year on a Community industrial policy reflected the basic impasse by devoting all of three short paragraphs to the defense sector.[42] The entry of Great Britain, with that country's cautious attitude toward defense and foreign policy cooperation, is not likely to change the situation. Moreover, in the first years after entry, British industry will be pressed to show visible national gains from Common Market participation. These circumstances are not likely to encourage British initiatives to dilute the significance of national boundaries by means of transnational industrial realignments.

The continuing problems of European unity will complicate and perhaps compound industrial competition between Western Europe and the United States. This seems inevitable in view of the fact that industrial and technological developments do not take place in a political vacuum but respond to political stimuli. A recent study of U.S. science policy showed that, in the past, more than 80 per cent of all federal R&D expenditures went into programs related to external challenges (i.e., international competition in military, space and atomic energy programs).[43] How much these programs contribute to commercial developments is a much debated question. But it is misplaced. The point is that science programs related to external challenges are the political motor of technological development. They are necessary to create the sense of national purpose without which resources on the scale required could not be mobilized.

[41]See, e.g., C. Layton, *European Advanced Technology* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969).

[42]Commission of the European Communities, "Die Industriepolitik der Gemeinschaft," memorandum to the Council, Brussels, 1970, pp. 172-173.

[43]OECD, *Reviews of National Science Policy—United States* (Paris, 1968), p. 36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It should surprise no one, therefore, if the European states avail themselves of "the American challenge" to stimulate their own technological development. The extent to which they do so will depend on how sharply the challenge is felt. Increasing opportunities for industrial and technological cooperation in the socialist countries may reduce the incentive for technological unity in Western Europe, as well as the requirement for competition with the United States.[44] The European countries may find future problems of internal cooperation, which will demand harder choices than in the past, more difficult than separate bilateral ties with the United States, which may lead them to opt for participation in U.S. programs like the space shuttle rather than to organize independent European projects. Furthermore, intensified national science programs may satisfy some of Europe's need for greater technological self-assertiveness. While national programs face resource limitations, they still permit, by virtue of their more cohesive political basis, a more intensive application of those resources that are available.

Above all, the European response to the American challenge will depend on the scope of the new consensus being worked out in the Atlantic Community, for the contest to determine the future political course of the West underlies the technological and other tensions in Atlantic relations. In these circumstances the United States can neither hope to maintain its past technological leadership, as some suggest by calling for U.S. initiatives to establish major new programs of technological cooperation with European countries,[45] nor ignore the political implications of technological change, as American officials did in the gap dispute. The political lesson of the technology dispute is that Europe seeks a more competitive rather than a complementary relationship. A timely recognition of this fact in the industrial sector may avoid the petty bickering that has afflicted U.S.-European relations in the agricultural sector. Certainly, the latter is more destructive of Atlantic friendships than openly accepted competition.

[44]A recent example of how new options in the East may affect European as well as Atlantic cooperation is provided in the field of uranium enrichment. After more than a decade of dependence on U.S. supplies of enriched uranium, the British, Dutch and Germans are now planning an independent European enrichment plant. Thus far, France has been unwilling to participate in this European venture and remains opposed to dependence on U.S. supplies. So France purchased the enriched uranium for its first light water nuclear plant from the Soviet Union. *New York Times,* March 16, 1971.

[45]Cf., e.g., Victor Basiuk, "Perils of the New Technology," *Foreign Policy,* Spring 1971, pp. 51-68.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STABLE DETERRENCE: A STRATEGIC POLICY FOR THE 1970'S*

by J. H. Kahan

NOW that the Soviet Union has reached a position of overall strategic equality with the United States, we no longer hear serious talk of the need for U.S. superiority, but find ourselves discussing the criteria for "sufficiency" and attempting to negotiate nuclear weapons limitations. Whatever the outcome of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), it seems virtually certain that the United States and the Soviet Union will remain roughly comparable in nuclear power over the next decade.

The fact of strategic parity is making us look once again at the military requirements for deterrence. But it is also surfacing the political dimension of the strategic balance — a dimension that was shrouded by our past superiority. In his latest foreign policy message, President Nixon explained that "sufficiency has two meanings. In its narrow military sense, it means enough force to inflict a level of damage on a potential aggressor sufficient to deter him from attacking. . . . In its broader political sense, sufficiency means the maintenance of forces adequate to prevent us and our allies from being coerced."[1]

The changed nuclear balance has thus introduced new political as well as military uncertainties into the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship. Whether or not a limited agreement emerges from the current arms negotiations, the task before us is to design an effective future strategic policy. This article describes a policy of "stable deterrence" and argues that it is the best way of managing our strategic posture and maximizing our nuclear security in the 1970's.

*This article is based on a study of U.S. strategic arms policy being conducted by the author under the joint sponsorship of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Brookings Institution. A fuller treatment of these and related issues is being prepared for book-length publication. The interpretations and conclusions presented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, officers or trustees of the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment, or the organizations that support their research.

[1] *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's,* a Report by President Richard Nixon to the Congress, February 25, 1971, p. 131.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Deterrence Requirements

The overriding purpose of our strategic forces is to deter the Soviet Union from launching a nuclear attack against this nation. Throughout most of the 1960's we accomplished this objective by maintaining a secure and powerful strategic force possessing an "assured destruction" capability — the ability to withstand the heaviest plausible Soviet nuclear attack and retaliate against the Soviet urban-industrial base by inflicting unacceptable damage, which was taken to signify population fatalities in the range of 20 to 30 per cent. For the 1970's, we need to re-examine and possibly redefine the political, as well as military, requirements for effective deterrence.

As an outgrowth of procurement decisions made over a decade ago, our strategic posture is comprised of three separate systems: Polaris missile-firing submarines (SLBM's), Minuteman land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), and B-52 intercontinental bombers. Each of these systems is capable of surviving a Soviet attack and then inflicting tens of millions of fatalities in retaliation. Within five years, however, if no countermeasures are taken, the survivability of our ICBM's and bombers could be endangered. If the Soviets developed accurate MIRV's for the large SS-9 ICBM's and improved the smaller SS-11 ICBM's, they could attain the capacity to destroy virtually all of our Minuteman missiles. Through the use of submarine-launched ballistic missiles fired from close range the Soviets might also be able, in a surprise attack, to catch the bulk of our B-52 bomber force on the ground.

These threats may not materialize. Even if they did, a successfully coordinated Soviet strike against our ICBM and bomber systems would be no easy task. Nonetheless, there is little question that we must decide now what to do about this potential danger to our land-based forces.

We might begin by examining our sea-based strategic forces, consisting of Polaris submarines currently being outfitted with the advanced Poseidon missile armed with multiple independently aimed re-entry vehicles (MIRV's). Capable of carrying over 5,000 warheads, the programmed Poseidon force *alone* could inflict 20 to 30 per cent population fatalities in a retaliatory strike. Poseidon could even penetrate moderate levels of Soviet anti-ballistic missile defenses to inflict high levels of damage. Moreover, within the next five to seven years, it is highly improbable that breakthroughs could occur in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technology to endanger the survivability of the Polaris submarines.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If the Soviets improved their ASW capabilities or began to deploy a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system (ABM), we could take countermeasures to improve or enlarge our submarine force. In addition to developing counter-ASW techniques for Polaris submarines, we could introduce an advanced undersea long-range missile system (ULMS) to supplement, and perhaps eventually replace, Poseidon. ULMS would differ from the present Polaris system principally in that it would be armed with longer-range missiles which would enable it to patrol wider ocean areas and stay closer to U.S. shores than the Polaris, thus reducing its susceptibility to Soviet ASW improvements.

The American deterrent for the 1970's might, therefore, rely only on sea-based forces. If the threat to land-based forces materialized, we could (1) retain these systems in addition to the sea-based forces, or (2) phase them out of the inventory. There is a serious question, however, as to whether either of these courses would satisfy our strategic deterrent objectives.

The issue involved does not center on the *level* of damage judged necessary for an effective retaliatory capacity. Once MIRV's are fully installed on both land- and sea-based missiles, debates over fatality levels will become somewhat academic. By the mid-1970's, we will have a total of about 10,000 nuclear warheads deployed; even a small fraction of this number surviving and penetrating to target could inflict severe destruction. The crucial issue concerns the degree of *confidence* we wish to have in our deterrent.

Consider the first alternative — maintaining a "mixed" force of sea-based systems and vulnerable land-based systems. Under this situation, even if the sea-based force remained secure and capable of inflicting high levels of damage, there might be some incentive for the Soviets to launch a first strike with their ICBM's in an attempt to "take out" U.S. land-based forces. In a severe crisis, for example, Soviet leaders, fearing that the United States was about to fire its missiles, might decide on such an action in hope of at least limiting damage to their society. By withholding their sea-based systems and bombers as a threat to our population, Soviet leaders might believe that we would be inhibited from mounting a full retaliatory response with our surviving weapons, even though a heavy Soviet attack against our ICBM's would cause millions of U.S. fatalities as a result of collateral damage.

On the U.S. side, the ever-present possibility that the Soviets might launch such a strike — and the fact that our ICBM's could

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not "ride out" the attack — could lead us to adopt a "launch-on-warning" firing policy for land-based missiles. This would require a virtually automatic capability to launch missiles on the basis of information conveyed from radar and satellite warning systems. Although such a policy might save our ICBM's in the event of war, it would increase the probability of an inadvertent or unauthorized U.S. missile launch.

Thus, although it could be argued that *any* mixed U.S. posture would complicate Soviet first-strike plans, the risks and instabilities associated with vulnerable forces would appear to outweigh the possible marginal gains of retaining them.

We should then consider the second alternative — phasing out our land-based systems as they become vulnerable. In this case, with all of our strategic forces at sea, the Soviets would be able to apply appreciably greater resources to ASW technology. Despite present predictions to the contrary, the possibility of substantial Soviet progress in ASW before the end of the decade cannot be ruled out. Although the number of Poseidon warheads runs into the thousands, our Polaris fleet consists of only forty-one submarines, one-third of which are usually in port. We could not be *assured* of unambiguously detecting Soviet efforts in ASW — or in extending their ABM defenses, for that matter — in time to take appropriate counteraction. In addition, submarine-based systems have less reliable command, control and communications than land-based systems. Consequently, if we had to rely exclusively on sea-based systems, uncertainties and doubts about the reliability of our deterrent might begin to plague U.S. leaders.

Soviet leaders might also come to question the efficacy of our sea-based posture. It is difficult to conceive of the Soviets concluding that they had acquired a full first-strike capability; facing only a fraction of our present strategic power, they could never feel certain of being able to launch a completely successful first strike. More plausibly, as a result of sustained ASW effort, Soviet planners might be able to perform credible calculations indicating that they could negate a significant fraction of our submarine force, thus seriously degrading our retaliatory potential. This could be coupled with military analyses showing a Soviet advantage in the ability to inflict damage. These perceptions might not completely reflect reality, nor would they automatically make the Soviets willing to initiate a strategic exchange. But the existence of such beliefs could diminish the reliability of our deterrent and increase the chances of inadvertent nuclear war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In designing our strategic posture — especially if this means relying solely on a sea-based deterrent — we must decide to what extent we should consider the purely "political" characteristics of the nuclear balance. The Soviets have already surpassed us in numbers of ICBM's, but we hold a decided edge in numbers of bombers and SLBM's. If we eliminated our land-based forces without reciprocity, the Soviets would possess a clear advantage in numbers and types of strategic systems. Once they developed advanced MIRV's, we could lose our lead in numbers of strategic warheads. These so-called static indicators may have little or no bearing on the *effectiveness* of our deterrent forces: i.e., their ability to survive an attack, penetrate to target and inflict damage. Nevertheless, because of uncertainties regarding the effect of the nuclear balance on Soviet behavior, it would not be wise to ignore completely these visible comparisons of U.S. and Soviet strategic power.

To be sure, a plausible case can be made that the nuclear balance is not "delicate" and that even significant shifts in the strategic relationship to our disadvantage could not be translated by the Soviets into military or political gains — as long as we retained a retaliation strike capacity. The Soviets seem to appreciate the futility of nuclear war as an instrument of policy, and it is hard to imagine any rational Soviet leader being willing to risk destruction of even a few of his major cities by directly testing our deterrent. On the other hand, buttressed not only by nuclear parity but perhaps by a marginal advantage, Moscow might be more prone to exert pressures on lower levels of the conflict spectrum in areas where U.S. and Soviet interests clash. Traditionally, the Soviets have viewed strategic power in more political terms than has the United States. During the 1950's, when strategically inferior, they tried and failed to use nuclear threats for political gains. In 1962, when Khrushchev's attempt to rectify the strategic imbalance rapidly by placing missiles in Cuba also failed, U.S. strategic superiority was evidently thought by the Soviets to be a key factor in their defeat.[2]

Moscow's missile buildup may simply reflect a tactic of "negotiating from strength" for SALT, or it may be driven by bureaucratic pressures stemming from organizational interests having little to do with strategic policies. But whatever the

[2]These points are discussed in some depth by Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush in *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), Chapters 10 and 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

motivation, since the Soviets' strategic program has already resulted in parity and could lead to some form of superiority, Kremlin leaders might be tempted to try to draw political advantage from changes in the balance. Even if we were confident that such Soviet efforts to exploit the balance would fail, we should still be concerned at the prospect because it is in our interest to *forestall* Soviet actions that could trigger severe crises involving the risk of nuclear escalation.

If American leaders believed that the Soviets saw the balance weighted against us, they might be more reluctant to act with certainty in a confrontation. Moreover, the perceived loss of U.S. strategic superiority could cause our allies to call into question the reliability of our deterrent in protecting their interests. U.S. strategic preponderance was a fact for over two decades, and we were aware of its political, if not military, value. In the aftermath of the Cuban crisis, it should be recalled, President Kennedy expressed concern that Soviet missile deployments in Cuba might have appeared to change the political balance of power.[3]

We cannot regain superiority, and attempting to do so would be dangerous as well as costly. Nor should we strive to match the Soviets across-the-board; this would place undue importance on strategic weapons comparisons, thereby stimulating Soviet interest in such measures of strength. But, given the unknowns, it would be prudent to avoid being placed in an obviously *inferior* strategic position during the decade to come. To this end, while continuing to emphasize effectiveness in the design of strategic forces, we should introduce into planning the criteria of (1) avoiding any dramatic disadvantage in overall numbers of delivery vehicles or warheads, and (2) retaining some mixture of strategic systems, as long as the Soviets also keep a varied deterrent posture. This would argue against unilateral elimination of our land-based forces in the event they become vulnerable.

We are thus led to the conclusion that maintaining a *multiple and invulnerable* strategic posture appears to be a way not only of keeping our deterrent secure in the face of an uncertain future Soviet strategic threat but also of guarding against the potentially adverse political effects of an altered nuclear balance.

As will be shown below, it will be neither technically simple nor inexpensive for the United States to continue to maintain a diverse and survivable deterrent. This does not mean that the goal

[3]Radio-television interview of December 17, 1962, *Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy* (1962) (Washington: GPO, 1963), pp. 897-898.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cannot be adopted and followed. If the insurance of a triple deterrent is judged to be not worth the cost, we could decide to retain only one land-based system — if not ICBM's, then bombers — to supplement the sea-based force. If we cannot ensure complete invulnerability, a reasonable investment could provide partially effective countermeasures.

Should it be decided, in line with this policy, to remove one land-based system from our inventory, the way in which this was done could become important. For example, were we to keep our bombers but phase out our ICBM's rapidly and without reciprocity from the Soviets, the resulting shift in the strategic balance might be politically disadvantageous — not to mention that it would also be in our interest to have any vulnerable Soviet ICBM's removed in order to keep the strategic balance stable. SALT might provide the best vehicle for stimulating parallel Soviet actions, either through tacit understandings or formal arrangements. Failing reciprocity, we should nevertheless plan on gradually reducing — if not eventually eliminating —our ICBM's, stressing to our allies and our own public that such a unilateral move strengthens, rather than weakens, deterrence.

Bilateral Stability

Since deterrence is two-sided, we need to be sensitive to the possible effects of our posture on the Soviet Union's forces, policies and perceptions. If they perceive our posture as endangering their deterrent, the Soviets might fear a U.S. first strike and thus be more prone to launch a pre-emptive strike in time of crisis. Under such conditions, the risk of nuclear war could increase. In order to protect their retaliatory capacity, the Soviets would almost surely expand and improve their strategic forces, making our worst predictions about the Soviet threat come true. This would increase the costs of maintaining a sufficient U.S. deterrent and diminish the chances for negotiating an arms limitation agreement at SALT.

American attempts to develop major "damage limitation" capabilities, through defensive or offensive means, would directly challenge the Soviets' retaliatory capacity. The deployment on a large scale of ABM's to protect our cities would most likely be seen by Moscow as a threat to the ability of its missile forces to provide sufficient retaliatory potential. During most of the 1960's, the Soviets viewed such defenses as stabilizing and desirable. But it now seems that they have decided against an extensive ABM net

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and adopted the U.S. concept that defensive deployments by one side threaten the other side's retaliatory deterrent force. At the same time, if our MIRVed offensive systems acquired a counterforce potential through improvements in yield and accuracy, a particularly severe threat could be posed to the Soviets' deterrent, since the bulk of their strategic power in the 1970's will probably remain with fixed land-based systems.

Fortunately, there is no conflict between eschewing major damage limiting programs and pursuing our deterrence objectives. Limitation of damage to our civilian population is not essential to deterrence. The Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon Administrations have rejected such efforts as costly, futile and destabilizing, and it is highly unlikely that this policy will be reversed. While concern is sometimes expressed over the need to procure defenses for our population to avoid an unfavorable ratio between U.S. and Soviet damage-inflicting potentials, maintenance of an invulnerable and redundant U.S. offensive posture with a high level of retaliatory effectiveness should ensure that the relative fatality balance does not shift significantly to our disadvantage.

On the other hand, the goal of minimizing possible threats to the Soviet deterrent can conflict with other strategic options. Deployment of a *thin* nationwide ABM for purposes of limiting damage from small missile attacks — from China or third countries, for example — would have some damage-limiting capacity against Soviet attacks and would substantially reduce the time and effort required to field a large-scale ABM system. Notwithstanding the "real" effectiveness of the system or our intention to keep it limited, conservative Soviet planners would be strongly motivated to react to a U.S. ABM and hedge against the possibility of its growth. The case for such an ABM is questionable at best. Thus, there is little to be lost and much to be gained by forgoing a thin ABM in the interest of maintaining U.S.-Soviet stability.

Because there are many dual-purpose or inherently ambiguous strategic systems, as a practical matter it may not always be possible to avoid seeming to threaten the Soviet deterrent while improving our own. While the MIRV's to be installed on Poseidon are not accurate enough to have a first-strike capability, Soviet planners, looking at our capabilities and not our intentions, would tend to resolve uncertainties from their own vantage point and might view these MIRV's as a threat to their forces. Again, the Soviets might perceive deployment of ABM's to defend our ICBM

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sites as the first step toward a nationwide population defense, especially if system components were — as in the case of Safeguard — common to both types of systems.

Certain strategic doctrine alternatives create similar problems. For example, the United States might wish to develop the option to use strategic forces for purposes other than total destruction of the Soviet Union — perhaps to launch a limited retaliatory strike against military targets in order to dissuade Soviet leaders from initiating a limited nuclear exchange in the belief that we might not be able to reply in kind and dared not risk escalation to an all-out countercity exchange. While acquiring a limited war option may seem reasonable, there are disadvantages that must be weighed against the possible benefits. First, the option would necessitate reliable command and control, flexible targeting, and accuracies sufficient to attack selectively — the last two of which could be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a U.S. counterforce first-strike policy. Second, there is the risk that developing a limited response capacity, which suggests that strategic war could be fought without large-scale destruction, would increase the chances of strategic weapons being used.

Nevertheless, despite the difficulty of pursuing such a policy, it is in our interest to evaluate U.S. strategic posture choices from the point of view of a *Soviet* strategic analyst, avoiding to the extent possible weapons and doctrines that could be considered a danger to the Soviet Union's retaliatory capability.

Thus, the two elements of a sound U.S. strategic policy for the 1970's appear to be: (1) maintenance of a secure and multiple deterrent force, which can provide high confidence in the U.S. retaliatory capability, and (2) avoidance of systems or strategies that might threaten the Soviet deterrent. This policy might be termed "stable deterrence."

Strategic Arms Limitations

The principles of stable deterrence can be used to guide American decisions on strategic forces and policy in the absence of bilateral agreements with Moscow. But there is a reasonably good chance that the ongoing U.S.-Soviet strategic arms negotiations may lead to a limited agreement which numerically restricts ABM's and some categories of offensive weapons.[4] Let us examine

[4]See President Nixon's announcement of May 20, 1971, *New York Times*, May 21, 1971, p. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

how the concept of stable deterrence fits into the SALT framework.

Success in negotiating an agreement at SALT can help the United States to achieve stable deterrence. The principal value of a limitation agreement would lie in restricting area ABM's — and missile-site ABM's with area potential — to zero or very low levels on both sides. Once deployment of large Soviet ABM's was prohibited, our submarine systems, which will become the major deterrent in the 1970's, would be able to perform their retaliatory task more effectively. Conversely, Soviet SLBM strength would also be assured. With ABM's constrained on both sides and missile-firing submarines increasingly assuming the basic deterrent function, a situation of stable parity based on mutual deterrence would be more likely to continue through the coming decade.

Quantitative limitations will not, of course, preclude a qualitative competition or remove all instabilities from the strategic balance. If MIRV's are not banned, both sides will continue to deploy them and land-based ICBM's will become increasingly vulnerable. Should the number of Soviet SS-9 missiles be limited by agreement, the threat to our ICBM's would be alleviated, but eventual installation of advanced, accurate MIRV's could still threaten the survivability of Minuteman ICBM's. As suggested earlier, one way of solving this problem would be to negotiate an agreement to gradually phase out ICBM forces on both sides.

Once an initial agreement is negotiated, U.S.-Soviet consultations will probably continue — perhaps as a "joint commission" — to discuss operational problems, clarify false alarms, and explore ways of improving the agreement through additions or modifications. The question of ICBM vulnerability could be one of the more urgent matters on the agenda. More generally, bilateral explorations of strategic and arms control issues could help to avert misperceptions of the nuclear balance or misguided attempts to exploit strategic forces for political gains. If successful, such contacts could decrease the risk of inadvertent nuclear war.

The United States would retain substantial flexibility under a SALT agreement — on decisions affecting research and development efforts and weapons improvements, decisions regarding procurement of new systems such as ULMS and the B-1 advanced bomber (which could be permitted to enter the force as replacements for older systems), and such doctrinal decisions as whether to emphasize development of limited strategic war options. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

guidelines of stable deterrence could be applied to ensure that these decisions are consistent with the spirit as well as the letter of any agreement.

Continuing U.S. efforts to improve deployed forces and pursue R&D programs within the bounds of agreement would provide "hedges" in case the SALT agreement failed due to Soviet abrogation, or in case we found that continuation of it threatened our vital security interests. Improvement of our bomber and missile penetration capability and development of systems capable of rapid deployment in the event the agreement were abrogated by either side might receive special attention. As in the case of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, there might even be a Congressionally-approved program to "safeguard" the agreement.

Soviet attitudes toward SALT probably reflect mixed motives. Taking into account the possibility of the United States going beyond present programs if their deployments pass a certain level, the Soviets might view an agreement consummated within the next year or so as likely to maximize their relative position at the peak of its power and relieve them of devoting scarce resources to increased spending on strategic systems. While they might view SALT as a vehicle for slowing down U.S. programs, they have much to gain from successful negotiations.

Parity apparently made SALT possible, since the Soviets did not enter the negotiations until they had achieved this position. Besides the military and economic reasons, they may view codification of parity through a SALT agreement as politically useful in helping to create an impression throughout the world that they have finally matched U.S. strategic power. Whether this codification would spark Soviet efforts to exploit a parity position, or whether they would be deterred from doing so by reluctance to endanger the viability of the agreement and risk a new round in the arms race, remains to be seen.

During the early rounds of SALT, the Soviets made known their acceptance of the principle of mutual deterrence, stressed prohibitions on extensive ABM systems as an essential element of an agreement, and even proposed a separate ban on ABM's. This represented a surprising reversal of the long-standing Soviet attitude that assured destruction was dangerous and that defensive ABM's were desirable. Such a convergence of U.S. and Soviet policies can provide a climate conducive to continuing arms control progress.

The United States will undoubtedly accept a SALT agreement

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

only if the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent remains unimpaired. However, consistent with the political as well as military criteria of "stable deterrence," an agreement should also ensure that no significant unfavorable imbalance emerges in the comparison of U.S. and Soviet strategic postures, either in terms of destructive capacity or deployed forces. In this circumstance Soviet leaders would be less motivated to attempt to exploit their newfound strategic strength for political or limited military purposes.

Strategic Forces and Budgets

While a strategic policy cannot always be translated into a unique set of detailed force requirements, it does provide general guidelines and criteria for making strategic weapons and budget decisions. What are the more important force and budget issues raised by stable deterrence? To what extent can we implement this policy in face of the realities of available technology and the costs of strategic programs? How might SALT affect these issues?

There is widespread agreement that we should keep our sea-based deterrent viable. This is crucial for stable deterrence. To this end, ULMS is receiving, and should continue to receive, high priority as a research and development program. But a procurement decision should not be made until and unless there are clear signs that our Polaris/Poseidon force is being threatened by Soviet ASW improvements and a buildup of Soviet ABM's.

A more difficult and controversial issue concerns the land-based forces. If we wish to keep a multiple and fully-survivable force for stable deterrence, we should maintain the invulnerability of our ICBM's and bombers. Preservation of ICBM's against the threat of accurate Soviet MIRV's could be accomplished in a number of ways. We could:

(1) Emplace ICBM's in new "super-hard" silos or, as a less expensive move, strengthen existing silos, though such protection would be short-lived as Soviet missile accuracies improve.

(2) Deploy additional ICBM's of the present type, but this countermeasure could easily be negated by Soviet multiple-warhead improvements or by Soviet deployment of additional missiles.

(3) Replace fixed ICBM's with land-mobile ICBM's. But mobile systems are expensive, present difficult logistical problems, and could prove vulnerable to a variety of offensive nuclear tactics.

(4) Defend existing ICBM's with ABM's, as in the Safeguard program. However, serious technical doubts have arisen as to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whether the Safeguard system, originally designed for city defense, is a cost-effective means of protecting our ICBM's. The Soviets could offset its protective benefits at less cost by improving their offense, and the ABM radar being utilized in Safeguard might prove vulnerable to direct attack. On the other hand, if an ABM system specifically geared for ICBM defense could be developed within the next few years, it might prove possible to provide sufficient protection for ICBM's to warrant retaining them in our force.

All of these alternatives, particularly an ABM system specifically designed for defense of ICBM's, are being investigated on the R&D level. Some interim actions, such as strengthening existing silos, are already being implemented. In the end, however, we may find that there is not a reliable or cost-effective technique for ensuring the long-term viability of ICBM's.

We might, therefore, have to turn to bombers to provide redundancy in our deterrent. Bombers would provide a unique hedge against what is perhaps the single most dangerous threat to the deterrent: the possibility that the Soviets might build an extensive ABM system which could negate the effectiveness of our sea-based missile force. A dual deterrent comprised of sea-based missiles and bombers would have greater diversity—and hence greater reliability — than a deterrent comprised of land- and sea-based missiles. In addition, since bombers have no meaningful counterforce capabilities against Soviet land-based forces, they would be consistent with the objective of stability.

While U.S. bomber bases could be subjected to surprise attack by missiles launched at close range from Soviet submarines, certain reasonably effective countermeasures are possible, and some are already being taken. New types of radar can maximize warning time, and penetration improvements, such as air-to-surface missiles, can make surviving bombers more effective. Continuous alert would be prohibitively expensive and possibly risky, but the bomber force could be made far less vulnerable, at least in times of tension, by placing an appreciable fraction of the force on airborne alert and by moving aircraft to dispersed bases in the interior of the country.

Although the existing B-52 force is aging, the few hundred later-model planes could, with appropriate modifications, be maintained through perhaps 1980, thus providing an adequate strategic bomber component. It would, however, eventually prove necessary to procure a new generation bomber, if this component

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were to be kept in being after 1980. To enhance survivability, such a bomber should have capabilities for rapid takeoff and dispersal at many airfields, as well as the capacity to remain airborne cheaply for long periods of time. To ensure penetration, it should carry an array of air-to-surface missiles. Essentially, it would be a mobile missile-launching platform.

The B-1 bomber, currently in R&D, does not satisfy all of these criteria and has other "sophisticated" features that increase its cost. Therefore, while maintaining our B-52 force, we should begin research and development on a new bomber which could more efficiently satisfy the primary deterrent objectives of survivability and penetrability.

What might be the consequences for our strategic force budget of such weapons decisions? For the past few years, the total annual strategic forces budget has remained in the range of $17 to $19 billion, representing approximately one-fourth of the total defense budget.[5] Although it would be possible to design strategic postures that might run from half to almost double this amount, the *probable* range of variation in future strategic spending will be relatively narrow. Large increases in the strategic budget will probably be precluded by continued pressures to reduce overall defense spending. Major unilateral reductions in our strategic posture, such as elimination of all land-based forces, seem equally implausible in a period of Soviet strategic ascendancy, and the likelihood of early and substantial reduction in existing forces as a result of SALT is small.

If we took some of the more modest actions discussed to enhance survivability of our ICBM's, and moved to procure ULMS toward the late 1970's, average annual spending for strategic programs would remain essentially constant. If we eliminated our ICBM's but kept a bomber fleet and took steps to maintain its survivability, the annual budget could be somewhat reduced. Procurement of a new bomber in addition to ULMS could drive the budget upward by $1 to $2 billion, but annual expenditures could be kept in check by gradually phasing in these new systems while cutting back existing systems not necessary for deterrence (e.g., air defense) and avoiding procurement of new defensive systems, notably area ABM's and advanced bomber defenses, that run counter to stability.

[5]For an analysis of the size and composition of the U.S. strategic forces budget, see Charles L. Schultze, *et al., Setting National Priorities: The 1972 Budget* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971), Chapters 3 and 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Economic savings from the limited type of agreement we might expect from SALT would tend to flow from future expenditures forgone, rather than from appreciable cuts in spending. By constraining the Soviet ICBM threat and restricting ABM's on both sides, an agreement that places quantitative limits on U.S. and Soviet forces would prevent major increases in U.S. strategic expenditures. On the other hand, continuation of programs permitting replacements of obsolescent systems, and increased emphasis on readiness and monitoring programs, would make it unlikely that the United States could substantially reduce annual strategic spending, at least over the next five years.

In short, even if a limitation agreement is not reached, we could implement stable deterrence without increasing the strategic arms budget. Conversely, even if SALT is successful, strategic forces should not be viewed as a major source of defense budget reductions in the 1970's.

In any case, it is important to realize that the level of spending may not be the most meaningful measure of our strategic posture. Certain relatively inexpensive technological advances, such as accuracy improvements, can have undesirable implications for mutual stability and SALT, and new procurement programs can often be accommodated within a fixed, or even a reduced, budget. In fiscal 1970, for example, the Nixon Administration *lowered* the strategic forces budget by $2 billion, while continuing both the MIRV and ABM programs. Thus, as a means of ensuring that desired policies are actually followed, the criteria of stable deterrence should be applied systematically to specific strategic weapons decisions.

Conclusion

In sum, while we can and should prevent the Soviets from attaining clear superiority, we cannot prevent them from achieving and maintaining a position of parity. The policy of stable deterrence outlined above would minimize the risks to U.S. security under this situation without requiring an increase in strategic spending. Pursuit of stable deterrence might evoke a similar response from the Soviet Union. This is an important goal, for the ultimate success of our strategic policies depends upon Soviet weapons and doctrine decisions. Strategic stability in the 1970's can be fully realized only if *both* sides downgrade defenses and emphasize survivable offensive forces which have an unambiguous second-strike role.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The proposed policy is consistent with arms control and its elements can be used as criteria for designing a strategic limitation agreement. The constraints imposed by such an agreement can help to stabilize the balance and enable us to achieve our strategic objectives with greater confidence and fewer forces than would otherwise be the case. But there will be considerable room for weapons decisions under a SALT accord, and, of course, there is no guarantee that the talks will be successful.

Thus, whether operating on a purely unilateral basis or within the constraints of a negotiated arrangement, our short-term weapons decisions and long-term strategic policy should be guided by the principles of stable deterrence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE OPERATIONS SIDE OF FOREIGN POLICY*

by Roy M. Melbourne

UNDERSTANDABLY, the literature on foreign policy has tended to dwell on policy concepts and to scant their operational context. There is an attraction to a broad vista of policy that seemingly does not hold for the more mundane prospect of operations. Yet no true grasp of either can be gained without an understanding of their fusion of relation and purpose.

An old-timer, interviewed on his golden wedding anniversary as to the reason for his successful marriage, declared, "My wife and I made an agreement at the outset whereby I would make all the big decisions and she would handle the day-to-day ones." Pausing pensively, he added, "It's strange, but in fifty years none of the big problems have come up."

The analogy is not inappropriate for foreign policy and operations. It has even been paraphrased: Let me control your operations and I will control your policy. Many have been bemused by the manifold analyses of successive Administrations' varying use of the National Security Council machinery and struck by Robert Cutler's working image of "policy hill," with plans going up, being designated as policy, and coming down to serve as operations guides. There is nothing wrong with this except that some may not stop to think just how much labeled policy the NSC machinery — and in fact all government — systematically handles. The NSC may handle no more than the tip of the iceberg. Meanwhile officialdom, to give it its due, attends to a daily flow of subsurface operations questions which, over time and by reason of operational precedent, have become "policy."

The holder of a most demanding position in the Nixon Administration is said to consider that perhaps his chief policy guidance role is to be consistently and persistently involved in coping with daily operational questions. This exemplifies the belief that only through painstaking attention to and direction of how matters actually are handled can the ship slowly be veered the degrees necessary to approximate the desired policy course.

*The views expressed herein are entirely personal and not a statement of government policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Perhaps with the wisdom of hindsight, Dean Acheson in commenting upon his international era seems to merge both policy and operations as guides. In retrospect, policy lines were not abstractions, doctrines or rules but grew into a kind of code by a method analogous to common law precedent "to aid the judgment of those who must make decisions." He emphasized "practicable objectives, concretely and realistically conceived."[1]

The distinguished public servant, Robert A. Lovett, had admonished, "if planning is removed too far from operating responsibility, a misleading lack of realism results."[2] When he was Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter emphasized this also by testifying: "You get more realistic planning from those in constant touch with the operational problems than from those who are completely divorced . . . from any operational relationships."[3]

Problems for Policymakers

For a considerable time the compartmenting of policy from operations persisted in the NSC mechanism and its like-minded liaison points such as the Policy Planning Council (originally the Policy Planning Staff) of the State Department. While operations proceeded under the supervision of those aware of the turf and the possibilities it offered, policy too frequently would be evolved in a planner's world with "its dream-like logic."[4] An NSC Planning Board might tortuously discuss a policy paper preamble which would be deemed irrelevant and be ignored when exposed to the real world of the practitioners. In recognition of such problems, planning and operations distinctions were erased within the NSC staff on the advent of the Kennedy Administration, but they persisted elsewhere.

The frustrations experienced nearly from the outset by the staff of the State Department's Policy Planning Council following the successes of the Kennan era, and expressed by former members, certainly reflect dissatisfaction at being only intermittently effective. While the benefits of a long look down a policy road are

[1]Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), p. 727.

[2]*The National Security Council,* Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level, edited by Senator Henry M. Jackson (New York: Praeger, 1965) (hereafter cited as *NSC: Senate Papers, 1965*). Testimony of Robert A. Lovett, p. 84.

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 153.

[4]*The American Ambassador,* Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman (Washington: GPO, 1964), p. 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

obvious, some reasons for frustrations attend the procedure. The essentially crisis response too often characteristic of American foreign policy has served to override planner calculations when the harsh prospect of the moment has made an earlier-chosen policy appear to be a dubious refuge. The major limitation, however, is the stark fact that a policy planner has been outside the agency chain of operational command. This can exclude him from the kind of grass-roots testing of possible policy courses accessible to the operational decision-maker.

For the guidance of his Administration, President Eisenhower approved basic national policy documents that were periodically revised. During the Kennedy-Johnson period there was no comparable national security or foreign affairs policy document. In part, at least, this was due to Defense Secretary McNamara's resistance and the development of his own military posture statements.[5] True, those basic documents regularly compiled in the Eisenhower era were criticized for volume, vagueness and blandness, which could have turned off successors. Nevertheless, the desirability of a general foreign affairs policy document has been felt, and in the Nixon Administration an equivalent has taken the unique and public sharing form of reports to Congress.[6]

When a new Administration takes office, certainly there are policy choices made — and made to stick — in significant areas. Aside from these, it finds itself limited by past commitments and precedent, as it comes to realize the bounds to the introduction of change. The courses of the operational rivers have frequently become well defined from the drainage pattern of the terrain. Hence a new Administration may find it illogical, unnecessary or, if it so intends, most difficult to revamp a policy map on which vast important reaches have been essentially the domain of operations decision-makers.

After initial steps in policy review, shifts and projected change, a new Administration can come to regard policy changes as gradual and incremental. But in the opinion of a veteran NSC staff member, "the contribution of a mechanism like the NSC to day-to-day incrementalism is, at best, limited."[7]

A disruptive element in the picture of an omnipresent, all-see-

[5]Robert H. Johnson, "The National Security Council: The Relevance of Its Past to Its Future," ORBIS, Fall 1969, p. 718.

[6]See President Nixon's two reports to the Congress: *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace,* February 18, 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970), and *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace,* February 25, 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1971).

[7]Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 716.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing policymaking cadre is that of sheer available time. The commonly accepted policy leadership group is of necessity quite small for the range and diversity of activities and developments affecting American national security, not to mention the formidable bureaucratic phalanx it must direct. This top element may frequently find itself involved, by the very nature of the American system, in handling time-consuming urgent (although not necessarily important) matters while remaining wryly aware of more vital fields its preoccupations cannot reach.

For the policymaking cadre, advice to be discriminating in selecting subject matter and in allocating time is really a dusty answer. The leadership can be faced with any number of Hobson's choices, only to find in retrospect that it may have devoted its energies to some of the wrong ones. Outside of the leadership's ken, for instance, thorny matters of policy magnitude may grow unseen until their unexpected maturing draws sharp pain and attention. Then, too, a series of operational decisions may be taken, with or without the direct cognizance of top leaders, which because of imperfect perception of consequences can eventually cause serious policy problems or crises. A seemingly innocuous decision affecting trade relations or an effort to gain one country's support against another's acts may be initial steps toward later-revealed policy issues.

Decision-makers, from their own unstated or unconscious images, prejudices and experience, seek support for and press actions in behalf of their preconceptions. While a particularly graphic illustration has been provided in the way the Army Air Force prepared for separate status after World War II, the example is easily duplicated in other executive agencies or major policies in which a chain of determined, spot operating decisions equally could have impelled "policymakers" into a seemingly inevitable, even logical, policy line.[8]

Techniques of Various Administrations

A question that must be asked — and it is a never-ending one — is how efficient are our foreign affairs decision-making institutions and methods? It is worth highlighting these in their successive Administration moltings.

The policy paper-operations plan technique of the Eisenhower era was discarded and partially revised in the form of National

[8]See Perry McCoy Smith, *The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-1945* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Policy Papers (NPP's) as the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations moved from *ad hoc* and task force approaches to the application of systems analysis in a budgetary control method for foreign affairs operations. The Nixon Administration has employed a systematic effort embodying the options offered for various courses together with their ranging financial implications, and used the Office of Budget and Management and organized committees to monitor operations and to raise major issues to top levels.

From the testimony of those intensively exposed to the workings of institutions for foreign affairs decision-making, there are uneven crests and troughs of achievement and frustration. Dr. Robert Johnson, long with the NSC staff, has said that the system at its best "continuously forced policymakers to re-examine policy alternatives, including alternatives previously rejected. It created a community within which education, communication, planning and debate could occur with considerable freedom. At its worst it was a treadmill and a paper mill which led nowhere and bored its participants."[9] This may be juxtaposed with the remarks of the late Secretary Herter, who told the Jackson Senate Subcommittee that when, as Under Secretary of State, he chaired the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), "the feeling of utility varied an awful lot. One could get bogged down in editing. Other times, pretty important decisions are made and made very quickly."[10]

There has been a trend through successive Administrations to evolve operations documents that first set forth anticipated objectives toward which or in accordance with which the composite of listed activities or actions would be directed or controlled. These had their beginning in the Eisenhower Administration as operations plans agreed on by the OCB as implementing instructions for the numerous NSC policy documents approved by the President and assigned to it for interagency coordinated monitoring. Criticism in many instances can be leveled at these papers for being cliché-ridden, vague in wording as to agencies' operating responsibilities, and without meaningful sanction for continuing performance. Nevertheless, this was an impressive initial effort.

The operational planning approach lapsed at first as the Kennedy Administration pursued an *ad hoc* approach to foreign policy situations. President Kennedy asserted that the State Department had the responsibility for providing both foreign affairs leadership and coordination, including the planning and marshaling of

[9]Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 729.
[10]*NSC: Senate Papers, 1965*, pp. 153-154.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resources for implementation.[11] Guidance and the implementing machinery proved insufficient, however. Practicality found it eventually necessary for the White House, through the NSC staff, to employ a recorded operational directive technique in addition to its concepts of task forces and of individually assigned responsibilities, as well as of the expected close relationships between departments and their principals.

The NSC mechanism, of course, is adapted to the ideas of each President, reflecting his approach to policymaking. After the pioneering use of the NSC by President Truman, a much more formal organization, staff and paper work procedures, and participation were evolved in the Eisenhower Administration. At the other extreme, when President Kennedy wanted a smaller NSC membership participation, he selected key policy advisers or agencies for limited sessions. One example is the so-called NSC executive committee summoned during the Cuban missile crisis.

Under Eisenhower the NSC actions were given sequential numbers and approved policy papers were allotted numbers by years. Kennedy's *ad hoc* approach based on pragmatic improvisation disregarded established staff or organizational procedures. It was some time before a system of numbered National Security Action Memoranda was installed to record policy decisions, not necessarily meaning decisions formally taken or stemming from any of the infrequent NSC meetings.

The Eisenhower Method

As a variation of the military staff principle, the Eisenhower system had subordinates grapple with a problem, merge their disagreements, if any, and present the President with the alternative of a "yes" or "no" decision based on a proposed action or policy. An approved policy was then converted into a series of implementing operations. Here the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) came into the picture. Its role, implicit in its title, embraced periodic assessments of the policies it coordinated. Working groups composed of affected agency representatives reported to the Board, monitored particular policies, and sought to make them operationally effective.[12]

Coordination responsibility, although it has a sweeping sound,

[11] *Ibid.* For example, see Statement of McGeorge Bundy, "The NSC in the 60's," pp. 277-278.

[12] Roy M. Melbourne, "Coordination for Action," *Foreign Service Journal,* March 1958.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is one of the most deceptive of foreign affairs phrases. Its pitfalls are many when connoting the role either of mediator between differing agencies and operating courses or of persuader of agencies with different statutory mandates or missions. To create a sense of common purpose among independent agencies, even with the support of Executive Orders, is a formidable task.

If an operations question has some significance or an operational interagency mechanism gives promise of being "where the action is," the number of elements or agencies requesting presence on the scene grows surprisingly. Each has its reasons other than those aired, such as self-protection, wanting to be "in," or influencing policy tangentially in its direction. An institution of potential such as the OCB started lean, staffed only with the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Under Secretaries of State (Chairman) and Defense, and the Directors of Central Intelligence, the United States Information Agency and the International Cooperation Administration. These officials had ranging, substantive overseas responsibilities. However, the Board progressively acquired other agency appendages which, further removed from overseas responsibilities, proved more insistent upon their own views. An unspoken deference to the concept of one man, one vote, long before the Supreme Court decision, had an adverse effect on operational direction as with the passage of time the OCB became an enlarging congeries of agencies. The example is not unique.

However, the Board, when faced with a concrete, urgent problem of magnitude, on occasion gave clear and full responsibility to an agency represented on one of its appropriate working groups. All other agencies thereon were required to assist the designated agent to the extent of their resources, but the agent had the task responsibility. In such instances the observed interagency attitudes and reactions were interesting. The Board agent wanted the most useful specialized advice and material help, and it sought these from those agencies it considered appropriate. Participating agencies, because they were represented on the working group and were Board members, did what they could to help fill the responsibility.

A former OCB chairman, the late Secretary Herter, declared:

> If there were not the OCB, you would have to have something similar. . . . There has to be one coordinating body somewhere where you can air out differences in the operational end of things, and often you find that something may have been decided upon but runs into operational

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

difficulties that require a complete reassessment. From that point of view it is very valuable.[13]

Pointedly, he further observed that the NSC does not cover too many issues, implying that this placed a major responsibility on operational decision-makers.

As the long-time OCB staff director, Elmer B. Staats, the Comptroller General of the United States, later gave his measured view: "While many mistakes were made, I also believe that much was learned and very considerable progress was achieved in effecting improved relations among the agencies, in deciding upon allocations of responsibilities, and – perhaps most importantly – in the development of country programs."[14]

The Kennedy-Johnson Approach

In abolishing the OCB, the Kennedy Administration believed the organ had no actual authority, obscured the real responsibilities of agencies, was not a true Presidential instrument, and simply comprised a "group of able men attempting, at second and third levels of government, to keep large departments in reasonable harmony with each other." It granted that the Board had done "much useful work," while referring to the good will of its members and the "unusual administrative skill in its secretariat."[15]

Task forces as a major policy-operations instrument had their deployment under President Kennedy. As such a tool they succeeded, in certain respects, the highest priority working groups of the Eisenhower era. On some urgent projects, such as Berlin, they were effective in marshaling resources and in providing an action vehicle. During the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, if a national security matter warranting the technique was assigned to State leadership, the task force was given all needed facilities in the State Department's Operations Center. Personnel drawn from affected sectors of government worked in shifts under the time-erasing fluorescent lights, evaluated incoming cable traffic right off the machines, and prepared responses of recommendations and outgoing cables. The task force leadership approved its actions and cleared its messages short of any needed top-echelon Department consultations, while keeping comparable interagency levels informed.

[13] *NSC: Senate Papers, 1965*, pp. 153-154.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 209-210.
[15] *Ibid.*, Statement of McGeorge Bundy, "The NSC in the 60's," p. 277.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Despite all this, there are operating drawbacks for all but the most earth-shaking crises under these conditions. Unfamiliar working personnel, the thought-inhibiting city news room atmosphere, and lack of essential files often detract from the alleged benefits, sometimes more optical than practical, of graphic concentration of personnel and marshaled resources. Appropriate interagency offices, actively handling their responsibilities, called when off-the-machine messages arrive, and in constant liaison with all elements concerned, have proved able to conduct business with the professionalism and tempo most crises require.

While a policy injunction to the old OCB had enjoined it from embodying any operating commitments that were not budgeted for, and though the operations plans themselves carried financial annexes, there was no integrative use of the budget for control and coordination of a foreign policy matter. By 1963, however, a technique was begun through the Comprehensive Country Programming System (CCPS). This was to have its inception in National Policy Papers (NPP's) drawn up under the aegis of State's Policy Planning Council to be all-inclusive for single country objectives. The country programs and allocated resources were to be developed by common standards under the direction of the appropriate ambassadors overseas, whom President Kennedy had sought to strengthen as coordinators and directors of all U.S. agencies in their countries.

To encourage the effort in general, President Johnson in 1966 issued a directive[16] which, "to the full extent permitted by law," set up under State's direction and coordination role in foreign affairs an interagency operational mechanism, known as the SIG-IRG machinery. The Senior Interdepartmental Group had as its chairman the Under Secretary and was made up of his counterparts in relevant agencies, while the Interdepartmental Regional Groups were chaired by the regional assistant secretaries and peopled by the interagency working associates.

The State Department Role and PPBS

Successive Administrations have issued Executive Orders, public statements and agency directives affirming in various styles the prime position of the State Department — including the ambassadors abroad — as the adviser, leader and chief coordinator in the foreign affairs field. Despite this *prima facie* support, the

[16]National Security Action Memorandum 341, March 4, 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Department has not, to observer satisfaction, been able to fulfill this publicly declared role. This deserves examination.

The country-based programs, led by ambassadors, and those of Washington agencies soon came into conflict on the question of authority and jurisdiction, which the various agencies were not prepared to relinquish. It appeared not enough to say that the State Department or an ambassador had full control. The program-funded agencies operating overseas had their money from Congress and were responsible for disbursing it according to Congressional direction and strictures. No self-respecting Washington agency wanted State to tell it how all its program money was to be spent, and State, with no program funds of its own, with people its sole resource, usually had no more effective handle than persuasion. As has been said, State was trying to be chairman of the board when it was the poor relation at the table. The problem evoked the aphorism that in the approach of pluralistic governments to foreign affairs "centrifugal forces seem usually more than a balance for the centripetal ones."[17]

Beset by time demands for policy direction, top Administration officials and those in State in the familiar pattern were unable to devote to their task the continuous and unrelenting focus of attention to the evolving system required as it was buffeted by agency criticisms and varying interpretations. Again it is remarkable that so much was achieved in the course of its practice and evolution.

Since the CCPS approach apparently was experiencing heavy weather, the Budget Bureau introduced the Planning-Programming Budgetary System (PPBS) by 1966 to the foreign affairs agencies and by mid-1967 for use by all executive agencies.[18] This system had its spur in systems analysis techniques introduced in the Pentagon. To get an economic "handle" on overseas operations, the Budget Bureau worked directly with the agencies instead of through the State Department as in the CCPS. Program objectives and alternative methods of meeting them were to be compared, while data on major programs were to reflect not only current but future implications of decisions. There were Special Studies of the analytic groundwork for proposed decisions; Pro-

[17] *Planning-Programming-Budget*, Memorandum of Dr. Frederick C. Mosher, Senate Subcommittee Hearings on National Security and International Operations, Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman (Washington: GPO, 1968), p. 9. (Hearings hereafter cited as *P-P-B, 1968.*) Dr. Mosher's memorandum, pp. 3-21, is a realistic summary of the question.

[18] Budget Bureau Bulletin No. 68-2, July 18, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gram Memoranda recommending, within agency objectives, these proposals to the President; and Programming and Financial Plans containing updated and comprehensive multiyear programs.

It is a truism that most decisions of import in foreign affairs are nonbudgetary, and even that most programs defy appraisal of effectiveness for money and effort expended. However, some thoughtful and revealing reflections on the application of the process to foreign affairs were voiced by witnesses to a Senate subcommittee.[19]

Dr. F. C. Mosher believed the Defense Department model, because of its unique characteristics, was most difficult to apply in foreign relations. In his analysis the earlier Comprehensive Country Programming System was favored by State as implementing National Security Action Memorandum 341, "giving it real authority and an instrument through which United States objectives, as in National Policy Papers, could be given effect." He thought State cool to long-range program commitments not producing "short-range results." Since agencies with "far more clientele and congressional support objected," State did little to exercise operational influence, and "the old distinction between operations and State's role in policy lingered on."[20] State found it most difficult to make an effective, timely input into the budget cycles of the various agencies, which could circumvent the control such inputs would signify.

To extrapolate the Defense experience to foreign affairs agencies, Dr. Thomas C. Schelling thought a general foreign affairs budget would have to be devised, but not all agencies would be subordinate to State nor would the prime concerns of some, such as Agriculture, lie in this field. For consideration by the Congressional structure, the whole package would have to be dismantled. Individual countries would comprise the basic "program packages," rather than placing all countries in one program. He thus opposed the implications of PPBS and, if President and Congress wanted the responsibility fixed, he would place it in the Office of the Secretary of State, but not tied into the Foreign Service. He warned that it has never been acceptable in this complex and disordered area to "put the purse strings directly into [the Secretary's hands] with encouragement to use them in the executive management of foreign policy."[21]

[19] *P-P-B, 1968.*

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 11-12, 21.

[21] *Ibid.*, Memorandum of Thomas Schelling, pp. 7, 9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Comptroller General of the United States Elmer Staats told the Senate subcommittee that State's reluctance to judge other agency programs was because "these agencies were stronger [than State] in terms of being able to get programs and money." Nevertheless, he pointed out that international activities had no effective interagency coordinating machinery. Favoring the PPB approach, Staats thought that program evaluations could help legislative and executive decision-makers to "understand the costs, the effectiveness and the risks of programs even where complete quantification is not possible."[22]

The Nixon System

After a year of thoughtful revision, President Nixon outlined the NSC system adapted to his purposes in a precedent-creating foreign policy report to the Congress. A mingling of policy and operational objectives is apparent. The President saw the need for "a clear future purpose as well as a procedure for dealing with the present." Once purposes were defined, he intended the system to address "specific operational issues." This NSC system was "meant to help us address the fundamental issues, clarify our basic purposes, examine all alternatives, and plan intelligent actions."[23]

In its reorganization of the NSC, the new Administration reconstituted the IRG's as Interdepartmental Groups (IG's) chaired by the appropriate Assistant Secretaries of State and with joint policy and operations functions. Such groups prepare NSC policy and contingency papers and handle both interpretations of NSC decisions and interdepartmental issues. In addition to the policy trail through the NSC Review Group to the NSC itself, the NSC Under Secretaries Committee was organized essentially to handle interagency operations matters overseas. This last body, with State's Under Secretary as chairman, considers questions referred to it by the NSC, the Secretary of State or the IG's. In this function, it bears a resemblance to the old OCB under Eisenhower and demonstrates how organization cycles can recur or, more properly, how adaptations of former patterns are made in the serious search for more effective techniques.[24]

The President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs,

[22] *Ibid.* (Part 3), pp. 208, 220.
[23] *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace,* pp. 17, 19, 23.
[24] See the State Department's *Foreign Affairs Manual Circular,* No. 521, February 6, 1969, "Reorganization of the National Security Council System and Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, informed a Senate committee that the Administration was turning from "the more *ad hoc* approach of the 1960's toward more regularized methods in the NSC system." It was the objective to view all pros and cons of alternatives, their implications and costs. A Presidential decision, he said, "then guides our inquiry into the operational issues."[25]

It may seem a feasible and not too complex exercise for those called upon to prepare an options response to a National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM). Yet in delineating the gamut of practicable options, subjective factors can blur the ultimate objective of selecting the one best serving American policy interests. Agencies and elements involved characteristically may tend to push their preferences for policy action, and this can result in curious turns unless most rigorously disciplined. The phrasing of a favored option, the editing of one less favored, the difficulty in giving reasonably accurate comparative weights to the pros and cons of competing options when these are drafted or amended by advocates or opponents — all may combine to constitute an unenviable staff assignment.

Speaking in another context, Dr. Schelling elaborated the problem in these terms: "Human ingenuity is so great that hidden assumptions can be introduced into any analysis, benefit of doubt can be prejudicially awarded, quantitative data can be subtly made prominent to the detriment of important qualitative considerations, and even the objectives themselves can be gathered into the wrong packages."[26]

Despite the difficulties, the goals reportedly are being pursued with intelligence and vigor, and from this winnowing process National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM's) eventuate and are allotted for implementation. With every good will, a decision-maker can subsequently be buffeted by forces and events that require continuous interpretation and evaluation of the designated course. Unless there are the greatest caution and continuing attention by the committees of the NSC system and the staff elements of Dr. Kissinger and affected agencies such as State, operational predilections not fully realized may effect substantive modifications.

Through its own reorganization the State Department significantly has faced up to the inseparable relation between

[25]Kissinger Letter to Senator Jackson, *The National Security Council,* Senate Committee on Government Operations, Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 2.

[26]*P-P-B, 1968,* Memorandum of Thomas Schelling, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy and operations. Responsible to the Secretary, there is a director of a two-pronged office, the Planning and Coordinating Staff, which incorporates the old policy-planning function as well as an organization for coordinating State's top-level policy-operations review (tied into the NSC Review Group) independently of the Assistant Secretary chairmen of the Interdepartmental Groups (IG's). Reality is recognized and institutionalized.

Further, the State Department, aware of its operational-policy weaknesses, sponsored a comprehensive internal examination looking toward management reform. With important reference to the integrated policy-operations organization, this study recommended more extensive interagency planning and initiatives on resource allocation. Its counsel has been accepted.[27] The Planning and Coordinating Staff is concentrating on the general departmental effort of policy analysis and resource allocation (PARA), hoping for a pragmatic development that it can influence and steer.

The NSC Staff

There can be at least some semantic confusion, however, over the roles of functionaries in policymaking. Dr. Kissinger, commenting after one year upon his role and that of the Secretary of State, is cited as asserting that the Secretary "is operationally oriented and responsible for conducting foreign policy. I am more conceptually oriented. I help to set goals."[28]

At the outset of the Kennedy era, Richard Neustadt recognized that if a strong Presidential Office of National Security Affairs was wanted, "you have to build it around actions. You have to build it around the process of receiving and answering requests for instructions from diplomatic and military missions abroad."[29]

Because the staff of the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, under the rubric of the NSC, has had a considerable expansion for both policy and operational monitoring purposes, signs of questioning are appearing. It is being asked why the Secretary of State should not serve as White House special advisers now do, if he is to be the President's principal foreign policy adviser with the diverse supplemental and line responsibilities recognized by the President and the Congress.

[27] *Diplomacy for the 70's, A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State,* Department of State Publication 8551 (Washington: GPO, December 1, 1970), p. 567.

[28] *Armed Forces Journal,* April 4, 1970, p. 29.

[29] *NSC: Senate Papers, 1965,* p. 284.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There are various suggestions about this, among them to place the Secretary physically in the White House with the Under Secretary acting as general manager at Foggy Bottom, or to put the Under Secretary or another ranking Department official in the White House, where he could also be the liaison channel between the President and the Secretary.

The suggestions may be currently irrelevant if one recalls that each Administration adopts techniques to suit its style of handling national security affairs. For example, President Johnson's NSAM 341, mentioned earlier, should not automatically be expected to reflect the approach of the Nixon Administration. Today's Administration apparently has decided that there are long-range advantages to a permanent national security staff acting as a catalyst to the departmental bureaucracies.

One can appreciate the systematic efforts of the Nixon Administration in its uniquely broad recognition of the interrelation of policy and operations. Also, one can only applaud the careful, multi-option approach to national security decision-making by the President on clearly paramount matters of policy to which sufficient continuing weight of attention and resource can be applied. But to say this is to raise the policymaker's specter of coping daily with interpretations of policy decisions, the expanse of operational options, and honest discrepancies that arise. A national security policy monitoring staff under Dr. Kissinger, earnestly trying to do its job but four times its earlier size, has in one view tended to isolate the President, undercut the Secretary of State and divide responsibility. A sweeping proposed alternative is to abolish the NSC staff, cut the State Department drastically to function in only a substantive leadership coordinating role, and return it to earlier-era quarters in the Executive Offices Building.[30]

A veteran bureaucrat observes that it can only reduce the President to the role of chief clerk if he is surrounded by numerous "personal helpers competing for his time and raising matters that would be better left to the institutional agencies in the Executive Offices of the President or the operating departments."[31] Dean Acheson's caution was that "the administrative tasks of the great departments of government are beyond the capacity of even the President's large personal staff to assume. To attempt to do so im-

[30]See John F. Campbell, " 'What Is to be Done?'—Gigantism in Washington," *Foreign Affairs,* October 1970.

[31]Harold Seidman, *Politics, Position and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 282.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pairs both the broad direction of national affairs and the specific administration of particular parts of the whole."[32]

Because it is cognizant of a chorus of advice along the above lines, certainly one would expect the NSC staff to be proceeding prudently and in close relation to the national security affairs agencies. This would be essential to accomplish the mission of commenting upon NSSM option responses, using these as educational devices for improving perceptions, and observing the meshing of designated foreign policy and correlated operations.

The Search for Improved Techniques

In a survey of the American official process, some further elements and techniques of foreign affairs decision-making can be mentioned. Any practitioner appreciates what John Burton calls "the large random element that is not subject to explanation and prediction." In face of an indeterminate future for which past experience, supported by better communications, is the guide, selected policies in reality are "directly dependent upon the sum of day-to-day decisions," unless in a rare case the latter "reflect some general theory." Declaring that there is no alternative unless the potential application of new techniques in the social sciences is proven, Burton echoes a contemporary concern in saying "diplomacy as an art is a luxury no major State can now afford."[33] He and others are searching for a more scientific system, integrating more factors into the mix for the decision-maker's attention, and seeking more predictable results. One current manifestation is the growing use of computers as a tool.

Contingency planning is a veteran device in policy-operations planning. Certainly it is an essential part of the national security system to weigh potential striking developments and to prepare those involved to cope with them. Given the predictive state of the art of foreign policy and the social sciences, however, there are still numerous variables that can inhibit a meaningful study by creating surprise conditions. It has accordingly come to be recognized that the planning value arises in getting those affected to work together, not necessarily from their resultant plan.

Because of his greater immersion in the factors affecting an issue, a decision-maker today who wears an operations hat is acutely aware of its aggregate of political, economic, psychological and

[32]Acheson, *op. cit.*, p. 733.

[33]John W. Burton, *Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 152, 173.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

social aspects. As the ramifications of his decisions become more serious, he appreciates that he may have personal preconceptions and that he cannot have too much relevant information on these aspects. Simultaneously, he may not be surprised that the form and depth of such data are inadequate for his tentatively advancing purposes. He is attuned to consulting the most knowledgeable parties and specialists if he thinks they can prove helpful. Yet the operational organization has not fully developed in his too urgent world so that crucial elements other than those he is aware of or deems essential may be readily identified or consulted.

Empirically, from long familiarity with a stubborn issue, an operator may accrete factors and related advice. He may under actual conditions even project ongoing operations contingencies and observe the subsequent interactions of his matrix. As he tries to refine these through successive contingency projections of fluctuating accuracy, a decision-maker and his associates cannot but harbor some disquiet and dissatisfaction that the tools are not honed to greater precision or sufficiently rugged to hew at the variables.

Nevertheless, the operations decision-maker must work with available equipment. His is the testing ground with reality, and here may be his chief contribution to what is known as foreign policy. By repeated evaluation, merging and discarding factors, and painful precedent, he helps to create what in its practicality is described as policy. His effort is never-ending, for a transient environment demands interpretation and adjustment as part of a seamless web.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A CAUTIOUS VERDICT IN MOSCOW: THE TWENTY-FOURTH PARTY CONGRESS

by Sidney I. Ploss

IN his book *Revolution on the Move,* which recently appeared in Belgrade, Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, once a top Communist Party leader of Yugoslavia, tells of his last meeting with Nikita Khrushchev. It was in the first half of 1963, at Khrushchev's villa near the Black Sea. Present was Viktor Grishin, then head of Soviet trade unions and Vukmanovic's opposite number. The foreign visitor asked Khrushchev about his plans to reorganize the Soviet economic system. Instead of Khrushchev, Grishin answered: "The wages of our workers depend on the profits made by enterprises." Khrushchev, however, interrupted Grishin crudely: "You talk sheer nonsense! We have resolved nothing because the most important problems of socialism are in question."[1]

Now Khrushchev is gone from center stage and Grishin was admitted to the ruling Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party as a full member at the party's Twenty-fourth Congress, held in Moscow from March 30 to April 9, 1971. The rise of Grishin and others like him is symbolic in light of the episode related by Vukmanovic-Tempo: the transactions of the Twenty-fourth Party Congress showed the unwillingness of Khrushchev's heirs to discuss the basic problems of Soviet political development or even to admit their existence.

During the year or so before the delayed party congress, the agenda of real problems in the USSR was spelled out by Soviet and foreign communist intellectuals. In March 1970, an analysis of internal strains was sent to party leaders by Academician Andrei Sakharov, V. F. Turchin, a physicist, and R. A. Medvedev, a historian. The document spoke of "breakdown and stagnation" in the domestic economy, expressed in a dropping growth rate, low labor productivity, shortage of goods and inflation, and a great technical lagging behind the United States. The source of these ills was identified as the "antidemocratic traditions and norms which appeared during the Stalin era and have not been completely liquidated." Specifically, the restrictive information policy and the thought controls of the regime were deplored:

[1]Parts of the memoirs appeared in the Belgrade daily *Politika,* March 5-21, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Truthful information about our shortcomings and negative phenomena is kept secret lest it be "used by hostile propaganda." Exchange of information with foreign countries is restricted out of fear of "penetration of hostile ideology." Theoretical conceptions and practical proposals which may seem too bold to some, are suppressed immediately without any discussion because of fear that they may "undermine the foundations." There is obvious distrust of active persons who think critically and creatively.

The cure for such ills prescribed by Sakharov and his associates included freedom of information and expression; direct, multiple-choice elections to party and state posts; and broad powers for local and national legislatures. The same letter voiced concern about the future of world peace because of the Kremlin's uncompromising stance on the Middle East and West Berlin. The chances for peace settlements would be vastly improved if public opinion were allowed to play a role in the making of Soviet foreign policy.[2]

The widening gap between state and intelligentsia was put on display at a meeting held in May 1970 under auspices of the Department of Philosophy and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The theme of discussion by twenty-eight of the 300 participants was a work pegged to the birth centennial of the party's founder, *Leninism and the Dialectic of Social Development.* Some of the critical remarks are indicative of the restiveness that has spread to politically-respectable sections of the educated class:

> The author puts in the foreground "the businesslike and critical mode of life" [*deiatelno-kriticheskii obraz zhizni*]. His main enemy is "the conformity of the Philistine," the acceptance of anything on faith alone, the adherence to habits and traditions—because it is supposedly necessary to raise independent thinkers. . . . the chapter is written from positions of individualism and abstract humanism. . . .
>
> The problem of conformity is advanced by the liberal bourgeois intelligentsia, reflecting its negative attitude toward reality. If we were to bring the same problem to the fore, it would mean a denial of our own, socialist values.[3]

The authors of the book were criticized elsewhere[4] for approving of the open contests of opinion among various party factions during the early period of Soviet rule. They had, it seems, rashly con-

[2]Excerpts from the letter of Sakharov, Turchin and Medvedev are in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post,* April 3, 1970, and *Saturday Review,* June 6, 1970.

[3]*Voprosy Filosofii,* No. 11, 1970, p. 171.

[4]*Voprosy Istorii KPSS,* No. 1, 1971, p. 46.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cluded that public debates between party leaders would ensure the taking of more sensible decisions on matters of state.

On the eve of the Twenty-fourth Congress, the supreme guardians of totalitarian orthodoxy — the full-time party officials (*apparatchiki*) — were engaged in polemic by the Moscow correspondent of the Italian communist daily *L'Unità,* Adriano Guerra. He rejected the view of the *apparatchiki* that greater economic efficiency might be achieved in the USSR through the use of mathematics and cybernetics, without allowing the citizen a sense of participation in decision-making. Guerra reported that there were communists in Leningrad who agreed with him and the Czechoslovak reformers of 1968 that the leading role of the party machine was not an inheritance to be administered, but a role that has to be earned each day anew. Only by taking the path of pluralism or the separation of powers, argued Guerra, might the Soviet Union overcome the ever-present burden of the errors of the Stalin period.[5] In other words, the absolutist structure of government had to be revamped if gross irresponsibility and waste were to be effectively curbed.

At the Twenty-fourth Congress, Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev harshly responded to those who demand that the Soviet political machine be brought into consonance with the social evolution of the country. Brezhnev labeled the radical reformers "bourgeois ideologists" and "revisionists," charging that they wished to replace "socialist democracy and tradition" with "bourgeois democracy," or "a democracy for exploiters." In the party too, said Brezhnev, there was no room for "anarchical lack of discipline presented as democracy."[6] The hierarchy's distrust of the intelligentsia was manifested further in Brezhnev's proposal, which was later adopted and set forth in the Congress Resolution, to grant the right of control over the activities of the administration to primary party organizations of scientific-research institutes, educational establishments and cultural-enlightenment and health institutions.[7] Such phenomena were typical of the neo-orthodox spirit of the Congress, which endorsed the Politburo's cautious verdict in favor of the status quo that had emerged since the Prague Spring of 1968.

Within the realm of live politics, the scales were tipped against the senior business executives, whose interest is a less dictatorial

[5] *L'Unità,* March 23, 1971.
[6] *Pravda,* March 31, 1971.
[7] *Ibid.,* April 10, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

way of running the economy and a more peaceful direction in foreign policy. The modest revisions of the system of command economy that Premier Aleksei Kosygin had sponsored in 1965 were notably de-emphasized in the Congress Resolution. Underlining the enhanced role of the party men since the December 1969 Central Committee Plenum was a change in the CPSU Rules which extended to primary party units of state ministries the right of control over the work of the staff in fulfilling political orders.[8]

These occurrences denoted a victory for the party *apparatchiki,* who for the most part are skeptical of promoting market relations, expanding the rights of the managerial-technical group, and dipping the banner of world revolution. An index to the changed balance of power in the Kremlin was the appointment to full membership in the Politburo of F.D. Kulakov, D.A. Kunayev, V.V. Shcherbitsky and Grishin.[9] All have worked for many years in the party bureaucracy and none has gone on record for any meaningful departure from its time-honored methods of bureaucratic centralism. The new recruits to the Politburo are aged fifty-three to sixty, which is in keeping with the demand of the Congress Resolution for "maximum" use of the experience and knowledge of "the old cadres."

At the same time, the more adaptive elements in the upper echelons of power were able to stave off a disaster for themselves. Brezhnev had to conceal for the moment his cherished notion of the need to maintain the clear-cut priority of the heavy and defense industries. He and other foes of the Kosygin reform were not able to consummate victory by silencing its partisans or forcing them to recant their views. Kosygin himself kept his seat in the Politburo, as did Brezhnev's natural competitor for personal supremacy, Aleksandr Shelepin. (It was noticeable just after the Congress that the party daily most favorable in its treatment of Brezhnev attempted to diminish the public exposure given to Shelepin.) [10]

In spite of avowals of utmost cohesion of the ruling group made at the Congress, there were signs of ongoing disputes over policy issues. One sector of influential party opinion still attaches more urgency to the manufacture of consumer goods while others demand a renewed upturn of heavy industry for agriculture and

[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] On April 18, 1971, the editors of *Sovetskaia Rossiia* cropped Shelepin's image out of a photograph of Politburo members that was also carried by *Pravda* and *Izvestiia.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

defense. Underlying the unsettled question of spending for guns or butter or consumer durables may be different estimates of the prospects for agreements with the Soviet Union's rivals for world influence, America and China. At any rate, the new makeup of Kremlin leadership tends to suggest that no sizeable risks for peace are about to be taken by the Soviet regime.

Economic Management

The Kosygin reform had put a premium on commercial rather than agitational talent in the management of industrial enterprises. It was to give the specialists a freer hand in making economic decisions at the lower level and sought to base plan fulfillment on sales and profits rather than on physical volume of output. The party watchdogs of industry had never been enthusiastic about this realistic approach to the efficiency problem, fearing that it would unleash spontaneity and erode their own charismatic basis of authority. Brezhnev did nothing to quiet these anxieties when he told the Twenty-fourth Congress that the reform had little more than "made it possible to stop the development of certain undesirable trends in the economy, which had been emerging in the previous years." One of Brezhnev's former colleagues from Moldavia was less discreet and urged a reactionary course of action:

> Many enterprise leaders are striving to achieve increased sales and profits volume not only by increasing their output of goods in total but also through increasing their wholesale prices without foundation. Tendencies of this kind are also being occasioned by weak control on the part of the state organs which regulate price formation in the country. These and other shortcomings in carrying out economic reform point to the premature nature of the renunciation of centralized planning for a number of important economic indicators, and to the lack of fully formulated principles on the utilization of the new economic levers in organizing industrial management, and of correct criteria for evaluating the activity of enterprises.[11]

Kosygin, however, was not intimidated and spoke of "the great and positive influences of the new system of planning and incentives for the production effectiveness." While admitting that "nuances" of the economic reform needed "further, more accurate definition and development," Kosygin opposed the substituting of economic methods by mere injunction and urged that the influence of the reform be intensified.[12]

Brezhnev prevailed on this issue. Unlike the case at the last

[11] I. I. Bodyul, *Pravda,* April 4, 1971.
[12] *Pravda,* April 7, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Congress in 1966, the Resolution failed to approve of an expansion of managerial autonomy, and boosted moral incentives at the expense of material ones. This was in effect a vote for the Stalinist practice of substituting for fair pay a variety of badges, certificates and photographs awarded by the party overseers of industry. Such a practice, aside from keeping the party men in the saddle, would enable the regime to maintain the primacy of heavy and war goods over consumer articles.

Various commentators have seen as a gain for Soviet liberalizers the Congress' endorsement of production associations. These embrace a number of factories engaged in producing the same commodities under one central direction. Usually cited among their advantages are the more sensible use of pooled resources and the stimulus to reduce overhead costs provided by looser financial control from Moscow.[13] But there are different approaches to the question of under whose auspices and by what methods the associations should be formed. Not long before the opening of the Twenty-fourth Congress, B. Rakitsky, an economist, argued against those who believe that the Kosygin reform "has even given the enterprises too many rights" and who "pin their hopes on associations as a means of centralizing those rights once again." The existing associations were said to have been created on order from above and to have proved inviable. Their success depended on the adoption of an entire complex of changes, foremost among them decentralizing the inflexible system of price formation and eliminating the nonstable but itemized plans that lead managers to conceal reserves. The present-day leadership's proneness to "the roundabout route of isolated changes" was deplored and a demand made for "reliance on the experience and initiative of the lower elements."[14]

Brezhnev and the *apparatchiki* have no such misgivings about the production associations, which they seem to regard as handy devices for controlling the managers along regional lines. At the Congress they uncritically praised the associations now in existence, and their talk about the wisdom of concentrating qualified specialists was reminiscent of Khrushchev's backing of collective-farm mergers in the early 1950's.[15] On the other hand,

[13]See, e.g., L. B. Alter and B. I. Braginsky, *Ekonomicheskie Zakony i Sovershenstvovanie Planirovanie Narodnogo Khoziastva* (Moscow, 1970), pp. 80-81.

[14]*Literaturnaia Gazeta,* March 17, 1971.

[15]See the speeches of Party Secretaries Grishin (Moscow), P. Ye. Shelest (Ukraine), G. V. Romanov (Leningrad) and P. M. Masherov (Byelorussia) in *Pravda,* April 1, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kosygin appeared to sympathize with the economist Rakitsky. He too cautioned that associations must be formed "thoughtfully" and "with economic justification." The Premier also implied that a party-type crash program was undesirable: "Of course, the organizational structure and forms of associations cannot be the same in all branches and here a creative searching is still needed." Kosygin's hesitations were ignored and the Congress Resolution echoed the summons of Brezhnev to proceed with the job of association-building.

The overall loss of ground by state experts to party officials since the 1966 Congress was registered by a number of verbal and organizational peculiarities. Brezhnev commended the practice of assigning party officials to the governmental ministries and Soviet missions abroad. The Party Central Committee — meaning Politburo or Secretariat — was disclosed to have ordered the state Council of Ministers to examine certain questions.[16] (Incidentally, the republic-level party congresses held in February and early March did not hear calls to enhance the role of the Council of Ministers, as in 1966.) Kosygin himself deferred to the will of the Central Committee as he had not at the last Congress, observing that the final version of the new five-year plan would be presented to the Committee Plenum, as well as a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, for examination. Also unlike the situation in 1966, the chairman of the State Planning Commission was not elected to the *ad hoc* body which drafted the resolution on Brezhnev's accounting report of the Central Committee; and a seat on the commission for amending the Draft Directives on the Ninth Five-Year Plan was granted to I.D. Serbin, head of the Department for Defense Industry at central party headquarters.[17]

Nationalities and Culture

Originally, Khrushchev's successors retreated from his policy of forcing the use of the Russian language in the various national republics. The practice of publishing in languages of the republics laws, decrees and other acts adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, abolished in 1960, was restored in 1965.[18] In 1967 a doctrinal formula of Khrushchev to the effect that there

[16]G. F. Sizov, *ibid.*

[17]Cf. *Pravda,* April 6 and 8, 1971, and *XXIII S"zed Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza. 29 marta-8 aprelia 1966 goda. Stenograficheskii otchët* (Moscow, 1966), I, 611-612 and II, 209-210.

[18]*Pravda,* October 1, 1965.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had been formed "a new historic society of men, the Soviet people" was deprecated because it was taken to mean the beginning of the merger of nations and had led to a curtailment of the publication of literature and radio broadcasts in the native languages.[19]

This more lenient attitude toward linguistic diversity was re-examined around the time of the upheaval in Czechoslovakia: there was some fear that a revitalization of that country's institutions might eventually set off a chain reaction in the Soviet Union, whose complicated ethnic problems were believed to provide a fertile ground for changes.[20] Almost two weeks before the Soviet Army occupied Prague, non-Russian Soviet writers were instructed that a "sifting away" of national tradition was desirable in their work and that national form had to yield way to "the leading, constantly strengthening role of modernday socialist content."[21] Not long afterward, reports filtered to the West of an effort by the Kremlin to suppress national feeling in the Soviet borderlands, the methods ranging from acts of official vandalism against church property to the arrest of nationalistic dissidents.

The new line of Russification was solidified at the Twenty-fourth Congress. Brezhnev resurrected the centralizing slogan of "the new historic society of men, the Soviet people." He was supported in this by G.A. Aliyev, a former secret police officer and current-day party leader in Baku, who drew applause upon complaining that

> there is some onesidedness in the scientific elaboration of the problem of national relations under socialism. Many papers describe well the flourishing of separate union republics, nations and nationalities, and that in the end is important and necessary. Yet at the same time the scientific papers shed insufficient light on problems of rapprochement of nations, on formation of the new historic society of men, the Soviet people, which includes all nationalities of the U.S.S.R.[22]

One of the candidate members of the Politburo, Sh. R. Rashidov, party head of Uzbekistan, duly extolled the Russian language as a "powerful accelerator of the process of rapprochement of nations."[23] I. I. Bodyul of Moldavia predictably assailed writers who

[19]M. S. Dzhunusov, in *Internatsionalnoe Vospitanie Trudiashchikhsia. Po Materialam Rizhskoi Mezhrespublikanskoi Teoreticheskoi Konferentsii, Posviashchennoi Voprosam Internatsionalnogo Vospitaniia Trudiashchikhsia v Usloviiakh Kommunisticheskogo Stroitelstva* (Riga, 1967), p. 37.

[20]Dalimil, *Literarni Listy* (Prague), August 8, 1968.

[21]*Pravda,* August 7, 1968.

[22]*Ibid.,* April 2, 1971.

[23]*Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are "speculating on the people's respectful attitude toward the past and their feelings of national distinctiveness" and are "essentially preaching the idea of non-class, uncritical acceptance of the past." In this spirit of leveling the national cultures, the Resolution of the Congress featured the Russificatory slogan Brezhnev had borrowed from Khrushchev.

When dwelling on questions of art and scholarship, Brezhnev pretended to abhor as equal deviations the muckraking of anti-Stalinists and uncritical admiration of the late dictator. Alluding to freedom writers like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, he rebuked those who "have tried to reduce the diversity of Soviet reality to problems that have irrevocably become a matter of the past as a result of the party's work to overcome the consequences of the personality cult." Without naming them, Brezhnev chided stark reactionaries like Vsevolod Kochetov for their "attempt to whitewash past phenomena which were subjected to resolute and principled criticism by the party, to preserve concepts and views contrary to that which is new and creative which the party has introduced into its practical and theoretical activities over these last few years." Such moderation was strange in view of the hard line on ideology Brezhnev had laid down at the Central Committee meeting in April 1968, and may be explained in terms of a compromise reached among various members of the Politburo.

In any event, mildness was absent from the Congress speech of the jolly hangman of Soviet letters, Mikhail Sholokhov. He vocally upheld "party mindedness and popular spirit" in artistic creation against "renegades and revisionists of every hue." Clearly unhappy about youthful disgust with the older generation of literati, Sholokhov found it necessary to claim that Soviet Army leaders would vouch for their continued usefulness.[24] A. B. Chakovsky, chief editor of the newspaper *Literary Gazette,* was just as wary of artistic experimentation. Chakovsky remembered the Khrushchev era sadly as a time when certain writers and works "bore the influence of bourgeois ideology, distorted Soviet reality, and lasciviously flirted with our class enemies." As Brezhnev had fondly recalled the Stakhanov movement, so Chakovsky glowingly praised "the heroic nineteen-thirties." Attacking the Voice of Israel and Zionism, this neo-Stalinist instinctively drew upon the terminology of the departed *Vozhd*: ". . . Soviet artists are perfectly aware that, just as ancient Antaeus derived his strength from constant contact with the earth-mother, so the Soviet artistic

[24] *Ibid.,* April 4, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intelligentsia is strong and spiritually invincible through its cohesion around Lenin's party, through the inseparable link with its great cause."[25]

The older delegates of the Congress who applauded these words were assuredly mindful of the Stalin utterance on the last page of the 1938 party *History*: "I think that the Bolsheviks remind us of the hero of Greek mythology, Antaeus. They, like Antaeus, are strong because they maintain connection with their mother, the masses, who gave birth to them, suckled them and reared them."[26] The stage managers of the Congress finally decided that the issue of literary Stalinism versus anti-Stalinism should be avoided in the Resolution of the meeting. But only safe men from the literary establishment were admitted to the new Central Committee. Sholokhov was re-elected to full membership, along with G. M. Markov, secretary of the USSR Writers' Union, while Chakovsky joined the conformist poet N. M. Gribachev as a candidate member.

The Uncertain World Scene

As if in part to justify the repressive political atmosphere inside the USSR, Brezhnev warned of threats to Soviet security from the West and the East. The party chief implicitly rejected the Stalinist dogma of the fatal inevitability of world war by scolding "Chinese leaders" who were "demanding of us a rejection of the 20th Congress line and the CPSU Program." He did speak, however, of the danger of general war in connection with the activities of Western forces of aggression and militarism, which had supposedly unleashed more than thirty armed conflicts of varying scale in the past few years. "American imperialism" in particular was accused of striving "to rule everywhere" and attempting "to impose its will on states and whole areas of the world." Communist China, for its part, was depicted as a hostile neighbor that had made territorial claims on the Soviet Union and provoked border incidents in the recent past.

Brezhnev was hardly optimistic about the immediate prospects of a basic improvement in Moscow's relations with Washington and Peking. All of the gestures of Soviet reasonableness he made were offset by serious qualifications. A favorable outcome of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with the United States was

[25] *Ibid.*, April 6, 1971.

[26] *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union /Bolsheviks/. Short Course* (Moscow, 1951), p. 552.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hoped for and an assurance of Soviet sincerity was given. But he hinted that only time would tell if the United States would not seek unilateral advantage in the talks. While recognizing that an improvement in Soviet-American relations would meet the interest of strengthening peace, Brezhnev cautioned that the Nixon Administration had lately stiffened its position on a number of foreign policy issues and might be trying to bully the Soviet Union into unfair agreements. This equivocality applied as well to his remarks about Soviet-Chinese relations. On the one hand, it was useful that border talks had started, that ambassadors had been exchanged and a trade agreement signed. On the other, the anti-Soviet line in China's policy was seen to continue, and only in the long run was good neighborliness likely to be achieved. These guarded views about America and China were incorporated into the Congress Resolution without significant modification. The Resolution, however, did not restate the call for arms control in Brezhnev's report, and in this respect it harmonized with the tough speech made by Politburo member Mikhail Suslov last November.[27]

Disputes and Relations among Leaders

As in 1966, the vast majority of Politburo members did not address the Party Congress. This violation of Bolshevik tradition may be interpreted as the result of an agreement not to disagree in public at a moment of incipient challenge to the party's authority from below. But there were signs that no consensus had been reached over how to deploy economic resources in the next five-year period. The obscurity clouding this issue was evident earlier, in February, when the Central Committee's Draft Directive for the 1971-1975 plan was published. The Draft vaguely envisioned an increase in producer goods output by 41 to 46 per cent and a rise of consumer goods output by 44 to 48 per cent.[28] Such figures could be juggled in favor of the advocates of consumer interests or the champions of military industrialization. Besides, the investments were not itemized by sectors — industry, transport and communications as opposed to housing and communal construction — as was done in the 1966 Directives.

Brezhnev seemed to argue against any who might point to the sudden Polish crisis which overthrew Wladyslaw Gomulka and urge that the Soviet leadership undertake a drastic shift in its own

[27] *Pravda*, November 7, 1970.
[28] *Ibid.*, February 14, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

priorities in favor of consumer-oriented industries. "While defining the raising of the well-being of the working people as a main task," he said, "one must not, of course, approach this in a simplified manner. The implementation of the policy aimed at a considerable increase in the well-being of the people will require time, serious efforts, and enormous means and resources." Army leaders could only feel reassured when Brezhnev listed the military-oriented radio-electronics industry among the branches which ensure technical progress. Seconding Brezhnev was the party boss of Estonia, who warned that "it is necessary seriously to be on guard against the consumer approach to resolving the main focal issues of our development."[29]

We may assume that Brezhnev's neo-Stalinist line on economic priorities was articulated by Central Committee Secretary K. F. Katushev in the speech he made for Lenin Day just after the Twenty-fourth Congress. Using an ancient idiom, Katushev described heavy industry as "the bedrock [*osnova osnov*] of our national economy" and pledged that everything would be done "so that the might of Soviet heavy industry will grow unswervingly."[30]

In contrast, Kosygin at the Congress did not glorify the output of capital goods and was optimistic about the outlook for satisfying consumer demand. He looked forward to the earmarking of vast resources for the economy's peaceful branches and declared: "We are confident that this will yield fruit quickly and will be felt in a further upsurge in the well-being of urban and rural populations." Kosygin omitted radio-electronics from his listing of key industrial branches — a calculated oversight of something dear to military hearts which logically complemented the Premier's insistence that he did not consider general war inevitable. The final version of the Directive for the 1971-1975 plan left open the question of how capital investments are to be distributed among the nonagricultural sectors of the economy.

A most envenomed aspect of the budget controversy is spending on agriculture, which during the past five-year period received about 20 per cent less state investment than was scheduled. Opponents of the farm lobby that exists in the power structure were denounced by the party leader of a big farming area: "It is important that all of us — both local workers and figures of statewide importance — view agriculture correctly, have a clear idea of its

[29] I. G. Kebin, *ibid.*, April 4, 1971.
[30] *Pravda,* April 23, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

importance, and rebuff and correct those workers who still do not fully comprehend agriculture's role and requirements."[31] But the agrarians may not win the next, crucial rounds in the struggle over funds. The Draft Directive and the version of this document amended at the Congress are in agreement that state capital investments in agriculture will amount to 82.2 billion rubles in 1971-1975. But the texts differ notably on the urgency of solving the nagging food problem.

The Draft had said that to implement the main task of the plan it was essential "to assure a high rate of growth and proportional development of social production, particularly agriculture and the light and food industries." This delicate political formula was revised by a special commission of the Twenty-fourth Congress and now reads: "to assure an improvement of the proportions of social production, high rates of growth of agriculture and the branches which manufacture consumer goods."[32] By deleting the word "particularly" and excising mention of the food industry, the importance of food was de-emphasized. In addition, not a single minister of the light and food industries was recruited into the new Central Committee as a full member. Among those dropped from the roster of Central Committee candidates was P. K. Sizov, head of the Department for Light and Food Industries at central party headquarters, who in the past had worked closely with Kosygin.[33]

As Kosygin's influence declined, Brezhnev came nearer to his goal of bringing the party machine under his personal control. No longer was the federal party Secretariat described as a "collegial" body, in which the General Secretary would have to negotiate with all of the other secretaries about important questions of party administration.[34] Yet the independent Suslov was ranked second in the nonalphabetical listing of those elected to the Secretariat which Brezhnev announced on the last day of the Congress — revealing that the General Secretary had failed to name a protégé or friend as deputy party leader (Moscow Radio, April 9, 1971). Brezhnev's primacy among the policymakers of the Politburo was indicated by the many references to his advising of local officials,

[31]G. S. Zolotukhin, *ibid.*, April 2, 1971.

[32]*Pravda,* April 11, 1971.

[33]Listings of Central Committee members are in *XXIII S"ezd . . ., op. cit.,* II, 383-387, and *Pravda,* April 10, 1971.

[34]N. A. Muraveva, chairman of the Central Auditing Commission, had told the Twenty-third Congress that the Secretariat was "a genuinely efficient collegial organ" (*XXIII S"ezd . . ., op. cit.,* I, 111).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tabling of proposals, and overall direction of affairs.[35] His increased power was also reflected in the award of full membership in the Central Committee to several aides, past and present, and in the rise of secret police representation on the Committee from one member to four.

Brezhnev, however, has not been able to subjugate the Politburo as Stalin did and Khrushchev sought vainly to do. The most sensitive tributes paid to him at republic-level party congresses were conspicuously missing from the published versions of speeches made at the Twenty-fourth Congress. None of the orators in Moscow was reported to have gone so far as to extol Brezhnev as head of the Politburo or to cite the two-volume compilation of his speeches and articles as new classics of Marxism-Leninism.[36] Moreover, during the Congress a ban was put on use of the phrase "Central Committee headed by comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev," which was contained in a greeting sent to the Congress by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ecuador on March 20 and published in *Pravda* on April 10, 1971. These tokens of resistance to a cult of Brezhnev's personality suggest that he still lacks the full support of his Politburo colleagues and will not easily turn into a political purge the exchange of party cards announced at the Congress.

The Balance Sheet

The Twenty-fourth Party Congress registered gains for the conservative-dogmatic wing of Soviet leadership. Organized around the party machine, this element seeks to keep intact the system of total power handed down from Stalin and Khrushchev, regardless of the material losses and demoralization of the educated class entailed. Congress decisions accordingly tightened the reins on all of the social groups that might raise a threat to the further existence of party absolutism. Stricter political controls were decreed for scientists and the managers of technology. A spur was given to linguistic centralism in the non-Russian border zones. Encouragement was lent to vigilant censors and conformist writers

[35]See, in particular, *Pravda,* April 1 (Kunayev and N. I. Maslennikov), April 2 (Zolotukhin and Aliyev), April 3 (A. E. Voss and A. Yu. Snechkus), April 4 (A. V. Georgiyev, Bodyul, V. I. Konotop, D. Rasulov, T. Usubaliyev and M. Gapurov), April 6 (F. A. Tabeyev and M. Z. Shakirov) and April 7, 1971 (Shcherbitsky).

[36]Kunayev and Aliyev at their local congresses spoke of Brezhnev as head of the Politburo, and noted his two-volume compilation, as did Rashidov, Usubaliyev and A. Ye. Kochinian (*Kazakhstanskaia Pravda,* February 25, *Sovetakan Haiastan,* February 26, *Pravda Vostoka,* March 3, *Sovetskaia Kirgiziia,* March 4 and *Bakinskii Rabochii,* March 11, 1971).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the literary sphere. A professed belief in the danger of nuclear war rounded out this neo-Stalinist platform of Brezhnev and his dominant faction.

The men who oppose Brezhnev at the top level can hardly be regarded as adherents of representative democracy or advocates of civil liberties. But some are aware that no amount of slogans can remedy the severe economic ills of the USSR. They know that more operational freedom has to be granted to factory managers and that funds tied up in military projects must be diverted to peaceful uses. Implicit in their outlook is a decline in ideology and the power of the Communist Party machine, as well as the promotion of a dialogue with the United States. These more flexible elements were presumably responsible for blocking new pro-Stalin initiatives and striking conciliatory notes on the theme of U.S.-Soviet relations at the Twenty-fourth Congress. Brezhnev's failure to silence or dislodge the members of this group in the leadership attested to the limits of the restorative trend in Soviet politics and was the only bright spot of an otherwise grim party rally.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BREZHNEV: ASCENT TO POWER*

by Paul A. Smith, Jr.

"A STOCKY figure dressed in a bulky, dark brown double-breasted suit, with huge bushy eyebrows dominating his flushed face. He seemed somber and dull. . . ." The description is by a member of the Western press corps in Moscow in 1963, when Leonid Brezhnev was chief of state. A Soviet official later warned a Western associate not to underestimate Brezhnev. He knew, the Soviet said, that Western observers had written Brezhnev off as a figurehead. Those who did so, he said, were making a mistake.[1]

The advice was sound. On October 14, 1964, Brezhnev replaced his patron Khrushchev by election of the Party Central Committee as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The other half of Khrushchev's power, the premiership of the USSR, was given to Alexei Kosygin, a member of the Party Presidium and a long-time government official. The shift brought Brezhnev to a pinnacle of pre-eminence within the USSR and — Mao notwithstanding — throughout the communist world.

Four years later Brezhnev had completed the equivalent, in time, of a United States President's first term in office. His command of the levers of power was still not comparable to that of his predecessors; control of the government still rested in the capable hands of his colleague Kosygin. But his stature and authority within the party had been strengthened by a gradual and effective distancing of his two chief rivals — Podgorny and Shelepin — from positions of influence and control.

The man whom the Soviet elite has chosen as its spokesman and most eminent member is well qualified to represent it. Before coming to power in 1964 he played, contrary to popular belief, an important behind-the-scenes role in domestic and international communist affairs for nearly fifteen years. Earlier, he had proved himself in some of the most important regional assignments

*This article, part of a larger study in progress, will appear later in 1971 in the book, *Leaders of the Communist World,* edited by Rodger Swearingen (New York: The Free Press). It draws upon information available to Western scholars up to September 1968 and covers Brezhnev's career through the Twenty-third Party Congress in March-April 1966. The author is now working on a second article based on information available on Brezhnev's life between the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Party Congresses.

[1]M. Page, *The Day Khrushchev Fell* (New York: Hawthorn, 1965), p. 178.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

available to a party official. Today, despite Mao's disaffection and troubles in Eastern Europe, Brezhnev remains heir to the mantle of authority in world communism created by Lenin, enlarged by Stalin, and defended by Khrushchev.

Many Western scholars remain unimpressed, however. One has described him as "an insignificant transition figure in a new interregnum and a succession crisis that has not yet come to a head."[2] But a Western diplomat who worked with him expressed admiration for his "absolute level-headedness" and appreciation of his "spirit devoid of fanaticism," his "courtesy" and "human warmth." Noting that Brezhnev tends to rely more on conciliation than on force, the same observer wondered whether he had the energy necessary to maintain concord and to check the inevitable ambitions among his peers.[3] Perhaps; perhaps not. But let us look at the record.

Labor Aristocrat

Brezhnev comes from the Ukraine and still makes it his political base. His native region, earlier called Ekatorinoslav, today Dnepropetrovsk, straddles the Dnieper River, a major artery of trade and conquest since Byzantine days. In the nineteenth century the river helped to open the region to world commerce, based on the grain trade, and to make it one of the leading industrial regions of the empire. Brezhnev was born on its banks in 1906, in a small river port known then as Kamenskoe and now called Dnieprodzerzhinsk, about twenty miles upstream from the provincial capital of Ekatorinoslav.[4]

In Brezhnev's childhood Kamenskoe was one of a number of thriving industrial towns along the Dnieper. An iron foundry, in existence since the 1880's was located there. The population of the area was mixed — Ukrainians, Great Russians, Jews, Germans, Greeks, Bulgarians and Tatars. In the towns the Russians and the Jews predominated; in the countryside the farmers were more independent, more individualistic, and more outward-oriented than the traditional Russian peasant. In 1908 the provincial parliament

[2]Bertram Wolfe, "The Durable Core of Totalitarianism," in S. Handel and R. Braham, editors, *The USSR After 50 Years: Promise and Reality* (New York: Knopf, 1967).

[3]L. Pietromarchi, *The Soviet World* (New York: Barnes, 1965), p. 97.

[4]Unless otherwise indicated, the basic biographic data on Brezhnev are taken from the *Bol'shaya Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, Yezhegodnik* (Soviet Encyclopedia *Yearbook*), editions of 1958, 1961, 1962, 1965 and 1966. A more recent version is in *Kommunist: Kalendar Spravochnik, 1968* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1967). None of these sketches covers more than half a page, and there are some significant differences among them to which I have drawn attention at the appropriate places.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Ekatorinoslav sent an agricultural agent to the middlewestern region of the United States to study the crops there, procure agricultural machinery and investigate the market for Ukrainian products. This spirit and the rapid industrialization in the towns gave the nickname "Little America" to the area.

There is no indication from official or other sources that Brezhnev or his family were involved either in prerevolutionary political movements or in the turmoil later. But the region was politically volatile. Whereas the Russians tended to be concerned with social and economic problems and with a variety of utopian schemes purporting to offer solutions to them, the Ukrainians were more interested in asserting the claims of their culture and their separate nationality. The result was a heady brew of national and social strivings expressed in a spectrum of outlawed political groups. The Bolsheviks and the Social Revolutionaries were strongly established in the industrial towns by the turn of the century. In the countryside a variety of anarchist movements agitated the farmers and village craftsmen. During World War I, in Brezhnev's early teens, the region was occupied by the Austro-Hungarians, torn by revolution, and ravaged in the civil conflict that followed the revolution. City and country alike were sacked with equal fervor and savage abandon by Reds, Whites, peasant anarchists, Ukrainian nationalists and bandits. Asked what he did during the French Revolution, one of the participants is said to have replied: "I survived." Perhaps the Brezhnevs felt themselves fortunate to have done the same.

Brezhnev is generally presumed to be a Russian. At least his name is Russian, and the fact that he comes from an urban rather than a rural background strengthens the presumption. His speech is colored by the Ukraine, but no more so than is to be expected from a man born and raised in the region. Soviet biographic sources describe him as born in the family of a metal worker, and he has claimed in conversation to be a fifth-generation steelman;[5] a brother worked in Poland as a metallurgical engineer after World War II.[6] It would seem a plausible assumption that Brezhnev comes from a stratum in the prerevolutionary working class which cherished a respect for family traditions and skills, but

[5]"Tomorrow is Three Suits," *Time*, February 21, 1964.

[6]"Not everyone is aware of it—although it has been mentioned in the press—but Comrade Brezhnev's brother, a specialist in metallurgical engineering, has worked for a long time at the Lenin Foundry here, helping our specialists, our working class, in assembling the plant and in the effective operations of this great combine." W. Gomulka, speaking in October 1964, as cited by Page, *The Day Khrushchev Fell*, p. 144.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which was not attracted by the political and social radicalism of the Marxists — a stratum resentfully characterized by Lenin as "labor aristocrats."

Life in the Provinces

Brezhnev worked his way through the Soviet equivalent of high school and college, and made a living professionally as a surveyor and later as a metallurgical engineer, academic and city official for the first thirty years of his life.

In 1921 the New Economic Plan was launched. In the Ukraine the guerrilla leader, Makhno, led the remnants of his once powerful peasant anarchists across the Dnieper for the last time to seek refuge in Rumania from the Red Army. An uneasy peace returned to the land, permitting many youngsters, including Brezhnev, to begin their working careers. Soviet biographic sketches say he began work at fifteen and simultaneously studied to become a land surveyor. Which was his primary occupation is not clear. But the proletarian image is qualified at an early age by his developing interest in technique, in precision, and in intellectual tools of professional caliber.

The scholastic side apparently predominated. In 1927, at the age of twenty-one, Brezhnev graduated from a technical college for land utilization and reclamation in the city of Kursk, a provincial capital of 80,000 people in southern Russia. For three years, until 1930, he used his skills as a surveyor and land-utilization specialist, first in the Kursk Provincial Administration, and later for a period in the Urals where he rose to a responsible position on the provincial land-utilization board of Sverdlovsk.

The 1920's, the period when Brezhnev received his basic education and spent his formative working years on the land, was the heyday of the farmer under Soviet power. In the fall of 1922 the Soviet government adopted a series of legal codes whose purpose was to give the farmer a sense of security. The principle of nationalization was affirmed. But the right of utilization could be exercised in a number of forms — in the traditional system of repartition within a community, in individual holdings, or in voluntary associations. For almost a decade the farmer enjoyed two significant freedoms: the right to choose the form in which the land was to be cultivated, and the privilege of disposing of his surplus products on the open market.[7] Brezhnev's opinion on these events is unknown. But it may be significant that he has been intimately

[7]E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution: 1917-1923* (New York: Penguin Books, Pelican edition, 1962), II, 295, 296.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

associated with three of the four major initiatives in agricultural policy under Soviet power: the land reform of the 1920's, the Virgin Lands program of 1954, and the rationalization and refinancing of agricultural management which he proposed in March 1965. All three have been relatively successful, at least by Soviet standards. The fourth major innovation was the collectivization program launched by Stalin in 1929. Brezhnev may have been involved in its initial stages, but he escaped its conclusion. In 1930, for unknown reasons, he abruptly dropped a promising future in agriculture and returned to industry.

In 1928, when Brezhnev was still in the Urals, the first Five Year Plan was launched, and in 1929 the collectivization of agriculture began. The result was a five-year war between the party, backed by the urban proletariat, and a terrorized and eventually decimated farm population. The consequences for the farmers, the country and the rule of the party were immense. Characteristic of the severity of the struggle was a remark by party leader Kaganovich at a party congress in the late 1920's. Charged by a speaker from the floor with carrying out a program so severe that it resulted in cannibalism in the villages, Kaganovich shot back: "If we lose our nerve now, they will eat *us*! Is that better?"[8] The result was an all-out drive by the party to push through collectivization. In order to strengthen the nerve of the local village communists, 25,000 workers with adequate political organizational experience were dispatched from the towns and were followed by many more. In the winter and spring of 1930 over half of the total farm households in the country were forced into collectives. By early 1932 the resulting disintegration of the farm economy resulted in such famine and turmoil that, as Churchill was later told by Stalin, close to ten million people were "affected" and, Stalin implied, wiped out.[9]

Where was Brezhnev? The evidence is conflicting. With one exception the official biographies simply say that from 1930 to 1935 he worked, and also studied at a metallurgical institute in his home town of Dnieprodzerzhinsk. The exception is an entry in the *Yearbook* of the Soviet Encyclopedia for 1962 which says that "In 1930-31 [he] studied at the Agricultural Institute in Moscow." The ambiguity is significant, for 1931 was not only the moment of truth when the party realized the cost of pushing

[8]As cited in K. Kellen, *Khrushchev: A Political Portrait* (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 35.
[9]L. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1960), pp. 378-390.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

through collectivization regardless of human suffering; it was also the year when Brezhnev became a member of the party.

Why did he go to Moscow? What happened to him there? Why did he leave under circumstances amounting to an abrupt change of professions? And what motivated him to enter the party? Again, we must fall back on circumstantial evidence. The agricultural institute in Moscow which Brezhnev attended is presumably the Timiryazeff Academy, in the northwest suburbs of the city—one of the *Grandes Ecoles* of Soviet power, and an intellectual establishment of no mean standing, under a different name, before the Revolution. Admission to it was an accomplishment for a young provincial surveyor and minor official. A degree from this academy would put its holder on the path to higher positions in the state bureaucracy. Yet Brezhnev failed to obtain a degree and chose to disregard its advantages in order to work his way through a provincial industrial college.

The *Yearbook* does not tell us whether Brezhnev joined the party in Moscow or later in Dnieprodzerzhinsk. It merely says "He entered the Party in 1931." Since the party requires a period of twelve months as a candidate before membership is accorded, the presumption is that Brezhnev made his decision either in Moscow or even earlier, in Sverdlovsk at the time he was selected to attend the Timiryazeff Academy. Quite possibly the two things were connected. At that time the party was pursuing a conscious policy of training a new generation of socialist intelligentsia of proletarian origins to replace the older intelligentsia whom it regarded as still tainted by their past and therefore unreliable for the stresses of Stalin's program of forced-draft industrialization. Party membership was more than doubled between 1928 and 1933, and its social composition was profoundly changed. In January 1929 a Central Committee directive required that 90 per cent of all party recruits from industrial areas and 70 per cent from rural areas should be workers in production. In April 1930 workers actually engaged in production were to form nearly half of the party.[10] Brezhnev was one of the many who benefited from the changes by gaining entree to the training he sought.

Whether Brezhnev joined the party from conviction or from more practical motives is not a fair question. At the time the two were probably mutually reinforcing for any young man of working-class origins with the interest and ability for higher education. On the side of conviction there is the consideration, according to

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 435-439.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some versions of the Soviet Encyclopedia *Yearbook,* that he joined the Communist Youth Organization (Komsomol) at nineteen. On the other hand, the year in which he joined, 1923, was one in which the party made vigorous efforts to appeal to young people by adopting measures to improve working conditions for young factory workers and to give them some degree of protection against unemployment by imposing minimum quotas of juveniles on plant management and by instituting a system of factory schools of the kind Brezhnev attended. The organization itself was overhauled and greatly expanded in membership.[11] In the case of the Komsomol, as later in the case of party membership, the timing and circumstances of Brezhnev's entry point more to a practical assessment of what was personally advantageous than to overwhelming ideological commitment.

This is not meant to deny that there was a great fund of innate enthusiasm among Komsomolites and party members in the early days of Soviet power. During the Revolution and the civil war the movement was small and militant; membership involved risk and devotion, often of selfless and heroic proportions. Later, when the Five Year Plan was well launched, there was a more massive wave of enthusiasm, but of a different kind. Young Komsomols were mobilized by the thousands to construct giant industrial combines, to open up Siberia, and to help stamp out illiteracy. This was the peak of inspirational bolshevism, the time when a party member could say and firmly believe, as one of its members later said: "The essential characteristic of the Party is that it is bounded by no laws, it is always extending the realm of the possible until nothing becomes impossible, nothing inadmissible for it, nothing unrealizable."[12] Brezhnev's experience in Siberia involved him in the early phases of this movement, and he appears to have thrived in it and used it to advantage by obtaining the appointment to Moscow. Membership in the party was a logical next step. But something went wrong, at least in Brezhnev's case.

It has been suggested that his switch from agriculture to industry was of Brezhnev's own choosing.[13] The supposition is that he acted from essentially opportunistic motives, recognizing that rural life under conditions of collectivization might prove not on-

[11]M. Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 244, 245.

[12]Yu. Piatakov, as cited in Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union,* p. 381.

[13]H. F. Achminov, *Breschnew und Kosygin: die Neuen Manner im Kreml?* (Diessen/Ammersee: W. V. Tucker, 1964).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ly nasty and brutish, but extremely short. Industry, on the other hand, was clearly the wave of the future. On the basis of this no doubt sound assessment, Brezhnev sacrificed the benefits and prestige of a Moscow education for the longer-term advantages of professional qualifications in industry, even though obtained in the provinces. The argument is plausible, but not fully convincing. Having invested two years in training a promising young man as an agronomist at the foremost institution in the country, it is strange that the appropriate governmental department, to say nothing of the party, would be willing to see him lost to his profession, at a time when agriculture desperately needed qualified personnel, simply to satisfy his own predilections.

A more likely line of speculation is that the change was made primarily for the convenience of someone other than Brezhnev; someone who could have been either a relatively impersonal bureaucrat concerned with cadre requirements for specific program needs, or some senior official either already in Dnieprodzerzhinsk or on his way there whose eye was caught by Brezhnev.

A third possibility — given the atmosphere in Moscow, and in the schools in particular — is that Brezhnev found himself on the wrong side of a political debate, and was dismissed from the academy. In this case, it would have been natural for him to turn to the area he knew best, where he presumably had personal friends, to recoup as best he could in another and potentially more promising field.

On the evidence at hand it is difficult to exclude any of these hypotheses, or indeed any combination of them. Several considerations tend to point in the direction of the bureaucratic explanation. The spirit and practice of the times were clearly attuned to mobilization in the military sense. The internal war in the countryside had riddled the party's ranks. A lowered standard of living in the towns was followed by absenteeism among workers, resulting in repressive measures, direction of labor and strict factory discipline. In 1932 internal passports were introduced, and the party as well as industrial management had accustomed itself to dispose of its technicians as well as its workers as the military disposed of troops. Combined with this was the consideration that Dnieprodzerzhinsk had been the subject of a special Central Committee resolution in 1929 providing for the development and further expansion of its steel works.[14] Brezhnev's

[14] *Bol'shaya Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* (Second edition), XIV, 574, 575.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

record as a qualified worker with the proper proletarian background, experience with the plant and its people, and demonstrated ability in professional work might have been enough in themselves to result in transfer "at the convenience of the government." Finally, there is the point that a purge of the party, undertaken in January 1933, resulted in some 800,000 members being dropped out of a total strength of just over 3.5 million. Had Brezhnev stumbled in Moscow it is unlikely that he would have survived the purge, particularly as the many new members taken during the rapid expansion after 1928 were the first to go.

Whatever the causes, the fact is that in 1931 Brezhnev returned to Dnieprodzerzhinsk, where he remained until 1935, "studying at the Metallurgical Institute," according to the latest Soviet biographic sketch. Earlier versions add that he worked concurrently in the local steel mill. In this same year — 1931 — another student from one of the Moscow academies also failed to complete his full course of study, although for a different reason. Following a purge of right-wing oppositionists, in which he played a role as informer, Nikita Khrushchev was appointed to head the party unit in the district of Moscow where his academy was located, and within six months he added to it the party leadership of another and even more important district. Unlike Brezhnev, Khrushchev's time at the academy served to launch him directly into the world of Moscow politics.[15]

The Move into Management

Over the next ten years, Brezhnev would do the same, but by a slower route. Until 1935, so far as we know, he continued to study and work — no easy task under conditions of the first Five Year Plan — and in 1935 he successfully completed his course. By doing so, Brezhnev qualified himself for membership in a new generation of party officials who, unlike their predecessors, have substantive technical educations. He also is one of those who experienced the stresses of forced industrialization while actually occupied in production. Although a party member at this time, he was apparently not functioning as a full-time party organizer.

Brezhnev seems to have found time during these years for some personal life. Judging from the ages of his children, he must have been married by 1932 or 1933, and his daughter was born soon

[15]L. Pistrak, *The Grand Tactician: Khrushchev's Rise to Power* (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 57-67.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thereafter. A son followed later, and a second son was born toward the end of World War II.[16]

Information on Brezhnev's activities after his graduation in 1935 is contradictory. The latest Soviet biography (in the 1968 *Kommunist Spravochnik Kalendar*) has him doing military service after graduation, followed in 1937-1938 by a position as director of a technical high school in Dnieprodzerzhinsk and service on the city council. Earlier versions (1961 Soviet Encyclopedia *Yearbook*) fail to mention military service — an unusual omission for any politician — and merely say that he worked as an engineer from 1935 until 1937. The *Politicheskii Slovar'* published in 1958 also fails to mention military service, but adds the information that he "worked as an engineer at the F. E. Dzerzhinski Factory," the mill in Dnieprodzerzhinsk.[17]

The Soviet sources tend to agree that 1938 marked the beginning of Brezhnev's career as a full-time party organizer, first as chief of a section and later as one of the secretaries of the Dniepropetrovsk Regional Party Committee. This change is one of the turning points in Brezhnev's life. To be city councilman in Dnieprodzerzhinsk (population 120,000) is one thing; to be a section chief in the effective seat of power — the party *apparat* — of one of the major industrial regions of the USSR, with a population of more than two million, is quite another. Positions on a city council in the USSR are often given to technicians, school directors, and outstanding workers. They are there as window dressing, and, when they possess professional skills, to provide appropriate advice if asked. They are not participants in the political process, and they are not expected to play an active role in the actual conduct of government. A party official at the regional level is a man with a grasp on the real sources of power. Through his chief, the party leader in the region, he wields a substantial measure of authority in interpreting directives from the central party authority, located in this case in Kiev and through it in Moscow. He has the power to recommend appointment and dismissal, and carries a heavy burden of responsibility for controlling and verifying the fulfillment of economic, political and social tasks assigned to the region.

The cause of this sudden change in Brezhnev's fortunes is clear

[16]Information on Brezhnev's wife and children is scanty, but the little there is tends to be consistent. I have used Page, *The Day Khrushchev Fell*, pp. 180-181, as a handy summary.

[17]B. N. Ponomarev, editor, *Politicheskii Slovar'* (Second edition; Moscow: Politizdat, 1958), p. 56.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when we look at developments in the party in the late 1930's. The purge trials, begun by Stalin after Kirov's murder in 1934, reached their peak in 1936-1938. In August and November of 1936, in January and June of 1937, and in February-March of 1938 trials took place in Moscow of leading party officials who were duly sentenced and executed or imprisoned for long terms. A comparable process was taking place throughout the party at lower levels, resulting in such a massive turnover that by 1939 at the Nineteenth Party Congress only 19 per cent of the delegates were those who had joined the party before World War I, as compared with 81 per cent at the 1934 congress. This process was particularly marked in the Ukraine, where almost all of the higher officials serving in 1937 were replaced by the end of 1938 by persons who had previously been too obscure for public notice.[18] Brezhnev was one such person.

The purge of the Ukraine was carried out by a man with whom Brezhnev's career would henceforth be closely associated. In January 1938 Nikita Khrushchev arrived in Kiev as party boss of the Ukrainian Republic. By June he had assumed a position in the Republic comparable to that occupied by Stalin at the All-Union level: He was the ranking member of the Ukrainian Politbureau, Orgbureau and Secretariat, and had personal control of the Kiev regional and city party organizations. He used his position to install his own men in the apparatus, and he and they proceeded to raise up a new generation of younger party officials throughout the Republic. Khrushchev's predecessor in the Ukraine, Postyshev, was dropped from the CPSU Politbureau later in the year, purged from the party, and subsequently shot. Most of his colleagues who were removed by Khrushchev suffered a similar fate, so much so that Khrushchev, who had recently lost his first wife, became familiarly known as the "Bloody Widower of the Ukraine."[19]

Three aspects of this affair are worthy of note insofar as Brezhnev is concerned. The first is that there is no clear evidence that he had an active role to play in the actual purges; as a technician and holder of a largely honorific position in a city government, he was probably not in a position to do so even if he had wanted to. At the most, he might have been able to participate in the wave of denunciations on which many of the purge trials were

[18]J. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus* (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 6.

[19]Khrushchev's rule in the Ukraine is relatively well documented. I have relied on Kellen, *Khrushchev: A Political Portrait,* and Pistrak, *The Grand Tactician.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

based. There is no indication that he attempted to play such a role. The second consideration is that he clearly benefited from the purge by stepping promptly into the shoes of his fallen superiors in the party hierarchy. The third and most significant aspect of Brezhnev's entry into politics at this time is that he became a part of what was to become one of the most stable and politically cohesive groupings in the Soviet Communist Party — the Ukrainian party apparatus. This grouping is by no means monolithic. But compared with other regional groupings within the party, such as the Leningraders, the Belorussians or the Georgians, it has been far and away the most successful in getting and holding power at the Moscow level.

Brezhnev did well in this group from the start. In 1939, a year after embarking on full-time political work at the managerial level, he was appointed first secretary of the Dniepropetrovsk region. He held the position until he was driven from the city by the Germans in 1941.

War and Conquest

Brezhnev spent the war years as a high-level political officer fighting in the Caucasus, the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia. Commissioned a colonel at the outset, he was promoted to major general in 1943. His functional responsibilities were purely political. The Encyclopedia *Yearbook* (1962) describes him as "Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of a Front; Chief of the Political Directorate of an Army; Chief of the Political Directorate of a Front, later of a Military District." Other versions reveal that the front was the Fourth Ukrainian, and the army the 18th Ukrainian. The military district, at war's end, was the Carpathian, with headquarters at Czernowitz. Brezhnev's fighting was on his home ground — the Ukraine and its approaches.

Brezhnev's status in the party was enhanced by his military service. The 1959 edition of the official *History of the CPSU* described the wartime service of party leaders under three headings: "eminent party figures who were despatched for leading work in the Army," others who "managed the national economy and provided the Red Army with all necessary supplies," and finally, "experienced Party workers who became members of Military Councils of Fronts and Armies." Brezhnev is listed among the regional and Republic party leaders who served in the third category.[20]

[20]B. N. Ponomarev, editor, *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskoyo Soiuza* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1959), p. 526.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Information on Brezhnev's combat experience is scarce, although the units he was with had a high proportion of time in action. In December 1942 he was involved in fighting in the foothills of the northern Caucasus.[21] In 1943 he was mentioned as taking part in a successful amphibious operation near the Black Sea port of Novorossisk. In February 1945 he appears again, in an account of preparations for the reconquest of Czechoslovakia. In the Novorossisk operation he was pulled unconscious from the sea after being blown out of a landing barge, which may possibly make him the only Soviet leader with any practical experience in naval warfare.[22] Otherwise, there is no record of his having been wounded.

In 1968, during the Czechoslovak crisis, Brezhnev is reported to have taken time during the Bratislava meetings with Czechoslovak leaders to visit a military cemetery. He is also said to have wept on at least one occasion during the conference.[23] One of the participants on the Czech side was General Ludvik Svoboda, at the time President of Czechoslovakia. In 1945 Svoboda commanded the Czech First Army Corps fighting under the command of the 18th Ukrainian Army in which Brezhnev was chief political officer. Marshal Grechko, whom Brezhnev made his Minister of Defense in 1965, served on the same front.[24]

In describing preparations for the Czechoslovak campaign in 1945, the Soviet official history of the war notes that "the Party-political work of the 18th Ukrainian Army, whose Chief Political Officer was Major General L. I. Brezhnev, was distinguished for its variety and political effectiveness." A subsequent paragraph then quotes some remarks by an older enlisted man, who happened to come from the area, as an example of the spirit animating the troops. "In the First World War under Brusilov," the old soldier said, "we almost took that hill over there, but we didn't make it. Now, after thirty years, I'm getting another chance and I don't intend to stop until we've finished off Hitler Germany."[25]

In June 1945 the Soviet High Command ordered all Soviet troops out of Czechoslovakia, with the exception of certain forces

[21] *Sovetskii Dagestan,* No. 5, 1967, p. 31.

[22] *Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny,* six volumes (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960-1965), III, 95.

[23] *New York Times,* August 4, 1968, p. 3.

[24] *Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny,* V, 301.

[25] *Ibid.,* p. 304.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

left in the Sudetenland. The system of Soviet military Kommandaturas was abolished. It was presumably at this time that Brezhnev was transferred to the military district headquarters in Czernowitz, where he stayed until sometime in 1946.[26]

Managing the politico-military affairs of the Carpathian Military District offered an experience that was novel for most Soviet leaders of Brezhnev's generation. The district included two areas that had never really been sovietized: the former Czechoslovak territory of Ruthenia and the part of Rumania known as Northern Bukovina. Their incorporation in 1945 into the Soviet Ukraine involved a thorough economic and social upheaval, including the nationalization of property and businesses, the collectivization of agriculture, and related political changes. The result, of course, was a large measure of civil unrest, including the operation of partisan bands and other forms of armed resistance.

Regional Power and National Prominence

For Brezhnev, the postwar years until the death of Stalin in 1953 brought hard work and steady progress. Major regional assignments in his native Dnieper area were rewarded in 1950 by two years as the party boss of the Moldavian Republic. In 1952, at the last party congress before Stalin's death, Brezhnev moved to Moscow and assignments which meant membership in the elite. The key to his success was without much doubt a close relationship to Nikita Khrushchev.

In November 1943 the Germans were driven from Kiev, and Soviet power was re-established in the Ukraine. The problems — both human and material — were enormous: the re-establishment of order in a population emerging from over two years of intensified brutalization by the Gestapo, and the reconstruction of an economy ransacked by the retreating German forces. During 1945 and 1946 Khrushchev carried out a process of testing, discarding and selectively promoting party cadres in the Ukraine. The result, in Brezhnev's case, was favorable. In the fall of 1946 he was appointed first secretary of Zaporozhia, an industrial region of 1.5 million people on the Dnieper between Dniepropetrovsk and the Black Sea.

[26]Emigré source to author. Official biographies indicate that Brezhnev served as a political officer in a military district at the end of the war, but they do not state which one.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Today, Zaporozhia is one of the major industrial regions of the USSR, producing aluminum, high-grade steels and a variety of machinery. A hydroelectric station is one of the showplaces of its kind, and the port facilities make the town an important center of rail and water transport. The surrounding region is a rich agricultural area in the black-earth belt. In 1946 the area may have been important to Khrushchev for another reason. Its agricultural-machinery plants produced the equipment desperately needed to get the breadbasket of the USSR into production again. The drought that struck the Ukraine in 1946 also hit Khrushchev and his followers politically. He and they survived, but for several months in the spring and summer of 1947 it was a near thing. It is not inconceivable that Brezhnev's ability in organizing the industrial backing needed for even minimum performance on the agricultural front helped turn the tide. By the winter of 1947-1948 Khrushchev's fortunes were again on the rise, and in December 1947 he was restored to full authority in the Ukrainian party apparatus, following a brief period of close supervision by his chief and long-time patron from the Moscow party apparatus, Lazar Kaganovich.

A month earlier, in November 1947, Brezhnev had been shifted from Zaporozhia. His new assignment was upstream, as party leader of the Dniepropetrovsk region. Brezhnev had held this position in 1941. But the region had changed. In 1939 the population of its principal city, also called Dniepropetrovsk, had been around 500,000. During the war nearly half of its industry was destroyed, and the people battered and decimated. By the end of the 1950's the city had been rebuilt, its industry restored and greatly expanded, and its population increased to over 700,000. The output from five steel mills and other plants included a significant percentage of the USSR's steel capacity, a wide range of finished steel products, heavy industrial equipment, and quite possibly a number of strategic defense items. Thermal power plants and rail and water transport facilities completed the picture. The foundations for this rebirth and expansion were laid under Brezhnev's rule.

In the spring of 1950 Brezhnev moved up again, this time to the national level. In December 1949 his chief, Khrushchev, left Kiev to return to Moscow as party chief of the Moscow region and as a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Brezhnev followed him for a brief period in the Central Committee apparatus, where he presumably familiarized himself with the larger considerations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

related to his next assignment — party leader of one of the sixteen Union Republics making up the USSR.

The Rumanian province of Bessarabia, called Moldavia by Russians and Ukrainians, is a rich prize. For an empire short of good agricultural land it is doubly desirable; the soil is fertile, the climate benign and the rainfall adequate. For centuries it has supplied distant imperial centers — Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman and Slav — with grain, fruit and wine. In 1945 it came again under Muscovite control when it was brought into the Soviet Union as the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldavia. In 1950 its 2.7 million people were over 60 per cent non-Slav, mostly Rumanian. Nominally 80 per cent collectivized in the preceding five years, its agriculture remained depressed and its farmers hostile to Soviet power.[27] In June 1950 a CPSU Central Committee decree formalized charges in the press against party officials in the Republic who had failed to push through the socialization of agriculture and to extract from it the return Moscow thought feasible and necessary.[28]

In July 1950 Brezhnev was sent to complete the conquest — a task he carried out with dispatch. Within six months collectivization had been completed and "the Kulaks had been liquidated as a class."[29] Brezhnev introduced sharper penalties for economic crimes and moved vigorously against resistance groups cooperating with like-minded groupings in adjacent provinces of the western Ukraine. Popular disaffection continued to occupy him during his tour in the Republic. In March 1951, at a congress of the Moldavian party, he devoted a large section of his report as first secretary to shortcomings in political education and means to overcome them. He then put into effect a series of cadre changes designed to strengthen his personal authority in the Moldavian party apparatus. (Some of the men whom he brought in from the Ukrainian party apparatus later followed him to Moscow and are with him today.)

The following year, in October 1952, Brezhnev reported to the Nineteenth Party Congress in Moscow on his stewardship. After outlining the accomplishments of the Republic, he pressed for a higher level of capital investment by the central government in Moldavian industry, in particular its food-processing facilities; asked for support in expanding the building trades and housing

[27]Achminov, *Breschnew und Kosygin*, pp. 35, 36.
[28]L. P. Repida, "Poebeda Sotsializma v Moldavii," in S. P. Trapeznikov, editor, *Istoriia Moldavskoi SSR* (Kishenev: Kartea Moldovenskaiia, 1968), II, 579-580.
[29]A. L. Odud, *Moldavskaya SSR* (Moscow: Geografizdat, 1955), p. 70.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

construction; and outlined measures for the elimination of illiteracy and an expansion of higher education facilities.[30]

Brezhnev's years in the provinces and at the national level in Moldavia gave him a thorough background in the problems of regional administration. He knows industry, and he knows labor. He has city-ward experience in urban problems. He has carried the responsibility and seen the consequences of Stalinist agricultural policy at the grass roots in two of the richest farm areas in the USSR. And he has experience in working with ethnic minority groups.

The Stalin Succession and the Military

Between 1952 and 1954 Brezhnev lived and worked in Moscow at the center of Soviet power. In the last year of Stalin's rule he moved rapidly upward. He was set back following the dictator's death, but survived the Malenkov interregnum in an apparently modest position which may have been important in his patron Khrushchev's relations with the military.

In October 1952 a party congress took place — the nineteenth of its kind and the last of Stalin's reign. The aging dictator used it, it now seems clear, to set the stage for what was to have been a major housecleaning in the upper ranks of the Soviet leadership. The top policymaking body of the party, the Presidium, was enlarged from ten to twenty-five members, plus eleven candidate-members. Stalin's purpose, many observers now feel, was to dilute the power of its original members and reduce the potential of the body as a whole as a forum for opposition to him. The new men brought into the Presidium were being positioned by Stalin to serve as replacements when their seniors were removed. The party's executive arm, its Secretariat, was recast and expanded. Its ten members selected at the congress were balanced between supporters of Malenkov, then heir apparent to Stalin, and Khrushchev, who had lately begun to display an increasing level of activity in a sphere formerly dominated by Malenkov — the supervision of party organization and cadres. The Central Committee, the party's parliament, was also expanded to nearly twice its former size. Its 236 members and candidates included a strongly increased representation of regional party secretaries.

Brezhnev was involved in these changes. He arrived at the congress as a Republic party secretary, one of sixteen in the USSR,

[30]Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, pp. 519, 520.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but not a figure in the central leadership. Moreover, he had no experience at the All-Union level, aside from a few months in 1950 spent in the Secretariat apparatus presumably preparing for his Moldavian assignment. In the reshuffle at the congress he became a full member of the Central Committee, a candidate-member of its Presidium, and one of its ten secretaries. It was a big jump.

The division of functions among Presidium members and Central Committee secretaries is seldom revealed officially. Little is known of the nature and extent of Brezhnev's duties on these bodies following the Nineteenth Party Congress. He was promptly replaced as first secretary of the Moldavian party by his deputy. But he remained a member of the Moldavian party bureau until June 1953, indicating that he may have retained some responsibility over the region from the Moscow level. He had also served on the credentials commission at the Nineteenth Party Congress.

Most of Stalin's additions to the Presidium and the Secretariat in 1952 were dropped in the reshuffle following his death in March 1953. Brezhnev lost his positions in both bodies, but remained a Central Committee member, and was given a substantive assignment as deputy to the chief of the main Political Administration in the Ministry of Defense. At the outset he appears to have been responsible for political control of the navy, followed later by wider responsibilities for all of the services as first deputy to the chief of the Administration. During 1953 he was promoted from his wartime rank of major general to lieutenant general. The position was nominally a drop in standing from his former party positions. In actuality, the nature of his new responsibilities, given the circumstances after Stalin's death, may have increased his value to his patron, Khrushchev.[31]

Success in the maneuvering among Khrushchev, Malenkov and Beria in the months after Stalin's death hinged on attitudes within the armed forces. Stalin had relied increasingly in his later years on Beria's police as an instrument of rule. The first question facing a potential successor, other than Beria, was whether it was desirable to continue this practice, and if not, what alternative method to adopt. Given the nature of Soviet power, it was obvious that the military was the only realistic alternative as an ultimate justification for the regime. And in practice, the resolution of the succession crisis revolved around the military, first in the elimina-

[31] R. Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 244.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of Beria in June 1953, followed by the gradual ascendancy of Khrushchev over Malenkov in the ensuing months on a program of renewed commitment to heavy industry and a high level of defense spending.[32] Each of these phases required an understanding of some kind with the military leaders and an accurate assessment of attitudes within the professional officer corps. Brezhnev was well placed to report on such attitudes and could conceivably have served as a channel of communication with key military figures.

From Brezhnev's standpoint, the assignment would seem a definite plus — given, of course, the circumstance that his patron, Khrushchev, came out on top. He had refurbished and extended his connection, dating from wartime, with an important segment of the Soviet Establishment. He had significantly broadened his functional experience. And he had cushioned his setback after the death of Stalin by at least remaining in Moscow in a position offering some proximity to the reality, if not the formality, of power. As an example of technique, the episode reveals a quality displayed by Brezhnev on several occasions in his career — the ability to cut his losses in adversity, to sacrifice appearances while holding on to substantive advantages, and to come out on the winning side.

The Virgin Lands

From 1954 until 1956 Brezhnev returned to regional affairs as Khrushchev's viceroy in the Central Asian Republic of Kazakhstan. The assignment was a critical decision for Khrushchev. Having recently triumphed over his principal rival, Malenkov, he had staked his political fortunes in the early spring of 1954 on a vast program of agrarian expansion popularly known as the Virgin Lands program. His purpose was to repair with one stroke a chronic and increasingly serious shortage of grain. His method was a crash expansion of the USSR's arable land by bringing under the plow for the first time vast areas of Central Asia and Siberia. The selection of Brezhnev to carry out this technically uncertain and politically risky gamble testifies to Khrushchev's assessment of his ability and personal loyalty.

By Stalin's death in 1953, the consequences of mismanagement in Soviet agriculture had reached the point where they seriously

[32]Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled,* p. 482, summarizes the main elements in the situation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

threatened the stability of the regime. During a period — from 1928 to 1953 — when the number of urban consumers increased by 50 million people, gross agricultural production rose only 7 per cent and the output of livestock products actually declined. In 1953 the per capita harvest of grain products was 435 kilograms — 106 kilograms less than in 1913; while the amount of marketed grain produce stood at 35,800,000 tons — 2.5 million tons less than in 1940.[33] The consequences of this situation were an increasingly sharp struggle within Soviet society for a share in the relatively diminished supply of basic materials of which agriculture is the ultimate source, and a slow, inexorable rise of almost tidal proportions in the level of popular discontent. It was obvious to Stalin's successors that something had to be done.

Khrushchev's solution was characteristically bold and unorthodox. He simply expanded the frame of the problem by expanding the area under cultivation. To do so, he had to take risks. First, risks of a technical nature: No one knew for sure whether the areas immediately accessible for such an expansion would produce the desired results. They were grasslands occupied for centuries by nomadic herdsmen. Many scientists argued that plowing would result in a dustbowl of colossal proportions. Second, the project involved a mass migration of Slavs into non-Slav lands of the Union. No one knew precisely what the consequences would be for the hitherto successful attempt to hold together what was in fact a multinational empire.

The job could be summed up in three words: land, men, machines. Brezhnev knew all three. He had been trained as a land-utilization expert. He had a solid background in top-level regional management of important agricultural districts. He had worked with national minorities and had coped, to Moscow's satisfaction, with the task of restructuring a predominantly non-Slav, and as yet unsovietized, social system. He knew industry; not only heavy industry, but also the machine-building industry, including those parts of it producing the agricultural machinery he would vitally need. Perhaps most important of all, he had the backing and personal confidence of Nikita Khrushchev.

He also had problems. To begin, he was not formally in charge. The man who was, P. K. Ponomarenko, was a party official whose rise and fall in the bureaucracy had paralleled Malenkov's. On February 7, 1954, Ponomarenko had been named first secretary of

[33]S. Ploss, *Conflict and Decision Making in Soviet Russia: A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953-1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 27, 75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Kazakh party, and Brezhnev had been named second secretary. On February 8 Malenkov had asked to be relieved as Premier of the USSR and had criticized his own performance, his self-criticism including the acceptance of responsibility for shortcomings in agriculture. Khrushchev had nominated Bulganin to replace Malenkov as Premier. We do not know where Ponomarenko stood in these changes, nor do we know anything of his relations with Brezhnev. We do know that Brezhnev applied himself effectively to the problems at hand, and within less than a year had replaced Ponomarenko — who was relegated to a diplomatic post — as first secretary of Kazakhstan.

Brezhnev's second big problem involved Soviet nationality policy. The traditional pattern of party control in non-Slav regions of the USSR was the appointment of a native as first secretary of the local party *apparat,* with a Russian as his deputy. This was the pattern in Kazakhstan, where the party leader of some years' standing, Shayakhmetov, was well entrenched. He and his Russian deputy, Afonov, had been brought to Moscow in the spring of 1954 to discuss Khrushchev's proposals. Both maintained that the projected budget of 600-650 million rubles was too low, and the expected time for results of one to two years too short.[34] In Shayakhmetov's case, the reservations probably reflected a deeper reservation about the social and political consequences of the project. As proposed, it involved an influx of 70,000 young people from European Russia and the Ukraine. The actual number, in terms of population transfer, could be expected to exceed this figure many times, as it in fact did. The result would be a Russification of Kazakhstan as well as a conversion of what had been a nomadic Muslim society with a Soviet veneer into a genuinely sovietized Republic based on collectivized grain farming. The consequences for the native Kazakhs, as well as their land, were immense.

Both Shayakhmetov and Afonov were purged. The Virgin Lands program was put through on schedule. Between 1954 and 1955 over 350,000 young people were moved to the Virgin Lands from Russia and the Ukraine. Over 200,000 tractors and thousands of pieces of agricultural machinery and equipment were brought in. Four hundred twenty-five state farms were created, machine tractor stations established, warehouses and grain elevators built, and thousands of miles of road and railroad constructed. In three years, over 36 million hectares of new land were

[34] *Ibid.,* p. 86.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

brought into use.[35] When the regular ten-year census was taken in 1959, it showed that by that year only 29 per cent of the population in Kazakhstan were still Kazakhs; the remainder were predominantly Russian and Ukrainian.

The grain crisis was solved, at least for the moment. In 1955 the Virgin Lands project resulted in a 6 per cent increase of total Soviet grain production over the 1949-1953 average, in spite of drought conditions and a poor harvest in the Volga basin and the Ukraine.[36] But the solution was not permanent. By 1963 the counterproductive effects of farming steppe land had begun to tell. In November 1963 the then party leader of Kazakhstan admitted that the grain yield per hectare had fallen by half, to 3.6 centners per hectare during 1963, as against 6 in 1962 and 6.7 in 1961. Descriptions of dust-bowl conditions appeared in leading Soviet journals, and in 1964 Khrushchev, in an interview with an Italian publisher, admitted that the Virgin Lands scheme had been a "stopgap" maneuver until some more lasting solution could be found.[37]

Brezhnev had demonstrated the requisite combination of managerial ability and political acumen. Had he failed in either respect, the consequences for Khrushchev might have been final. Khrushchev's struggle with Malenkov had turned on the issue of resource allocation. Malenkov had been defeated in 1954 and subsequently rusticated to a minor managerial post. But his supporters remained in the Soviet leadership until 1957. Had the Virgin Lands program failed, they would have had Khrushchev's head, and rightly so, as the man responsible for an error costing billions of rubles. The national minorities question was less apparent, but potentially of equal or greater seriousness. In the immediate post-Stalin period Beria had sought support in his struggle with Khrushchev by a policy of concessions to the national minorities. Beria was dead and gone. But non-Slavs still made up nearly half of the population of the USSR. A spectacular explosion of resentment by the displaced Kazakhs of Central Asia could have had serious repercussions not only for Khrushchev, but for the whole structure of Soviet power. At the least, it would have raised obstacles to Khrushchev's foreign policy objectives among the less developed countries, an area to which Brezhnev was now to turn.

[35]Ponomarev, *Istoriia KPSS*, 1959 edition, p. 634.
[36]Ploss, *Conflict and Decision Making in Soviet Russia*, p. 97.
[37]R. Conquest, *Russia After Khrushchev* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 91.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

High Office and Heir Apparent

Brezhnev returned to Moscow in February 1956. Election in the same month by the Twentieth Party Congress to candidate membership in the party Presidium and assignment as a secretary to the Central Committee meant a return to the upper echelon of Soviet power. This elite, to which he had been admitted for a brief period before Stalin's death, and of which he was now again a part, numbers less than a thousand people, including dependents. Brezhnev was to remain in it, despite some ups and downs as a high-level troubleshooter for Khrushchev, for the next eight years.

De-Stalinization came in 1956 and so did its consequences in Eastern Europe — the Poznan riots, the Polish October and the Hungarian rebellion. In the fall of 1955 Tito and Khrushchev exchanged a series of visits intended, it now seems clear, to engage Tito's help in defusing the situation in Hungary. Brezhnev attended at least one of these meetings, in Yalta, together with Gero, then party leader in Hungary; Kirichenko, the Ukrainian first secretary; Furtseva, his colleague on the Presidium; and Serov, the Soviet security chief.[38] What role he played is unknown. Possibly he had responsibilities for cadre matters relating to the Ukraine and other western borderlands of the USSR. Or he may have been asked for advice on attitudes among the Asian communist parties, having returned in April from his first assignment abroad as head of a delegation to the North Korean party's Third Congress.

The explosion in Eastern Europe, when it came, shook the foundations of the communist world. It also shook Khrushchev. But it did not topple him. At the December 1956 Plenum of the Central Committee, his protégé, Shepilov, was dismissed as Foreign Minister. Other supporters, including those in the party apparatus, like Brezhnev, remained unscathed. Brezhnev's personal views in this affair are not known. Presumably he shared those of his chief.

Brezhnev shared in the challenges and triumphs experienced by Khrushchev in 1957. The record grain harvest of 1956 encouraged Khrushchev to push ahead with domestic reforms in spite of growing political opposition. At a February meeting of the Central Committee he announced a major decentralization of economic management through creation of regional economic councils (*Sovnarkhozy*) which had the effect of raising the role of top party

[38]Tito's account of the meeting is in *Borba*, November 16, 1956. An English translation is in P. Zimmer, editor, *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organs at the expense of the authority formerly enjoyed by the central governmental organs. On March 12 he called for a crash solution to the chronic livestock problem, and on May 22 fixed a target date of 1961 for overtaking the United States in per capita production of meat and milk. The unvoiced corollary was a shift in the allocation of resources from heavy industry to agriculture. Both moves served to crystallize resentment against him in the party Presidium.

The showdown came in June. Outvoted seven to four in the Presidium, Khrushchev appealed to the Central Committee. With the help of the military he summoned a surprise meeting of the Central Committee and reversed the decision. His opponents, led by Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich — thereafter christened the Anti-Party Group — were discredited and eventually eliminated from high party positions. In their place he installed, in addition to Marshal Zhukov, his associates Furtseva, Aristov, Belyaev, Brezhnev, Ignatov, Kozlov, Kuusinen, and Shvernik.[39]

It had been a near thing. Concessions had had to be made to the military in terms of loosened political controls, and to the heavy-industrial advocates, such as Kozlov, Suslov and Bulganin (who alone among the conspirators remained on the Presidium).

Brezhnev's role in this affair is instructive. The details of his involvement are unknown, but the significance may be inferred from one central fact: he was on the winning side, and he was on it in a situation where men with more experience than he in Presidium politics had guessed wrong. Why? Two factors suggest themselves: Brezhnev's background and the changing nature of the Soviet polity. The substantive issues involved the allocation of resources among industry, agriculture and defense. But the key to a political resolution of the problem no longer rested in the Presidium. It had shifted downward into the Central Committee, in which the balance of power is held by regional-level party leaders plus added elements from the emerging interest-group structure of Soviet society — primarily the professional military, and to a lesser extent the enterprise managers. Brezhnev knew all three, not only at the top, but also at the regional and working levels, to which political power in the USSR was now shifting.

Brezhnev's new status as full Presidium member brought a growing range of assignments. In July 1957 he is known to have taken part in meetings with Hodja, Kardelj and Rankovic; then

[39]M. Fainsod, "What Happened to Collective Leadership?," in *Russia Under Khrushchev: An Anthology from "Problems of Communism"* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 109, 110.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with Zhivkov; and later with Kardelj and Rankovic.[40] In 1958 he was made a deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau, the office within the party Secretariat responsible for party affairs in Russia, as distinct from other republics of the Union.[41] In January 1959, at the Twenty-first Party Congress, he chaired a discussion of developments in the Virgin Lands, indicating a continuing interest in the project. It is difficult to say to what extent this pattern of assignments in foreign and domestic affairs represented a cumulative acquisition of power, and to what extent it was simply high-level troubleshooting for Khrushchev. Possibly there was a good measure of both. In either case, the effect was a significant expansion of Brezhnev's status in the power structure, a status publicly acknowledged on April 22, 1959, when he was selected to deliver the keynote address on Lenin's birthday.

Brezhnev's rising influence paralleled the political fortunes of his chief. In retrospect, Khrushchev's best year may well have been 1959. He had dominated the Twenty-first Party Congress at its outset. In April his sixty-fifth birthday had brought congratulatory tributes reminiscent of Stalin's cult of personality. Domestically, his hopes for a dramatic rise in the output of meat and dairy products were still given credence, and the diminishing returns in Kazakhstan had not yet become fully apparent. Abroad, unrest in Eastern Europe had been brought under control, relations with the West were volatile but on the upgrade, and the rift with China was still no more than a potential for trouble.

In 1960 Khrushchev's fortune changed, and so did Brezhnev's. In the Virgin Lands a diminishing rate of return had set in and difficulties were piling up. In January Brezhnev presided over the relief of his successor Belyayev, ritually charged by Brezhnev with the usual shortcomings. On May 4 the U-2 affair burst on the scene, unsettling the country and reversing a promising trend toward improved relations with the United States. Three days later the Soviet parliament, then in session, accepted the resignation of the aging Voroshilov as chief of state and elected Brezhnev to replace him. It was not clear at the time whether the move to what was traditionally a figurehead position also involved the loss of Brezhnev's party posts. Later, it became known that the move included a reshuffle in the leading party organs, resulting within a matter of months in a loss of positions by several of Khrushchev's supporters. Brezhnev remained a Presidium member but sacri-

[40] *Pravda,* July 19, 1957; *New York Times,* July 19, 1957.
[41] Soviet Encyclopedia *Yearbook,* 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ficed his post as party secretary. The beneficiaries of the shuffle, it later appeared, were Frol Kozlov, a heavy industry advocate from the Leningrad party apparatus, and Mikhail Suslov, a hard-line ideologist concerned with interparty relations. Khrushchev and his Ukrainian clique were still predominant in the upper leadership. But the rosy days of 1959 were gone. Henceforward, they would face an increasingly difficult struggle requiring constant maneuver and compromise to keep afloat.

As chief of state for the next four years, Brezhnev carried a heavy schedule of ceremonial functions. The visits abroad gave him a needed awareness of noncommunist areas. (The beginning was hardly auspicious. On a trip to North Africa in January 1961 the French Air Force, then in its Algerian agony, buzzed and fired on his plane.) Later tours were less dangerous and no doubt served to widen the horizons of a man whose only previous experience of the noncommunist world had been the military landscape and war-ravaged population of Eastern Europe. In 1961 he visited Morocco, Guinea, Ghana, Sudan and India, saw Finland, and headed a delegation to Czechoslovakia. In 1962 he visited Belgrade to pave the way for another visit by Khrushchev and again headed a delegation to Czechoslovakia. In 1963 he went to Cambodia, Afghanistan, and on a state visit to Iran, and again visited Czechoslovakia. In 1964, a week before Khrushchev's fall, he represented the USSR at the fifteenth anniversary celebrations of Ulbricht's regime in East Berlin.

Other members of the Brezhnev family benefited from this exposure to the world. Mrs. Brezhnev made the trip to Iran, and the daughter, Galina, pleased the world press by appearing with her father in Belgrade dressed in the latest styles. One of the sons, Yuri, has traveled abroad as a member of foreign trade missions.

These ceremonial duties did not prevent Brezhnev from continuing to troubleshoot for Khrushchev in many areas. In May 1960 he participated in a meeting of secretaries of primary party organizations in the army and spoke forcefully on the need to carry out the decisions of an October 1957 Central Committee plenum on the restoration of Leninist norms, i.e., political control, in the army.[42] (The plenum had removed Marshal Zhukov from power for refusal to comply with the party's decision on political control in the armed forces.)

Rocketry and the Soviet man-in-space program also occupied

[42]Yu. P. Petrov, *Partinoe Stroitel'stvo v Sovetskoi Armii i Flote, 1918-1961* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), pp. 497, 498.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Brezhnev's attention. In June 1961, two months after Gagarin completed the world's first flight in space, Brezhnev was awarded the Hero of Socialist Labor medal for "outstanding service in the development of rocket technology and the successful flight of a Soviet man in space."[43]

During 1962 Brezhnev rendered loyal support to Khrushchev in the mounting quarrel with China and in domestic political problems. During his visit to Belgrade in September 1962 he put forward faithfully the Khrushchev line against Chinese dogmatism and Yugoslav revisionism. In November, a month after the Cuban missile crisis, Suslov attacked Khrushchev in a Central Committee meeting as a compromiser and "companion of Chamberlain."[44] Brezhnev replied, in effect, at the Czechoslovak Party Congress the following month by vigorously supporting Khrushchev's personal conduct of the crisis. In the same speech he contradicted a speech made by Suslov's ally, Kozlov, the day before in which Kozlov reversed the Khrushchev line that dogmatism rather than revisionism was the main danger.[45]

Brezhnev's actions in the difficult times of 1960-1962 are reminiscent of his style in earlier periods of adversity. There is the same resourcefulness, the same facility in shifting into new fields of substantive interest, and the same steadfast adherence to what turned out to be the winning side.

Brezhnev's loyalty was rewarded in the following year. On May 4, 1963 Kozlov's illness was announced in *Pravda*. A Central Committee plenum scheduled for May 28, on which the conservatives grouped around Suslov and Kozlov appear to have based their hopes for ideological retrenchment, was postponed without explanation until June. Something — possibly fate — had intervened.

When the plenum met in June it restored much of the leverage Khrushchev and his Ukrainian *apparat* had lost in May 1960. Brezhnev and a fellow member of the Ukrainian party *apparat*, Podgorny, were assigned as Central Committee secretaries. The Secretariat, now numbering fourteen members, mostly Khrushchev supporters, exceeded the membership of the Presidium proper. The increase in responsibilities did not prevent Brezhnev from continuing to function as chief of state. In addition to trips abroad, mentioned above, he continued to appear at Moscow functions, including a reception he arranged in July for

[43]Soviet Encyclopedia *Yearbook*, 1962.
[44]Pietromarchi, *The Soviet World*, p. 102.
[45]*Pravda*, December 6, 1962, cited in C. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership: 1957-1964* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 163.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western test-ban negotiators Averell Harriman and Lord Hailsham. Concurrently, his role in Soviet domestic politics again increased. In November Khrushchev told visiting French statesman Guy Mollet that Brezhnev, Podgorny and Polyakov were his possible successors.[46]

Within six months Brezhnev had moved into the lead among the three heirs presumptive. On July 15, 1964 it was announced that old Bolshevik Anastas Mikoyan had replaced Brezhnev as chief of state, thus freeing the younger man "to concentrate on Party matters." His colleague Podgorny had had a year's lead on him in full-time Secretariat work. But he lacked Brezhnev's broad range of substantive experience, and he may possibly have lacked Khrushchev's preference. Podgorny, it now seems likely, was positioned by Khrushchev to serve as a "counter-heir," someone who could keep the heir from falling prey to the temptation to precipitate his own succession.[47]

Leadership, 1964-1968

Khrushchev's replacement by his protégé at a special session of the Central Committee on October 14, 1964 came suddenly, seeming to surprise the victors as much as the vanquished. The shift brought no immediate change of personalities or principles. Initial changes in policy were limited to the abolition of some of Khrushchev's innovations in economic organization and party structure. For the rest, the policy direction of the new leadership seemed more a case of not doing some of the things Khrushchev had intended to do than of initiating new policies. It was not to be long before the Chinese would be calling the new mode "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev."

Changes of personnel which took place in the period 1964-1968 were gradual. When he fell Khrushchev took with him only his personal entourage. The related changes in leading party and government organs amounted to little more than filling the gaps left by Khrushchev's departure. There were no changes in the military. Beginning in 1965 a gradual, almost glacial shift in the balance of forces within the party apparatus took place in favor of Brezhnev. Podgorny, the former "counter-heir" to Brezhnev, was decorously bumped upstairs to fill the vacancy left by easing Mikoyan sidewise out of his position as chief of state, and subse-

[46]F. Stevens, *U.S. News and World Report*, April 27, 1964.

[47]For a discussion of this concept, see M. Rush, *Political Succession in the USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quently out of the party Presidium. Somewhat later the young and excessively vigorous Shelepin was shoved downstairs by abolishing his job as chief of the powerful combined Party-State Control Commission, and later by dropping him from the Secretariat. In due course, Brezhnev supporters from the provinces, mostly former Brezhnev fiefs, began to filter into key jobs in the Secretariat and government. In March 1966 at the Twenty-third Party Congress, Brezhnev's enhanced status was symbolically blessed by granting him the title of General Secretary of the party. The Central Committee which granted him this honor, and which in large part re-elected itself at the Congress, involved less turnover than any preceding body of its kind in the post-Stalin era.[48]

Changes of principle have been even less apparent. Brezhnev's substantive contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory has been nil. Existing programmatic documents whose contents were obviously irrelevant in the atmosphere of gathering conservatism, like the 1961 Party Program, were rendered perfunctory lip service for a period and then ignored. No attempt has been made to revise or refute them. Other plans involving fundamentals, like the draft constitution and the new Collective Farm Statute, have been conveniently forgotten. Brezhnev's chairmanship of the drafting commission for the new constitution, as well as an explicit commitment to produce the constitution in time for the 1967 celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of Soviet power, are no longer mentioned.

After an appropriate interval Brezhnev and his colleague Kosygin embarked on a series of cautious moves designed to renovate the ramshackle structure of Soviet industry and agriculture. In March 1965 Brezhnev proposed the only major policy initiative publicly connected with his name — a rationalization and refinancing of Soviet agriculture. During the discussion, it emerged that Khrushchev's voluntarist measures to raise the productivity of Soviet agriculture in the period 1959-1964 had been in vain. Instead of a 70 per cent growth in agricultural production provided for in the then current Seven Year Plan, the actual growth had been only 10 per cent. The March 1965 plenum passed a resolution providing for the investment of 71 billion rubles in agriculture over the next five years, accompanied by a number of practical, tested measures to improve and expand the area of arable land and to raise incentives

[48]H. Schwartz, "Brezhnev Packs New Central Committee with Supporters from Dnieper," *New York Times,* August 15, 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for the farmers.[49] The program appears to have been solidly based, and for the first few years it resulted, with the help of good weather in 1966, in a perceptible improvement. In October 1967 the schedule of investment fell victim to a 25 per cent cut in order to finance higher defense costs, leaving the future of the program in some doubt. Brezhnev had nothing to say about the cuts, although his Presidium colleague Polyansky, who was responsible for agriculture, protested vociferously.[50]

Although Brezhnev has left the initiative in pushing through the reform of industrial management to his colleague Kosygin, he must bear the ultimate responsibility for it in his capacity as leader of the party. The program, popularly associated with the Liberman proposals for a modified form of profit-making in industry, is still only slightly more than half implemented. So far, its effectiveness has been severely curtailed by foot-dragging among conservative middle-level party officials and entrenched government bureaucrats. If the resistance continues, Brezhnev may eventually have to choose between ousting the resisters or accepting another period of decline in economic growth rates. The plan results for the first half of 1968, published in July, indicate a decline in the rate of growth of total industrial output to the lowest point since 1963.

With one exception — the dismissal of the biologist Lysenko in February 1965 — Brezhnev's cultural policies have been solidly conservative. The result has been a mounting wave of disaffection and dissent among the creative intellectuals, highlighted by the remarkable outbursts following the Sinyavskiy-Daniel trial of 1966 and the Ginzburg trial of 1968. In 1967 an effort was made to create an atmosphere of harmony in the arts as part of the anniversary celebrations for the fiftieth anniversary of Soviet power, and both Brezhnev and Kosygin avoided any personal involvement in cultural affairs. In 1968 when the response from the liberal intellectuals showed that a wide spectrum of opinion was affected, both leaders made public statements, and a Central Committee plenum in April adopted a resolution which added up to a reformulation of official cultural policy in terms of militant orthodoxy and outright xenophobia.[51]

Brezhnev's major foreign policy concern from 1964 to 1968 was with the communist world, where his policy was conservative in

[49] A. Avtorkhanov, *The Communist Party Apparatus* (Chicago: Regnery, 1966), p. 289.
[50] *Kommunist*, cited in the *New York Times*, October 29, 1967.
[51] P. A. Smith, Jr., "Protest in Moscow," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the sense of trying to maintain things basically as they were, rather than reverting to what had been or pressing forward toward what might be. His first moves were designed to conciliate the dogmatists by arresting the sharp deterioration in interstate relations with the Chinese and reassuring Ulbricht by scrapping Khrushchev's gestures toward some form of understanding with Bonn. The nod toward the Chinese had little effect. Polemics were resumed, starting with the Chinese, who by August 1966 had regained and exceeded their earlier level of vituperation against Khrushchev. Within months the Soviets were replying at an equal level of tension, although perhaps with somewhat more decorum. In a secret letter circulated following a December 1966 meeting of the Central Committee, the case against the Chinese was given full treatment, including an exposé of Brezhnev's personal attempts to affect a reconciliation and the nature of the Chinese response.

In Eastern Europe Brezhnev sought to straddle the widening gap between the dogmatists, led by Ulbricht and Gomulka, and the revisionists in Rumania and Czechoslovakia who were intent on following or outdoing the Yugoslav example. Brezhnev succeeded in bridging this polarization by a combination of coercion and concessions until the summer of 1968, when the pace of events in Czechoslovakia reached the point of restoring a two-party system, and the Soviet military developed genuine concern at the loss of Warsaw Pact control over the Czech armed forces. In the resulting hawk-dove division within the Soviet Politbureau, Brezhnev is believed to have played a mediating, middle-of-the-road role until the crunch, when he came down on the side of intervention.

These moves had taken place against the backdrop of a continuing search for unity in the world communist movement, led by Suslov but encouraged and actively participated in by Brezhnev. Until the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the effort had centered on attempts to convene a world meeting of communist parties. Brezhnev's success in this endeavor was limited to a series of small "preparatory" meetings which at least served to keep the idea alive, but which had the disadvantage of revealing with shattering clarity the depth and extent of the fissures in the former monolith of international proletarian solidarity.

Toward the West, Brezhnev sought to maintain and exploit the divisions in NATO created by Khrushchev's popular-front policies in Western Europe and by his guarded cooperation with the United States in the search for control of nuclear weapons. There

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were limits to what could be done in these areas in the mid-1960's, but it is a tribute to Brezhnev's flexibility that he exploited both for all possible advantages for as long as he could. The popular-front tactic flourished under signs of Soviet permissiveness toward Rumanian rapprochement with West Germany and during the early stages of toleration for internal liberalization in Czechoslovakia. It was set back by internal developments in France — for which Brezhnev can hardly be blamed — and at least temporarily scuttled by the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Brezhnev's American policy up to 1968 amounted to a modified version of peaceful coexistence — the modification consisting of a gradually increased emphasis on national liberation, demonstrated in the Arab-Israeli conflict and enunciated with growing frequency in the Viet Nam context; and in the use of anti-imperialist themes, primarily as a basis for his efforts to maintain some semblance of bloc unity. He did not renounce a search for cooperation with the United States in areas of mutual interest — as revealed in the August 1967 agreement on a draft non-proliferation treaty — but left the initiative to his governmental officials, notably Gromyko and Kosygin. The outstanding example, of course, was the Glassboro summit meeting between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin following the June 1967 Middle East conflict.

In considering Brezhnev's attitude toward the Third World, one gains the impression, despite his statements on Viet Nam and the Middle East, that he hoped it would go away. The impression may be unfair, but it remains a demonstrable fact that Brezhnev's involvement up to 1968 in both the triumphs and setbacks of Soviet engagement in the area was the minimum required. The Glassboro example has been cited. Brezhnev was keeping the lid on Eastern Europe from Moscow while Kosygin faced the world and the Americans at the United Nations and Glassboro. Podgorny visited Cairo, but a follow-up trip by Brezhnev to Cairo was canceled. Earlier, the successful Soviet role in mediating the India-Pakistan conflict had been left to Kosygin. On the debit side, the rift with Castro, symbolized by the polemics at the July 1967 Latin American Solidarity Conference, seems to have stirred Brezhnev, but only feebly.

Reviewing Brezhnev's first four years, one is inevitably led into comparisons with his predecessors. From the historian's standpoint the comparison is a disappointment. Brezhnev obviously lacks Lenin's charisma. He has made efforts to restore a measure of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

popular respect for the achievements of the Stalin era, but there is little evidence that he aspires to Stalin's personal role as a revolutionary despot. Khrushchev's Bolshevik voluntarism and flamboyant peasant populism are obviously not his style. As a subject for monumental biographies, he leaves much to be desired.

Yet by 1968 Brezhnev seemed durable, perhaps for the very reasons that Western observers rate him down. In a time of rising conservatism at home and abroad he represented familiar policies, and yet constituted a threat to no one, at least in the way his predecessors threatened and harried the society over which they ruled. To the middle-level party officials, the government bureaucracy and the professional military officers whose institutional and personal interests now shape the course of Soviet society, he had come to represent a form of stability and order long absent from their lives.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE GREAT PURGES AND "THE PRAGUE SPRING"*

by Barbara Jancar

AS the most violent expression of the ruling group's exclusive exercise of the functions of isolation, security and control, purges are an integral part of the communist system. They represent a comprehensive form of cadre selection involving the whole population but focused on the party, and particularly the new class. Whenever important changes are to be made in the ranks of the ruling group or its policy, removal of the opposition or potential opposition becomes necessary. At times this process can create a nightmare of mass terror. More recently it has meant mainly dismissal and/or deprivation of party membership.

An important aspect of purges is their periodicity. The leadership cannot maintain an uninterrupted or permanent purge, as Zbigniew Brzezinski has argued,[1] because of the negative effect on the economy. The struggle at the top intensifies the regime's need to exercise its control functions. As the purge gains momentum, however, the demands of the economy force the ruling group to relax its vigilance. Relaxation induces the formation of a new opposition. After a time, when their authority is once more seen in danger, the power struggle forces the leading contenders to instigate another purge. Thus, we see swings of repression and relaxation as the ruling group successively eliminates an opposition, recovers from this catharsis, and gets on with the task of economic development. Available statistics on communist party memberships indicate that these alternate at between 2 and 5 per cent of the population, never reaching more than 10 per cent. The ruling group's maintenance in power depends on the loyalty of this small minority. Purges are the guarantee of the reliability and commitment of each member to the cause of communism as the ruling group sees it at a given time.

The 1950 purges in Czechoslovakia and those now in progress

*This article is adapted from a paper presented at the Fifth Congress of the Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences in America, New York University, November 13-15, 1970.

[1]For the development of Brzezinski's theory, see Chapters 2 and 10 of his *The Permanent Purge* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are no exception to the general rule. In the case of the satellite nations, however, one additional factor has to be mentioned. Purges generally have not been instigated voluntarily by the domestic ruling groups but have been forced upon them by virtue of their membership in the international community of communist nations headed by the Soviet Union. An investigation of the purges in Czechoslovakia, therefore, will not only shed light on the political arrangements that helped to produce "the Prague Spring," but will also provide insights into the interdependent and complex nature of communist interstate relationships.[2]

II

The character of the Czechoslovak purges was determined by the unique personality of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CzCP). Both in 1948 and in 1968, the CzCP definitely deviated from the accepted pattern of a communist party because of the singular political, economic and nationality circumstances in which it found itself.

One of the important sources of the communists' popularity through the years after 1945 was their careful cultivation of a democratic image. The CzCP was able to enlist support for the Soviet-modeled national committees because of the severe faults in the pre-Munich administrative system, which was seen as having had many undemocratic aspects.[3] Party propaganda drove home the idea that the national committees were the democratic answer to the evils of the prewar centralized bureaucracy.[4] Material that has now come to light on the 1950 purges indicates that the accent on democracy may not have been all window-dressing, and that President Gottwald possibly did not favor the complete destruction of democracy required by the advent of communism.

It may be recalled that the Czechoslovak Communist Party had

[2]Except where indicated, material on the great purges of the 1950's has been drawn principally from *Das unterdrückte Dossier: Bericht der Kommission des ZK der KPTsch über politische Prozesse und "Rehabiliterungen" in der Tschechoslowakei, 1949-1968,* edited by Jiri Pelikan (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1970), otherwise known as the Piller Report, and an analysis by party historian Karel Kaplan, entitled "Thoughts about the Political Trials," which appeared in the June, July and August 1968 issues of the party monthly, *Nova mysl.* The Kaplan articles were translated into English in Radio Free Europe's Czechoslovak Press Survey, Nos. 2146, 2147 and 2148. Material on the 1968-1970 purges has been drawn from RFE sources and from Czech and Slovak newspapers.

[3]For a good account of the administrative system of the First Republic and postwar reform suggestions, see Edward Taborsky, *Czechoslovak Democracy at Work* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1945), p. 115 ff.

[4]See, for example, Gottwald's speech to a mass meeting at Brno, June 23, 1945, in Kliment Gottwald, *Za socialisticky stat, za socialisticke pravo* (Prague: Ministerstvo informaci a osvety, Jednota Ceskoslovenskych pravniku, 1950), pp. 48-51.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had a generally positive experience of the democratic system under the First Republic. At its founding in 1921, the CzCP had opted for a mass-based organization and feelings of patriotism for the newborn nation ran high. The first leader of the party, Bohumir Smeral, welcomed the Republic as the climax of Czech and Slovak history, while he dreamt of making it the most democratic country in Europe.[5] The party's endorsement of a Czechoslovak road to socialism won for it considerable popular appeal, which reached its apex in the 1925 elections when the CzCP polled over 12 per cent of the total votes cast, ranking second only to the majority Agrarian Party.[6] Bolshevization thus came as a watershed in party behavior, forcing the CzCP away from a popular democratic evolutionary platform to full compliance with the Soviet revolutionary model.

There is evidence that Gottwald attempted to formulate a new case for a special Czechoslovak road to socialism after 1945. All his actions as Benes' coalition Premier prior to the 1948 takeover exhibit careful attention to the workings of the Czechoslovak system, while the communist victory in the elections of 1946 and the *putsch* itself fully vindicated the usefulness of democratic procedure. Gottwald claimed in 1947 that "The dictatorship of the proletariat is not the only road to socialism. . . . Our experience has demonstrated that it is possible to move in the direction of socialism in our Czechoslovak way without the dictatorship of the proletariat."[7] Conceivably, he did not appreciate in its entirety what his rule logically would have to be, once he came to power.

The reformist movement in 1968 was the third attempt on the part of the Czechoslovak communist leadership to develop a Czechoslovak road to socialism based on the democratic past. It was rooted in a fundamental change in the CzCP's hitherto monolithic mode of behavior as a ruling party. The change was progressive, gaining ground as tension between the Soviet Union and the CSR mounted. Eight months of relative freedom from centralized party control, brought about by the rapid democratization of the party as a result of the power struggle at the top, proved the viability of a consensus form of government. Liquidation of the conflicting economic, social and nationality in-

[5]A recent discussion of Smeral's views may be found in Radomir Luza, "The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Resistance, 1939-1945," *Slavic Review,* December 1969, pp. 561-563.

[6]An analysis of the party and the voters is given in Paul E. Zinner, *Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 63 ff.

[7]Quoted in the *New York Herald Tribune,* June 24, 1947.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terests within and outside the party had been shown to be fundamentally impractical. The climax came during the Soviet invasion. For the first time in its history, the CzCP acted independently of Moscow as the leading political force in the country. The decisions reached at the Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress, particularly those regarding the new Party Statutes, reflect agreement among the various party groups that decision-making by consensus was in both their own and the national interest.[8] In its democratized form, the CzCP found itself in the unique position of being a popularly supported, and therefore truly effective, vehicle of national leadership.

On the economic level, also, the party faced peculiar circumstances in 1948 and 1968. At the time of the communist takeover, Czechoslovakia was the most highly industrialized of the communist nations. Her impressive prewar economic development had been the product of a relatively free enterprise system and trade with Western Europe. In 1948, however, the country forfeited part of its sovereignty in the interests of the world communist movement. The inauguration of COMECON in January 1949 represented Stalin's economic answer to the problem of centralized direction of the movement created by the formation of communist states in Eastern Europe.

COMECON's primary purpose was to achieve member states' economic independence from the "capitalist" countries by integrating the member economies. The Cold War was then reaching its height, and consolidation around the Soviet Union was judged to be in the interests of all the communist leaderships. In August 1949, a COMECON Congress in Sofia instructed members to limit their foreign trade with the capitalist countries. These instructions fell hardest on Czechoslovakia. Discontinuation of historic economic links with the West was viewed by the communist leadership as a serious threat to the ongoing development of the national economy.[9] The Czechs were naturally reluctant to take drastic steps. A year later, the CSR came under strong

[8]For documentation on the Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress, see *Le Congrès clandestin: Protocole secret et documents du 14e Congrès extraordinaire du P.C. tchécoslovaque (22 août 1968)* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970).

[9]In an article in *Literarni listy,* issued on June 20, 1968, Eugen Löbl described what economic proposals were made to the West at that time, and how economic ties with Western Europe and the "capitalist" world would have benefited the Czechoslovak economy after 1948. Among his most pertinent comments: "We could have captured a share of the market [in automobiles] in all the important countries of Europe, set up a service organization and gained a hold which hardly any of the now existing European factories could have wrested from us. . . ."

"The chances for [a hold on world markets in the porcelain and glass industry]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

criticism for failure to carry out the Sofia resolution, especially from Rumania and Bulgaria. Gottwald had to retreat, to abandon Czechoslovakia's traditional path of economic success and begin institutionalization of the demanded Soviet economic model.[10]

In 1968, the problem was how to pump new life into an economy that had been virtually brought to a standstill by an overzealous adherence to Soviet economics, reinforced by isolation from Western markets and Western technological thinking. Clearly influenced by the ideas of Löbl, Richta and Ota Sik, the party's April Action Program envisaged the progressive withdrawal of state interference in the economy, while feelers were cautiously put out to assess the possibility of reviving the prewar trade with Western Europe.[11] In this sphere, as in the political sphere, the Czechoslovak communist leaderships of both 1948 and 1968 sought solutions based on the unique demands of the country, which were at variance with accepted communist practice.

A third factor peculiar to Czechoslovakia and strongly affecting the attitudes of the communist leaders was the nationality question. In 1948, Gottwald was confronted with the task of resolving a problem that had taxed the limits of the First Republic and had been further complicated by the emergence of an independent Slovakia during the war. In addition the Slovak communists had broken with the CzCP to form their own separate and vigorous Slovak Communist Party (SlCP). Tensions between the Czechs and Slovaks had not been improved by the fact of a better organized communist resistance movement in Slovakia, culminating in the Slovak national uprising. In addition, Moscow seems to have toyed with the prospect of a permanently independent Red Slovakia during 1941-1942 when the USSR's fortunes were at low ebb.[12] For Prague, postwar reunification meant that it had to come to terms with this independent Slovak state. The May 9, 1948 Constitution re-establishing the old centralist state and the forcible merger of the SlCP with the CzCP not only disappointed Slovak expectations; it also alienated a whole cadre of able Slovak leaders who had been most active in the communist cause during the war.

were very good in the postwar situation, because the Japanese glass and costume jewelry production was partially destroyed and lacked American outlets. . . . We had almost a monopoly in the United States." "The Symmetrical Model, This Time in a Different Context," p. 14.

[10]See Kaplan, in RFE, Czechoslovak Press Survey No. 2147, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-5.

[11]The Action Program was printed in its entirety in *Rude pravo,* April 19, 1968. A full English translation is to be found in R. A. Remington, editor, *Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 88-137.

[12]This idea was suggested in *Praca* (Bratislava), August 30, 1963.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Slovak ascendancy during the Prague Spring was the product of a successfully mounted offensive to regain the initiative lost during the Novotny years and to achieve the federation so desired in 1948. The remarkable cohesion of the Slovak party in the face of a splintered Czech group within the CzCP during 1968 reflected the singleness of purpose developed to attain this end. Where democracy was the issue in the Czech lands, regional and national autonomy was paramount in Slovakia. These differing goals might not have been a sufficiently disrupting element, but when coupled with a resurgent parochialism, they proved disastrous.

Precisely what went on at the Moscow talks in August 1968 may never be fully known. But we do know that at the SlCP Congress held at the end of August, the Slovak communists voted against accepting the legitimacy of the clandestine CzCP Congress held earlier in Prague. In so doing, the Slovak party demonstrated that Slovak national interest was on sale to the highest bidder. The parallels with 1938 are obvious. In each case, a foreign power capitalized on the Slovak leaders' national pride. In the first instance, the reward was limited independence conferred by Germany; in the second, Slovakia became the cornerstone of the Soviet effort to rebuild the Soviet system in Czechoslovakia. In 1968 the Slovaks triumphed over the majority Czechs, and the Czechs had to bear the consequences.

The urgency of the triply complicated domestic situation thus argued unorthodoxy to the CzCP leadership. Yet such an approach could only fix the attention of the other communist nations on the potential unreliability of an independent-minded Czechoslovakia. Purges were in order to commit or recommit the country as a whole to communism.[13] It is well known that the CSR was the last of the satellite nations to initiate trials in the great purges which swept Eastern Europe after 1948. Gottwald requested the first Soviet "advisers" in November 1949 under duress. The rationale of the other communist leaderships was that their trials had revealed an international conspiracy whose focal point had to be Czechoslovakia, both by process of elimination and because of the CSR's Western associations. Gottwald's claim that there could be no enemy penetration of the Czechoslovak party because of its history of having operated legally in a democratic society merely increased suspicion among his "fraternal" allies, in the same way

[13]Because of its blatant association with great-power "diplomacy," the 1968 Soviet invasion could not, of itself, have brought the CzCP and its leadership back into the orthodox fold.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as did Dubcek's interminable explanations and protestations to the concerned Warsaw Pact members.

III

Against such a background, an assessment of the purge process in Czechoslovakia poses three general questions: Who was purged and why? What were the political ramifications? And who benefited?

The first victims of the 1950 purges were groups outside the party, notably former officials in the prewar political parties. Then, in December 1950, the "Trial of Vatican Agents" took place. In each case the accused were charged with international conspiracy: the first group for assisting Yugoslav and West German agents, the second for being in league with the Vatican. In each case the defendants had obviously had direct ties with the First Republic, during which time, as during the war, they would naturally have developed contacts with their counterparts in Western Europe. Because of their association with the West and with organizations outside Czechoslovakia, their loyalty to the communist regime could not be counted upon, and their rating as a source of potential opposition to the leadership was high.

The initial trials set a pattern for the purges involving the entire Czechoslovak Communist Party which followed. When the terrible succession of trials, death sentences and imprisonments eventually subsided in 1954, the party found itself without all those who had had any Western contacts, been in the West, or fought in an organized resistance movement at home. Gone were the economists and other specialists, such as Eugen Löbl, who had worked with Gottwald on East-West economic relations in the early days of the communist takeover. Gone were the Slovak communist leaders who had worked hardest for the Slovak national interest during and after the war. Without exception, anyone who was capable of forming, from experience, his own judgment of what communism was or could be, or who was not entirely dependent on Moscow for his maintenance in power, was silenced or swept away. Liquidated as well was anyone who constituted a threat to the centralizing control of Prague's leadership.[14]

[14]While the notorious "Trial of the Center" took place before Novotny came to power and was definitely Soviet-instigated, the trials of the "bourgeois nationalists" occurred during his tenure as First Party Secretary. Opinions differ as to Novotny's real role in reducing the strength of the Slovak communist movement. Pavel Tigrid indicts him without reservation (see *Le Printemps de Prague* [Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968], pp. 45-50), as does the Piller Report, *op. cit.*, p. 281 ff. Mnacko, on the other hand, seems to believe that Novotny's part was less critical. Ladislav Mnacko, *La Septième Nuit* (Paris: Flammarion, 1968), pp. 191-192.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It would be misleading to search for racism as a clue to the purges. Certainly anti-Semitism and "anti-Slovakism" existed.[15] But the Jews purged were those whose lives had been devoted to the communist cause notwithstanding their Western contacts (Löbl, London, Klementis). The Slovak victims were those who had come to power *after* the SlCP had broken with the CzCP and whose organization of resistance in Slovakia had met with considerable popular support.

The main reason why these individuals were either liquidated or sentenced to long-term imprisonment is obvious. Czechoslovakia had become part of the communist community of nations, and Moscow would tolerate as subordinates only those who would be absolutely obedient to its directives. All whose loyalty was suspect had to be eliminated despite their record of devotion to the cause.

A second reason suggests itself from the pages of the Piller Report and the behavior of the CzCP as a political party prior to its Bolshevization. Unlike the Polish party's experience, the leadership of the Czechoslovak party was not liquidated during the 1930 purges in the Soviet Union. The group which took over the direction of Czechoslovakia in 1948 was essentially the same that had held leading positions in the CzCP since 1929. Gottwald's possibly differing conception of the institutionalization of communism has been suggested, as has his reluctance to begin the purges. Apparently he was a man not without sensitivity. Jiri Pelikan tells us, in his introduction to the Piller Report, that after the Slansky trial was over, the former Czechoslovak leader withdrew more and more into himself, going ever deeper into alcoholism until it eventually ended his life. Both the Piller Report and party historian Karel Kaplan seem reluctant to convict Gottwald without mercy. Both stress his difficult position in seeking to ascertain whether it was possible to build socialism without the Soviet Union. Given only a small popular following, the Cold War situation of a divided Europe, and a lifetime of obedience to the CPSU, he answered this question in the negative, sacrificing in the process his closest associates. In forcing Gottwald to go through with the trials, Stalin bound him and the Cezchoslovak Communist Party inexorably to the Soviet communist model and to the Soviet Union.

[15]At the Tenth Party Congress in June 1954, for example, Novotny declaimed that the "bourgeois nationalists" were the "worst malefactors of the Republic," "the descendants of the Hapsburgs and a sordid scum in the service of imperialist warmongers." *Rude pravo,* June 12, 1954.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It was impossible for those who had been the main prosecutors of the purges to talk seriously or convincingly of democratic socialism afterward. All question of popular support was gone. Slowly but surely, a small clique gathered the reins of power into its hands and subordinated justice and the state administration to itself. The top organs of government gained in significance as CzCP Presidium members took over key state offices. Parliament lost all hope of autonomy. The administration of law was inextricably caught up in the political demands of the leadership as embodied in the trials. "Cabinet justice" became standard legal practice. Judges presided over a well-rehearsed scenario, the decision about which had been made beforehand by the small ruling clique in agreement with its Soviet advisers.

By far the most efficacious vehicle for the centralization of power was the security organs. Without parliamentary or governmental control, they were responsible only to the ruling group consolidated in the political secretariat of the Presidium of the CzCP. The relationship between the political regime and the security organization appears to have been extremely complex. As the trials wore on, the ruling group came to rely increasingly on security reports as the basis of its decision-making, while simultaneously becoming more addicted to using harsh security methods to produce political solutions. Both the Piller Report and Kaplan stress the enormous power that accrued to the security organs during the purges. True, they prevailed over the legal, governmental and political processes, but it is important to stress that at no time did they become all-powerful. For one thing, rivalry between the CzCP/CC Control Commission and the Ministry of State Security effectively assured liquidation of the leading personnel of both organizations. Independent operation on the part of security was further weakened by the presence of Soviet advisers and a large turnover in staff, all of whom were appointed directly by the party, and all of whom were young (between twenty-five and thirty) and felt no allegiance to the Ministry. Frequently the new recruits made their reports directly to the Soviet advisers, who in turn reported to Gottwald. The security chiefs could thus hear about the work of their organization for the first time at second hand. The crucial role played by the lower security echelons in "unmasking" Slansky is graphically described in the Piller Report.

The main means by which the Ministry of State Security was deprived of the chance to gain an independent power position and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

became, instead, a vehicle of power concentration was the establishment of notorious security quintettes, known as *petky*. The primary task of these committees was to seek out "enemy" elements and develop the script for the trials. Their activities were subordinated to the *petka* at the top of the party hierarchy, whose work was directed by Gottwald himself. Their operation thus bypassed the Ministry of the Interior. Between 1950 and 1951, these committees acquired extraordinary authority and were the chief instruments of repression. Their jurisdiction extended into the economic sphere, where they contributed to the Stalinization of the economy in their exercise of an arbitrary decision-making power over important economic questions, such as labor discipline. Under these conditions, local government, already hampered by its subordination to the Ministry of the Interior, lost its last vestige of independence.

IV

Because the 1950 purges made the CzCP leaders answerable only to themselves and to the Soviet Union for their actions, one of the major political consequences was the forced breaking of the party from any ties it may have had with the Czechoslovak democratic heritage. It was transformed into a Soviet-style ruling party with a reduced membership and an increasingly smaller participation in the ruling group.[16] A second consequence derived from the first: Czechoslovakia's independence in the economic and organizational spheres ended, and all her institutions were Sovietized. This latter process completed her isolation from the outside world, and her dependency on Moscow and its satellites.

A third and even more critical consequence of the 1950 purges was the lasting divisions they created within the party. The primary division was between those who had directly promoted the trials and the trials' victims. There were also those who had had no part in the trials whatsoever. But the number of the involved must be understood as comprising more than the party leadership or the officials in the top echelons of government. Membership in the quintettes included the First Party Secretary of a given area, the CzCP regional or local security officer, the chief of police (*Sbor narodni bezpecnosti* [*SNB*], the security official of the regional or local national committee, and if needed, the regional or local prosecutor. These agencies reached down to

[16]I estimate that between 1948 and 1962 approximately 800,000 party members were either liquidated or expelled, the bulk of them between 1948 and 1954.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the smallest governmental unit. When one multiplies them by the number of rural, municipal (*okres, kraj*) and all national administrative units in the country, the total of those who helped to liquidate their fellow party members becomes substantial. From this core of individuals, all of whom constituted the bureaucratic or new class element, were born the conservative *apparatchiki* of the 1960's.

The purge victims who survived and were rehabilitated comprised a natural opposition to their indictors. It was only normal that those who had held important power positions and lost them should seek to regain them once they found the chance. It was equally understandable that, given the climate of de-Stalinization of the 1960's, this group would take the issue of the trials as its point of attack against the entrenched leadership. It would further lend its support to any criticism of the ruling group, such as economic mismanagement, that would weaken the latter's political position.

The uninvolved third group is harder to place. It included party members during the 1950's who had no position of leadership at any level but who might be aspiring to rise in the party hierarchy. It would also include those who joined the CzCP after 1954. (Some 400,000 joined between 1954 and 1962.)[17] Many of these became part of Novotny's *apparat* and many of them reached sufficiently high positions by the 1960's to compete in the power struggle.

The Piller Report provides a good description of the unrest in the Czechoslovak party in 1956, after Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech had forced it to institute self-criticism of both the methods used in the trials and the trials themselves. Such criticism encouraged the growth of pressure from all segments of the party to investigate the trials more thoroughly, particularly as those convicted were returned to society and more information about the purges came to party and public knowledge. During the 1960's, the chronic economic crisis induced an association between the so-called bureaucratic administrative methods of the trials and the bureaucratic administrative methods that had produced economic failure. Those who had had no part in the purges were in the best position to take the offensive and to challenge the Novotny group to a new course. Equally important, nonassocia-

[17]Data on CzCP membership statistics have been drawn from RFE sources; from "Niektore udaje o Komunistickej strane Ceskoslovenska, 1958-1962," *Zivot strany,* December 19, 1962, pp. 1503-1510; and from an unsigned article in *Zivot strany,* September 21, 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion with the trials meant that power seekers in this third group had clean hands which they could show the population to enlist its support against the hierarchy. It is no coincidence that the Slovaks emerged as the strongest challengers to Novotny's rule. The generation that came to power in the late 1950's and early 1960's could boast no links with the Stalinist past, yet could present the SlCP as the most victimized by the purges.

The interests of the second and third groups were not identical. The former was seeking to regain political power, the latter to gain it. Then too, the latter was numerically the stronger, including in its ranks the younger generation. During 1967 and 1968, their interests coincided to the extent of bringing Novotny down. During the Prague Spring, however, their unity of purpose showed severe strains. Husak paid lip service to the idea of democratization, but events proved that his primary interest was regaining control of Slovakia, and ultimately Czechoslovakia. Smrkovsky posed as a great reformer, yet went on record as wanting to call in the tanks after the publication of "The 2,000 Words." Both men differ markedly in character from the reforming zeal of Josef Spacek or the inherent honesty of Alexander Dubcek.

V

These considerations bring us to the last question: Who benefited from the purges? The first and most obvious answer is the USSR. The lesson of the trials was that there could be no Czechoslovak collaboration with the West at any level. The "isms" at which the trials were directed — Titoism, bourgeois nationalism, cosmopolitanism, Zionism — were all doors to a larger world outside Soviet control. As the foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union shifted, so did the focus of the purges on one or another of these "isms."[18] The trials thus achieved Stalin's main objective of isolating Czechoslovakia from the world. More important, as the future showed, they established the precedent of direct interference by the USSR and its satellites in Czechoslovakia's domestic affairs.

A second answer which admits of no hesitation relates to ascendancy in the political hierarchy. Virtually all those who came to

[18]Kaplan draws attention to the fact that the Slansky trials came at a time when the Soviet Union was shifting her support to the Arab countries, as Israel veered increasingly toward the West. The crisis in the Middle East consequently supplanted the USSR's overriding concern with Yugoslavia and independent-minded nationalists and changed the whole focus of the purges. "Thoughts about the Trials," RFE, Czechoslovak Press Survey No. 2149, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power after 1954, including the members of the 1968 CzCP Presidium, owed their rise to the fact that someone had lost his job before them. The purges of the 1950's were sufficiently thorough to make possible a clean administrative sweep at all levels of the party and to bring new personnel into the top echelons. The vacuum created among the elite permitted a 60 per cent turnover of new members in the 1954 CzCP Central Committee, a sharp contrast to the 20 per cent hard-core leadership that had been continuously re-elected since 1946.[19]

The final answer with respect to who benefited, however, is more complex. Not all benefited equally. Those involved in the purges under Novotny (the first group) became entrenched in their positions, while those who were challenging them (groups two and three) initially lacked the means to be effective. The bureaucracy had a vested interest in maintaining the old system, and it took the economic crisis to demonstrate once and for all that the system was economically unfeasible. Because of the identification of economic incompetence with the methods used during the trials, accusations of economic mistakes inevitably embraced involvement in the trials. The bureaucracy was terrified at having its complicity known. Accordingly, it fought rehabilitation and economic reform with equal vigor. It was successful for fourteen years.

By the mid-1960's, it was clear that no reform would be possible unless there was a total regeneration of both the party leadership and the party membership. Regeneration could only be achieved in three interconnected ways: a comprehensive investigation of the trials and assignment of responsibility for them, real economic reform, and the renewal of the CzCP Central Committee.

Complete investigation of the trials was thwarted by a further aspect of the problem of who benefited: the heightened political importance of the few who were in possession of the truth. From 1955 to 1966, three commissions were established to review the trials. The chairman of the first was Rudolf Barak. Since he was appointed Minister of the Interior in 1954, after the trials had ended, Barak could be considered initially a member of the noninvolved third group. The evidence shows that he attempted to use the knowledge of the trials derived from his investigations to challenge Novotny. By the early 1960's he was considered a possible successor, and the threat he posed to the First Party Secretary

[19]By comparison, in 1958 and 1963 new recruits constituted only 37 per cent of the CzCP Central Committee membership. (RFE statistics.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was sufficient for Novotny to have him removed in 1962. The second and third commissions, established in the 1960's, were chaired by Drahomir Kolder. Their membership included Alexander Dubcek, Jozef Lenart, Vaclav Prchlik, Lubomir Strougal and Vasil Bil'ak.

The members of these commissions and those of the Piller Commission alone had full knowledge of what went on during the trials. It is significant that the leading contenders for political power from 1963 on should be found among their number. It is equally significant that both the Piller Commission and the CzCP Presidium were divided on whether or not to publicize the findings in 1968. Piller argued that the revelations were so shocking as to undermine all belief in the party, while Dubcek tried, even after August 1968, to get the report published. The only way to forge the future was to reforge the link with the past, but the 1968 CzCP leadership was not ready to face this choice. Thus, in an indirect way these men too became involved in the purges and marked by them; they found themselves custodians of secrets which were never formally condemned by the party and never made public. The key to the power struggle of 1968 lies in the explosive force latent in the possession of the truth about the trials and the attitudes taken by the few who were initiated into their mysteries.

VI

The purges now in progress are having consequences similar to those described above. The political divisions wrought by the old purges could not be resolved in the short period of the Prague Spring. As the periodicity of purges implies, relaxation serves to heighten rather than mitigate tension. To regain a position of control after the Soviet invasion, the new party leadership had no choice but to initiate another purge. Accordingly, new divisions are forming upon the old, carrying with them the seed of future political conflict. Once again, the prosecutors are in power and will be until a noninvolved third-group candidate effectively challenges them.

The prospect of such a development in the near future, however, is severely limited by some significant differences between the old and new purges. First of all, the present purge is being carried out more thoroughly in Bohemia and Moravia, particularly in the big cities, than in Slovakia. With the Slovaks in the ascendancy and supported by Moscow, it was logical that the Czechs should ex-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perience a fate similar to that of the Slovaks in the 1950's. More important, Czech democratic socialism has replaced Slovak nationalism as the communist bête noire. By the end of October 1969, sixty out of the eighty-five districts in the Czech lands (70 per cent) had been purged, while only nine of the forty-eight Slovakian districts (19 per cent) had been similarly purified. In addition, purges in Slovakia have proceeded slowly, gaining a halfhearted momentum only in the spring of 1970.[20] The majority of the twenty-two districts that have been purged more than once is in the Czech lands, Prague and Brno heading the list.

A second major difference distinguishing the present purges relates to the number of party members judged unreliable. The euphemiously labeled "exchange of party cards" has had as its objective the restoration of unity and discipline by reducing the CzCP to between 500,000 and 800,000 members. One million are expected to be expelled in the process, a significant increase over the 800,000 deprived of membership between 1948 and 1962. To separate the loyal party member from the European-style social democrat, every communist is to be interrogated by an investigatory committee. The fact that the party has made attitudes toward such events as "The 2,000 Words," the Soviet invasion, the August 1968 Moscow protocol and the demonstrations following the death of Jan Palach the criteria for paring the membership to a third of its former size is clear proof that during 1968 the majority of Czech and Slovak comrades, regardless of prior alignments, began to entertain a different view of communism than did the Soviet Presidium.

The purge is not proceeding on an easy path. Alibi-ism has raised its head. By January 1970 only one-third of the membership had been expelled or pressed into resigning. Newspaper articles throughout the year criticized investigation committees for negligence and lack of party discipline.[21] With the leadership sharply divided on how far to carry the purges, the inquisitors are reluctant to take harsh measures. Indeed, the extent of the purges is the central issue in the current power struggle, indicating that the Prague Spring has succeeded in "corrupting" virtually the entire CzCP.

In such a situation, the Czechoslovak leadership stands to be crippled rather than strengthened by continuing the purges. Far

[20]Statistics on the 1968-1970 purges have been gleaned from Czech and Slovak newspapers and periodicals and from RFE reports.

[21]See, for example, Josef Batak's criticism in *Pravda* (Plzen), April 24, 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more than after the 1950 terror, the chief beneficiary of today's repression is the Soviet Union. Moscow no doubt hopes to assure the loyalty of Czechoslovakia's present rulers, as it did in the past, through shared complicity in liquidating the Dubcek era, effecting in the process a new isolation of the ruling group from the country's popularly supported democratic heritage and Western diplomatic and economic orientation. The Soviet invasion, however, killed once and for all any remaining belief among Czech and Slovak communists in the validity of Soviet communism as a social program per se. The fact that the purges have run a tougher course in Czech lands and have been aimed primarily at a Czech phenomenon has reduced and radicalized Czech participation in the new regime. The ruling group thus finds itself more dependent than ever on Moscow for its maintenance in power. This dependency is not all to the Soviets' gain. Absence of any real commitment to communism on the part of the CzCP renders the USSR's task of reconstructing a docile satellite extremely difficult if not impossible, especially since the achievement of this objective must proceed at the expense of the ideological and nationality majority within the Czechoslovak party.

VII

The foregoing suggests certain conclusions regarding the utility of purges as a mechanism of control and integration within and among the communist nations under Soviet hegemony. (1) Through their use on an international scale to coerce the loyalty and conformity of the individual domestic leaders to the Soviet communist model, purges promote and reinforce the limited sovereignty of the member states. Deviant political behavior is not allowed to go so far as to achieve the complete independence of any domestic ruling group from the USSR. (2) Purges strengthen the institutional conformity of the communist international community in that they destroy any actual or potential pluralistic arrangement within any one country. (3) To the extent that purges attack the hard-core 2 to 5 per cent loyal to both the domestic ruling group and to Moscow, they are dysfunctional to the control and integration they are designed to promote.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CHANGING EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN EUROPE: THE BONN-MOSCOW TREATY OF AUGUST 1970*

by Dennis L. Bark

THAT East-West relations in Europe are changing is evidenced most notably by Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* and its offspring, the Soviet-West German treaty signed in August 1970. To some the treaty, betokening a reconciliation between the enemy of the Second World War and the victor of the East, seems a longed-for dream come true. To others, for various reasons, it appears to be a source of concern and even alarm. This difference of opinion is in no way surprising. Many men of good will in the West have clung for a long time to the hope that the crucial German problem between the West and the Soviet Union can be solved to everyone's satisfaction and that an era of peace and stability can be introduced in Central Europe. Yet the length of time spent in searching for a German settlement may be a substantial part of the reason why some have not greeted the prospective Bonn-Moscow treaty with jubilation. Perhaps critics are wary of claims made by the treaty's proponents that détente has suddenly been achieved on such a vexing and long-standing problem.

Political analysis is a deceptive business. The announcement that a major step has been taken toward peaceful cooperation among all European states, irrespective of differences in their social systems, suggests an enticing vista of "change through rapprochement." The era of injured accusations by the East and replies of righteous indignation by the West may be on the wane. An aura of respectability attends the professed desire of the Soviet Union to join the Federal Republic in a common effort to remove the psychological and political barriers sustained by twenty-five years of Cold War and its specter of future conflict. But have the problems been solved or merely discounted? If they have been solved, to whose satisfaction was it done? The question is not *whether* to negotiate with the Soviet Union but *how* to negotiate with the Soviet Union and how to measure the results of such negotiations.

*Adapted from an address before the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco on December 18, 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bonn's decision to take the negotiating initiative is praiseworthy. A prolonged West German failure to come to an understanding with Moscow would have had dire consequences, for the Soviet Union is adept at placing the onus for failure to reach agreement on real or imaginary Western inaction. But the awakening of illusory hopes can be equally as detrimental, and it is naive to ascribe legitimacy to an asserted desire to diminish an atmosphere of tension on the international level if this merely reflects a tactical maneuver. The glimmer of détente and the shadow of Cold War imply the presence of alternatives, of being able to choose between one or the other, in anticipation that embarkation on a course of détente, were it possible, would end the years of confrontation and render harmless the protestations of the "imperialists"; that the good will and firm resolve thus evinced would produce a lessening of East-West strains throughout the world.

It is said that the conclusion of the Soviet-West German treaty has changed the political mood in Europe. We are told again that the age of Cold War has been replaced by the age of détente.[1] The Socialist-Liberal (SPD-FDP) coalition government in Bonn, under Social Democratic Chancellor Brandt, claims to be conducting a policy of "understanding" with the Soviet Union, a policy based on *mutual* recognition of the existing realities in Europe. At long last, in deference to these political and economic realities, the curtain of ideology is being raised, and peaceful coexistence has finally scored a victory.

When Brandt delivered his *Bericht zur Lage der Nation* to the West German parliament on January 14, 1970, three months after he had become the first Socialist Chancellor in West Germany's history,[2] he pointed out that he hoped to achieve the transition of his country's foreign policy toward the East from "confrontation to cooperation." In doing so he paid particular attention to the explanation that "patriotism demands the recognition of what is. . . . It demands the courage to recognize reality." Brandt's message marked the initiation of his widely acclaimed

[1]Back in 1955, for example, *New Statesman and Nation* concluded that "the cold war was suddenly called off at Geneva because both sides recognized that these suspicions [of beginning a new war] were entirely unfounded." See "Problems of the Garden-Party Peace" in the issue of August 13, 1955.

[2]In the last national West German election, held in September 1969, 46.1 per cent of the electorate voted for the opposition Christian Democratic and Christian Socialist parties (CDU/CSU). Although the SPD-FDP coalition continues to enjoy a majority of six in the Bundestag, the CDU has a one-seat majority in the 41-member Bundesrat.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

version of *Ostpolitik,* directed in the long term toward establishment of a European order of peace.

Soon afterward, in March and May, in Erfurt and Kassel, the first postwar meetings between East and West German leaders took place. The next milestone in Bonn's new *Ostpolitik* was the Bonn-Moscow treaty, termed a mutual renunciation of force agreement and signed in Moscow on August 12, 1970 by Chancellor Brandt and Premier Alexei Kosygin. There followed the Polish-West German treaty of December 7, 1970. Today, a year after the Moscow ceremonies — and a decade since the building of the Berlin wall on August 13, 1961 — it is time to recapitulate and analyze the events that have transpired in West Germany's relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since the Bonn-Moscow treaty was signed. It has not yet been ratified by the West German parliament, but it is being written and spoken about as existing in fact. Indeed, although the Soviet government continues to press for ratification as a decisive counter to Cold War advocates in the West — who, for example, opposed the 1970 Mansfield resolution in the American Congress for a cutback of U.S. forces in Europe — statements appearing in the East European press since early 1971 assert that, because the essence of the Bonn-Moscow treaty is political, it is in the long term immaterial whether it is ratified or not. The following considerations are based, not on the assumption that the treaty will or will not be ratified, but on the situation — *rebus tunc stantibus* — as it exists in mid-1971.

II

The five articles of the treaty are relatively simple. The two parties affirm their desire "to maintain international peace and achieve détente." They agree to further "normalisation" in Europe, in accordance with "the actual situation existing" on the continent. Both parties resolve "to refrain from the threat or use of force" in all matters affecting international or European security as well as in their mutual relations, in accordance with Article 2 of the United Nations Charter. They pledge "to respect without restriction, the territorial integrity of all states in Europe within their present frontiers," which are declared to be inviolable. Singled out by name in the treaty are the two borders between East and West Germany and between East Germany and Poland. Both sides agree to promote economic relations as well as scientific, technological and cultural contacts.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Both governments have solemnly voiced their conviction that the treaty will (1) contribute to European security, (2) contribute to the solution of existing problems on the continent, and (3) foster peaceful cooperation among all European states. These goals cannot be criticized. But they are reminiscent of the scores of bilateral treaties — with Czechoslovakia, for example, or with Poland, or with Hungary — that the Soviet Union has violated unilaterally. They call up also the image of hands across the walls of a divided city. Amid the clamor that West Germany has chosen a path of normalization of relations with the East, as opposed to a policy of Cold War, the perspective of what constitutes détente and what determines existing realities is increasingly blurred. Since the easiest way to misinterpret a political document is to confine one's analysis to its text, it would be wise to look not only at the text, but at the various motives behind this acclaimed instrument of détente. All the realities involved must be considered, not merely those leading to a specific interpretation. While the mirror-image analysts of the West may interpret political events interestingly — and sometimes dangerously — a Christmas rush to buy political wares on a selective basis often leads to disillusionment with the merchandise in the New Year.

It is doubtful whether all the realities existing in Europe today are being recognized, either in Bonn or Moscow or the United States. But experience with proclaimed détentes of the past teaches us that West Germany has concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union (1) which will be honored by Moscow only as long as it is compatible with present and future goals of Soviet policy (e.g., compare Soviet adherence to the Potsdam agreement or to those of the European Advisory Commission on Berlin),[3] (2) which aims at consolidating the Soviet power position in Eastern Europe, and (3) which has given West Germany not a single concession on any major European problem.

The West has a legitimate interest in coming to mutually advantageous agreements with the Soviet Union, such as may transpire from the SALT negotiations. But it must be recognized that, just as the SALT talks are not a sign of détente but reflect a mutual U.S.-Soviet interest in limiting strategic weapons competition, so the Soviet negotiations with West Germany reflect Moscow's concern with consolidating the status quo and

[3]The incident of Soviet and East German interference with Allied military traffic on the Berlin-Marienborn autobahn that occurred on January 12, 1971 is illustrative. This was the first case of interference with Allied military vehicles since 1963.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

persuading Germany to grant the USSR the economic and technological assistance necessary to solve her economic difficulties. One cannot read into them a Soviet desire for genuine peaceful accommodation with the West or a willingness to negotiate on a *quid pro quo* basis. A claim to the contrary would be, in the words of Premier Khrushchev on the eve of the 1959 Foreign Ministers Conference convened to discuss the topic of Germany, "a huckster's approach." Khrushchev added, "We do not have any concessions to make, because our proposals have not been made for bartering. . . . [Their] proposals do not contain a single element for negotiation. . . . They are not based on a desire to find a correct solution."

The Soviet Union is seeking to strengthen her role in Eastern Europe and at the same time to persuade the West to approve it. The negotiations with Bonn reflect growing Soviet anxiety over China and concern with finding a solution for the economic difficulties plaguing the East European countries, for which West Germany would provide economic assistance. The USSR wishes to receive Western technology, but in turn has offered only visions of détente and mutual trust. She advocates a European Security Conference, which has received West German support, but which aims at creating divisions within the West.[4] Such a conference would possibly sanction the participation of the United States at the outset, but a purely European decision-making body has been proposed for its later stages; in this the Soviet Union, as a European power, would remain a member, and the United States would be excluded. If the United States were to be euchred out of Europe, and if deceptive illusions of détente were to undermine the common bond uniting the NATO allies, a major Soviet goal would be achieved.

The term Cold War and the disagreeable image it summons to mind, of querulous discordance bordering on military conflict between East and West, is an effective political weapon in the hands of Soviet tacticians. Overlooking the fact that the Cold War, as a manifestation of American power and Western solidarity, has accounted for peace in Europe since 1945, the Soviet Union suggests to the West that the advocacy of détente is a preferable

[4]Brezhnev's proposal in Tbilisi on May 14, 1971, in which he advocated discussions with the West on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe, can be viewed similarly. It should be remembered that this proposal was initially made by the NATO ministers at their meeting in Reykjavik in June 1968. At that time the idea did not evoke the "great attention" its endorsement by Brezhnev elicited in May 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alternative, but neglects to define on what grounds détente should be realized. Thus, by morally disarming confrontation-weary or philosophically-attuned Westerners with eulogies on harmony and peace, the way may be opened for accommodation as Moscow envisages it. In a vacuum created by the hope of détente it could become increasingly easy to sow divisions of interest among West European states and to encourage a reassessment of policy objectives and priorities concerning NATO and its value. As Secretary Brezhnev so carefully reminded his audience during the Twenty-fourth Party Congress of the CPSU on March 30, 1971, Lenin's adage on sowing and reaping remains applicable: "selfless devotion to the revolution and revolutionary propaganda among the people are not wasted even if long decades divide the sowing from the harvest." A disunited Europe could gradually become estranged from the United States. Lacking U.S. leadership and a clear-cut sense of direction or definition of goal, West European countries could become more susceptible to the chimerical assurances of Soviet communism. This possibility is strengthened by spokesmen in the West advocating unilateral withdrawals of American troops from Europe, even before the Europeans themselves increase their cooperation and joint responsibility on the military, political and economic levels.

A relaxation of tension in Europe needs to be seen in the perspective of the Soviet aim of pushing the United States from the European continent. In Moscow on August 12, 1970, Kosygin assured Brandt that he expected no loosening of Bonn's ties with the West. In the October issue of the Moscow journal, *International Affairs,* the treaty was termed "a tangible result of postwar development in Europe; it has been prepared by the total development of European realities, by the natural course of international relations." On January 2, 1971, Kosygin was quoted by TASS as endorsing an All-European Security Conference, which would (1) serve to "collect and generalize the positive results and experience" accumulated in the wake of the treaties between West Germany and Moscow and Poland, (2) contribute toward "détente in Europe and in the world in general," and (3) aid in overcoming the opposition of those "who are against détente."

The analysis of the relation between détente in Europe and U.S. foreign policy that appeared in the February 1971 issue of *International Affairs* is even more revealing. The author, Anat. Gromyko, not only criticized the "negative" position of the United States toward the consolidation of the status quo in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe, but concluded: "A further rise in the temperature in Europe will depend on how actively the West European countries themselves decide to take a line independent of the USA in their relations with the USSR and other socialist countries." Subsequently, in a release distributed by TASS on May 16, the *Pravda* correspondent in Brussels, Yuri Kharlanov, declared "the main obstacle to a genuine détente in Europe" to be "the military-industrial complex of the United States and its NATO branch in Western Europe."

III

The Bonn government proclaims with assurance that the Soviet Union recognizes the "realities" of the situation in Europe today. That is beyond question. The Soviet Union recognizes the realities as they are understood in Moscow. But can so much be said of the Brandt Government itself?

One should note that in June 1970, two months before the signing of the Moscow-Bonn treaty, an editorial in *Pravda* stressed the significance of the communiqué released in Moscow in June 1969, during the first international meeting of seventy-five communist and workers' parties in nine years. In that communiqué communist goals in Western Europe were defined. First on the list was a breakup of NATO and the convocation of an All-European Security Conference. The second imperative was securing "the inviolability of existing frontiers in Europe, in particular the frontier along the Oder-Neisse" and the frontier between East and West Germany. This goal was attained almost verbatim in Article III of the Bonn-Moscow treaty.

Third, the Moscow communiqué called for West German recognition of East Germany. In the treaty Bonn acquiesced to *de facto* recognition, and pressure on this point continues. The now departed East German leader, Walter Ulbricht, in his New Year's Eve message for 1971, importuned for the establishment of normal diplomatic relations — in other words, *de jure* recognition — by the Federal Republic. This demand has been repeated on numerous occasions during the year as Bonn's obligatory contribution toward détente in Europe. Further, the Moscow communiqué sought Bonn's renunciation of its "claim to represent the whole of Germany." Chancellor Brandt's government has renounced the claim, thereby rejecting the mandate given it by free elections according to the preamble of West Germany's Basic Law

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(*Grundgesetz*). Thus reference in West Germany to a normalization of *Soviet-German* relations twenty-five years after the war is a patent misrepresentation.

The Moscow document of June 1969 also demanded that West Berlin be recognized as "a separate political entity." West Berlin is not a separate political entity, but the Soviet Union made this claim again on a minimum of four occasions in December 1970 alone,[5] has reiterated the assertion frequently during 1971, and will continue to do so in the future. Finally, the communiqué declared that to ensure peace and security in Europe, the European peoples must be guaranteed "their sovereign right to be masters of their continent without interference from the USA" and must be assured "mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technological co-operation among the European countries and the establishment of relations between them founded on a genuine relaxation of tension and mutual trust."

Descriptions in Moscow and Bonn of the Federal Republic's concessions are deceptively hailed as having created an atmosphere of accord and "understanding," directed mainly toward the world public. The Soviet Union knows well that the justification for alliance (in this case, NATO), in spirit and in fact, is the conviction that a potential (Soviet) threat exists. Create the impression that a threat is nonexistent, and a gradual crumbling of the alliance will follow. How clear this is when we observe the alacrity with which men charmed by the sweet music of promised friendship and cooperation tend to forget the *raison d'être* of alliance against a common foe, typified by such actions as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Many people appear to have sudden memory lapses when they are warned that the alternatives in dealing with the Soviet Union are between friendship or a continuation of the Cold War.

Western optimists, in the Federal Republic and elsewhere, have reminded us time and again that Brandt's *Ostpolitik* relies for its success on his country's stable, healthy association with the West. In principle this is no doubt true. But the concessions he made to the Soviet Union in pursuance of *Ostpolitik* far outnumber the advantages gained by West Germany—and, hence, by the West as a whole. The significance of the mutual renunciation of force, for example, is highly questionable. While Soviet military policies and capabilities are well known, the Federal Republic is not, has never

[5]See, for example, *Pravda*, December 6, 1970; Moscow Radio, December 19, 1970; TASS, December 21, 1970; *Izvestiya*, December 22, 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been, and is not likely to be in a position to attack the Soviet Union. The Brandt Government signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1969 and is also bound to the limitations on armament production detailed in the protocols to the treaties creating the Western European Union in 1954 and admitting the Federal Republic to NATO in 1955. Brandt's trip to Moscow to assure the Soviet government that the Federal Republic would not attack the USSR would, thus, seem to be nothing more than a *beau geste.*

Although both the USSR and West Germany agreed in the treaty to refrain from the use of force according to Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, two important articles of that Charter, Articles 53 and 107, are not mentioned. In these two articles, which despite claims to the contrary are in no way invalidated by Article 2, the Allied powers that fought against the Axis in World War II, in effect against Germany, retain the right of intervention. In short, the Federal Republic has renounced the use of force in settling international disputes. But the Soviet Union retains its right of intervention.[6]

Though the treaty declares the "borders of all states in Europe"[7] to be inviolable, two disputed cases were, as mentioned, singled out for special attention. The Bonn government judged it necessary to acknowledge by name the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse line with Poland and the border between East and West Germany. This recognition of the status quo in Europe, affecting nations not parties to the Bonn-Moscow treaty, is therefore not simply an acknowledgment of reality as the Soviet Union sees it. It is also a tacit acceptance by Bonn of the Brezhnev Doctrine of the

[6]Controversy on this point has been considerable in the Federal Republic and elsewhere. In Moscow in March 1971, the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, Valentin Falin, is reported to have stated that Articles 53 and 107 had not been "invalidated" but "superseded" by the treaty, as long as West Germany observed the treaty's provisions.

In April a West German government spokesman indicated that a secret protocol of the negotiations prior to the treaty's signature contained the Soviet assurance that Moscow would not unilaterally apply the Enemy States Clause of the UN Charter against the Federal Republic of Germany. See *Relay from Bonn,* March 19, 23, 25, and April 15, 1971. See also *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* March 19, 20, 23, 1971, and *Frankfurter Rundschau,* April 10, 1971.

[7]Whether the Soviet Union considers the Berlin wall an inviolable border is a disputed question. Every indication would suggest that an assertion to this effect will not be long in forthcoming. Moscow proclaims East Germany, including its capital city of "Berlin" (*sic*), to be a sovereign state in Europe. In addition it has stated on repeated occasions during the last year that the Four-Power discussions on the Berlin problem, begun in March 1970, are negotiations on the "West Berlin" problem.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

limited sovereignty of East European countries.[8] Moreover, whereas the Soviet Union has exacted Bonn's recognition of the division of Germany, it is not prepared to concede to West Germany the right of reunification by peaceful means. No mention of this vital matter is made in the text of the treaty.[9]

IV

Now, what of the changes in Soviet-West German economic and technical relations? It may be an exaggeration to say that the Soviet Union needs German scientists and technicians, but it is undeniable that the USSR faces serious economic difficulties. From West Germany it has sought and received the kind of economic assistance designed for underdeveloped countries, which could strengthen its economy now and in the future.[10] Berthold Beitz, chairman of the Krupp concern, has pointed out that one of the primary reasons for Moscow's support of the treaty is its need for German capital goods and technical know-how. He has forecast that the present East European and Soviet share of West German foreign trade, currently at about 5 per cent, may rise to 15 to 20 per cent in the next few years.

It is illuminating to note the speed with which Brandt sent his Minister of Economics, Karl Schiller, and his Minister of Science and Education, Hans Leussink, to Moscow after the treaty was concluded. During Leussink's visit, a Science-Exchange Pact was

[8]It will be interesting to note what justification the Federal Republic can cite for recognizing in a bilateral treaty the borders of third states which, according to the Soviet Union, are sovereign nations, yet are not free to determine what constitutes an infringement of their sovereignty. Since the signing of the treaty considerable dispute has surrounded the interpretation to be given the word "inviolable." See, for example, M. Vulfson, "Problems of European Security," *Kommunist Sovetskoy Latvii,* January 1971.

[9]A letter addressed to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko by his West German counterpart, Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, was delivered to the Foreign Ministry in Moscow at the time of the treaty's signature. It stated "that this treaty does not conflict with the political objective of the Federal Republic of Germany to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will recover its unity in free self-determination." This letter was accepted at the Soviet Foreign Ministry but was not acknowledged in any form and the point it made is not included in the text of the treaty.

In April 1971 a government spokesman in Bonn announced that the secret protocol to the negotiations, prior to the signing of the treaty, contains a Soviet statement that the existing borders in Europe can be changed by peaceful means. The Soviet government was said to have agreed to publication of the protocols when the treaty is submitted to the West German Bundestag for ratification. See *Frankfurter Rundschau,* April 10, 1971.

[10]During Foreign Minister Scheel's visit to Rumania in May 1971, Premier Nicolae Ceausescu demanded that the Federal Republic recognize Rumania as a "developing country" on the economic level. Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), May 18, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

signed on September 28. The pact foresees cooperation in the fields of physics, chemistry, astronomy, biology, medicine, ecology, oceanography, data processing and educational development. The first exchange visits have begun. At the end of November and the beginning of December two groups of German scientists left for Moscow, and the visits have continued into 1971. Leussink is quoted as envisioning the day when West German research satellites might be launched with Soviet rockets. In addition, Daimler-Benz, in association with Renault and several other European firms, undertook discussions with Soviet representatives for the construction of a $1.4 billion plant in central Russia for the annual production of 150,000 ten-to-twenty-ton trucks. Such a plant would be the largest of its kind in the world. In May, however, the U.S. firm, Mack Trucks, Inc., outbid its West German counterpart and signed a preliminary agreement that will more than double the current volume of U.S. exports to the Soviet Union. Some critics, recalling how Warsaw Pact troops were trucked into Czechoslovakia in 1968, hardly consider this a project designed to limit the mobility of the Soviet army.

The sole Soviet contribution to the West German economy thus far has been an agreement, concluded before the signature of the treaty, to deliver natural gas — in return for 1.2 million tons of large-diameter pipe. But the trade offensive is not limited to the Soviet Union. In recent months negotiations have been completed, or are in the process of being concluded, with Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, all aimed in one way or another at the trade Bonn can offer these countries.

V

Much has been said of the fact that Brandt has made submission of the treaty to the West German parliament for ratification dependent on an acceptable solution of the Berlin problem. A solution would be quite simple. It would be Soviet recognition of (1) the reality of West Berlin's political, economic and legal ties with Bonn, (2) the right of West German political figures to visit and meet in Berlin in official capacities, and (3) the right of the Federal government in Bonn to represent West Berlin in matters of foreign policy.[11] It would also mean "guarantees" providing

[11]When the West German Ambassador in Moscow sought to intervene on behalf of a West Berliner arrested in Moscow on April 8, 1971, the Soviet Foreign Ministry declared that the embassy was not "competent" in questions concerning West Berlin. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, April 27, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unrestricted access to and from Berlin and would require that West Berliners be permitted to visit their friends and relatives in East Berlin and East Germany. To compromise these realities would be inviting further encroachment.

According to spokesmen in Bonn and Moscow the treaty is based on a mutual recognition of the realities existing in Europe today, as a constructive step toward détente. The easiest way to relieve the tension that has beleaguered Berlin for twenty-five years would be for the Soviet Union simply to lift the various measures it has taken in concert with the East German regime in violation of every Four-Power agreement governing the city. Moscow's position on Berlin in December 1970, however, was very clear — all political, economic and legal ties between Berlin and Bonn must be eliminated, and the Soviet Union must be given the right to censor West Berlin's press, radio and television. This stand is far from a recognition of the realities of the West German and Berlin problems. But it was enlarged upon in the Soviet position paper presented to the Western allies in Berlin on March 26, 1971 and published in violation of the confidential nature of the discussions in the Polish paper, *Zycie Warzawy,* on April 15.

As published in Poland, the draft agreement was incomplete. Provisions contained in the paper to "secure the Soviet interests in West Berlin [*sic*], including economic and property interests," were omitted. The provisions governing rights of access to West Berlin, the right of West Berliners to visit the GDR and the Soviet sector of Berlin, and the right of the Federal Republic to represent West Berlin's interests abroad are open to wide interpretation (and misinterpretation). They could in no way be enforced by the Western allies. In addition, the Soviet Union has no "interests" in West Berlin that might be construed as being connected with the internal affairs of the three Western sectors. The publicized version of the Soviet paper also omitted passages referring to West Berlin as a "separate political entity." There are, nevertheless, indications that there are some in West Germany who would be willing to compromise on what constitutes an acceptable Berlin solution, or who might be prepared to advocate that the treaty be submitted for ratification in the absence of a Berlin solution.

The realities of the Berlin problem are complex. Brandt's decision to sign a nonaggression treaty with Moscow before an acceptable Berlin solution was reached by France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union has increased the difficulties.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The major concessions given Moscow by Bonn are primarily political in nature and do not require a guarantee that they will be observed. The border between East and West Germany and the Oder-Neisse line have been recognized. They cannot be "unrecognized," even if the treaty is not ratified. One result is that there is no longer great pressure on Moscow to agree to an acceptable Berlin solution. But the pressure on Brandt to achieve the treaty's ratification remains. In December he sent notes to France, England and the United States urging that the Four-Power talks be speeded up and suggesting that they be put on a permanent basis. On March 11, 1971 Foreign Minister Walter Scheel considered it advisable to deny press reports that the State Secretary in the Chancellor's office, Egon Bahr, had shown signs of "impatience with the firm attitude" of the Western allies regarding the Berlin question.

A Berlin settlement should not involve points of political emphasis, such as the recognition of sector borders (or acceptance of the Soviet assertion that there exists a "West Berlin" problem as opposed to a "Berlin" problem), and there would have to be ample guarantees to ensure Soviet observance of an agreement. But the Berlin solution Bonn desires could in no way be guaranteed. Harassment on the autobahns, for example, could be renewed at will. Access for West Berliners to the Soviet sector of Berlin or to East Germany could be arbitrarily denied at any time, as it can be arbitrarily granted. West Germany thus would have to rely on the Soviet Union honoring its word. On the basis of past performance this appears a dubious risk, despite occasional indications that an agreement on practical problems, such as access to and from Berlin, may be possible.

Brandt's declaration that ratification of the treaty is contingent on an acceptable Berlin settlement has placed him in a difficult position in another sense. The Soviet Union holds almost all the pieces in the Berlin chess game. The Chancellor has made so much of achieving a settlement that Moscow could offer a proposal deemed unacceptable to the West under normal circumstances and be credited with advocating moderation by having made any offer at all. If the offer were rejected, the West — particularly the United States — would bear the onus of declining a "well-meant" proffered compromise. Yet acceptance of such an offer might seriously compromise the political and economic viability of West Berlin.

Despite the point made by Brandt on January 14, 1970 in his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bericht zur Lage der Nation, that the Federal Republic has no less a right to be in Berlin than the People's Chamber of East Germany, the CDU/CSU was sharply criticized for holding a party meeting in West Berlin at the beginning of December 1970, in keeping with a legal right that has been exercised since 1949. One Socialist member of the West German parliament declared that the CDU/CSU parliamentary opposition was thus indicating a desire "to attack the government in the rear" while Chancellor Brandt was continuing efforts to achieve success with the new *Ostpolitik*. The West German government tried to discourage the CDU/CSU from holding the meeting in Berlin for fear of upsetting the new "détente."[12] West German newspapers also viewed the meeting as detrimental to the progress of Brandt's *Ostpolitik* and to a settlement of the Berlin problem.

Reaction from the East was immediate, and indicative of the Soviet interpretation of a mutual recognition of realities. For five days harassments were recorded on the Berlin autobahns, involving delays of up to seventeen hours, and the CDU/CSU "revanchists" were charged by the communist party press in Warsaw, East Berlin, Prague, Budapest and Sofia with seeking to sabotage a Berlin settlement. *Pravda* claimed on December 6 that it was the intention of the "enemies of détente" to complicate the Berlin negotiations and to prevent the convening of an All-European Security Conference. Since the conclusion of the Bonn-Moscow treaty there have been eleven instances of interference with traffic on the autobahns or in the air corridors; in the eight-month period prior to its signing there had been only one such occurrence, in January 1970.

The *Junktim* between a Berlin settlement and ratification of the treaty was criticized steadily during the autumn. The communist organ in West Berlin, *Die Wahrheit,* declared on December 8 that "an acceptable settlement of the West Berlin question [*sic*] . . . demands that this problem should not be linked with the ratification" of the treaties with the USSR and Poland. Premier Kosygin, at the beginning of 1971, pointing out that "no international question . . . exists in a vacuum," stated that no one has "the right to declare the settlement of some questions as a preliminary condition for the settlement of other questions. . . . Such an approach leads to procrastination and hinders an improvement of the situation in Europe."[13]

[12]See the remarks of Dr. Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU-Fraktion of the West German parliament, on December 1, 1970, as reported by the Deutsche Presse-Agentur and *Der Tagesspiegel,* December 1 and 2, 1970.

[13]As reported by TASS on January 2, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Another expression of the Soviet position was provided on June 7. During a visit to Bonn, Professor Jeschow of the Moscow Institute for International Relations maintained that Chancellor Brandt's stipulation that a tie exists between ratification and a Berlin settlement, made before the signing of the Bonn-Moscow treaty, does not constitute an agreement. This would seem to contradict the earnest assurances from Bonn that the Soviet Union understands and respects the fact that ratification of the treaties depends on a Berlin solution, particularly since Kosygin's viewpoint has been echoed over and over in the East European press since January. In addition, although Foreign Minister Scheel affirmed on November 29, 1970 in Saarbruecken that neither the Moscow nor the Polish treaty would be submitted for ratification before a Berlin settlement, Deputy Press Secretary Ruediger von Wechmar said the next day that Scheel's statement merely pointed out a political, not a juridical, link between the treaties and a satisfactory settlement.

Six months later von Wechmar was much more precise on this issue, as Scheel as well as other members of the Federal government had also become in the intervening period. On May 15, 1971 von Wechmar said that "the treaties [with Moscow and Warsaw] will not be sent by the Federal Government to the legislative bodies for approval before a satisfactory Berlin settlement has been reached." On May 21 Press Secretary Ahlers stated that the West German government did not believe the question of a mutual and balanced force reduction in Europe (MBFR) should be viewed as completely separate from an All-European Security Conference and hence from the conclusion of a satisfactory Berlin settlement — a position which conflicted with that of U.S. State Department spokesman Charles Bray, who declared on May 24 that the absence of a Berlin agreement would not exclude MBFR discussions.

The position of the Federal government became clouded again in Brandt's interview with *Der Spiegel* published on May 24. The Chancellor maintained that although there was no legal connection between a Berlin settlement and ratification of the treaties with the USSR and Poland, the necessity of a Berlin agreement had been pointed out repeatedly to the Soviet government before the signature of the Bonn-Moscow treaty. He added that should a Berlin agreement prove unattainable, this would be an indication that no real progress toward détente in Europe could be made. Brandt's statement was supported by a similar declaration by Scheel in Frankfurt on May 25. But on May 27 Ahlers held that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the factual connection between a Berlin settlement and ratification of the treaty with Moscow (he did not mention Poland) "was not and is not in question," while urging understanding for the government's restraint in public statements on the Berlin negotiations.[14] On June 3 von Wechmar declared in Lisbon, at the NATO ministerial meeting, that no tie existed "in a legal sense" between the issues of Berlin and MBFR discussions.

Notwithstanding SPD opposition to the CDU decision to exercise its legal right to hold meetings in Berlin, the SPD itself, ironically enough, decided to hold a political meeting in Berlin just before Christmas. Symptomatic of the form of détente achieved between Moscow and Bonn, Berlin traffic was harassed anew for four days on this occasion. In reference to the SPD meeting, TASS reported on December 21 that "cold war advocates" were attempting to thwart "the growing desire of the people of Europe for détente" and were conducting a campaign with "the sole purpose of causing international complications." Since then this assertion has been repeated with regularity. Nevertheless, the West German government has emphasized on numerous occasions throughout the past year that it is not the Soviet Union which opposes a Berlin settlement, but East Germany. This curious ascription to East Germany of independence on the foreign policy level conflicts markedly with the claim of the Brandt Government that one reason for the conclusion of the treaty with Moscow was to open the doors to negotiation with East European countries. Without Bonn going through the Moscow door first, it was held, the East Europeans would not be in a position to discuss outstanding issues with the Federal Republic. A dialectical puzzle has resulted, in which the Soviet Union assumes the role of advocate and the East German government the role of the accused.[15]

Despite this equivocal analysis in West Germany as to why no Berlin settlement has been reached, optimism continues. West Berlin's Mayor Klaus Schuetz announced on November 17, 1970 that by December 31 it would be clear whether a settlement was in the offing and what it would consist of in principle. A month later, revising his estimate, he predicted that by the *summer* of 1971 it would be clear whether "we can again visit our relatives and friends in the other part of the city." On March 11 Foreign Minister Scheel registered strong disagreement with the view that

[14]Scheel initially formulated the "link" between ratification of the treaty with the Soviet Union and a "satisfactory" Berlin settlement in Tokyo in May 1970.

[15]See, for example, Ruediger von Wechmar's statement to this effect on April 13, 1971 in *Relay from Bonn,* April 14, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the U.S. State Department did not consider the Four-Power talks on Berlin to be progressing at a productive pace. On the same day Press Secretary Ahlers reported that the Federal Republic hoped a satisfactory Berlin settlement would be achieved by the end of September. While Deputy Press Secretary von Wechmar disclosed in April that the East and West were "still far apart" on Berlin, on May 24, referring to the same position papers, he pointed out that there was reason for optimism on the Berlin talks, since the position of the East and West showed similarities in dealing with the matters at issue. On the same day Scheel stated that he believed a satisfactory Berlin settlement could be expected before the end of the year. But again Chancellor Brandt voiced a conflicting opinion on June 1 in an interview with the Viennese daily *Die Presse*. He declared that "an approximation of positions can be expected only on procedural issues related to practical improvements," and added that "the positions are still far apart."[16]

VI

What, then, has been the result of the Soviet-West German treaty concluded a year ago? West Germany has conceded much to the USSR, but not one change has been registered on the Berlin problem: new harassments have blocked the air corridors and the interzonal highways. The realities of the Berlin wall, the division of Germany, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the consolidation of Soviet control of Eastern Europe, continued interference with traffic to and from Berlin, all remain. Since 1950 Moscow has sought recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. Now this has suddenly been achieved. For twenty-one years the Soviets have sought West Germany's surrender of its claim to represent all the German people. This too has now become a reality. For the same length of time the Soviet Union has sought recognition of its East German regime. Chancellor Brandt has provided *de facto* recognition. The West, for twenty-five years, has sought a solution to the Berlin problem. On August 23 it secured merely a draft agreement. Even if this is eventually approved by all governments concerned,

[16]The conclusion of a draft agreement among the four powers in Berlin was announced on August 23. Since its provisions were not immediately made public, it is unclear whether the agreement was concluded at the price of Western concessions on the status of Berlin. It is more than likely to be only a question of time until the Soviet Union asserts the existence of a "four-power status for the independent political entity of West Berlin" on the basis of the draft agreement. The establishment of a Soviet Consulate-General in the Western sectors would represent an initial step in this direction. The consequence would be not the *solution* of the "Berlin" problem but the *establishment* of a "West Berlin" question.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it cannot be guaranteed. Since 1949 Bonn has hoped for an improvement of relations with East Germany. Relations have not improved. Treaty is not détente. This was made evident in October 1970, just two months after the treaty's conclusion, when *Pravda* again published an enlightening article. Peaceful coexistence was defined anew as "a form of the class struggle between Socialism and Capitalism." "The decisive factor of peaceful coexistence" was declared to be "the economic and military strength of Socialism."

The only predictable element in international relations is change, but it should never be influenced by the political euphoria induced by attractive promises. As Chancellor Brandt has observed on many occasions before and after signing the treaty with Moscow, West Germany needs both "cooperation and consultation" with the West and "understanding" with the East. But Bonn's need for "understanding" does not excuse equivocation on the definition of realities. Only recognition of all the realities can result in a clear-sighted assessment of any political, economic or military situation. A deceptive psychological atmosphere can make unpleasant dilemmas appear to be innocuous. This does not contribute to their solution, but only to the creation of illusions. Moreover, it is naive and hazardous to permit the conduct of foreign policy to be influenced by shifting emotions. It seems apparent that the Soviet Union is bent on recognizing only those realities compatible with her own interests. The West German government's failure to comprehend this and to point it out, as a fact in the portfolio of all existing realities, will produce the kind of change leading to further unilateral concessions, and could pave the way for a united peaceful Europe from the Ussuri to the Atlantic rather than from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Cold War continues as it has for the last twenty-five years under its various cloaks of propaganda and polemic. The minefields still divide Germany. The wall still cuts across Berlin, dividing families and serving as an altar for the death of refugees from the East. The political borders dividing Europe remain. Soviet goals have not changed. Peaceful coexistence has not become détente. It is obviously folly to predict the future course of history, but it is dangerous error to ignore the lessons of the past.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOVIET POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA SINCE KHRUSHCHEV

by W. Raymond Duncan

SOVIET diplomacy in Africa and Asia underwent change after Khrushchev's deposition in late 1964. The earlier euphoria over socialist development potential in "revolutionary" states came to an end. Moscow rather began to emphasize the difficulties that plagued any transition toward socialism. At the same time Kremlin leaders began to expand their relations with "nonrevolutionary" states — those countries not necessarily involved in the construction of socialist societies. Juxtaposed with broadened diplomatic contacts was evidence of a new pragmatism and realism.

While these characteristics of Soviet diplomacy have been observed in Africa and Asia, they have not been compared with their Latin American counterpart. The purpose of this article is to probe Moscow's Latin American posture after Khrushchev by using the African-Asian setting as a departure point. Have the changes in general orientation observed by scholars been manifest in a new Soviet approach to Latin America? How have these changes been given effect? What are the implications of discernible change for future Soviet-Latin American relations?

The approach will be (1) to identify briefly the basic trends in Soviet policy toward Africa and Asia during the middle and late 1960's, (2) to compare those trends with Soviet-Latin American affairs since Khrushchev, and (3) to examine Moscow's special connection with the one "revolutionary" state in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba.

Soviet Policy in Africa and Asia

The Kremlin modified its orientation toward Africa and Asia after the fall of Khrushchev in two basic ways. One alteration focused on relations with "moderate" or "nonrevolutionary" states, like Dahomey, Senegal and Uganda. The other affected "progressive" or "revolutionary" states, that is, those presumably engaged in or about to engage in socialist development, such as Ghana, Mali, Algeria, Burma and the UAR. In the first case, the new Soviet leadership of Brezhnev and Kosygin expanded the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trend of political realism evident in Khrushchev's last years — that of pursuing accommodation with nonrevolutionary states in the Third World on the basis that they would be functioning for some time and could be of importance to shifting Soviet foreign policy objectives. In the second case, as the Kremlin's optimism about socialist development possibilities in revolutionary states ended, vague ideological formulas on these states' internal processes of economic and social change were reassessed. The post-Khrushchev years were marked by decreased optimism, more stress on the problems of socialist development, and use of more orthodox ideological formulas in Soviet dealings with the revolutionary states, i.e., purging the party of nonrevolutionary forces, transforming it into the vanguard of the movement, urging broadened participation in strengthened "mass organizations." In summarizing Moscow's general foreign policy approach after 1964, which suggests these two basic shifts in policy formation and execution, specialists in Soviet studies refer to increased "caution and prudence,"[1] "restraint and moderation,"[2] "realism,"[3] "pragmatism, less doctrination,"[4] "conservatism,"[5] and "neo-orthodoxy in ideology."[6]

The modifications were in part a reaction to discouraging circumstances. Socialist development in the revolutionary states had not proceeded as rapidly as anticipated in 1955-1956 when Khrushchev began to court the Third World countries.[7] Mos-

[1]Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 695-696.

[2]*Ibid.*, p. 737.

[3]Wolfgang Leonhard, "Politics and Ideology in the Post-Khrushchev Era," in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson, editors, *Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 42, 68.

[4]Alvin Z. Rubinstein, editor, *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 397.

[5]Carl A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 227.

[6]Robert H. Legvold, "The Soviet Union's Changing View of Sub-Saharan Africa," in W. Raymond Duncan, editor, *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries* (Boston: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1970), especially pp. 67-71. For other assessments of post-Khrushchev shifts in policy, see essays by Ishwer Ojha, Marshall Goldman and R. A. Yellon in *ibid.* The Khrushchev period is examined in J. M. MacIntosh, *Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); Thomas Perry Thornton, editor, *The Third World in Soviet Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); Marshall Goldman, *Soviet Aid and Trade to the Less Developed Countries* (New York: Praeger, 1966); and Swen Hamrell and Carl Gosta Widstrand, editors, *The Soviet Bloc, China and Africa* (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1964).

[7]R. A. Yellon argues that the revolutionary states had not accepted Khrushchev's ideological concepts, including the notion of the "national democratic state" in which communists were to enjoy legal existence and the right to organize and participate in government. He suggests that by 1964 the Soviets faced possible loss of ideological initiative on the important "paths of development" question, because Africans and Asians wanted to decide for themselves which measures

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cow had received only marginal political dividends from its economic outlays to certain neutralist and nonaligned countries; their positions had not changed substantially and they had expressed little appreciation for Soviet assistance.[8] Moreover, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the buildup of unfulfilled Soviet aid commitments abroad was running counter to the desire to improve and reorganize the Soviet economy at home.[9] Certainly these considerations were reinforced when the overthrows of Ben Bella in Algeria, Sukarno in Indonesia and Nkrumah in Ghana occurred in 1965-1966, by which time heavy political and economic investments had been made.[10]

The modified approach led to new trade, aid and diplomatic patterns in the Third World based upon new priorities. The post-Khrushchev leadership determined that (1) socialist development required a more sophisticated assessment of the obstacles to change plaguing revolutionary regimes; (2) given the difficulties of socialist development, the possibilities of a vast transformation of society must be placed in longer-range perspective; and (3) given longer perspectives, the priority of developing closer contacts with a select group of revolutionary states no longer seemed much more important than expanding trade and diplomatic relations with a larger number of nonrevolutionary countries.[11]

constituted genuine Marxism-Leninism. In rejecting the "national democratic state" idea, they continued to press for CPSU recognition of their countries' own socialist path of development, which they frequently received, and once claiming CPSU recognition as "builders of socialism," they could gain greater aid from Moscow. See Yellon's "Winds of Change," *Mizan,* July-August 1967, pp. 158-159. The failure of the "national democratic state" concept to catch the imagination of the Third World is also assessed in Marshall D. Shulman, *Beyond the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 65-66; Legvold, *loc. cit.;* and Ishwer Ojha, "The Kremlin and Third World Leadership: Closing the Circle?," in *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, op. cit.*

[8]Shulman, *op. cit.,* pp. 65-66; Yellon, "Shifts in Soviet Policy Towards Developing Areas, 1964-1968," in *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries,* pp. 232-246.

[9]See W. W. Rostow, *The Dynamics of Soviet Society* (Toronto: George J. McLeod, 1967), pp. 274-279; Alex Nove, "Economic Policy and Economic Trends," in *Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev, op. cit.,* pp. 73-109.

[10]On Soviet economic aid, see Leo Tansky, "Soviet Military Aid, Technical Assistance, and Academic Training," in *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries,* pp. 42-51; also Marshall I. Goldman, "Soviet Foreign Aid Since the Death of Stalin: Progress and Problems," *ibid.,* pp. 29-41. Charles B. McLane develops the thesis that military aid was used to "counter the threat of Western alliances directed in one way or another against the Soviet Union, which accounts for aid to Indonesia as a check against SEATO." See his unpublished manuscript, "Foreign Aid in Soviet Third World Policies," presented at the September 1968 meeting of the American Political Science Association.

[11]Various specialists summarize this trend in different terms. In Shulman's words, "In practice, Soviet foreign policy has been going through a very considerable evolution; as a consequence, the gap between its actual operating principles and the symbolic language of Marxist proletarianism has been widening." (*Beyond the Cold War,* p. 53.) Rubinstein states that Moscow "may be less pre-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus Moscow established relations with Pakistan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, Jordan and Kuwait, and increased its contacts with Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Syria, Iraq and Tanzania. These and other expanded trade and diplomatic ties with nonrevolutionary states paved the way for Moscow's representation in national liberation movements and helped to normalize relations that, albeit "unprogressive," gave the new Soviet leadership flexibility and detachment with potentially less economic outlay — an important consideration in view of the need to strengthen the domestic economy. Increased flexibility and detachment in the Third World also served, as one student suggests, as a tacit reminder to leaders of revolutionary states that Soviet political and economic support should not be taken for granted but demanded something more of a *quid pro quo* than had been previously forthcoming.[12]

While seeking to expand trade and diplomatic relations, the new Soviet leaders apparently decided to hold new aid commitments to a minimum. The $2.1 billion committed in Africa and Asia between 1965 and 1968, although equaling the total pledged between 1957 and 1960, was actually a lower amount when expressed as a percentage of the Soviet national product, and fractionally lower than for 1961-1964.[13] They also began to enforce more careful analysis of development projects and to ensure that aid was channeled to those countries best able to utilize it. As might be expected, aid projects became reflective of changing Soviet national security interests — containment of Communist China (aid to India, Pakistan, North Viet Nam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore), maintenance of peace and stability (to allow concentration on economic development at home), and emphasis on pacific settlement of disputes (which might heighten Soviet prestige among the nonrevolutionary states).[14] This ap-

occupied with the instigation of revolution and more interested in the extension of its influence along the traditional paths of diplomacy." (*The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, p. 397.) Richard Lowenthal describes the new epoch as "the decline of the world revolutionary commitment and the realistic concentration on the national interest." ("The Soviet Union in the Post-Revolutionary Era: An Overview," in *Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev*, p. 13.) Vernon V. Aspaturian perceives the new period as one of "progressive disengagement of foreign policy goals from ideological norms" and "globalization of Soviet power and influence." ("Foreign Policy Perspectives in the Sixties," in *ibid.*, p. 129.) See also Yellon, "Shifts in Soviet Policy . . .," *op. cit.*, pp. 246-271.

[12]Yellon, "Shifts in Soviet Policy . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 281.

[13]*Ibid.*, p. 278.

[14]On these concepts of national security policy, see *ibid.*, pp. 246-271; Shulman, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-69; Lowenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-17; Aspaturian, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-154; Uri Ra'anan, "Problems of a 'Communist' Foreign Policy," in Samuel Hendel and Randolph L. Braham, editors, *The U.S.S.R. After 50 Years: Promise and Reality* (New York: Knopf, 1967), pp. 261-262.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proach to economic policy abroad would allow the USSR to promote its own socialist production without becoming overcommitted in potential disaster areas such as Algeria, Indonesia and Ghana proved to be during 1965-1966.

Tightened ideological formulas for dealing with revolutionary states accompanied broadened trade and diplomatic relations with the nonrevolutionary states of the Third World. The new leadership returned to more orthodox concepts, once again distinguishing between the "noncapitalist" and "socialist" paths of development. Algeria, Ghana, Mali and the UAR were placed in the "noncapitalist" category, lower on the scale of ideological value than during the Khrushchev courtship and one stage short of actual transition toward socialism. It became increasingly difficult for revolutionary regimes to obtain official ideological endorsement that they had progressed to the *de facto* socialist course, and, correspondingly, more difficult for them to demand large Soviet aid commitments. The Kremlin began to place more stress on strengthening "mass organizations," which were to become extensions of the elite cadre party.[15] While the new emphasis had not been outlined in detail by the late 1960's, orthodox elements of Marxism-Leninism had emerged in the Soviet concern about "paths of development." The party must be purged of nonrevolutionary forces and transformed into the vanguard of development. Participation must be broadened in the mass organizations led by the party, and socialist goals must be made clear.[16]

The Soviet Union and Latin America

Soviet policy in Latin America after Khrushchev is characterized by three distinct trends. First, Moscow expanded trade and diplomatic relations with the Latin American countries, matching Kremlin policies in other Third World nonrevolutionary states. This was a striking departure in light of traditionally low Soviet interest in the area, which had not risen perceptibly (except in the special case of Cuba) since 1955-1956 when Khrushchev began to flirt with Third World countries in Asia and the Middle East. Although Latin America is still no doubt of lower priority than Asia and Africa (certainly than the Middle East), Soviet interests clearly heightened after 1964, encouraged by persistent evidence of Latin American hostility to the United States.

Second, the Kremlin appears intent upon reducing its threat-image in Latin America. Its unreserved support of Fidel Castro,

[15]See Legvold, *op. cit.*
[16]*Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who advocates militant overthrow of established governments through violent guerrilla warfare, could only implicate the Soviet Union. Moscow thus followed a "correct" or noninterventionist posture in its diplomatic relations. It did so through the personalist style of its ambassadors; by use of "commercial credits" in trade relations; and by supporting a variety of governments, including nationalist military regimes not traditionally lauded by the Kremlin — as in Peru and Bolivia — rather than only governments in which a large communist party participated, such as Chile's.

The third trend is one of minimizing the importance of local communist parties within selected Latin American countries and maximizing the importance of nationalist sentiment, known for its anti-North American bias. The Kremlin expanded its relations south of the Rio Grande at a time when membership in communist party organizations had dropped substantially, many parties having declined in strength and prestige due to factional splits or governmental proscription. Although the new nationalist military governments of Peru and Bolivia had declared their opposition to the small resident communist groups (5,000 in Bolivia; 5,000 in Peru), the Soviets praised these governments — as did their local communist parties — and established new relations with them.

A more detailed examination of these trends suggests that Moscow applied the same political realism in Latin America after 1964 that it was pursuing elsewhere in the Third World. As in Africa and Asia, the post-Khrushchev leadership balanced support of revolutionary states (Cuba) with new attention to the nonrevolutionary states (other Latin American countries). This feat was particularly complex in the Western Hemisphere setting, since many of the nonrevolutionary governments were Cuba's sworn enemies. It was accomplished precisely when Castro was most militant in advocating the violent road to change, and presumably most threatening to his Latin American neighbors, during the years 1966-1968.

While systematically courting a large number of Latin American countries, the Kremlin continued its support of Cuba, but under increasingly conservative guidelines. As discussed below, Moscow brought economic and diplomatic pressure upon Castro in the late 1960's and apparently used its expanded relations in Latin America to dampen Cuba's militant posture toward the hemisphere. The nature of its balancing tactics between

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"revolutionary" Cuba and "nonrevolutionary" Latin America made clear a shift in emphasis in the area.

The Latin American policies pursued by Moscow indicate its continuing desire to encourage nationalist movements, with preference given to the more radical varieties such as those in Peru and Bolivia. This does not mean general support of extreme left-wing guerrilla movements, however; Moscow and the traditional communist parties of Latin America favor the peaceful over the violent road. The goal rather is to make new trade, aid and diplomatic outlets available for those countries seeking them, in order to stimulate more independent foreign relations in the hemisphere vis-à-vis the United States. Demonstrating special preference for more radical versions of nationalist anti-Americanism serves this end. For example, Soviet praise of Bolivia's and Peru's sharp opposition to the United States in 1969 was not matched by similar praise for the 1969 U.S.-Chilean Anaconda agreement which indicated Chile's slower pace of nationalizing industry. This agreement also showed North America's willingness to join in the Chilean reforms — a fact that did not mesh neatly with Moscow's policy objectives.

Moscow's Expanded Relations in Latin America

In the Kremlin's shifting Third World policy considerations after 1955-1956, Latin America did not originally warrant much attention. When compared with postwar aid commitments in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, aid received by Latin America was appreciably smaller, as Table I indicates. The reasons for the area's low priority when measured against, say, the Near and Middle East, would include its geographical distance from the USSR and consequent lack of impact on the Kremlin's constant security concerns; the strong influence of the United States and Monroe Doctrinism in the hemisphere; and the prevalence of popular strong-man rule (Perón in Argentina, Vargas in Brazil, Rojas Piñilla in Colombia) and military governments in opposition to communism. Moscow undoubtedly had been interested in Latin American communism for some years, and the movement enjoyed some success during the interwar period when pro-Soviet parties were formed in most countries. But the history of Latin American communism included serious organizational difficulties (due in part to the Latin American temperament), a weak revolutionary tradition, and challenges to power by other leftist parties such as the Popular Alliance for Revolutionary Action (APRA) in Peru,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE I

SOVIET ECONOMIC AID EXTENDED TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, BY AREA, 1955-1969[a]
(*in million U.S. dollars*)

Year	*Africa*	*Asia*	*Latin America*	*Middle East*	*Annual Totals*
1955	0	126	0	0	126
1956	0	223	0	20	243
1957	0	147	0	113	260
1958	0	37	30	278	345
1959	137	577	0	141	855
1960	69	255	0	270	594
1961	193	354	0	0	547
1962	24	27	0	2	53
1963	100	53	0	83	236
1964	206	262	0	530	998
1965	43	76	15	285	419
1966	77	660	85	422	1244
1967	9	5	55	..	69
1968	..	127	2	245	374
1969	135	20	20	287	462
Total	993	2949	207	2676	6825

[a]Much of this information is drawn from numerous official and nonofficial publications available to the public. A primary source is the annual review of communist aid programs published by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State. The Latin American figures do not include aid to Cuba. Between the years 1954 and 1969, Latin America received about 5 per cent of the total communist economic credits and grants extended to less developed countries, the Near East and South Asia receiving approximately 70 per cent, Africa 16 per cent, and the Far East 9 per cent. The four major recipients of communist assistance since 1954 (excepting Cuba) have been Afghanistan, India, Iran and the UAR.

the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico, Christian Democratic parties in Chile and Venezuela, and the Democratic Action Party of Venezuela.[17]

The Cuban revolution ignited Soviet interest. Anastas I. Mikoyan, then First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of

[17]On the history of Latin American communism and its difficulties, see the various monographs by Ernst Halperin, issued through the M.I.T. Press: *Castro and Latin American Communism* (1963); *The Sino-Cuban and the Chilean Communist Road to Power—A Latin American Debate* (1963); *Proletarian Class Parties in Europe and Latin America* (1967). Also see Halperin's *Nationalism and Communism in Chile* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965). Other useful works include Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1957); Luis E. Aguilar, editor, *Marxism in Latin America* (New York: Knopf, 1968); and Rollie Poppino, *International Communism in Latin America: A History of the Movement, 1917-1963* (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ministers, toured Cuba in February 1960; Moscow thereafter launched a program of heavy economic and political investment which continues today. However, the large financial outlays to Cuba, combined with Castro's opposition to Soviet priorities after the 1962 missile crisis and U.S. opposition to "future Cubas," undoubtedly have conditioned Brezhnev and Kosygin to a reluctance to support further ventures of the Cuban sort in the Western Hemisphere.[18]

The net effect of expanded Soviet trade, aid and diplomatic relations in Latin America from 1965 onward is evident in available statistics. Trade rose from $157 million in 1965 to $260 million in 1968, and overall Soviet trade representation also increased.[19] By 1969 Moscow was making firm trade inroads in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay. A more dramatic indication of Soviet interest was increased aid, notwithstanding Moscow's basic desire to hold new aid commitments in developing countries to a minimum. The USSR extended $85 million in credits to Brazil in 1966, the first large credit to that country; $55 million to Chile in 1967, the only major Soviet aid to developing countries that year;[20] and a $20 million credit for machinery purchases to Uruguay in 1969.

Diplomatic activity was stepped up as well. Peru and the USSR agreed to exchange ambassadors in January 1969, for the first time since the Bolshevik Revolution. One year earlier, in January 1968, Colombia had announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with Moscow. Shortly after his election in 1964, Chilean President Eduardo Frei had opened diplomatic channels with Moscow after a nineteen-year lapse. These links were in addition to the embassies in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. More recently, in late 1969, Bolivia and Ecuador announced plans for the exchange of ambassadors.[21]

[18]On Moscow's reluctance to support additional permanent obligations in Latin America on the Cuban model—so much a part of the new leadership's conservatism and clearly at odds with Castro's belief in exporting revolution—see Wolfgang Berner, "Castro and Moscow's Latin American Strategy," *Aussenpolitik,* June 1968, pp. 357-367, JPRS 45,971, Translations on Latin America; also, Herbert Dinerstein, "Soviet Policy in Latin America," *The American Political Science Review,* March 1967, pp. 80-90.

[19]*Le Monde,* weekly edition in English, May 21, 1969.

[20]"Soviet Economic Performance: 1966-1967," Materials Prepared for the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress (Washington: GPO, 1968), pp. 124-128. The percentage of aid offers to Latin America relative to other developing areas is another index of Moscow's interest: 3.7 per cent in the period 1954-1966; about 36.5 per cent of all Soviet and East European offers in 1967.

[21]Another indication of Soviet interest is the decision to publish a new scientific and political journal, *Latin America,* every other month. It will be edited

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moscow's increased interest in Latin America occurred not only as a function of its new orientation toward the developing countries. The new leadership's attitude toward broadened relations with more countries on a nonrevolutionary basis coincided with developments in Latin America. Several states (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay) either displayed interest in expanding their trade patterns beyond traditional partners or began reform programs detrimental to the United States' foreign investments. Chile initiated a strong domestic reform program in late 1964 (after Frei's election), leading to a long-term nationalization of the Anaconda Copper Company in June 1969. In October 1970 the Chilean Congress confirmed a Marxist, Dr. Salvador Allende, as President, and four months later the Senate gave him wide constitutional powers to nationalize U.S. copper interests. The new Peruvian government of General Velasco Alvarado expropriated the installations of the International Petroleum Company (IPC) in October 1968. General Alfredo Ovando Candia, who assumed power in Bolivia in September 1969 through a bloodless coup d'état, announced annulment of the petroleum code as a prelude to nationalizing the Gulf Oil Company subsidiary in that country. In 1970 Costa Rica appeared interested in "normalizing" diplomatic relations with the USSR, partly due to Soviet coffee purchases, and Guyana announced its agreement in principle to establish diplomatic relations with Moscow.

In Moscow's long view, these events — highlighting deterioration in U.S.-Latin American relations — improved the outlook, suggesting a potential for noncapitalist development and the extension of Soviet political influence.

A Noninterventionist Diplomacy

Moscow appears intent upon stopping what might be termed the persistent "Cuban eclipse." The shadow of potential intervention, ominously cast by a Cuba interposed between the USSR and Latin America, has plagued the Kremlin since early 1966 when Castro assumed a "hard line" position on the export of revolution. The statements and activities of Soviet ambassadors il-

by the Latin American Institute of the Academy of Sciences; the first issue appeared on February 4, 1970.

Latin America's diplomatic relations, of course, extend to communist countries other than the USSR. Czechoslovakia and Poland are represented in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Significantly, Bolivia and Ecuador renewed, upgraded or formalized relations with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania during 1969-1970. Yugoslavia has diplomatic relations with all of the South American states.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lustrate the noninterventionist image sought in recent foreign policy. When interviewed by the Colombian newspaper, *El Tiempo,* for example, Nikolay Belousov, newly appointed Soviet Ambassador to Colombia, stated:

> I am not and never have been a political agitator. . . . We want to develop friendly relations with the largest possible number of countries; relations based upon equal rights, national sovereignty, and nonintervention. . . . We all have only one wish, and that is for lasting world peace. Diplomatic and other contacts contribute to achieving that peace . . . neither revolution nor counter-revolution are exportable. . . . I represent the government of the USSR in Colombia, I have no opinion. I am here only as the Soviet ambassador, not a spokesman for communism. . . .[22]

In describing the activities of Aleksander Sergeyevich Anikin, the Soviet Ambassador to Chile from February 1965 to March 1968, one Chilean journal reported that "at public gatherings, he paid little attention to Chilean Communists, seeking exchange with members of the wealthy families of the country."[23] Why this behavior? Again in the words of the Chilean journal, because

> The main task of the first Soviet ambassador after the re-establishment of relations with the Soviet Union in 1964 was the removal of any suspicion that the USSR intended to intervene in the country's domestic affairs or to support the Marxist parties openly or indirectly.[24]

The USSR's restrained reaction to Chile's election of Marxist President Allende is another case in point. Before his confirmation by the Chilean legislature in late October 1970, Moscow avoided any public signs of exhilaration over the popular election of a Marxist government for the first time in history. On September 20, *Pravda* published an interview with Luis Corvalán, Secretary General of the pro-Soviet Chilean Communist Party, which understated the significance of the election for the rest of Latin America. Corvalán stressed, instead, the importance of worker-and-people unity in the national liberation struggle. When Allende's victory was ratified, however, Soviet press coverage increased, *Pravda* (October 25) featuring on its front page his election and a telegram from Allende to President Podgorny expressing his desire for closer Chilean-Soviet relations. Allende's reestablishment in early November of full diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba and of trade relations with North Korea was acclaimed as representing "more realistic tendencies" in Latin America (*Pravda,* November 14) and erosion of United States im-

[22] *El Tiempo,* May 11, 1968.
[23] *Política Económica Cultura* (*PEC*), March 8, 1968, JPRS, 46,188, Translations on Latin America.
[24] *Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perialism (*New Times,* November 25). Yet, notwithstanding the importance of these events in terms of Soviet perceptions of the evolving epoch, pro-Soviet communist party delegations to Allende's inauguration in November were of low level.

Stopping the "Cuban eclipse" and minimizing the shadow of potential intervention took other forms. Moscow began to emphasize trade-oriented "commercial credits" from 1966 onward. These were usually for the purchase of individual pieces of machinery and equipment rather than complete plants. The importance of "commercial credits," as opposed to "state credits," is that they require less Soviet involvement in project activity and fewer Soviet technicians, which gives them greater appeal to reluctant trade partners.[25] From Moscow's standpoint, reduced Soviet involvement in project activities coincides with post-Khrushchev realism and might be compared with President Nixon's "low profile" foreign policy in developing countries.

Finally, new-image-building in Latin America is reflected in improved Soviet relations with a variety of governments, including regimes not traditionally favored by the Kremlin, as well as in the attitudes of the local communist parties. For example, in 1969 the USSR exchanged ambassadors with the nationalist *military* governments of Peru and Bolivia, and the communist parties in Peru and elsewhere approved the nationalization of the International Petroleum and Gulf Oil companies. Peruvian communists also supported the "Liberty of the Press law," which other groups condemned as a way for the government to secure control of the press. Other governments courted by Moscow since 1964 have included the Christian Democratic, reform-oriented, government of Chile and the more traditional military regime of Brazil.

Local Communist Parties

Soviet relations with Latin America were expanding at a time when membership in communist parties was dropping substantially, due partly to factional splits or governmental proscription.[26] The prospects for closer ties with several nonrevolutionary states clearly were enhanced where reform-oriented governments permitted legal, pro-Soviet communist parties to operate within the political system (Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay). These

[25]See "Soviet Economic Performance: 1966-1967," *op. cit.*

[26]For documents illustrating organizational difficulties and party fragmentation in Latin American communism, see W. Raymond Duncan and James Nelson Goodsell, editors, *The Quest for Change in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), Parts Three, Four and Seven.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parties generally opposed the violent road to change and supported Moscow's peaceful parliamentary reform approach to development. Moreover, local communist parties could be used to tactical advantage both in improving Moscow's image and in encouraging independent nationalist foreign policies (as in their support of the Peruvian junta and of the Marxist government of Chile after October 1970) or in opposing extremist guerrilla movements (e.g., Bolivian Communist Party opposition to guerrilla warfare in that country).

But in spite of these advantages, the size and status of Latin America's communist parties do not appear as key considerations. Membership in communist party organizations, Cuba excepted, fell from 480,000 in 1947 to about 220,000 in 1960, to approximately 178,000 in 1969.[27] Table II indicates communist party strength and status in Latin America between 1960 and 1969. Table III summarizes communist party fragmentation and organizational disunity as of December 1969, underscoring that the solidarity required for effective strategy and tactics was lacking.

Moscow and Havana: A New Phase

The task of balancing Moscow's widening relations among the nonrevolutionary states with continued — but more conservative — attention to revolutionary states proved extremely challenging in the Western Hemisphere. Problems for the USSR lay in the nature of international politics in the area during the latter 1960's. Cuba, the revolutionary state supported by Moscow, was separated from much of Latin America not only by geography, exclusion from the Organization of American States, and economic sanctions, but also by fear in many countries of its desire to export revolution. It was a critical element in the international relations of the nonrevolutionary states, not some distant country whose foreign policy posture mattered little. Moreover, Castro disagreed with the foreign and domestic policies of his nonrevolutionary Latin American brothers. During and after the Tricontinental Conference, held in Havana in January 1966, he moved increasingly toward support for violent left-wing guerrilla movements throughout Latin America. Thus, the potential underlying conflict between Moscow's approach to revolutionary and nonrevolutionary states was raised to confrontation pro-

[27]These figures are drawn from the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research Annual Reports, "World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE II
COMMUNIST PARTY STRENGTH AND STATUS IN LATIN AMERICA[a]

Country	Party Membership 1960	Party Membership December 1969	Legal Status 1960	Legal Status December 1969
Argentina	70-80,000	55,000	Legal	All parties dissolved 1966
Bolivia	4,000	5,000 (E)[b]	Legal[c]	Proscribed 1967
Brazil	50,000	16,000 (E)	Illegal since 1947	Illegal
Chile	20-25,000	45,000	Legal	Legal
Colombia	5,000	9,000 (E)	Legal	Legal
Costa Rica	300	600 (E)	Outlawed by decree 1948	Illegal
Cuba	12,000	120,000 (C)[d]	Legal	In power
Dominican Republic	Negligible	1,110 (E)	Illegal since 1947	Illegal
Ecuador	1,000	1,650 (E)	Legal	Legal
El Salvador	500	200 (E)	Illegal	Illegal
Guatemala	1,000	750 (E)	Outlawed since 1954	Illegal
Haiti	Negligible	Negligible	Outlawed in 1948	Illegal
Honduras	500	300 (E)	Proscribed since 1947	Proscribed
Mexico	5,000	5,000 (E)	Legal	Legal
Nicaragua	200	200	Outlawed since 1945	Illegal
Panama	Negligible	250	Outlawed since 1953	Illegal
Paraguay	500	4,500 (E)	Outlawed since 1936	Illegal
Peru	6,000	5,000 (E)	Proscribed	Proscribed
Uruguay	3,000	20,000 (E)	Legal	Legal
Venezuela	30-35,000	8,000[e]	Legal	Legal

[a]Figures and status for 1960 are drawn from "Soviet Bloc Latin American Activities and Their Implications for United States Foreign Policy," A Study Prepared at the Request of the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, No. 7 (Washington: GPO, February 28, 1960). Data for 1969 are from "World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations," *op. cit.*, 22nd Annual Report, 1970. Membership figures represent total participation among different communist parties of the same countries. "Proscribed" means party power and operations are proscribed by law, administrative decree or constitutional provision. "Legal" means party activities are to a large degree legal, but not necessarily in all respects. See Table III for party breakdowns.

[b]"E" indicates that party strength is estimated in the report.

[c]Bolivia's communist parties had been considered illegal prior to 1956 but were allowed to participate in the elections of 1956 and 1958.

[d]"C" indicates the party strength claimed by the Cuban Communist Party (PCC).

[e]Although outlawed, the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) formed the Union for Advancement as a front to allow legal participation in the December 1968 elections. The election of Rafael Caldera, leader of the Christian Democratic Party (Copei), brought a decision to legalize the Communist Party. Legalization may partially account for its growth in membership (in contrast to the decline in other Latin American communist parties) from 1968 to 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE III
COMMUNIST PARTY FRAGMENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA
(December 1969)[a]

Country	*Communist Parties*
Argentina	Argentine Communist Party (PCA): 50-60,000 all groups Communist Party-National Committee for Revolutionary Recovery (PC-NCRR)
Bolivia	Bolivian Communist Party (PCB-I), (Moscow Line): 3,000 Bolivian Communist Party (PCB-II), (Peking Line): 1,000 Trotskyites (POR): 1,000
Brazil	Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), (Moscow Line): 14,000 Communist Party of Brazil (CPB), (Peking Line): unknown Brazilian Revolutionary Communist Party (PCBR), (Cuban Line) Communist Workers Party (POC), (Guerrilla Liberation)
Chile	Chilean Communist Party (PCC), (pro-Moscow): 45,000
Colombia	Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), (pro-Moscow): 8,000 Communist Party of Colombia Marxist-Leninist (PCC/ML), (pro-Peking): 1,000
Costa Rica	Popular Vanguard Party (PVP), (Moscow-oriented): 600
Cuba	Communist Party of Cuba (PCC): 120,000
Dominican Republic	Dominican Communist Party (PCD), ("independent" position): 250 Popular Dominican Movement (MPD), (Moscow-Peking oriented): 250 Orthodox Communist Party (PCO), (somewhat pro-Peking): 50 Communist Party of the Dominican Republic (PCRD), (militant pro-Peking): 100 Popular Socialist Party (PSP), (pro-Moscow): 50 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR-IJ4), (Moscow-Peking oriented): 400
Ecuador	Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE) and its youth wing (JCE), (Moscow-oriented): 700-800 Ecuadorean Socialist Revolutionary Party (PSRE), (violence-oriented): 500-600 Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE) and Revolutionary Communism of Ecuador (CRE), (pro-Peking): 300-400
El Salvador	Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES): 200
Guatemala	Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT): 750
Haiti[b]	Haitian Communist Party outlawed in 1948 Party of Popular Accord (PEP), (pro-Moscow): unknown Unified Democratic Party (PUDA), (pro-Cuba or pro-Peking): unknown

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE III (*Continued*)

Country	*Communist Parties*
Honduras	Communist Party of Honduras (PCH), (pro-Moscow): 300 Honduran Revolutionary Party (PRH): negligible
Mexico	Mexican Communist Party (PCM), (pro-Moscow): 5,000 Bolshevik Communist Party of Mexico (PCBM), (pro-Moscow): 200-300
Nicaragua	Socialist Party of Nicaragua (PSN): 200
Panama	People's Party (PDP), (pro-Moscow): 250
Paraguay	Communist Party of Paraguay (PCP): 4,000-5,000 Less than 10 per cent estimated to be residing in Paraguay. Bulk of party's membership is in exile, primarily in Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil. Pro-Moscow but badly split. Leadership is highly factionalized.
Peru	Peruvian Communist Party (PCP), (Moscow Line): 2,000 Peruvian Communist Party (PCP), (Peking Line): 3,000
Uruguay	Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU), (pro-Moscow): 20,000 Revolutionary Movement of Uruguay (MRO), (pro-Cuba): in the hundreds National Liberation Movement (MLN Tupamaros): in the hundreds
Venezuela	Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), (pro-Moscow): 8,000—an estimated increase of about 3,000 since legalization.

[a]Data drawn from "World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations," 22nd Annual Report, *op. cit.* Numbers cited represent the estimated membership of different parties.
[b]Haiti's PEP and PUDA merged in 1969 to form the Unified Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH).

portions in Latin America, where those states directly faced each other.

The result of this situation was intense friction between Moscow and Havana after the Tricontinental Conference.[28] Polemics between the two countries naturally included key issues. Castro insisted on the paramountcy of militant, violent overthrow of established Latin American governments. Drawing from his experiences in the Cuban Sierra Maestra, he directed his attacks on the traditional Latin American communist parties and certain

[28]See Andrés Suárez, *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1967); D. Bruce Jackson, *Castro, the Kremlin, and Communism* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969); W. Raymond Duncan, "Moscow and Cuban Radical Nationalism," in *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, op. cit.;* Dinerstein, *op. cit.;* and Edward Gonzales, "Castro's Revolution, Cuban Communist Appeals, and the Soviet Response," *World Politics,* October 1968, pp. 39-68.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

governments labeled "bourgeois reformists," such as those in Chile and Venezuela; the former were too pacific ("unrevolutionary") in their approaches to change, and the latter still inclined to the status quo. His central appeals went to violence-oriented guerrilla leaders. These positions directly contradicted Moscow's tactics of "united fronts" and peaceful parliamentary reforms, in line with which local communist parties were urged to support those political groups advocating a larger state sector in economic development programs and nationalist, anti-American policies in diverse forms. Given Castro's challenge to the Kremlin's new approach to nonrevolutionary states, Moscow's leaders could not let him go unbridled indefinitely.

The USSR's relations with Cuba after 1964 illustrate its increasing stress on orthodoxy and conservatism in dealing with one revolutionary state. Brezhnev and Kosygin began to apply both economic and diplomatic pressure on Cuba as a means of bringing Castro more into consonance with their new orientations toward Latin America, but not going too far to repress his revolutionary position with all its anti-American manifestations. In the matter of economic pressure, Castro announced on January 2, 1968, that gasoline rationing and other curbs on oil consumption were necessary, due in part to the inadequacy of Soviet deliveries. He emphasized that in 1967 oil needs rose 8 per cent, while supplies rose only 2 per cent. Moreover, the trade agreement for 1968 encompassed only a 10 per cent trade increase, compared with a 23 per cent increase in 1967 over 1966.

Diplomatic pressure was also applied. *Pravda* carried the writings of Latin American communist parties which criticized Castro's call for armed struggle.[29] Throughout the first half of 1968, Moscow hammered home its thesis of peaceful change through broad, united anti-imperialist fronts, embracing, in the words of one Soviet writer, not guerrillas, but "ever wider sections of the working people."[30] As tensions between the two countries must have mounted, Moscow tempered its economic and diplomatic pressure with selected words of praise. It pledged continued solidarity with Cuba in April 1968, honored the anniversary of "Che" Guevara's death in June, and extolled Soviet-Cuban economic cooperation in July.[31]

[29]For example, see Luis Corvalán, Secretary General of the Chilean Communist Party, "The Alliance of Revolutionary and Anti-Imperialist Forces in Latin America," *Pravda*, July 30, 1967.

[30]V. Tyaguneko, "Emancipated Countries Choose Their Path," *International Affairs* (Moscow), March 1968, p. 56.

[31]Radio Broadcasts, Moscow, in Spanish to Cuba, April 19, June 15, and July 23, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This generally increased Soviet conservatism, when added to domestic events in Cuba and to the dilemmas of guerrilla movements in Latin America during the late 1960's, helps to explain a new phase in Moscow-Havana relations after the summer of 1968, when Havana, surprisingly, supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In growing rapprochement, both nations began during 1969 to praise their "fraternal friendship." Moreover, Castro clearly began to moderate his position on guerrilla warfare and "armed struggle" in the Western Hemisphere. He showed increased flexibility in his approach to reform, suggested by his support of the Peruvian military government in 1969. He also decreased his criticism of Moscow's new trade, aid and diplomatic policies in Latin America and of the roles to be played by the traditional communist parties. Moscow, on its part, sent important diplomatic delegations to Cuba throughout 1969, and, as if in compromise with Castro, stepped up its Radio Peace and Progress broadcasts in French and Creole to Haiti (from two half-hour programs per week to one a day), openly advocating insurrection in support of the Haitian communists. The improvement in relations, although it may be an Indian summer before winter instead of a spring thaw, suggests that the USSR derived key benefits from its shift in emphasis in Latin America.

Before the New Phase

The new period of accommodation, beginning in August 1968, contrasts sharply with major events in Moscow-Havana relations just a few months earlier. Castro purged a "sectarian" group of Cuban communists in February 1968, a "microfaction" allegedly led by the old pro-Soviet disciple, Aníbal Escalante. This highly publicized purge produced a report by Major Raúl Castro to the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) that contained direct anti-Soviet statements and suggested, by implication, sources of attempted Soviet influence in Cuban domestic and foreign policies.[32] Such interference, Castro made clear, would not be tolerated.[33] Then in March, Castro stressed the

[32]An excellent analysis of the "microfaction" affair is given by Kevin Devlin in "The Soviet-Cuban Confrontation: Economic Reality and Political Judo," *Radio Free Europe Report*, April 1, 1968. The three-day Central Committee meeting which purged the "microfaction" issued a simultaneous statement that Cuba would not send a delegation to the Budapest meeting of communist parties called by the Soviet Union. Radio Broadcast, Havana Prensa Latina, February 2, 1968.

[33]Moscow, of course, denied interference. See Professor V. Volskity, Director of the Institute of Latin America of the USSR Academy of Sciences, "Latin America: A New Stage in the People's Struggle," *Pravda*, March 19, 1968, p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

importance of Cuba becoming independent of outside aid — in direct reference to the USSR — and reiterated his own view of Marxism-Leninism, openly downgrading the basic texts, presumably Russian. These texts, he said, contain "many clichés, little stereotyped phrases and some lies." In unmistakable criticism of Latin America's pro-Soviet communist parties and the Cuban "microfaction," he spoke of the "enormous abyss which, at times, exists between philosophy and reality."[34]

On April 6, the Cuban-led, Havana-based Tricontinental Secretariat (AALAPSO) released a renewed call for guerrilla warfare under the slogan, "Arms, money and teams [of guerrillas] to liberate Latin America."[35] Later that month Castro assailed once again the reformist Chilean ambassador to the United States, Rodimiro Tomic, a "trained parrot that the Yankees have been grooming to be President," one, incidentally, that might run "with support of the Chilean Communist Party."[36] Moreover, perhaps in response to the USSR agreement to give Chile $15 million in loans for the purchase of Soviet machinery and equipment, or to Moscow's recently established diplomatic relations with Colombia, or to the Soviet-Brazilian agreement signed in early April, Castro stated that the Chileans were "treated like decent persons, almost like progressives; bourgeois and reactionary oligarchs have been pampered and showered with attention by governments that call themselves 'revolutionary' " — which was a direct commentary on Moscow's post-Khrushchev policies toward moderate, nonrevolutionary Latin American states.[37]

The New Phase

Solid evidence of a Soviet-Cuban rapprochement developed after Havana declared its support of Moscow's August 1968 Czechoslovakian policy. In addition to praising their "fraternal friendship," both countries demonstrated the new sense of accord in 1969 through formation of a Cuban-Soviet Friendship Association in April, a visit of seven Soviet warships to Havana to help commemorate the 26th of July, and a well-publicized one day's work in the cane fields by 650 Soviet technicians and diplomats in

[34]Speech at Havana University, March 13, 1968, Havana Radio.

[35]See Kevin Devlin, "Rumania Intervenes in Cuba-Soviet Confrontation," *Radio Free Europe Report,* April 22, 1968, p. 2.

[36]Speech of April 19, 1968, Havana Radio.

[37]*Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

November.[38] The Defense Minister of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei A. Grechko, traveled to Havana in November. Much fanfare attended the Soviet naval fleet and Grechko visits, unlike the low-key treatment of Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin's June-July visit in 1967.[39]

Evidence of the new phase can be derived from three additional sources. First, major speeches during 1969 relegated acknowledged problems between Moscow and Havana to the past. In his speech of January 2, marking the tenth anniversary of the Cuban revolution, Castro praised Soviet aid to Cuba and said:

> On certain occasions we have had differences of opinion on certain matters, and we have expressed them with all honesty. But at the same time this honesty obliges us to point out that this aid was decisive for our country throughout the difficult years.[40]

Addressing the Moscow Conference in June, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez remarked that

> In the development of that friendship and collaboration [between Moscow and Havana], inevitable discrepancies—which on some occasions were acute—arose. But the Communist Party of Cuba is of the opinion that, in the process of the people's struggle against imperialism, the Soviet Union is a fundamental bulwark and that that historic role has been expressed in our times in its support for Cuba's socialist Revolution. . . .[41]

Second, a defector from Castro's intelligence network reported in July 1969 that Castro had signed an accord with Moscow in 1968 committing himself to a pro-Moscow line, in return for which the Soviet Union agreed not to diminish its economic support to Cuba and would supply 5,000 technicians to work in Cuba's faltering economy.[42] If this report is accurate, it would help to explain the new phase.

[38]For relevant speeches and commentary, see *Granma,* Weekly Review in English, January 5, April 27, and August 17, 1969. Also, speech by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez at the Moscow Conference of June 1969, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, *ibid.,* June 15, 1969; and speech by Major Jesús Montane Oropesa, member of the Central Committee of the PCC, Minister of Communications and President of the Commission for Lenin's Centennial, *ibid.,* November 16, 1969.

[39]Publicity for the fleet's arrival included cane-cutting by Soviet sailors to commemorate the 26th of July, plus several photographs in *Granma* contrasting the "voluntary productive work" of Moscow's sailors with the barroom and statue-climbing-while-intoxicated antics of United States sailors in earlier times. See *Granma,* August 3, 1969.

[40]*Ibid.,* January 5, 1969.

[41]*Ibid.,* June 15, 1969.

[42]James Nelson Goodsell, "Cuba More Sovietized," *Christian Science Monitor,* July 16, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Third, certain party events in Cuba suggest a response to Moscow's renewed emphasis on orthodoxy and conservatism in its approach to revolutionary states. Castro and other members of the PCC's Central Committee, such as Armando Hart Davalos, began in 1969 to urge the necessity of strengthening the party and its mass organization at all levels. They explicitly referred, in some cases, to the Soviet experience as the example.[43] This stress on party unity and renewed building of base organizations, rather than on the differences of Cuban communism from other brands of Marxism-Leninism, which Castro had accentuated in March 1968, reveals a surprising convergence of Soviet and Cuban views.[44] While it is difficult to find direct evidence of Soviet influence on Castro's party organization, the orthodoxy advocated by Moscow was gradually reproduced in Cuba's organizational setting, as participation broadened in the mass organizations along with exhortations for renewed revolutionary commitments by all Cubans.

Forces Behind the New Phase

The forces behind the new phase had both domestic and international dimensions. Domestically, Castro faced severe economic and social strains. Partly as a result of a drought in eastern Cuba, the 1968 sugar harvest by mid-March was almost a million tons below the mid-March total of 1967,[45] and far off the eight-million-ton goal set for the year. Moreover, as reported in 1969, a number of social problems — closely tied to economic difficulties — were plaguing Cuba. Worker apathy that bordered on passive resistance, absenteeism, lack of discipline, shoddy work, low labor productivity, disorganization and carelessness with equipment were reportedly widespread.[46] Other difficulties in-

[43]See speech by Armando Hart Davalos, Organizing Secretary and member of the Political Bureau of the PCC, at the graduating ceremony for the 1963-1969 Department of Political Science course at the University of Havana's School of Humanities, *Granma,* October 5, 1969.

[44]This did not preclude Havana from emphasizing the specific *national* roots of its 1959 revolution. The post-1959 literature ties the heroes of Castro's movement together with earlier combatants against Spanish colonialism (Máximo Gómez, Antonio Maceo, José Martí, Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, Ignacio Agramonte) and the deficiencies of Cuba after the Spanish-Cuban-American War of 1898 (Julio Antonio Mella, Eduardo Chibas). By late 1968 the Cuban government had begun to honor the theme of "A Hundred Years of Struggle," suggesting that 1968 was a national centennial of the beginning of the struggle for "independence." See *ibid.,* September 15, 1968.

[45]Speech by Fidel Castro at Havana University, March 13, 1968, Havana Radio.

[46]*New York Times,* October 12, 1969. Reports of worker apathy were confirmed by my own interviews with newly arriving Cuban exiles in Miami, Florida, in November 1969. Several exiles reported that apathy was particularly severe in the cane fields when the "chiefs were not looking."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cluded juvenile delinquency, crime, truancy and continuing, presumably growing, illiteracy.[47] Castro admitted in March 1968 that "the situation in Cuba is not easy" with popular discontent rife. These distresses help to account for renewed party strengthening of base organizations such as the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR's), and increased militarization to combat the crime, indifference and absenteeism which so affected production.[48] It is not unlikely that, given these problems offsetting the goal to produce a ten-million-ton sugar harvest in 1970, Castro would tone down Havana's antagonism with Moscow in an effort to assure continued economic aid from socialist nations.

The international setting of mid-1968 was also favorable to warmer Moscow-Havana relations. Castro's theory of armed struggle in the hemisphere did not look impressive in practice. Ernesto "Che" Guevara's activities had failed in Bolivia, illustrating a misinterpretation of the specific conditions for revolution in that country. Bolivian peasants did not respond well to Che's plans. Support from the Bolivian Communist Party was lukewarm at best.[49] Che's death in October 1967 helped to reaffirm Moscow's and the Latin American communist parties' argument that power could best be attained through peaceful "united fronts." Meanwhile, other guerrilla movements were not doing well. The

[47]See *Granma,* "Report on Internal Order," May 11, 1969; also *New York Times,* March 19, 1969. Interviews with newly arriving exiles in November 1969 suggested that crime has risen partly because of the difficulty in obtaining sufficient food, clothing and modest consumer goods in some areas. Most people interviewed complained of insufficient food and clothing; they indicated the necessity of using *la bolsa negra* (black market). Castro spoke about crime problems in September 1968 at a rally in Havana's Plaza de la Revolución commemorating the eighth anniversary of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. Havana Radio Broadcast in Spanish, September 29, 1968.

[48]Armando Hart Davalos (*Granma,* May 5 and October 5, 1969) linked party building directly with absenteeism and underproduction. Organizational tightening was so severe at the local level as to be called "oppressive" by Cubans interviewed in November 1969. Rigid CDR control of daily activities (number of people in one's apartment, radio programs listened to) was singled out for specific criticism by the newly arriving exiles.

[49]Moscow was not enamored with guerrilla activities in Bolivia. On June 15, 1967 *Pravda* reported on guerrilla clashes and quoted Jorge Kolle, Secretary of the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB), as saying that the party "supported" the guerrillas but had its own line of broad mass struggle; that armed struggle was not the only or definitive form of struggle. See also "The Castroite Bolivian Debacle in Perspective," *Communist Affairs,* March-April 1968, pp. 3-10, and "The Challenge of Castroism in Chile," *Política Económica Cultura (PEC),* Santiago, Chile, March 1, 1968, pp. 10-11, JPRS 44,876, Translations on Latin America. *PEC* argues that Bolivian communists deliberately undermined the activities of Guevara's group. For a study of the doctrine and problems of the left-wing movements in Latin America, see John D. Martz, "Doctrine and Dilemmas of the Latin American 'New Left,'" *World Politics,* January 1970, pp. 171-196.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

guerrillas in Venezuela were less numerous and less active.[50] The Rebel Armed Forces of the Edgar Ibarra Front in Guatemala, led by César Montes, were on the defensive, as were Colombian guerrillas. The highly publicized Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO), founded at the ending of the first Tricontinental Conference of January 1966, had become noticeably ineffective.[51] Castro might well have concluded from these events that policy shifts vis-à-vis Latin America and the Soviet Union were in order.

Implications for Soviet Diplomacy

While too much should not be read into this warming trend, it does suggest relative success for Moscow in balancing its revolutionary and nonrevolutionary state policies in Latin America. Evidence for this conclusion lies in the record of Cuban diplomacy since August 1968.

Cuba's criticism of Latin American governments became less frequent and more circumspect. One might recall the language used by Castro in February 1966. In response to a letter sent to the United Nations Security Council by representatives of eighteen Latin American governments protesting the militant and "interventionist" line of the 1966 Tricontinental Conference, Castro declared that "the people of these governments have the right to sweep . . . and sooner or later will sweep them away by means of the most violent revolutionary action."[52] Compare this with the mood expressed by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez in April 1969, speaking at a press conference in Lima, Peru:

> In reference to Latin America, it is worth noting that it was not Cuba that broke off relations with the Latin American countries which do not have relations with us today. . . . Cuba would be willing to resume diplomatic relations with those governments of Latin America which decide to rid themselves of U.S. political control and to follow an independent policy. . . . Cuba maintains a position of friendship with all the peoples of Latin America. We were not the ones who broke off relations with the established governments.[53]

Moreover, Havana increasingly lauded Peru's new military regime, which deposed President Fernando Belaunde Terry in Oc-

[50]See "Discord Grows Between Castro and the Communists," *Este y Oeste* (Caracas/Paris), March 1968, pp. 10-17, JPRS 45,497, Translations on Latin America.

[51]*Punto Final,* Santiago, Chile, December 31, 1968, pp. 8-16.

[52]*New York Times,* March 12, 1966. Also, Havana Radio, Havana Prensa Latina in Spanish, February 10, 1966.

[53]*Granma,* April 27, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tober 1968.[54] This support for a radical nationalist government — a befitting classification in light of its expropriation of the IPC — coincided with the first USSR-Peruvian accord of February 1969.

Decreased criticism of Latin American governments was also shown in the cessation of daily radio broadcasts assailing Chile and Venezuela. In the past, sharp criticism of Chile and Venezuela as "bourgeois reformist" governments, combined with equally strong denunciations of the resident communist parties, had tended to undermine both Marxist-Leninist unity and the potential for the communists to join other nationalist, anti-American groups within these countries.[55] Halting the broadcasts brought Cuba's foreign policy at least partially in line with that of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the clearest expression of Cuba's more flexible approach toward revolution and reform has come from Carlos Rafael Rodríguez. During his April 1969 press conference in Lima, he referred to the violent road in the following terms:

> Cuba believes that armed struggle is the fundamental instrument for the advancement of the revolutionary process in the vast majority of the Latin American countries, and we will continue to support this thesis. This concept has often been misinterpreted in the belief that it means that armed struggle is indispensable in each and every country of Latin America. *We consider that there may be cases in which this is not so. Uruguay has been cited as such a possibility. In the specific conditions of Latin America there is even the chance of electoral victories.* This is the hypothetical case of Chile, although it is clear that such an electoral victory would very likely be followed by a military coup, which would, in turn, be followed by armed struggle, as we have already observed.[56]

This statement contrasts with those voiced at the First Conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization, July-August 1967, in Havana. Sponsored by Castro, the conference had as participants left-wing extremist groups from throughout the hemisphere. The principal points developed left no doubt about Havana's position: "armed struggle is the fundamental line of

[54]Havana justified its support of Peru on the basis of the Peruvian "struggle against the United States Government's attempt to impose a 'Big Stick' policy. We support the struggle of the Peruvian nation for her sovereignty . . . the stand the military junta has taken in the I.P.C. case is a justified one." (Rodríguez press conference, *ibid.*) Moscow joined Cuba in support of Peru at a meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, held in Peru, in April 1969.

[55]Castro's undermining of Marxist-Leninist unity and the communists' capability of joining "broad anti-imperialist fronts" during the 1966-1968 period is examined in W. Raymond Duncan, "La Habana y el Partido Comunista Chileno," *Problemas del Comunismo* (*Problems of Communism,* Spanish edition), July-August 1967, pp. 64-74; Martin D. Gensler, "Los Aliados Incompatibles," *ibid.,* pp. 49-63; and Kevin Devlin, "The Permanent Revolutionism of Fidel Castro," *Problems of Communism,* January-February 1968, pp. 1-11.

[56]*Granma,* June 15, 1969. (Emphasis added.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

revolution in Latin America," "armed struggle is inevitable."[57]

The transition from "armed struggle is inevitable" (1967) to "there may be cases in which this is not so" and "there is even the chance of electoral victories" (1969) helped to re-establish the importance of traditional pro-Soviet Latin American communist parties and to accomplish Castro's partial realignment with them. This was emphasized when Castro joined them in praising the electoral victory of Salvador Allende.

During the 1966-1968 period Castro had linked the inevitability of armed struggle with castigation of the communists:

> Our position regarding Communist parties is based strictly on revolutionary principles. Those parties which unhesitatingly follow a revolutionary line we will support in spite of everything. Those parties which call themselves Communist or Marxist and believe themselves to have a monopoly on revolutionary feeling, but who are really monopolizers of reformism, we will not treat as revolutionary parties. If in any nation those who call themselves Communists do not know how to fulfill their duty, we will support those who—even though they do not call themselves Communists —behave like real Communists in the struggle. . . . *What defines a Communist is his action against oligarchies, action against imperialism and, on this continent, action in the armed revolutionary movement.*[58]

His position was of course challenged by Moscow and the pro-Soviet communist parties. They accused Havana of "doctrinal intervention" and "division" of anti-imperialist unity. Responding to this criticism, Havana was prepared by 1969 to qualify its "hard line" in other ways. Rodríguez, in his April 1969 press conference, denied that the Cuban government had directly participated in guerrilla movements and said that its support of guerrilla warfare lay only in the example Cuba set for Latin America. Later, at the Moscow Conference of June 1969, he made it clear that, like other pro-Soviet communist parties of Latin America,

> The Communist Party of Cuba is convinced of the importance of achieving the unity of action of the Communists, of all anti-imperialist forces in order to develop, utilizing all new possibilities, to the maximum degree, a broader offensive against imperialism and the forces of reaction and war . . . .[59]

which is what Moscow had been emphasizing all the time.

[57]See *La Nación,* Santiago, Chile, August 11, 1967. In October 1966, Captain Osmani Cienfuegos, President of the Foreign Relations Commission of Cuba's Communist Party, stated that "armed struggle, insurrection and revolutionary war are the only solutions" for Venezuela and Latin America. *New York Times,* October 12, 1966.

[58]Speech at Havana University, marking the tenth anniversary of the assault on the presidential palace, March 13, 1967. Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services, March 14, 1967. (Emphasis added.) Also quoted by Devlin in "The Permanent Revolutionism of Fidel Castro," *op. cit.*

[59]Rodríguez, Speech to the Moscow Conference, *op. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That Castro meant to be selective about supporting guerrilla warfare became clearer in January 1970. Douglas Bravo, in the name of the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), revealed that a group of Venezuelan guerrillas was determined to break relations with Cuba because of Cuba's "failure to give material aid to revolutionary movements."[60] Bravo insisted that Cuba's economic strategy was causing a change in its international strategy, as this failure showed.[61]

Conclusion

Moscow's relations with Latin America mirror the realistic guidelines noted by specialists on Soviet affairs in the Kremlin's Third World posture during the post-Khrushchev years. Soviet diplomacy in this area where confrontation between Cuba and several other countries was at times accentuated illustrates the complexities Moscow faced in balancing its support for "revolutionary" and "nonrevolutionary" states. That the USSR could (1) continue its relations with revolutionary Cuba while expanding its contacts elsewhere in Latin America, and (2) bring pressure to bear on Cuba as a means of moderating Castro's "hard line" foreign policy, attests to the Kremlin's growing sophistication and ability to forge a new set of conditions favorable to its long-run interests.

Soviet-Latin American relations contained new opportunities for Moscow as the decade of the 1970's began. Castro's decreased criticism of other Latin American governments and his declining confrontation with the pro-Soviet communist parties, measured in conjunction with acceptance by moderate Latin American states of improved and widened relations with the USSR, tip the scale to Moscow's advantage. A decreased threat from Cuba toward established Latin American governments improves Moscow's image and reduces the limited sense of United States-Latin American unity created by that common external threat. To the extent that nationalist fears of Cuba and the USSR are lessened, the balance against strong anti-American sentiments in Latin American nationalism is transformed. Should U.S.-Latin American relations continue at the low level reached by the late 1960's, a more respectable Cuba could encourage strengthened Soviet relations in the hemisphere as well as nationalist economic policies such as

[60]Madrid Radio Broadcast in Spanish, January 13, 1970.
[61]*Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those already demonstrated by Peru, Bolivia and Chile.

That Castro has reduced his attacks on "bourgeois reformist" governments and local communist parties also facilitates conditions for improved relations among Marxist-Leninist groups within and among the Latin American countries. His militant, uncompromising stand was a prime cause of disunity among these groups as they responded differently to his call. Strengthening the operational setting of the pro-Soviet communist parties through a Cuba made increasingly pro-Soviet after 1968 is now a possibility for Moscow, and it is the product of Muscovite realism at work.

These positive consequences must be assessed in light of continuing limitations to Soviet policy in Latin America. As the 1969 Moscow Conference illustrated, issues of conflict between Cuba and the USSR still exist, as do their implications for the rest of Latin America. Castro remains unconvinced that the communist and workers' parties can fulfill their roles as the main force in the anti-imperialist and revolutionary struggle in Latin America, even though he has muted his criticism of those parties.[62] Neither is he fully in accord with Moscow's broadened diplomatic and trade relations with "bourgeois reformist" governments, although he is less intransigent on the subject. Finally, he continues to be critical of the USSR's "peaceful coexistence" strategy in world politics.[63] He reiterated Cuba's support for militant guerrilla and other "revolutionary" movements in Latin America at Havana's celebration marking the Lenin Centennial in April 1970.

The history of Soviet-Cuban relations since the early 1960's also warns of the anti-Soviet knife edge that Latin American nationalism can develop. Moscow is well aware of this essential lesson and shows no enthusiasm for supporting another Cuba, led by a volatile, charismatic, and often unpredictable leader. *Personalismo* (importance of personalities), *machismo* (male virility), and *caudillismo* (strong-man rule) can operate against the Soviets as they have against the United States. Similarly, sensitivity to intervention can be directed east as it continues to be aimed north. Soviet policy in Latin America shows new flexibility and strength in the present epoch, but its future will be conditioned by Latin American political cultures, the tendency toward political instability in much of the area, and the perceptions of the United States held south of the Rio Grande.

[62]Rodríguez, Speech to the Moscow Conference, *op. cit.*
[63]*Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE LAW OF THE SEA AND U.S. POLICY INITIATIVES

by Ann L. Hollick

IN 1970 the Nixon Administration arrived at significant new policy positions on major aspects of the law of the sea: the breadth of the territorial sea, freedom of transit through international straits, offshore fishing rights, the boundary of the continental shelf, and an international regime for the ocean floor beyond that boundary. These decisions were the culmination of several years of study within the government, debate among government officials, Congressmen and private interest groups, and negotiations with other nations.

Decisions on the five issues were made public at different stages during the year. A policy on the territorial sea breadth, international straits and fisheries was announced on February 18. On May 23 President Nixon released a statement on the boundary of the continental shelf and an outline of an international seabed regime. Further details on the continental shelf boundary and a detailed proposal for a seabed regime were set forth on August 3, when the U.S. delegation presented a draft convention to the United Nations Seabed Committee meeting in Geneva. A final policy development came on November 20, when the United States proposed to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly that an international conference be convened to conclude conventions on the nature and extent of a seabed regime, the territorial sea boundary and related issues, and the regulation of marine pollution.

I

Of avowed importance to the American government has been an international agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea.[1] On February 18, 1970, President Nixon announced in his report to Congress that "the most pressing issue regarding the law of the sea is the need to achieve agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea, to head off the threat of escalating national claims over

[1]Within the area of the territorial sea, the littoral state exercises full sovereign jurisdiction, except for the right of innocent passage.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the oceans."[2] Speaking on the same day before a meeting of the Philadelphia Bar Association and the Philadelphia World Affairs Council, John R. Stevenson, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, amplified this statement by revealing that the United States had been consulting with a "large number of nations" about undertaking new efforts to reach agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea. The United States had found "widespread support" for fixing it at twelve nautical miles. "As a result of our consultations, we believe the time is right for the conclusion of a new international treaty fixing the limitation of the territorial sea at twelve miles and providing for freedom of transit through and over international straits and carefully defined preferential fishing rights for coastal states on the high seas."[3] Within the government this tripartite set of proposals is referred to as the "law of the sea" initiative.

The inclusion in Stevenson's statement of the issues of passage through international straits and offshore fishing rights followed from considerations of American interests and negotiating tactics. If agreement were reached on a territorial sea of twelve miles, 116 international straits of importance to commercial and naval powers would be entirely within the regime of the territorial sea and would therefore become subject to the right of innocent passage.[4] Because the United States could not contemplate such a prospect with equanimity, it proposed that any agreement extending the breadth of the territorial sea to twelve miles be supplemented by provision for free rather than innocent passage through and over international straits.

The State Department issued a statement on February 25, strongly emphasizing the *quid pro quo* role of the straits provision. "The United States supports the 12-mile limit as the most widely accepted one, but only if a treaty can be negotiated which will achieve widespread international acceptance and will provide for freedom of navigation through and over international straits."

[2]"U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's," *Department of State Bulletin* (hereafter referred to as *Bulletin*), March 9, 1970, p. 314.

[3]*Bulletin*, March 16, 1970, p. 341.

[4]The right of innocent passage through territorial waters is exercised subject to compliance with the regulations of the coastal state. In practice it may be considerably restricted. Submarines are required to navigate on the surface of territorial waters; the right of warships to passage without express consent is widely disputed; and no provision is made for innocent passage of aircraft, thereby precluding all rights to fly over territorial seas. See Articles 14 to 23 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, April 29, 1958 (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L/52).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The statement went on to say that until the "law of the sea" treaty initiative was successful, the United States would not recognize territorial seas that exceed three miles.[5]

A third provision in the "law of the sea" treaty dealing with preferential rights for coastal fishing nations was not directly related to vital American interests but was designed instead to induce coastal nations dependent on offshore fishing to accept a twelve-mile territorial sea. Nine of these nations have gone so far as to extend unilateral claims to a 200-mile territorial sea to protect their fishing interests.[6] The United States sought, by means of this provision, to allay the fears of these nations and persuade them to reduce their claims to twelve miles. Although this third article has been circulated to other governments, a full description of it has not been made public. According to one account of its terms, a coastal fishing nation would be permitted to reserve a portion of the catch off its shores for its own fishing fleet. The amount would be determined by the nation's economic reliance on and investment in offshore fishing and on the range of its fishing fleet.[7] The proposal thus attempts to devise a concept of preferential fishing rights which would satisfy coastal fishing nations without establishing a fishing zone that might ultimately detract from the viability of a twelve-mile territorial sea by encouraging expanding claims to jurisdiction.[8]

In his foreign policy message to the Congress, President Nixon, after underscoring the importance of resolving the territorial sea boundary, went on to state that "we also believe it important to make parallel progress toward establishing an internationally agreed boundary between the Continental Shelf and the deep seabeds, and on a regime for exploitation of deep seabed resources."[9] Stevenson's speech, while also mentioning the shelf and the seabed regime, did not significantly elaborate on the President's statement. It outlined the differing attitudes toward the location of the national continental shelf boundary and reiterated that the United States favored the establishment of "an internationally agreed regime for exploitation of resources beyond

[5]*Bulletin,* March 16, 1970, p. 343.

[6]Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay.

[7]Leigh S. Ratiner, "United States Oceans Policy: An Analysis," *Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce,* January 1971, pp. 248-249.

[8]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Territorial Sea Boundaries, Hearings* before Subcommittee on Seapower, Testimony of Leigh Ratiner, Chairman, Defense Advisory Group on the Law of the Sea (H.A.S.C. No. 91-61), June 25, 1970, p. 9291.

[9]*Bulletin,* March 9, 1970, p. 314.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

national jurisdiction . . . as soon as practicable." The vague tenor of these remarks indicated that, at least as of February 1970, the government was not prepared to set forth a United States position on the continental shelf boundary and the seabed regime.

Stevenson, speaking for the State Department, considered it inadvisable to handle the shelf and seabed regime issues with the other three in a general law of the sea conference. Pointing out that the last comprehensive conference held in Geneva in 1958 took nearly ten years to prepare, he recommended that the issues be dealt with separately or in "manageable packages."[10] In the United States' view, the issues of territorial sea, international straits and fisheries required early decision and, because they were well understood by the international community, they could be handled most expeditiously if dealt with as a single unit. The question of a seabed regime would take far longer to resolve because it involved many new technical and legal matters. It should be dealt with in a separate conference.

In conclusion, Stevenson underscored the identity of American interests with those of other nations. "The United States," he affirmed, "is prepared to lead the way toward a true internationalism in the oceans. We do this not only because of our ideals but because it is clear that this is the only way to assure that our own interests and the interests of all other nations are adequately accommodated."

II

The second set of proposals, concerning the boundary of the continental shelf and the seabed regime, was announced some months later. In the interim, several important events affected the law of the sea. On March 25 Brazil unilaterally extended its territorial sea claim from twelve to 200 miles. On April 22 Canada's House of Commons unanimously passed legislation extending the Canadian territorial sea to twelve miles, authorizing the establishment of exclusive Canadian fisheries in certain areas of the high seas beyond twelve miles, and establishing shipping safety control zones extending 100 miles from shore. The Arctic Waters Pollution Bill, enacted in August, in effect subjected the Northwest Passage to Canadian control for purposes of pollution regulation.[11] Further, the Canadian government denied the right of the *Glomar*

[10]*Bulletin*, March 16, 1970, p. 342.

[11]The Arctic Waters Pollution Bill, C-202, 2nd Session, 28th Parliament, 18-19 Elizabeth II, c. 47 (1969-1970). The area affected includes all waters of the Arctic region up to the North Pole between 145 degrees longitude and a line equidistant between Canada and Greenland.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Challenger, the oceanographic research vessel of the JOIDES project, to drill at a depth of 12,000 feet at a site off the Grand Banks.

Pressure was building within the United States for the formulation of a position by the executive branch on the continental shelf boundary and a seabed regime. Both decisions would have a significant effect on the allocation of seabed mineral resources and on the use of the seabed for purposes of national security and scientific research. The importance of these considerations was reflected in the heated debate between petroleum interests and representatives of the military establishment, a debate that had been in progress for over two years. Congressional hearings on the matter were scheduled for April 8, then postponed and later rescheduled at the request of an Administration unprepared to announce a policy decision and unwilling to have its options foreclosed by public hearings on the question.

On May 23 the Administration was ready to take a stand. In a statement released by the White House, President Nixon proposed "that all nations adopt as soon as possible a treaty under which they would renounce all national claims over the natural resources of the seabed beyond the point where the high seas reach a depth of 200 meters (656 feet) and would agree to regard these resources as the common heritage of mankind. The treaty should establish an international regime for the exploitation of seabed resources beyond this limit." This international regime should "establish general rules to prevent unreasonable interference with other uses of the ocean, to protect the ocean from pollution, to assure the integrity of the investment necessary for such exploitation, and to provide for peaceful and compulsory settlement of disputes." In the area subject to international control, the President's proposal envisioned the collection of "substantial mineral royalties" to be "used for international community purposes, particularly economic assistance to developing countries."[12]

Two types of machinery for authorizing exploitation of seabed resources would exist in the area beyond the 200-meter isobath. In an "International Trusteeship Zone," coastal states would act as "trustees" for the international community; they would receive a portion of the revenues collected by the international regime and would, if necessary, impose additional taxes. As Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson explained to Congress, the trusteeship zone would comprise the continental margins beyond the depth of 200 meters and "would include the continental slope and the con-

[12] *Bulletin,* June 15, 1970, p. 737.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tinental rise, as well as the areas of the continental shelf which extend deeper than 200 meters."[13] Beyond the continental margin, international machinery would authorize and regulate exploration and use of seabed resources.[14]

The President's statement also included a plan for an interim policy that would afford protection for the integrity of investments until international agreement upon a seabed regime could be reached. "All permits for exploration and exploitation of the seabed beyond 200 meters," he suggested, should be issued "subject to the international regime to be agreed upon." As soon as a "sufficient number of other states" indicate their acceptance of such an interim policy, President Nixon promised that "a substantial portion of the revenues" derived from exploitation beyond 200 meters would be turned over to "an appropriate international development agency for assistance to developing countries."[15]

The May 23 Presidential statement and accompanying explanations were more revealing regarding the location of the continental shelf boundary than concerning the seabed regime. By its very nature, a serious seabed regime proposal has to be detailed. The President promised to supply "specific proposals" at the next meeting of the United Nations Seabed Committee.

The proposal setting the 200-meter depth line as the boundary of the continental shelf was quite specific; some no doubt thought it was too specific. Only the technical problem of boundary delimitation remained for further elaboration in the U.S. proposal to the UN Seabed Committee meeting. The concept of the trusteeship zone was added not to hedge on the boundary question but rather to accommodate specific foreign and domestic interests. It tried to balance the interest of large petroleum companies in maintaining national control over offshore drilling with the interest of the Defense Department in restricting the control of coastal nations over their continental margins.[16]

[13]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Outer Continental Shelf, Hearings* before Special Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, p. 431.

[14]In a press conference held on May 23, Stevenson pointed out that "Most of the mineral resources [oil and gas] are found either in the continental shelf area, which is roughly, on an average, the area down to the depth of 200 meters, or in the area beyond that and to the edge of the continental land mass, which is the slope and rise. . . . Most of the hard minerals [nodules containing manganese and other hard minerals] . . . are in that area beyond the continental rise, beyond the continental land mass." White House News Conference No. 607.

[15]*Bulletin,* June 15, 1970, p. 738.

[16]Samuel C. Orr, "Administration Insists Oil Industry Benefits from Proposed Seabed Treaty," *CPR National Journal,* June 6, 1970, pp. 1184-1185.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In his testimony before Congress, Richardson described the accommodation as follows: "The proposal combines narrow limits of sovereign rights over seabed resources with a pragmatic division of royalties and administration of the resources of the continental margin." He went on to indicate why the Administration had declined to claim national jurisdiction over the entire continental margin. "For the United States to propose a concept of broad extension of national jurisdiction would have indirect, but serious, national security implications, and would impede the freedom of scientific research and other uses of the high seas. On the other hand, it is improbable that coastal states with long coastlines exposed to the open sea would be prepared to agree to a 200-meter limit if no international trusteeship zone with a division of royalties and administration were included."[17] The interest of the petroleum companies was not mentioned.

The Presidential statement and the accompanying announcements, press conference and Congressional testimony stressed the multilateral nature of the U.S. proposal—no doubt with the recent Canadian and Brazilian actions fresh in mind. In addition, each of the statements referred to the earlier set of proposals concerning a law of the sea conference to deal with the territorial sea, straits and fisheries. Although it was acknowledged that the two initiatives overlapped, no suggestion was made that they be dealt with together. The seabed and continental shelf proposal was, like the earlier one, "an effort to close the gap in another part of the international law of the sea."

III

In the months after May 23, the Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea, chaired by John Stevenson, undertook the task of supplementing the President's statement with specific proposals for a seabed regime. The task force, which had had official responsibility for law of the sea policy since February 1970, appointed an *ad hoc* drafting committee to formulate these proposals.[18] With the August meeting of the UN Seabeds Committee as its target date, the committee prepared a draft convention of seventy-eight articles and five appendices.

[17]U.S. Congress, Senate, *Outer Continental Shelf, Hearings, op. cit.*, p. 430.

[18]The members of the committee were Bernard Oxman of the Legal Adviser's Office, chairman, Professor Louis Sohn and Stuart McIntyre of the Department of State, Leigh Ratiner of the Department of Defense, and Vincent McKelvey of the Department of the Interior.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This document, entitled the "United Nations Draft Convention on the International Seabed Area," was submitted to the Seabed Committee on August 3 by Ambassador Christopher H. Phillips, the U.S. representative to the United Nations. It was, he said, presented "for distribution and discussion as a working paper."[19] In a statement issued in Washington on the same day, Stevenson also stressed the fact that the draft convention was a working document for discussion purposes. This description of the draft convention, a subtle downgrading of its status from a formal proposal, represented an effort to accommodate objections that had been raised by a Congressional committee two weeks before it was to be presented at Geneva.[20] In a letter dated July 21, four members of the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee had urged Secretary of State Rogers to refrain from presenting the treaty at Geneva and to revise substantial parts of it.[21] Of prime concern to the Senators were treaty provisions respecting the allocation of financial royalties and mineral leasing rights in the trusteeship area.

The *ad hoc* drafting committee, after a closed meeting on July 27 with the Senate Subcommittee on the Outer Continental Shelf, modified parts of the treaty in an attempt to satisfy the Senators. One of the most important revisions was made in Article 28 regarding the percentage of fees to be paid to the international authority from licensing revenues in the trusteeship zone. The adjustment provided that a coastal state would retain between 33 1/3 per cent and 50 per cent of all fees and payments instead of the original 33 1/3 per cent.[22]

In his statement of August 3 to the Seabed Committee at Geneva, Ambassador Phillips said that "it is our view that the time for detailed and comprehensive proposals has arrived." The U.S. proposal, "an essentially new and bold departure in the law of the sea," outlined a system of "continuing and comprehensive regula-

[19]*Bulletin,* August 24, 1970, p. 211.

[20]Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. *Outer Continental Shelf, Report* by Special Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, p. 25. See also U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Metcalf speaking on the Report on the Outer Continental Shelf, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, March 10, 1971, *Congressional Record,* S. 2817.

[21]Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), chairman of the Interior Committee, Senator Gordon Allott (R-Colo.), the committee's ranking minority member, Senator Lee Metcalf (D-Mont.), chairman of the committee's special subcommittee on the outer continental shelf, and Senator Henry L. Bellmon (R-Okla.), ranking minority member of the special subcommittee.

[22]Samuel C. Orr, "Soviet, Latin Opposition Blocks Agreement on Seabeds Treaty," *CPR National Journal,* September 12, 1970, p. 1975.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion" whereby the "benefits from the exploitation of resources will be equitably divided."[23]

IV

The draft convention is a lengthy document covering many complex legal and technical issues of varying importance to U.S. maritime interests. Of considerable concern are the convention's provisions on the offshore boundary of national jurisdiction and on the nature and extent of national rights in offshore areas. It establishes three distinct offshore zones of jurisdiction: The first zone boundary encloses an exclusively national seabed area. Beyond that is an intermediate zone in which the coastal nation enjoys the right to license exploration and exploitation of seabed resources, subject to certain international rules. The third zone is the remaining seabed area where an international authority has sole rights to regulate seabed resource exploitation. The last two zones comprise the "International Seabed Area."

Substantive issues overlapping those of zones of jurisdiction are set out in Chapter Two of the convention. It contains "general rules" on mineral resources, living resources, protection of the marine environment and property, scientific research, and marine parks and preserves. Appendices A, B and C include detailed rules on these matters. No rules governing military uses are laid down.

The issues of zones of jurisdiction as well as the substantive matters of resource exploitation, pollution safeguards and other ocean uses are aspects of two overriding policy considerations. The first is freedom of the seas, or the freedom of nations to use the ocean for many purposes.[24] The second policy consideration, a corollary of the first, is the division of ocean wealth or the allocation of seabed resources and revenues among the nations of the world. The draft convention comes to grips with both issues; it devises different formulas in the trusteeship zone and in the zone beyond to accommodate both freedom of the seas and an acceptable allocation of ocean wealth. The international machinery provided by the convention reflects the accommodation of the two policy concerns.

Beginning with the boundaries and the zones they delimit, it is clear that the draft convention carries out the Nixon Administration policy of narrow zones of exclusive national jurisdic-

[23] *Bulletin,* August 24, 1970, p. 211.

[24] The purposes specified by the Geneva Convention on the High Seas include navigation, fishing, laying submarine cables and pipelines, and overflight. Article 2, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.13/L.53.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion. Article 1 states that "the International Seabed Area shall comprise all areas of the seabed and subsoil of the high seas seaward of the 200 meter isobath adjacent to the coast of continents and islands." The article further provides a formula for boundary delimitation based on straight lines (not to exceed sixty nautical miles in length) and providing for offshore troughs and trenches. Article 2 makes it clear that national claims are to extend no farther than this boundary. "No State may claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the International Seabed Area or its resources." This narrowly defined boundary seeks to maximize the area in which freedom of the seas pertains.

A significant omission from the convention is significant reference to alternative mileage criteria. A number of earlier proposals provided a mileage alternative to the depth-measurement in an effort to make the proposals attractive to those coastal states without substantial continental shelves or margins, such as nations on the west coast of Latin America.[25] Lacking such submerged offshore areas, a number of states have made extensive claims to broad territorial seas or fishing zones. The draft convention deliberately omits a mileage alternative, because of the concern that a zone providing for limited national rights over seabed resources might evolve into a zone of comprehensive national sovereignty which would threaten the viability of a narrow twelve-mile territorial sea.[26] The drafters no doubt hoped that the agreement of coastal nations lacking substantial continental margins could be won by other provisions of the convention.

Article 26 deals with the second boundary established under the convention, the one defining the limits of national authority over the exploration and exploitation of seabed resources. "The International Trusteeship Area is that part of the International Seabed Area comprising the continental . . . margin between the boundary described in Article 1 and a line, beyond the base of the continental slope . . . where the downward inclination of the

[25]The President's Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources recommended that the continental shelf boundary "be fixed at the 200-meter isobath or 50 miles" from shore, whichever is greater. It further recommended the creation of an intermediate zone beyond that with its outer limits "defined in terms of the 2,500 meter isobath or 100 nautical miles" from shore. (*Panel Reports of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources,* Part VIII, [Washington: GPO, 1969], p. 34.) Senate Resolution 33 (91st Congress, 1st Session), submitted by Senator Claiborne Pell on January 21, 1969, recommended a national continental shelf extending to a depth of 550 meters or to a distance of 50 miles from shore, whichever is greater.

[26]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Territorial Sea Boundaries, Hearings, op. cit.,* p. 9294.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

surface of the seabed declines to a gradient of 1: — [to be determined by international agreement]." Provisions are made for applying the gradient formula in cases of transecting basins or plains.

The concept of the trusteeship zone offers a plan for unequal rights in an area intermediate between a zone of national and a zone of international control. The coastal nation has special rights, not enjoyed by other nations, to authorize the exploration and exploitation of seabed resources. The convention makes it clear, however, that the rights of a coastal state in the trusteeship zone off its shores are strictly limited. Article 27 (1) states that "except as specifically provided for in this Chapter, the coastal State shall have no greater rights in the International Trusteeship Area off its coast than any other Contracting Party." Article 6 states that "neither this Convention nor any rights granted or exercised pursuant thereto shall affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the air space above these waters." These provisions attempt to preclude the expansion of claims by the coastal state to broader rights, to high seas beyond the 200-meter isobath, and to the air space above or the seabed below.

In the trusteeship zone, the coastal state has discretionary rights regarding seabed resources to establish the procedures for issuing licenses and to decide whether a license should be issued and to whom. (Article 28.) The coastal state is responsible not only for issuing, suspending and revoking licenses but also for establishing work requirements, ensuring compliance of its licensees with the convention, and exercising criminal and civil jurisdiction over its licensees. The coastal state also determines the allowable catch of the living resources of the seabed and prescribes appropriate conservation measures. (Article 27.)

The special rights of the coastal state regarding seabed resources in the trusteeship zone do not limit the rights of other nations to use the area for other purposes. The coastal state may not restrict the access of other nations to the waters or air space overlying the seabed of its trusteeship area, nor may it prevent the emplacement of submarine detection devices or the conduct of scientific research on its continental margin.[27] In exchange for forfeiting complete control over its own continental margin, a nation would gain access to the margins off other countries, except, of course, for purposes of controlling exploration and exploitation of seabed

[27]In the case of drilling for scientific purposes, a permit is required. This is issued by the International Seabed Resource Authority, not by the coastal state. (Appendix A 1.4.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resources.[28] Essentially, therefore, the convention provides a substantial degree of freedom for all nations to use the continental margins of the world.

Coinciding with the mixed authority in the trusteeship zone is a revenue-sharing formula for the area. In return for undertaking special responsibilities in the zone, the coastal state is entitled to keep an unspecified amount between 33 1/3 per cent and 50 per cent of all revenues collected plus whatever fees are required to cover administrative expenses. (Article 28.) Viewed another way, the International Seabed Resource Authority is given between one-half and two-thirds of all revenues collected in exchange for granting the coastal nation special rights to control exploitation in the trusteeship zone. The coastal state is responsible for collecting and transferring the payments to the Authority. (Article 27 [g].)

The ultimate beneficiary of the revenues is not the Authority but rather "all mankind." Article 5 cites a number of purposes to which the revenues should be directed, the main one being to the "economic advancement of developing States Parties to this Convention." The revenues received by the Authority, after expenses, would be divided among a list of specified international and regional development organizations. (Appendix D.) The prospect of receiving these funds for economic development will presumably induce developing countries to subscribe to the provisions of the convention regarding narrow boundaries. Their acceptance of the principle of freedom of the seas is to be secured by financial rewards.

The only revenues received by the developed coastal state from the International Seabed Area would be the one-third to one-half portion of the revenues received from licensing exploration and exploitation in its trusteeship area. No other revenues would be channeled through the Authority to a developed nation. In return for forfeiting some of the revenues from resource exploitation on its continental margin, the developed nation would continue to enjoy freedom to use the marine environment for many purposes except in relatively narrow zones of national jurisdiction.

The bulk of the draft convention describes the machinery of the international regime that will govern the International Seabed Area and the rules for its operations. In the area beyond the trusteeship zone, exploration and exploitation of seabed resources are to be licensed and supervised by an International Seabed

[28]The access of petroleum companies to deposits off the shores of all countries would remain unchanged, since national governments would continue to license operations in all areas where fossil fuels are found.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Resource Authority, specifically by its Operations Commission, subject to the provisions of the convention. (Article 44.)[29] The actual exploration and exploitation is to be conducted by contracting nations or by the enterprises they authorize (in the trusteeship area) or sponsor. (Article 10.) The Authority is prohibited from engaging in exploration or exploitation itself. (Article 44.)

Primary responsibility for inspection and enforcement rests with the nation authorizing or sponsoring an undertaking. Ultimate responsibility for supervising the operations of licensees rests with the Authority. The contracting nation submits inspection reports to the Authority, which can take action if it suspects that a violation of the convention has occurred. (Article 19.) The convention details a procedure whereby a violation may be brought first to the Operations Commission and then to the Tribunal and whereby continued violations may lead to a fine (of $1,000 a day), payment of damages, and ultimate revocation of license. (Articles 50-52.) An important qualification of this power is the fact that the Authority can only revoke licenses it issues and can only request the trustee to revoke licenses it has authorized. Moreover, a license cannot be revoked if the offending actions of the licensee were directed by the nation authorizing or sponsoring it. (Article 52.) In the case of violation by a contracting nation, following a judgment by the Tribunal, the complainant may have recourse to the Council of the Authority. The Council may "suspend the rights under this Convention of the Party failing to perform its operation." (Article 58.) No further sanctions are specified and perhaps no others would be feasible.

The rules the Authority can prescribe relating to exploration and exploitation are circumscribed. (Article 68.) It can make rules to fix the level of payments (within specified ranges), to establish work requirements (also within specified ranges), to set criteria for defining the competence of applicants for licenses, and to assure safe design of installations and equipment.

Although the power of the International Seabed Resource Authority is limited regarding exploration and exploitation of seabed resources, there is the possibility that its power to regulate other ocean uses, set out in Articles 23 and 68, is more extensive.

[29]There is doubt in the minds of some experts that commercial exploitation of the hard minerals of the International Seabed Area beyond the continental margin will be feasible in the near future. The technological difficulties of recovery at such depths and the alternative supplies on land may make the costs of seabed minerals prohibitive. If this should prove to be the case, the direct licensing functions and powers of ISRA and the resulting revenues would be negligible.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Authority is authorized to prescribe rules or practices to ensure the protection of the marine environment,[30] to minimize the possibility of injury to persons and property, and to prevent unjustifiable interference with other ocean uses. In addition to this vague mandate for accommodating multiple uses of the ocean, the Authority may designate marine parks and preserves and prescribe conditions for their use. The approval of the trustee, however, is required for the establishment of a park in the trusteeship zone. The Authority can also prescribe rules on a number of technical matters, including the encouragement of uniformity in mapping, boundary determination, and the like. None of these powers significantly encroaches upon the freedom of the coastal states to use the marine environment.

Even if the regulatory powers of the Authority set out by the draft convention had been extensive, its structure and membership would assure that it could not act contrary to the interests of the major maritime states. The convention describes three principal organs of the Authority: the Assembly, Council and Tribunal.[31] Since the Council has the most important powers and duties,[32] its composition and voting provisions are of particular interest. It is composed of twenty-four nations, divided into two main categories: The first includes the six most "industrially advanced Contracting nations" defined as the countries with the highest GNP; and, in the second group of eighteen members, at least twelve must be developing nations. Two members are to be land-locked or shelf-locked nations.

These categories reflect the distinct interests of developed and developing nations in the oceans. Any decision by the Council requires the affirmative votes of a majority of members in both categories. Among the six developed nations, a majority will almost certainly have an interest in the use of the oceans for commercial-maritime, military, or distant water fishing purposes. Thus, no decision by the Council is likely to be taken contrary to the developed nations' desire to maintain the freedom of the seas. The convention's formal legal structure accommodates differences of interests, but, in so doing, it raises the danger of creating an organization that will not be able to act effectively.

[30]International regulation of pollution control would eliminate the excuse for unilateral national measures.

[31]Three commissions are also established: a Rules and Recommended Practices Commission, an Operations Commission, and an International Seabed Boundary Review Commission. (Article 42.)

[32]As noted above, action against any contracting nation violating the convention is the prerogative of the Council only.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The interests of developed and developing nations differ regarding the allocation of resources and revenues as well as the freedom of the seas. The technology of the developed nations can be expected to provide the motivating force behind the exploration and exploitation of seabed resources, and their corporations will make the investments and undertake the actual operations. Thus, the developed nations share an interest in setting up a rational system of exploitation that provides security for the investor.

The developing nations do not share this concern. Instead, they want either to secure national control over offshore resources for possible future development or to define the ocean's wealth as the "common heritage of mankind" and obtain a substantial portion of that wealth. The draft convention adopts the latter approach by providing for the administration of resource exploitation as well as the receipt of revenues in order to head off a resort to the alternative approach of broad offshore claims of national jurisdiction. According to the convention, the bulk of revenues derived from operations off the continental margins of all contracting nations will be turned over to the International Seabed Resource Authority and ultimately to the developing nations. The composition and voting pattern of the Council ensures that the interests of the developing nations cannot be overridden, and in the Assembly the developing nations will undoubtedly constitute a majority.

A comprehensive summary of the international interests the draft convention is designed to serve was made by John Stevenson on the day it was presented at Geneva.[33] The convention, he acknowledged, implements the President's concept "of narrow limits on national sovereign rights with respect to the seabed." It also provides for "a pragmatic division of revenues and administration in the area beyond national jurisdiction" to accommodate eight different interests. First, it takes into account the "maritime states' interest in freedom of navigation and other freedoms of the sea" by eliminating any basis for expanding jurisdictional claims beyond a depth of 200 meters. A related interest protected by the convention is "the rights of states to conduct activities other than exploration and exploitation of natural resources in the International Trusteeship Area and beyond." Third, the convention recognizes the "coastal states' interest in administering the exploration and exploitation of seabed natural resources" in the trusteeship area by providing for "complete

[33] *Bulletin,* August 24, 1970, pp. 209-210.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

discretion" by the coastal state "to determine who shall exploit these resources." Fourth, the "coastal states' interest in participating in the revenues" from operations in its trusteeship area is taken into account by the revenue-sharing plan. Fifth, developing countries "would participate in the revenues derived from seabed mineral exploitation as the ultimate beneficiaries of payments made by the International Seabed Resource Authority to international development organizations."

The last three interests which Stevenson cited are shared by "all parties to the convention, to the extent they or their nationals undertake exploration and exploitation activities in the Trusteeship Area off other countries' shores or in the area beyond the continental margin." That is, they are shared by the technologically advanced nations and constitute essentially a single interest — the maintenance of order to facilitate use of the ocean environment. Order-maintaining provisions of the convention are those (1) governing exploitation and forestalling expropriation, (2) seeking to prevent injury to persons, property or the marine environment, and (3) outlining procedures for the settlement of disputes.

This list of interests which the convention attempts to serve is clearly weighted in favor of the developed state's objective of maintaining free use of the oceans and providing a climate conducive to efficient resource exploitation. Such an imbalance is to be expected in a proposal drafted by officials of a nation with global interests. Nor is it surprising that the balance struck by the drafters of the convention also reflects the accommodation of powerful domestic interests and that Stevenson neglected to mention these.

What is surprising are the convention's seemingly generous provisions for sharing revenues gained from operations on the continental margin with developing nations. Equally remarkable is the apparent U.S. willingness to work within a multilateral framework to regulate the exploitation of seabed resources. And finally of note is the fact that the international machinery of the convention is structured to preclude operational control by the superpowers or even by the major maritime powers.

V

In late 1970 the United States government ceased to support the concept of "manageable packages" for the upcoming negotiations. This decision to link the issue of the seabed regime to that of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

territorial sea boundary is explained in part by the generous terms of the U.S. draft convention on the International Seabed Area. On November 20 the United States proposed in the UN General Assembly's First Committee that a single international conference be convened to conclude international conventions on "the breadth of the territorial sea and the directly related matters of international straits and conservation and management of living resources of the high seas" as well as on "an international regime for and the definition of the area of the sea-bed . . . beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."[34] No longer would the United States press for separate consideration of these issues. Washington's new approach was to use the U.S. position on the seabed regime to win agreement of other nations to a twelve-mile territorial sea and to a narrowly defined continental shelf.

For similar reasons the United States recommended that the proposed international conference also consider "the effective regulation of marine activities in order to prevent pollution." In the course of 1970 it had become clear that Canada and other nations concerned with pollution, while perhaps willing to accept a twelve-mile territorial sea, would insist on pollution regulations in extensive offshore areas. The United States feared that unilateral national measures to deal with pollution would lead to the establishment of offshore zones that might result in expanding claims of jurisdiction and ultimately threaten the viability of a narrow territorial sea. By bringing the pollution problem to an international forum, Washington hoped to reduce pressure for unilateral action to protect coastal waters.

Motivations behind national policy are inevitably mixed. The relatively far-reaching international provisions of the U.S. draft convention on the seabed and the American willingness to provide for special fishing rights and for regulation of pollution may be attributed to a selfish impulse — the fear that if the United States does not accommodate the interests of other coastal states, national claims to exercise jurisdiction over offshore areas will effectively reduce the freedom of the seas and hamper efficient exploitation of resources. Equally true, however, is the view that the U.S. position does reflect a genuine concern to contribute to the advancement of developing nations and to establish the beginnings of effective international regulation in an area covering 70 per cent of the globe.

[34]United Nations, General Assembly, 25th Session, November 20, 1970, United States of America: Draft Resolution A/C.1/L.536, p. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reviews

The Wailing Wall, or a Pan American Tragedy in Two Acts*

by Arthur P. Whitaker

I well remember how sackcloth and ashes was the fashionable garb for this country's writers on U.S. relations with Latin America for a decade or so before the Good Neighbor fanfare burst forth in the early- and mid-1930's. Thereupon most Americans put their garments of repentance in mothballs and left them there for a generation. Even when we learned in the late 1950's and early 1960's that real trouble was brewing for us south of the border, it was most often blamed not on ourselves but on foreign devils, Russian, Red Chinese and Latin American, with Fidel Castro as the Prince of Darkness.

Lately, however, the penitential mood has crept or swept over us again. Once more, as in the 1920's, our writers are admonishing us that the fault lies in ourselves that all our Latin American relations have gone sour. Perhaps this change of mood is due in part to the realization that Castro's and the Kremlin's power to do us harm in Latin America is not conceivably great enough to account for the heavy losses our image and interests have suffered there in recent years. Or perhaps the change is only one expression of the *fin de siècle* pessimism and loss of nerve about things in general that has afflicted so many of our people.

Whatever the reason for the current cycle of self-flagellation, it is admirably represented in the field of U.S.-Latin American relations by the two books under consideration here, *The Alliance That Lost its Way* and *The Containment of Latin America*. They are in effect laments over the failure of the two most highly advertised and best-intentioned cooperative undertakings of the United States in the whole history of its relations with Latin America: the Good Neighbor policy and the Alliance for Progress. Both books tell stories that have happy beginnings and unhappy endings.

Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís trace the history of the Alliance from its launching in 1961, with great éclat and the personal support of President Kennedy, until at the end of the decade, under President Nixon, the United States "virtually abandoned the Alliance principle." (p. 308). By that time, they tell us, the Alliance had lost its social and political content and its popular appeal; it had even

**The Alliance That Lost its Way. A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress.* By Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970. 381 pp. $7.95.

The Containment of Latin America. A History of the Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy. By David Green. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971. 368 pp. $10.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"lost its way" (a phrase they borrowed, with due acknowledgment, from an article by President Eduardo Frei of Chile in the journal *Foreign Affairs*). No wonder the tragic note is sounded before the halfway mark has been reached, as when we read that all the things that went wrong in Peru "made up one of the tragedies of the Alliance for Progress." The total number of such tragedies is never given, but clearly the authors think there were several.

David Green is, if anything, even harsher in appraising the Good Neighbor policy, which he examines mainly in the Roosevelt and early Truman years. Previous writers, he says (pp. vii, x), have concluded that that policy was a success, but in fact President Roosevelt was unsuccessful in resolving basic inter-American conflicts (by which he means only U.S.-Latin American conflicts). That the policy really was intended to be good-neighborly, as he concedes, seems to him to have only made matters worse, for therein lay the roots of "the tragedy of modern inter-American relations." (p. x.) Not surprisingly, by the book's end Green was strengthened in this prefatory view, saying flatly that in the long run the Good Neighbor policy was "a failure" (p. 291).

Imitation, we have long heard, is the sincerest form of flattery, but again Green thinks otherwise. To him, the fact that the Alliance for Progress was an "updated revival" or "modernized version" of the Good Neighbor policy (pp. viii, 296), far from flattering that policy, is another proof of its failure —the clear implication being that if the antecedent had succeeded, there would have been no need for the Alliance for Progress.

What are we to think of these two inquests or autopsies performed on two of our government's most celebrated foreign policies? How were their bleak conclusions reached? And do they enable us to understand why, though the United States has combined rare benevolence with unequaled power and wealth, its nearly forty-year cultivation of the Latin Americans through these two policies has accomplished so little that today anti-Americanism in a virulent form is rife in all the variegated nations between the Rio Grande and Cape Horn?

II

Let us look first at Green's book, since it deals with the earlier period. The first thing to say about it is that in some important respects it reflects great credit on its young author (born in 1942, the jacket tells us). The exposition is clear, the narrative vigorous, and the focus seldom strays from the book's central theme, which is an economic interpretation of the Good Neighbor policy (though the author does not so describe it). Except to provide background information and venture afterthoughts, he likewise maintains a steady focus on his chosen period. Preliminaries aside, that begins in 1938, for in Green's view the Good Neighbor policy, like the Alliance for Progress, was "initially a response to a powerful and dangerous outburst of revolutionary national-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ism in Latin America" and in the earlier case "the key event" was "the Mexican oil expropriations of 1938." (p. 296.) The period ends ten years later with the Bogotá Conference and OAS Charter of 1948. Nearly 300 pages of text on this period and its setting are supported by a substantial section of notes. From these and a three-page "Note on Sources" (there is no other bibliography), it appears that, in addition to printed materials, Green consulted a great many manuscript collections, including the papers of almost all the principal U.S. officials concerned with foreign policy in this period and several lesser ones. He also had the benefit of interviews with a few former government officials of the United States and one Latin American country, Brazil.

On the other hand, the book is flawed by many faulty details and above all by an unremitting overemphasis on economic factors in the Good Neighbor policy, to the neglect or exclusion of any other kind. Benevolence gets a formal bow and is then forgotten. Humanitarianism, the missionary spirit, tradition, ideas—these are all left out. Political interest is subordinated to the economic, as in the concluding chapter, where we are told that the Truman Administration, taking up where Roosevelt's had left off, "completed the building of an inter-American system which was *intended* to ratify United States supervision and control of Latin American economic development." (p. 291, emphasis added.)

The statement just quoted brings under Green's economic interpretation not only the OAS Charter and the Pact of Bogotá for the peaceful settlement of inter-American disputes. It does the same for the Rio Treaty of Hemisphere Defense (1947), which seems a bit excessive but accords with his uniform subordination of all other factors, including the military as well as the political, to the quest for economic power and profit. It seems never to have occurred to him that the leaders of the U.S. armed forces acted, like other human beings, from a variety of motives and may have been pursuing some goal of their own in Latin America. Perhaps one goal was merely self-serving—to extend the power and influence of their guild and its opportunities for employment near such pleasant places as Copacabana beach. More to the point, it is just possible that they took seriously all the talk of those days about the need for Latin American cooperation in hemisphere defense and set about meeting that need as a patriotic duty.

But whatever their motivation, the armed forces should have received far more than the scant attention this book pays them. During the period under scrutiny, with the new Pentagon as their collective symbol they became for the first time a constant major factor in the making of U.S. policy, foreign as well as military, at the highest level. Franklin Roosevelt himself aided the Pentagon in its rise to greater influence in the formulation of national security policy, especially after the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

His cabinet chiefs in these two fields, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, were quick to feel his growing predilection for the military and both noted it in their generally restrained memoirs—a fact not mentioned by Green.

The military caste and cast of thought maintained a strong hold over U.S. foreign policy after the war, as I found special reason to appreciate when I made a study of the air and naval bases pact of 1953 between the United States and Franco Spain. It is a pity that Green did not devote close attention to the question of the extent to which our armed forces influenced the development of the Good Neighbor policy. A valuable clue might have been found in the fact that the most distinctive feature of the "new Pan American policy" promoted under the Good Neighbor policy was its identification with multilateral military defense of the hemisphere. That had no precedent in U.S. policy except for Woodrow Wilson's abortive Pan American Pact of 1915-1916.

On the other hand, there was nothing new about the economic liberalism of which Green makes so much as a kind of streamlined booby trap of Yankee imperialism to catch unwary Latin Americans. Although it had been given different forms of expression with changing times, the principle had remained a constant of American foreign policy ever since the Year One of the Republic. What may have been new is the way in which the old economic and the new military interests came together in the Good Neighbor policy, but Green has nothing to say about that. The answer depends on further research. If the results are positive, they could make an interesting chapter in the history of the military-industrial complex.

It takes two to make a good neighbor policy work. Presumably in recognition of this fact, Green has a good deal to say about the Latin American side of the story. His preparation for the task was inadequate. The contrast is stark between the wealth of his citations on the U.S. side and the comparative poverty of his authorities on Latin America. Among the latter, those most relied on are not Latin American but North American, and important works in both groups are omitted.

Take, for example, the case of Argentina, which gets more of Green's attention than any other Latin American country, and two of his generalizations about it. Commenting on a speech in 1944 to the Argentine Unión Industrial by a member of the military regime, he writes: "Thus the interests of the industrialists and the ambitions of the Argentine military seemed to coincide quite nicely." He continues, apropos of Perón's political mobilization of the country's industrial workers, begun (according to him) in 1945: "Until this development, the struggle between the landowners and industrialists had dominated Argentine politics." (p. 243.) Neither assertion will hold water. To mention only one flaw in them, "the industrialists" in Argentina did not, as implied, form a unified

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

group. Instead, the Unión Industrial was only one of their two rival organizations and they were further divided into old and new, large-scale and small-scale, *porteño* (Buenos Aires) and the rest of the country. Though less fragmented, the landowners and the military also lacked the internal unity attributed to them in these passages.

This means, among other things, that the struggle between landowners and industrialists could not have dominated Argentine politics in the period vaguely indicated; and indeed it did not. Checking the authorities cited in neighboring passages (since none is cited for the generalizations just quoted), one finds that the most likely authority is Ysabel Rennie's book. Her book was fine when it was published, but that was more than a quarter of a century ago. A very different account of the period emerges from the works of subsequent writers not cited by Green, such as the Argentines Gino Germani, José Luis de Imaz, Dardo Cúneo, Darío Canton and Tomás Fillol, and, from the United States, Samuel L. Baily, James R. Scobie and Robert A. Potash.

This is a fair sample of Green's handling of Latin American themes. He simply has not done his homework on them. He even misrepresents one of the most famous Latin American classics, Rodó's *Ariel,* by asserting that it portrays the United States as a "misbegotten Caliban bent upon the spiritual and cultural destruction of Latin America." (p. 6.) It does nothing of the sort, as he could easily have learned by reading that celebrated essay, which can be read in an hour; but apparently he knows it only from Herring's textbook history of Latin America, which he cites.

As if to reinforce his thesis of the United States' exploitation (deliberate or not) of Latin America, Green asserts that the Inter-American Development Commission, set up in 1940-1941, at first undertook only "consumer-goods" projects and "was not initially prepared to concentrate upon the development of *heavy industry export products even in the largest and potentially most industrially powerful Latin American countries.*" (pp. 75-76, emphasis added.) Even with the qualification "potentially," it is fantastic to talk about "industrially powerful Latin American countries" at that time. Only one of all those countries, Mexico, had any heavy industry to speak of, and it was far from powerful. Two other countries, Brazil and Chile, were just beginning to build steel mills as a basis for future development of heavy industry, and they were doing so with substantial aid from the United States. With these extremely minor exceptions, all Latin American industry was of the consumer goods and extractive types. Hence it would have been silly for the IADC not to concentrate on projects of those types, particularly since a titanic war was in progress and wartime shortages put a premium on the Latin Americans making do with what they already had.

Not until near the end of the book is the term "containment" in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its title fully explained. The reasoning in justification of it is at times hard to reconcile with the author's assurance in the preface (p. x) that the Good Neighbor policy "as developed by Franklin Roosevelt and his associates and continued into the Truman years, really was intended to embody the politics of good neighborhood—indeed, of benevolence." It would, for example, require uncommon dialectical skill to reconcile "benevolence" with Green's later statement that the "schema" of the Inter-American Development Commission, headed by Nelson Rockefeller and other U.S. officials, was really designed to protect and promote U.S. exports to Latin America and that in furtherance of this purpose the IADC and the State Department raised obstacles to the "development of dangerously competitive products in Latin America." (p. 76.)

This policy, we are told, was complemented by efforts of the Truman Administration to "close off the Western Hemisphere to penetration from any other great power"—efforts which coincided with a bid for the opening up of "British Empire markets and other market areas to American capital and industry." (p. 256.) "This," the author continues, "was the general pattern of the Truman administration's program for a closed Western Hemisphere in an otherwise Open World for United States influence." In the next two sections he seeks with little success to show that there was such a program in two policy areas, one military, the other economic. The best proof he offers is the Inter-American Military Cooperation bill urged on Congress by the Truman Administration in 1946 and 1947 with a view to establishing a U.S. monopoly of supplying arms to Latin America. But even with strong support from General Eisenhower, President Truman was unable to induce Congress to adopt the plan (a fact not made clear in Green's account), so that it never became U.S. policy.

His case in the other area, the economic, is equally unconvincing. He sums it up in the Epilogue in a passage, part of which we have already quoted: "Taking up where the Roosevelt administration had left off, the Truman administration completed the building of an inter-American system which was intended to ratify United States supervision and control of Latin American economic development." (p. 291.) It would be quite a feat to show how this "ratification" took place. Of course, it never did, and in fact a striking feature of the inter-American system has always been the relative poverty of its economic functions as compared with its juridical, cultural, military and political functions. Since Green, in his Epilogue, looks beyond his stopping point of 1948 to the 1960's, we may do likewise and note that when, at last, the inter-American system began to acquire substantial economic functions through the adoption of the Alliance for Progress, two features of the Alliance were: (1) its stress on national action and consequent lack of any central authority through which the United States

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or anyone else could "supervise and control" Latin American economic development; and (2) its open, nonexclusive character as shown by its provisions for seeking not only contributions of European and other non-American capital, but also the cooperation of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, including the Economic Commission for Latin America, which contained several non-American members, and the International Monetary Fund.

Yet Green somehow finds it possible to insist to the end that "the Good Neighbor Policy approach, stressing a closed hemisphere in an Open World . . . led to a policy of containment of Latin America." (p. 291.) Finding that the "containment strategy," originally applied to potential enemies, particularly Soviet Russia, was now extended to "presumed allies," i.e., Latin America, he styles this "an ironic development indeed." However, the case is not so much one of ironic development as of odd terminology. In U.S. policy, "containment" has so long meant only containing the world's other superpower that it is quite inappropriate to our dealings with an aggregation of far weaker countries, the strongest of which is lower on the power scale than such middle-group countries as the Netherlands and Canada.

It does not help matters that Green is talking specifically about the U.S. containment of Latin American revolutionary nationalism through increasing "involvement in anti-nationalist military and political maneuvers in Latin America." (p. 291.) By his own count most of the relevant cases have occurred since 1952, that is, since the end of the period on which his study is focused. As a result, he does not produce enough evidence to demonstrate his proposition even were its terminology unexceptionable.

It is a pity that so much is wrong with this book, for there is ample room for criticism of the United States' handling of its Latin American relations, both in the special period covered and subsequently. Reversing a familiar cliché of that period, we are safe in saying that the author's trouble was "too much and too early." He tried to cover too much ground and published before he had completed his homework.

III

Levinson and de Onís' *The Alliance That Lost its Way* is a different kind of book. The most important difference is that the master key to its interpretation of U.S. policy toward Latin America is not economic interest. Far from neglecting it, the authors lay considerable stress on it and I have the impression (though I have not counted noses) that they furnish more concrete illustrations of its operation than does Green; but they give top priority to the "security interest" of the United States (pp. 315-316, 321), which Green rather disparages. Their materials and methods are also different. Their book, too, is copiously annotated (with footnotes in the literal sense, not notes gathered in splendid isolation at the back), and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

many of the notes likewise cite printed materials and interviews. But, doubtless because most archival collections for this recent period are still closed, they made little use of that kind of material, which was Green's main source. On the other hand, their book is based to a considerable extent on personal observation and experience, which are conspicuously absent in the other work. Levinson was officially involved in the Alliance for Progress for four years, serving in both Washington and Brazil, and de Onís has had long experience as a journalist (United Press, *New York Times*) in Latin America, especially the Spanish American countries.

Chiefly for these reasons, I think, their critique gives the reader a sense of closer contact with reality in both Washington and Latin America. They tell us, for example, about a factor for which I found no counterpart in the other book: how the Alliance for Progress was constantly weakened by various departments in Washington pulling in opposite directions. Thus, "the United States has sent advisers on textile export marketing to Colombia, but the Department of Commerce has restricted U.S. imports of Colombian textiles. U.S. loans have helped livestock ranchers in Costa Rica and other Central American countries to develop their cattle herds, but the Department of Agriculture has blocked beef shipments to the United States," and so on (p. 166).

Levinson and de Onís carry their stress on security interests as a policy factor to the point of asserting that "the pointless obsessiveness of [the United States'] concern for security" combined with the "overambitious idealism of its development goals" to undermine the Alliance before it got started (p. 323). Yet they also hold that during "most of the Alliance, U.S. business interests . . . have taken precedence over the U.S. national interest in Latin America." (p. 159.) They find the explanation in "the interest-group nature of U.S. domestic politics" and the fact that, although the business community is "not always of one mind," it is "the only interest group that consistently presents its viewpoint on Latin American affairs to U.S. government policy-makers." (pp. 159-160.) This it has done through the Business Group for Latin America, reorganized in 1965 as the Council for Latin America and headed from the start by David Rockefeller of the Chase Manhattan Bank. The Council includes such other giants as Du Pont and Standard Oil of New Jersey; it represents "approximately 85 per cent of all U.S. companies doing business in Latin America"; and it has an "institutionalized relationship . . . with the State Department."

This relationship, fortified by "the influence of individual companies with Congress" and the absence of opposition from other interest groups, predisposes policy-makers in favor of the business group. Levinson and de Onís are not at all happy about this situation, but they describe it fairly and make it the text, not for a philippic, but for a constructive proposal: the establishment of "a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

permanent Latin American advisory group, with members appointed . . . from a representative range of U.S. institutions—labor, business, universities." (p. 160.)

The specific aims of the Alliance are described in detail by the authors, who sum up its overall objective as the development of Latin America on the assumption that "economic growth, social reform, and political democracy are mutually reinforcing aspects of an effective program." (pp. 8-15.) If I may sum up their conclusion, it is that the United States was largely responsible for the failure of the Alliance to achieve its goals and for the paradoxical upsurge of Latin American Yankeephobia in the ten years since the Alliance was adopted.

Many major events of the decade worked against the Alliance, none in favor of it. President Kennedy's untimely death was a heavy blow to it. So was the United States' intervention in the Dominican Republic and its involvement in Viet Nam. The State Department's top personnel in Latin American affairs were little or no help. Thomas C. Mann, who came in with Lyndon Johnson, soon made a name and enemies for himself in Latin America as a champion of big business, investments and the military. Then came Jack Vaughan (in AID only, not State), who might have succeeded better in "putting love back into the Alliance" (as he described his mission, p. 227) if he had lasted longer. In 1966 Lincoln Gordon deprived the Alliance of its political and social content and its popular appeal by making economic development alone the keystone of U.S. policy (pp. 96-97, 216-218.) So suspicious had the Latin Americans become by this time that when, at another Punta del Este conference in 1967, President Johnson at last gave enthusiastic support to a measure long urged by the Latin Americans—the economic integration of Latin America—they soon executed an about-face and attacked the integration project as a Trojan horse of Yankee imperialism.

The authors' criticisms of the United States are measured, well-informed, and balanced by recognition that there have been Latin American shortcomings too. They also illuminate the problem by case studies and put it in much-needed perspective by pointing out that the serious tensions that have built up in Latin America are common to developing countries in all parts of the world and that the most dangerous of these tensions, Yankeephobe nationalism, flourishes on the right wing as well as the left of the Latin American political arena.

In a section on the lessons of the Alliance (pp. 323-325) we read that its major lesson is that "the reach of the United States should not exceed its grasp." Despite Robert Browning, most people in this country would probably agree. General agreement may also be expected on the second lesson, that "a profound and perhaps very painful readjustment is taking place in Latin America, one that the United States may influence in minor ways but cannot begin to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dominate or direct." But observing that this "upheaval" is most likely to increase and go on producing authoritarian governments, the authors court certain dissent by laying down the law that the United States "cannot provide financial assistance to authoritarian regimes without calling its own political system into question." The prospect that this "limitation on policy may make an alliance impossible" does not deter them. They take somewhat less debatable ground when, in connection with the rise of aggressive nationalism in Latin America, they draw the lesson that the United States must learn to live with change and new property relationships, as it has already done in Mexico and Bolivia.

This section closes with the injunction (p. 325) that our policymakers "must achieve a profound and sure understanding of just what constitutes the national interest of the United States" in its Latin American relations. The objective is worthy but its realization seems rather remote. There has probably never been a time in the last hundred years when the people of the United States were further from agreement on "just what constitutes the national interest" than they are today.

There are several errors in the book, though fewer than one might expect in a work that deals with so many countries and measures and so troubled a decade. Unless "traditionally" is given an exceptionally short chronological connotation, there is no warrant for the statement that "U.S. policy in the hemisphere has traditionally been based" on the assumption that "the United States must continue to *dominate* Latin America and that *any* basic change in the established structure of Latin American society would be detrimental to the security interests of the United States." (pp. 315-316, emphasis added.) Under "Rogers, William," the index confuses two persons of that name, one of whom, William P., is President Nixon's Secretary of State, and the text does not clarify the confusion. The other Rogers, William D., was Deputy U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress in 1963 and is the author of a book on the Alliance, *The Twilight Struggle* (Random House, 1967), which I have not found mentioned in the book under review.

Several things are wrong with the account of President-elect Kennedy's Task Force on Latin America, which recommended (among other things) the creation of the Alliance for Progress. Since I was a member of that Task Force, I think I could set the record straight, but this is not the place to do so. I should point out, however, that Levinson and de Onís obviously have never seen the Task Force's report to Kennedy, which was confidential and, as far as I know, still remains unpublished. For if they had seen it, they could hardly have failed to note that the policy recommended in it differed in at least two important respects from the Kennedy Administration's policy as it developed in the following months. First, the report was much more modest in its forecast of what could be accom-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plished through the Alliance in ten years. The report said only that the Alliance would bring "most of Latin America . . . within a decade into economic step with the modern world," so that it could then "rely for its further growth on its own resources and the normal flows of outside public and private capital."

The second difference is that whereas the Kennedy Administration pinned its hopes on the "democratic left" in Latin America, the report recommended the formation of a broad "democratic-progressive" front that would bring together "the various Latin American political parties covering a spectrum as wide as Catholic and moderate democratic parties on the right, running to Christian Socialist and non-Communist Socialist parties on the left. . . ."

Whether these recommendations were sounder than the course adopted by the Administration is one of the many questions about policymaking posed or suggested by this wide-ranging book. One such question, to which the right answer may be very different from the one the authors take for granted, is suggested by their discussion of the Inter-American Development Bank. This is a question of particular importance today because President Nixon has come out in favor of channeling most U.S. foreign aid through multilateral institutions and the IDB is a major institution of that kind. After noting that the United States, for political reasons, has on occasion held up technically approved loans of the IDB, the authors assert that "the IDB can function effectively only by retaining its essentially apolitical integrity. . . ." (p. 328.)

The fact is that the IDB is *not* "essentially apolitical." Its president, Felipe Herrera, frankly admitted as much in a speech at the end of his third and last term of office on March 1 of this year, saying that the Bank has had to operate within the framework of the member countries. The same is true in some degree of all international organizations, and if we keep this fact in mind it may save us from a repetition of the disillusionment that resulted from overselling the Alliance for Progress.

Eastern Europe, A Battleground*

by Vladimir Petrov

In spite of all the improvements in Soviet historiography in the post-Stalin years, there are very few books published in Moscow on politically sensitive historical topics which can be used as actual sources of information by Western scholars. Almost all of them interpret history for the purpose of reinforcing and advancing policy objectives of the Soviet government at the time of their publication, and nothing that may confuse uncomplicated minds, cause embarrassment to the Kremlin, obstruct its foreign policies, or cast doubt on the eternal collective wisdom of the party in conducting foreign relations, appears in print.

**Imperialisticheskiye derzhavy i Vostochnaya Evropa, 1945-1965 (Imperialist Powers and Eastern Europe)*. By Igor Ivanovich Orlik. Moscow: Academy of Sciences, 1968. 287 pp. $1.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Since Soviet policies do change, histories written in the past become dated. Those events and deeds which represent an "error" in today's context are played down or disappear altogether from communist chronicles. No one who is forty or younger, for instance, has ever heard the story of Otto Kuusinen's short-lived government of the "Democratic Republic of Finland."

Yet the deficiencies of Soviet historical scholarship should not be a cause for dismissing it or for automatically replacing the interpretations of Soviet writers with the speculations and conjectures of Western historians who often have prejudices of their own. The fact that in our society we have a variety of biased writers, ranging from outright apologists for communism to the paranoids hypnotized by the supposed omnipotence of communist power, may be consoling on general grounds but is of limited utility to anyone trying to reconstruct the rationale for Soviet policies in specific periods and situations. Even for the most perceptive and detached scholars, there is no substitute for a systematic and discriminating analysis of Soviet historical literature.

The task, however laborious, is by no means hopeless. One should know, for example, that Soviet general texts on international relations, widely used in the classroom, contain much more ideological verbiage than specific monographs; their authors must closely adhere to the integrated communist *Weltanschauung*. On the other hand, serious studies, printed in a modest number of copies, often contain a remarkable amount of information which is only partially distorted by ideological imperatives. On occasion, a scholar concerned with the integrity of his work takes a position sharply at variance with the official line. One recent study dismissed the twenty-year-old version about American aggressors unleashing the Korean War, merely stating that the United States "intervened" in it; even Syngman Rhee was not accused of an attempt to invade North Korea.

Such original studies are not numerous. There are no fixed rules on how to go about locating them or extracting useful information from them. Much depends on the researcher's skill, patience and perception. But the payoff may be significant.

When we say "information" we do not mean disclosure of dramatic new facts and important documents radically changing the picture as we know it. The Soviets still guard their secrets well. What we can hopefully obtain are insights into Soviet political behavior, answers to such questions as: Why did Soviet and other communist leaders act and react the way they did? How did they interpret actions and reactions of their enemies? What motivated certain political decisions of the Soviet government?

Searching for this kind of information, the reader must try to be detached from the set notions prevalent in Western societies, for many of his findings are apt to contradict these notions and appear "unreasonable." He must be able to control his irritation and be prepared to concede that there is no single

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

universal reason in world affairs; that the Soviets have their own view of their interests; and that it is this view which ultimately counts.

What makes a Soviet study "serious"? It is certainly not the absence of the Marxist-Leninist method, whatever that is; Soviet scholars cannot break away from it even if they want to because it is in their bones. Nor is it the absence of distortions in the historical record, for certain distortions are dictated to the Soviet scholar by political considerations of his government. It is rather the breadth of his knowledge of the subject (which can usually be determined by glancing at the bibliography) and his capacity for critical analysis of *Soviet* policies that qualify the study as serious. This criticism is difficult to discern. Since the author has no choice but to uphold the principle of infallibility of Soviet foreign policy, it must always remain implicit. All he can do is apportion the rhetoric judiciously, devote more attention to what really counts, and subtly display his disapproval of the predecessors of the present leadership (never of the present leaders) by giving them no personal credit for their accomplishments, by recognizing their blunders, again implicitly, and by playing down even those successes generally accepted as such. This is not much by Western standards, but a Soviet scholar who goes that far at least deserves a hearing.

II

One recent example of such serious studies is a book by Igor Ivanovich Orlik entitled *Imperialisticheskiye derzhavy i Vostochnaya Evropa, 1945-1965* (*Imperialist Powers and Eastern Europe*), published in Moscow in 1968 under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences. Its value as a source of information about the perfidy of "imperialist powers" in Eastern Europe is marginal. But as a picture of how the Soviets themselves have viewed Eastern Europe since 1917, and how they have perceived the Western role in this region, the study is most illuminating. By communist standards, the charges leveled against the West sound like an understatement; other books treat the same subject much more stridently. Orlik is "neutral" on Stalin, whose name he mentions but twice; this means that at the least he is not an admirer of the late leader. The politically-motivated distortions in the book are kept to a minimum.

Let us list some of these. The author devotes considerable space to the Truman Doctrine but says nothing about the Greek civil war which largely brought it about, since this would have made Truman's designs look less menacing. There is a chapter on the unity of the socialist countries but the word "Cominform" is not mentioned once, obviously because East European communists see red whenever reminded about that ignominious episode. Likewise, the bitter record of Tito's heresy and the violent purges that followed his break with Stalin are squeezed into a modest five lines: "Sometimes certain errors and misunderstandings led to rather serious complications, as it

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

happened, for instance, in relations with Yugoslavia in 1948. But such phenomena were not a norm during the period of consolidation, and these difficulties were overcome." (p. 122.) To be on the safe side, the author makes a footnote reference to an appropriate volume of CPSU resolutions.

Here and there one finds other deliberate distortions, such as Orlik's flat denial that the Czechoslovak government withdrew its agreement to participate in the Marshall Plan under Soviet pressure. The Berlin blockade and the Berlin wall are treated as "non-facts," although both events were factors in the developments in Eastern Europe. Other examples could be cited.

Nevertheless, in spite of these transgressions against the integrity of scholarship, Orlik's work offers a number of revealing insights. The Soviet view of Eastern Europe before the war was of a Western imperialist preserve to be utilized eventually for armed aggression against the Soviet Union, and of a *cordon sanitaire* designed to isolate the USSR from the rest of Europe. There is no doubt that the Soviet government regarded the reactionary regimes in Eastern Europe and their alliances with France and Great Britain as a source of clear and present danger. This perception of the region had become the principal reason for steadfast Soviet opposition to all the plans for East European federations hatched in Washington and London in the 1940's. For the same reason the Soviets resisted, after the war, the inclusion of peasant parties into the governments of East European countries. According to the author, the Anglo-American backing of these parties was determined by a desire "to repeat the experiment they carried out in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia following World War I" when, with the help of the peasant parties, the Western powers "succeeded in creating the conditions for the establishment of the openly counter-revolutionary regimes." (p. 51.)

Orlik does not discuss at all *Soviet* relations with East European countries, but we can assume that it was this concern about the reemergence of Eastern Europe under Western influence that prompted Moscow to deal with the postwar regimes there on a bilateral basis and to discourage direct links among them. The same mistrust was probably the reason why Stalin scuttled the idea of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation, favored by both Tito and Dimitrov.

III

Wartime relations with the Western allies are explained in such a way as to make many Western historians, save for the extreme "revisionists," wonder whether they understood them at all. That the Soviets regarded Churchill's proposal for the invasion of Axis-dominated Europe through the Balkans as a political move aimed at checking the advance of the Red Army, has been taken for granted. But that they would view Allied bombings of targets in East-Central Europe as a deliberate policy aimed at the destruction of the economies in these areas *because* they were to be occupied by the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Red Army, is something new. The author confirms what some of us have suspected all along: the dramatic bombings of Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were—and still are—regarded in Moscow as "barbarous demonstrations of Western strategic power . . . dictated exclusively by political considerations," i.e., by a desire to intimidate the Soviet Union. The delays in the opening of the Second Front in France, according to Orlik, were attributed to Roosevelt's and, particularly, Churchill's sinister determination to see the Soviet Union bled white in the struggle against Nazi Germany.

In this connection, one of the most intriguing questions the reader of Soviet historical studies may ponder is that of the extent to which Soviet policies and, indeed, the whole outlook of the Soviet leadership have been affected by the trauma of the German invasion. It appears that the destruction of Soviet military might and the deep penetration into Russia of the German armies in the campaigns of 1941-1942, accompanied by the terrible losses in human life and material wealth, imbued Soviet leaders with such an overpowering sense of insecurity that even the totality of the eventual victory could not erase it. The early defeats were of such tremendous scope that the Soviets must have developed an urge to magnify the significance of victory by extending a claim that Germany was defeated not only entirely due to Russia's own magnificent effort, but also *in spite of* the perfidious designs of the Western powers whose "ruling circles" had been hostile to communism all along.

Of course, there have been many high-placed individuals in the Soviet Union holding different views who went on record giving the West considerable credit for the war effort. But the *political* leaders' memories and reasoning are uniquely adjustable, and it is their collective view and will which determine the contents of history books. To them, the Anglo-Americans were suspect while the war was still on. The subsequent falling out among the allies turned their suspicion into conviction. Hence, the irresistible temptation to attribute the postwar difficulties that Stalin's regime encountered in managing Soviet international affairs and consolidating its hold upon Eastern Europe to Western anti-communist activities. In combination with the awareness of the USSR's economic weaknesses and the enormous exhaustion of the nation in the war, this perception of the scheming West goes a long way toward explaining the brutality with which the induced revolution in Eastern Europe was carried out. It also explains much of the Soviet historical analysis of the period.

IV

Orlik sees the conflicts in East European countries in the postwar years between the communist-led "progressive" forces and their opponents as manifestations of the "class struggle" within each national society, exacerbated by Western intrigues. Since in the Soviet value system the communist victory is a positive development,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western efforts to "export counter-revolution" into the area are naturally regarded as sinister. Orlik does not contend that this communist victory was or is final. Nevertheless, he treats the presumed Western desire to suppress the "developing popular-democratic revolutions, to return these countries to capitalism and transform them into states hostile to the Soviet Union" as a clear-cut case of imperialist aggression. (p. 78.) In itself, this view is not original in Soviet historiography. What is significant in this book (as well as in several other recent Soviet studies) is that Eastern Europe emerges not as an integral part of the already consolidated Socialist Commonwealth, but as a still contended territory, a veritable battleground in which the East-West conflict continues to rage. Until at least 1955, Western imperialism, joined after 1949 by German revanchism, is seen as refusing to give up hope for converting the region once again into a "springboard for aggression against the Soviet Union."

Orlik explores the period of the coalition regimes (1944-1947), describing in considerable detail the links between the leaders of the "reactionary forces" and the West, and the various forms of Western support of their resistance. The coup d'état in Prague in February 1948, long a mystery to many Western observers in view of the known pro-Russian attitudes of Czechs and Slovaks during the Benes presidency, becomes readily explainable. From Stalin's vantage point, what truly mattered was that the voices of the "bourgeoisie" had not been silenced entirely, the country had not been isolated from Western Europe, and there had been hostile voices in the West (the Soviets kept record of them even if we didn't) expressing hope of breaking this "weak link" in otherwise solidly socialist Eastern Europe.

According to common Soviet periodization, the Cold War was launched by the West late in 1945, marked by the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers where, says Orlik, "Western representatives for the first time since the war uttered openly anti-Soviet declarations." (p. 70.) He does not discuss the effects upon Stalin's thinking of the first serious rebuffs the Soviets experienced in 1945-1946 on such issues as reparations from Germany, administration of Japan, military bases in the Turkish Straits and the Mediterranean, and the "autonomy" of the Iranian Azerbaijan. But he indicates that a number of developments during the following three years sharply increased Soviet concern for security, culminating by late 1949 in what might have been a genuine war scare in Moscow.

This question deserves separate attention since we remember that during the late 1940's it was precisely *the West* which lived in fear of a communist takeover and even of an outright Soviet conquest. This fear was rooted in the West's perception of its own weakness and communist strength. As seen from Moscow, however, it was the other way around. In the wake of growing Western hostility, the year 1947 witnessed a number of menacing moves. In March

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

came the Truman Doctrine and the direct American involvement in Greece and Turkey. In June Washington launched the Marshall Plan, which, from the Soviet perspective, was designed to strangle the Soviet Union economically and lure away from it the East European countries. In July George Kennan's "X" article appeared in *Foreign Affairs* and was read in Moscow (and not only in Moscow) as the official American declaration of the intent to "contain" communism on a global scale. In December the wartime allies found themselves deadlocked on the German issue, and the Soviet delegation walked out of the foreign ministers meeting in London.

All the while, anti-Soviet and anti-communist agitation in the Western press had been mounting, reaching a peak after the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, when many proven friends of the Soviet Union (including former Vice President of the United States Henry A. Wallace) turned away in disgust. Simultaneously, not yet known to us, the Soviets were experiencing great difficulties in Eastern Europe; in June 1948 the break with Tito's Yugoslavia marked the beginning of the decline of the Soviet hold upon communist parties.

Also in June came an open break with the United States and Great Britain over Germany. The Berlin blockade was followed by the Berlin airlift, the American decision not to evacuate U.S. forces, and revitalization of West Germany. The Soviets lifted the blockade in May 1949, having failed to prevent the emergence of the Federal Republic of Germany and the formation of NATO, with its unmistakably anti-Soviet direction. At the other end of the Eurasian continent, the whole of China had been unified by October under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, with minimal Soviet aid and encouragement.

We do not know the extent of Stalin's forebodings in connection with the communist victory in China toward the end of 1949, although we may guess that during his prolonged stay in Moscow early in 1950, Mao acted more than presumptuously toward his Soviet interlocutors. Indubitably, however, Stalin's overwhelming concern at this point, aside from the poor state of the Soviet economy and the difficulties in bringing the satellites to heel, was the anti-communist crusade launched by the United States under the guise of "containment."

"The truly aggressive nature of the policy of 'containment' manifested itself with a particular clarity during the Korean War," writes Orlik. "The American diplomacy which determined the major directions of the policy of 'containment' closely related the aggression in Korea with possible 'containing' actions against East European countries. Having bogged down in the Korean War, the United States could not afford to unleash aggression also in one of the East European regions. John Foster Dulles lamented in 1950 that the situation in the Far East had reached the present critical stage precisely at the time when the United States was confronted

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with serious 'unresolved problems' in Europe." (p. 125.)

Does this mean that Stalin gave his blessing to Kim Il Sung to launch the attack against South Korea because he feared an American attack in Europe? Were Stalin's memories of the Soviet Union's darkest hour still so vivid that the fear of a two-front war moved him to seek to eliminate the meager American presence in Asia before it was too late? Was he scheming to provoke a clash between the United States and China? These are tantalizing questions that no Soviet historian has yet attempted to answer.

Orlik devotes considerable attention to the McCarran Act of 1951 which permitted the recruitment of "counterrevolutionary emigres" from Eastern Europe into the U.S. Army and provided funds for the support of subversive activities in their native lands. He writes at length about the "doctrine of liberation" included in the GOP platform in 1952 which, he assumes, became the policy of the Eisenhower Administration. We have all forgotten these episodes. To the Soviets, however, they are a living memory, and we may only guess how the advent of Dulles, and the near-successful United Nations war in Korea affected Stalin's already sick mind and his designs for the last bloody purge that began in Eastern Europe in 1949 and was sweeping the Soviet Union by 1952.

Stalin's concern with the consolidation of power in his domain was not limited to police measures. To what he perceived to be a threat from the West he responded by a series of measures designed to impress the enemy. The communist-led political strikes in Western Europe in 1947, the Berlin blockade in 1948-1949, and the international "peace movement" launched in Prague in April 1949 were clearly meant to show the enemy that the Soviet Union had at its disposal considerable means to disrupt Western societies. Also in 1949, the Soviets tested their first atomic bomb and, following the formation of the Bonn government, declared the independence of the DDR. Many of these developments were at the time regarded in the West as manifestations of Soviet aggressiveness: Didn't *we* know that we had no intention of attacking the Soviet Union, occasional pronouncements of Senator Joseph McCarthy and some others notwithstanding? What Orlik suggests is that the Soviets deeply mistrusted the West and, knowing their own weaknesses much better than we in the West did, reacted to what appeared to them a deadly menace, whether actual or potential.

V

It took some time after Stalin's death before his successors managed to overcome the dead man's legacy, rid themselves of their fear of imperialist aggression, and redirect their internal and external policies. Although the Korean War ended in an inconclusive truce, violent anti-communist agitation in the United States continued. Dulles talked about "massive retaliation" and about going to the brink of a nuclear war in dealing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the Soviets. A number of organizations with the task of subverting East Europeans from the socialist path had been created; their propaganda by means of radio, leaflets, brochures, and the like, left no doubt as to their ultimate aim. "German revanchists," backed by the United States, agitated for the return of the Sudetenland and the Oder-Neisse territories. According to Orlik, it was they who staged a "counterrevolutionary putsch" in East Berlin in June 1953. He does not talk about other relevant aspects of the situation, but we may safely assume that the apprehensions of Soviet leaders were greatly heightened by the internal disarray following Beria's grab for power and by the unrest in the communist world at large.

A careful reader of Orlik's book would conclude that the rapprochement with Tito in 1955 and the "new look" in Soviet foreign relations under Khrushchev's leadership resulted less from decisions freely taken by Stalin's heirs than from their pessimistic reading of the overall situation. The key factor in the latter was the emergence of the German Federal Republic as an independent state and a member of NATO. This process began in September 1950 when the three Western powers pledged to protect West Germany against encroachments from the East. The Soviets tried to forestall German independence several times in 1952 and 1953, calling for a Four-Power conference to work out the terms of a German peace treaty. The conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers finally took place in Berlin early in 1954, but ended in deadlock; by then the West was determined to give West Germany sovereign status.

Since Germany's membership in NATO was tied to the issue of German reunification, the alliance acquired a further anti-Soviet direction. As if additional proof was needed, "imperialist strategists" in 1953 and 1954, as Orlik points out, attempted to make the encirclement of the Soviet bloc complete by linking Yugoslavia with NATO through the mutual defense and cooperation agreements Tito signed with Greece and Turkey, already members of this sinister organization. Perhaps it was this development that turned out to be the last straw, finally inducing the Soviet leadership to try a different course. Yugoslavia's link with NATO had to be broken. Orlik does not mention Khrushchev's penitential trip to Belgrade (which, as we know, several of Stalin's stalwarts opposed to the end), but he says that the imperialist plans "fell through when the Yugoslav government declared in 1955 that there was no need to implement the military clauses of the treaty with Greece and Turkey." (p. 137.)

The year 1955—of the Warsaw Pact, the Austrian State Treaty, the Geneva Summit—was clearly the turning point. Orlik refuses to see in Geneva a psychological breakthrough that permitted the Western public, if not yet the Western governments, to hope for the dawn of a new era and generously give the Soviets the benefit of the doubt. Perhaps he truly does not recognize the significance of this change, but one suspects that at

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

least partly he is guided here by current imperatives of Soviet foreign policy. The reason for this suspicion is the scant attention he gives to the implications of the Twentieth Party Congress and his treatment of the Hungarian uprising in October-November 1956. Although he concedes that the latter was a product of the internal "class struggle," he also ascribes it to Western intrigues and propaganda—which he would have had a hard time doing if he had treated the Geneva Summit differently. Fully approving the swift Soviet action in suppressing the uprising, Orlik states that "had the counterrevolutionary putsch lasted one-two weeks longer, armed detachments of the 'hortists' and, possibly, the troops of the Western powers, would have poured into Hungary." (p. 177.) Another question arises: Can it be that the Soviet leaders truly expected such a development?

The Hungarian episode notwithstanding, Orlik is more sanguine about Eastern Europe after 1955. (The book was written before the Czechoslovak events of 1968.) Imperialist "liberation policy" had collapsed, he says, and this led to a fundamental change in Western strategy. Having fully taken into account the strategic military power of the Soviet Union, the imperialists had abandoned by the early 1960's the crude aggressiveness of the previous era. Although their ultimate goals have remained the same, they had to refine their methods and resort to more sophisticated means in their struggle against socialism. Prominent among the new methods had become the so-called bridge-building policy which, rather than being a temporary tactical maneuver, represents a strategy "imperialists count on employing over a long period of time." (p. 207.)

VI

Implicit in Orlik's study is the thesis that the fate of Eastern Europe has by no means been sealed. Although predatory imperialistic machinations in this region appear to us grossly exaggerated in this book, there is a touch of realism in the analysis as a whole, and the standard Marxist optimism is distinctly in short supply. That there is a trend toward realism in Soviet thinking can be seen in another work by a Soviet scholar (who also happens to be a high-ranking Soviet diplomat) published in the magazine *Znamya* in June 1970. This old expert on Eastern Europe, writing under the pseudonym of K. Ivanov, goes considerably further than Orlik in treating the region as a battleground between East and West. As Orlik does, he attaches importance to the subversive activities of Western "intelligence services" bent on driving a wedge between the Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist Commonwealth. But he also recognizes that there is a great deal of resistance to socialism in the area, spearheaded by former "bourgeois-capitalist elements" who—unlike in the Soviet Union—were not exterminated in the early years of the East European revolution. Many of them had infiltrated the state and party apparatus, breeding there

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"right-wing opportunism and revisionism."

"K. Ivanov's" point of view is unmistakably Soviet, but it is not a narrow and dogmatic point of view, and his analysis of the "creeping counterrevolution" in Czechoslovakia in 1968-1969 is uncommonly broad and almost devoid of cheap propagandistic verbiage.

It may take a long time before the communist East and democratic West come to terms in settling outstanding issues, and many of these issues may in the meantime become unmanageable. What counts now is that in the last decade Soviet scholars have made considerable efforts to learn and understand our viewpoints. In the past, our task of understanding Soviet viewpoints had been exasperating because of the heavy and senseless ideological smokescreen enveloping their positions. Now that there are Soviet studies of a serious nature, this task promises to be more rewarding with regard to our interests as well as theirs.

Concepts and Terms in International Relations*

by Ronald R. Pope

Every academic discipline and sub-discipline needs at least one good dictionary. Nothing is more discouraging to a student of any subject than to be overwhelmed by a host of imprecise concepts and terms, especially when there is no reliable reference book in which to check their meanings and usages.

**The International Relations Dictionary.* By Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969. 327 pp. $3.95 (paper).

For the complex field of international relations, *The International Relations Dictionary* by Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton is a commendable attempt to meet this need. It significantly extends the coverage of international relations terminology over that provided in previous dictionaries, such as Smith and Zurcher's *Dictionary of American Politics* (Barnes and Noble, 1968), yet it does not treat the entire field. The most notable gap is the absence of terms associated with the newer methodologies, e.g., "operationalize" and "factor analyze." However, the authors have indicated in a letter to this reviewer that a new dictionary, tentatively titled *Dictionary of Political Analysis,* is being prepared in an attempt to fill this void.[1] There is one other relatively minor way in which this dictionary falls short of being all-inclusive. As would be expected, Professors Plano and Olton, both of Western Michigan University, have defined and discussed the entries essentially from an American perspective; they have not taken into ac-

[1] *A Modern Dictionary of Sociology* by George A. Theodorson and Achilles G. Theodorson (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969) defines "factor analysis," "operational" and related statistical and methodological terms. On the other hand, since it is aimed at sociologists it does not include definitions of specialized international relations terminology such as "balance of power"; and terms that are used in international relations are not generally defined in this connection (e.g., "deterrence" is defined only in relation to the subject of crime). While there is an entry on political science there is none on international relations. Yet, given the relevance of the work of many sociologists to the field of international relations, this is a dictionary of value to students of world affairs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

count differing interpretations preferred by, for example, British or Russian scholars.[2]

The authors have chosen to arrange the terms under twelve subject headings: Geography and Population; International Economics; War and Military Policy; Ideology and Communication; Nationalism, Imperialism, and Colonialism; Nature and Role of Foreign Policy; American Foreign Policy; National Political Systems; Diplomacy; Disarmament and Arms Control; International Law; and International Organization: The United Nations and Regional Organizations. This system of organization makes the book convenient for use in particular sub-fields, while thorough cross-referencing and a comprehensive index make it easy to use as a dictionary. Each entry is first defined and then an attempt is made to discuss its current significance. While this is a worthwhile approach, in some cases the discussion, in style and content, is difficult to distinguish from the definition.

As might be forgiven a first edition, the book has other flaws. Some of the discussions are either incomplete or lack precision. For example, the authors state that for deterrence to be effective it must be "fully credible." They do not make it clear whether they are referring to capabilities or intentions. Is it the existence of effective military force that must be proved, or the willingness to use it? The first question is primarily a technical one, while the second is essentially political-psychological. Both questions are important, but it is not at all clear that *full* credibility on either point is required for deterrence to be effective. Another term that is misused in one context and not accurately defined with regard to current usage is "polycentrism." It is used in place of the more common term "multipolarity" (for which there is no entry at all) in contrast to "bipolarity," and its definition contains no reference to its general usage in describing the breakup of the communist bloc.

A more critical shortcoming is the absence of a general definition of "international relations" itself and of a discussion of the important debate over the word "theory" (e.g., normative theory and empirical theory).

It can be expected that some of the omitted terms will be included in the new dictionary of political analysis mentioned above. Also, the authors have invited readers to "call any sins of omission or commission to their attention." If readers will take the time to respond and if the publisher can find it profitable to allow regular revision and updating of the text—and to put it in a more durable binding—then *The International Relations Dictionary* should become a standard reference work for students and teachers alike. Despite its first-edition deficiencies, it is already a valuable book for the international relations specialist.

[2]By way of contrast, an excellent discussion of important Soviet international relations terminology can be found in William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations: 1956-1967* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Analyzing Foreign Policy: An Introduction to Some Conceptual Problems. By Roy E. Jones. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970. 157 pp. £1.75. An appraisal of alternative approaches to the study of foreign policy. The book contains chapters on decision-making, foreign policy strategies, and the units of foreign policy, including states, systems, issues and elites.

Appearance and Reality in International Relations. By Grant Hugo. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. 207 pp. $5.95. Setting as his objective to illustrate by examples the proposition that the "quarrels of mankind are aggravated by misunderstanding and that their consequences might perhaps be mitigated if governments were to precede their decisions by a more methodical process of analysis," the author's central argument is that actions "should be decided in the light of their likely consequences, a precept that is practical only if these consequences can be predicted with some degree of accuracy." He contends that the significance of an action depends more on its concrete results than on its antecedents or on the merits of the motives that prompted it.

Comparative Government. By S. E. Finer. New York: Basic Books, 1971. 615 pp. $10.00. In this introductory text to the study of comparative government a leading British political scientist describes the main forms of modern government and the major national systems illustrative of them.

A Comparative Study of Party Organization. Edited by William E. Wright. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1971. 566 pp. $6.50 (paper). A combination text and reader of six sections, each preceded by an introductory essay placing the readings in theoretical perspective. The study is limited to party organization in democratic political parties. The primary focus is on the lower or grass roots levels because of the importance assigned them in theory and because most empirical research on party organization has been conducted at these levels.

Developing the Third World: The Experience of the Nineteen Sixties. By Ronald Robinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. 289 pp. $13.50. The record of a Cambridge Conference on Development, which is distinguished for its technical contributions. The volume emphasizes practical rather than theoretical lessons.

The End of Glory: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War II. By Laurence LaFore. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1970. 280 pp. $2.45 (paper). The author contrasts the actual state of affairs in the interwar period with the lingering and inaccurate world views of statesmen reluctant to contemplate a new balance of power.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Foreign Trade in the Economic Development of Small Nations. The Case of Ecuador. By Charles R. Gibson. New York: Praeger, 1971. 327 pp. $17.50. Another volume in the Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development. The author uses both the model of foreign trade's role in economic development and the experience of Ecuador to reach his evaluations.

Ideology. By John Plamenatz. New York: Praeger, 1970. 148 pp. $5.00. A volume in the Key Concepts in Political Science series. In addition to explaining the different uses of the term "ideology," the author tries to account for differences and relationships among the usages. He devotes particular attention to Marx's formulation, contrasting his definitions of problems with those of other writers to illustrate the confusion surrounding the use of ideology as a concept.

Imperialism. By George Lichtheim. New York: Praeger, 1970. 183 pp. $7.50 ($2.45, paper). The author traces imperialism's diverse historical manifestations through the postwar period, providing explanations of concepts such as nationalism, mercantilism, capitalism and liberalism, that often have been mistakenly identified as integral to imperialism. Also explored are the writings on imperialism of such major theorists as Marx, Lenin, Kautsky, Luxemburg, Hobson, Hilferding and Schumpeter.

Legal Limits on the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons: International Law 1899-1970. By Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr. Dallas: SMU Press, 1970. 332 pp. $10.00. The Thomases have written a comprehensive and systematic exposition of the development and present status of international law as it relates to chemical and biological warfare. Their three major themes are (1) the nature of the various types of weapons; (2) the development of conventional international legal limitations; and (3) the application of legal limitations and the customary law of war to chemical and biological warfare.

National Interest. By Joseph Frankel. New York: Praeger, 1970. 173 pp. $5.00. The author proposes a framework suited for analyzing the concept of "national interest" within any single national context as well as for cross-national comparisons. In his concluding chapter he places "national interest" in broad perspective by discussing such topics as the rationality of choices and the contemporary trend from autonomy to interdependence in international relations.

1919 Red Miracle. By David Mitchell. New York: Macmillan, 1970. 385 pp. $7.50. A British historian and journalist provides a highly readable kaleidoscopic narrative of the spirit of general revolution and the hopes for idealism in the aftermath of World War I. The failure of Wilson's utopianism and the experiments in idealistic Marxism, he contends, gave birth to the monolithic ideologies that are currently under the challenge of a new spirit of rebellion.

On Historical and Political Knowing: An Inquiry into Some Problems of Universal Law and Human Freedom. By Morton A. Kaplan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971. 159 pp. $6.50. "What do we mean by truth, by meaning, by freedom, whether of a particle, of a man, or of an organization? What do we mean by prudence of action in an uncertain world?" These are some of the philosophical questions to which Dr. Kaplan addresses himself in a concise treatise. The book, divided into three parts, is concerned with Knowing and Explaining, Historical Consciousness and Truth, and Freedom in History.

Political Power, Community and Democracy. Edited by Edward Keynes and David M. Ricci. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970. 286 pp. $3.95 (paper). Nine selections from journals or books, and four original essays by the editors, are grouped into three sections. The first section contains pieces on actual power studies in various settings and the historical background to those studies. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

second treats methodological problems in the search for power and the consequences for democracy. The third evaluates whether the facts revealed by community power studies equate with democracy.

The Politics of Disorder. By Theodore J. Lowi. New York: Basic Books, 1971. 185 pp. $6.95. In contrast to most writers on the theme of democratic change, who condemn the use of violence, Lowi sees in much of the current disorder new opportunities for effective political action. Only through the mechanism of confrontation politics, he argues, has it been possible to get the stalled machinery of government to respond to newly emerging interests in society.

Polyarchy. By Robert A. Dahl. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. 257 pp. $7.95. Dahl views seven sets of complex conditions as essential to the creation of a polyarchy—a regime in which opportunities for public contestation are available to the great bulk of the population. These include historical sequences; the socioeconomic order, both in form and level of development; inequalities; subcultures, cleavage patterns, and governmental effectiveness; the beliefs of political activists; and foreign control. He also analyzes the implications of his study for strategies of change, particularly as they might affect U.S. foreign policy.

The Process of International Organization. Edited by Robert S. Wood. New York: Random House, 1971. 525 pp. $6.95 (paper). These readings have been selected to focus attention on international organization both as a reflection of and a significant element in international politics. They are grouped under four aspects of the process of international organization: conceptual and political context; scope, structure, and procedures; uses and purposes; and tension between present processes and future aims and developments. The work would be of value as a supplementary text in courses on international organization.

The Reality of Foreign Aid. By Willard L. Thorp. New York: Praeger, 1971. 370 pp. $12.50. An assessment of the role of foreign aid in the developmental process, with special emphasis on the potential contribution the wealthy states can make by providing capital and knowledge to less developed countries.

Requiem for Democracy? By Lewis M. Andrews and Marvin Karlins. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. 148 pp. $5.95. Preferring participatory democracy over psytocracy, the authors explore the possibility of utilizing behavior modification as a technique to develop the type of individuals necessary to ensure the survival of democracy.

Self-Determination and History in the Third World. By David C. Gordon. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. 219 pp. $7.50. Political man is both a creator and creature of history. This work deals with the conception of history—"its uses and abuses, its embodiment in myths, its propagation as propaganda and through education"—in the national liberation struggles of the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa, and to some extent of India and Turkey. An eclectic study, it touches on the views of many Western scholars but fails to convey a sense of how historical consciousness influences the behavior of colonial peoples seeking independence.

The Study of Coalition Behavior: Theoretical Perspectives and Cases from Four Continents. By Sven Groennings, E. W. Kelley and Michael Leiserson. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970. 489 pp. $8.50. Coalition formation is examined in such countries as the German Federal Republic, France, Norway, Japan, Brazil and the United States, as well as in the European Economic Community. In addition, the volume deals extensively with theories of coalition formation, both at the national and international levels.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century. By Roderick Ogley. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1970. 217 pp. $8.00. The aim in this volume of the World Studies series is to illustrate by speeches, articles, memoranda and treaties what various declarations of neutrality were meant to entail; to show some of the attitudes the adoption of neutrality has evoked; and to trace what has occurred in selected cases to states trying to pursue a neutral policy in conflicts between their neighbors. This approach, it is hoped, will enable students to judge whether neutrality can continue to serve as a useful concept or whether it is an anachronism.

The United Nations in International Politics. Edited by Leon Gordenker. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. 241 pp. $7.50. Six well-known scholars on the United Nations explore various facets of that organization's role in the world today and assess its future prospects. The first essay, by Oran R. Young, sets the theoretical framework—the relationship between an international organization and the system in which it operates. Stanley Michalak then analyzes the peacemaking records of both the UN and the League of Nations; Gabriella Rosner Lande evaluates member-state responses to 29 Assembly resolutions; Linda Miller treats the impact of internal conflicts on international organization; Leon Gordenker discusses the UN's influence on social and political change; and Richard Falk suggests a set of alternative models that may characterize the UN's future role.

Untangling the Cold War: A Strategy for Testing Rival Theories. By William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. 222 pp. $6.95. Treating the Cold War as a concrete sequence of actions and reactions generated by two hegemonic coalitions between 1946 and 1963, the authors aim to test competing theories of why this interaction took the course it did. Theories tested are based on the writings of such expositors as Robert Strausz-Hupé, Marshall Shulman, Adam Ulam, George Kennan, Charles Osgood, David Horowitz, D. F. Fleming, Ronald Steel and Carl Ogelsby. They hope their research strategy can be used to enhance understanding of other hostile interactions.

World Politics in Our Time. By David C. Jordan. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1970. 426 pp. $8.95. This basic text examining the evolution of the international system in the twentieth century relates major theories of international relations to the contemporary world, assesses the role of national power, and evaluates the significance of international law and organization, collective security and balance of power as limitations on the behavior of states. The volume contains analyses of the international relations of Latin America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, the Soviet Union, China and Western Europe.

II. United States

After Vietnam: The Future of American Foreign Policy. Edited by Robert W. Gregg and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1971. 343 pp. $1.95 (paper). A collection of essays by Richard Barnet, Kenneth Boulding, George Ball, Marshall D. Shulman, Morton A. Kaplan, Leslie M. Lipson, Martin C. Needler, *et al.*, whose frame of reference is to focus attention on those foreign policy questions necessitating attention "after Vietnam." Included are examinations of how that conflict has affected U.S. relations with Western Europe, Latin America, the Soviet Union, South Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Third World in general. The writers suggest various approaches to a reordering of U.S. national priorities in foreign policy so as to give perspective to the American role in international affairs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

America and Russia in a Changing World: A Half Century of Personal Observation. By W. Averell Harriman. New York: Doubleday, 1971. 218 pp. $5.95. This is a chatty, meandering, occasionally interesting collection of reminiscences by a distinguished political figure whose concern with Soviet affairs spans four decades. Originally presented as three lectures at Lehigh University, the compilation has been supplemented with commentary to provide a measure of coherence to the whole. Harriman the skilled negotiator and astute analyst does not emerge from these pages.

The Challenge to U.S. Dominance of the International Corporation. By Rainer Hellmann. New York: Dunellen, 1970. 348 pp. $17.50. A study of the extent of the U.S. role in direct foreign investment, ownership control, management, price determination, research, and corporate policies of multinational corporations. The author discusses the impact on European national industries of American investment and West European efforts to compete in American markets.

The Cuban Missile Crisis. Edited with commentary by Robert A. Divine. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971. 248 pp. $2.65 (paper). In addition to the statements of participants in the government's handling of the Cuban missile crisis, this collection of documents and articles includes the writings of more than 20 expert observers, among them Roger Hilsman, Stewart Alsop, I. F. Stone, Dean Acheson, Theodore Sorensen and Ronald Steel. The range of interpretation varies from those who defend the President's action as wise to those, such as Ronald Steel, who see Kennedy as having unnecessarily risked nuclear war for reasons of personal prestige and political gain.

From the Crash to the Blitz. By Cabell Phillips. New York: Macmillan, 1969. 596 pp. $12.50. Drawing on the files of the *New York Times* and the leading periodicals of the period, histories, memoirs, diaries and government reports, a journalist presents an intriguing portrait of an important era in American history, from the late 1920's to the early 1940's.

The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and Other Essays. By Arthur S. Link. Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971. 426 pp. $12.95. Twenty-four essays, previously published in journals or delivered as lectures, by the leading scholar on Woodrow Wilson, with a foreword by Dewey W. Grantham. An engaging work for those students and general readers interested in national and international politics during the first three decades of the 20th century.

Hopes and Fears of the American People. By Albert H. Cantril and Charles W. Roll, Jr. New York: Universe Books, 1971. 93 pp. $4.95. Based on data from polls conducted in January and April 1971, this little volume suggests that the American people, while personally content, are deeply troubled about the state of their nation. The typical faith in the American concept of progress seems to be in jeopardy.

Legislative Liaison: Executive Leadership in Congress. By Abraham Holtzman. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970. 308 pp. $8.50. Based upon research conducted during the Kennedy Administration, this study focuses on the role of legislative liaison agents of the departmental secretaries and the President as they lobby for their leaders in Congress. The author views the function of these agents as one set of linkages between the two essentially separate systems of political action, the executive and the legislative branches of government. In addition, their performance is assessed within the context of the interest group-lobbyist approach to Congress.

A New U.S. Policy Toward China. By A. Doak Barnett. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971. 132 pp. $5.95. A senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Policy Studies Program who is a well-known expert on China examines the fundamental issues in Chinese-American relations and discusses the policy changes he believes are required to form the basis of a new and more effective American policy for the 1970's. After delineating the historical legacy of the Chinese-American relationship, he offers his own suggestions for the solution of such difficult problems as the question of Chinese representation in the UN, the future status of Taiwan, and Chinese nuclear power. The volume takes into account the initiation of "Ping-Pong diplomacy" in the spring of 1971 but was published before President Nixon's dramatic announcement of his intention to visit China.

The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy Making: A Reader. Edited by Douglas M. Fox. Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear Publishing Company, 1971. 353 pp. $7.95. A broad collection of readings from scholarly, journalistic and professional sources featuring recent material, including a case study of the Cambodian invasion.

III. Western Europe

Germany and the Management of Detente. By Philip Windsor. New York: Praeger, 1971. 207 pp. $8.50. An examination of the changing relationships between the Federal Republic and Eastern Europe, including the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union, based on analysis of the circumstances that have led to the present relaxation of political tensions in that area. The author treats such factors as the shifting objectives of the two superpowers, the growing independence of European states, changes in economic and military requirements in the Germanys, and the loosening of alliance ties in both East and West as relevant to an understanding of détente. He also considers the impact of détente on arms control, alliance politics and the prospects for world peace and explores the means for continuing and expanding the détente and ensuring the future of Europe.

Mussolini's Gadfly: Roberto Farinacci. By Harry Fornari. Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971. 238 pp. $8.95. In this informative account of the career of Roberto Farinacci, who served briefly as Secretary General of the National Fascist Party and later as Mussolini's Minister of State, Fornari presents an unusual and insightful glimpse into the inner workings of Italian fascism. Farinacci is portrayed as among its most extreme and violent members, seeing in Hitler's Germany the kind of fascist state he had always visualized for Italy.

Spain. By Richard Herr. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 306 pp. $7.95. In the Modern Nations in Historical Perspective format, this work analyzes the process by which Spain has evolved as a contemporary nation that is rapidly catching up with developed Europe. Revolution and evolution, the impact of rural alienation from urban centers, and the re-emergence of a sense of national unity are the author's main themes.

Transnational Business Collaboration among Common Market Countries: Its Implication for Political Integration. By Werner J. Feld. New York: Praeger, 1970. 139 pp. $12.50. An examination of the role of European business executives of Common Market countries who are engaged in various forms of cooperation with firms in other Common Market countries. The author studies the growth, motivations, objectives, problems and effects of such cooperation.

IV. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies. Edited by Roger E. Kanet. New York: The Free Press, 1971. 376 pp. $9.95. In his introductory essay, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

editor assesses the impact of the behavioral revolution in political science upon the study of communist nations. In succeeding articles various authors reflect the behavioral approach, using such methods as content analysis, correlation analysis, organization theory and role theory in an effort to comprehend communist political systems.

Economic Warfare in the Communist Bloc: A Study of Soviet Economic Pressure Against Yugoslavia, Albania, and Communist China. By Robert Owen Freedman. New York: Praeger, 1970. 192 pp. $14.00. Three case studies of attempts by Kremlin leaders to use economic weapons to threaten discontented clients. The experience with China is the most interesting. The author observes that in each case the Soviet Union escalated gradually, underestimated the capacity of the target country to resist successfully, and learned from its experiences.

Fifty Years of Communism: Theory and Practice 1917-1967. By G. F. Hudson. Penguin Books, 1971. 229 pp. $1.65 (paper). From his examination of the development of communism in theory and practice during the past fifty years, the author concludes that were Marx to return today he would be surprised by many of the practices adopted by the Soviet Union in his name.

The Masaryk Case. By Claire Sterling. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. 366 pp. $7.95. In this provocative book a former writer for *The Reporter* sets forth the contradictory evidence surrounding the death of Jan Masaryk, Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, on March 10, 1948. In her search for the truth she presents a persuasive case for murder rather than the explanation of suicide presented by the communists at the time.

The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid. By James Richard Carter. New York: Praeger, 1971. 134 pp. $12.50. This highly specialized study treats three major topics: the dollar cost of Soviet economic aid between 1955 and 1968, the effects of this aid on the volume of Soviet foreign trade, and the relationship between changes in Soviet foreign trade and the monetary cost of the foreign aid program. The conclusion is that net cost is relatively small.

Russia, China, and the West: A Contemporary Chronicle, 1953-1966. By Isaac Deutscher. Edited by Fred Halliday. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970. 360 pp. $1.65 (paper). An edited collection of Deutscher's writings on current affairs from 1953 to 1966 originally published in numerous journals and newspapers. The editor has arranged the texts in narrative sequence so that they present a coherent commentary on events.

The Soviet Experience: Success or Failure? Edited by Daniel R. Brower. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. 129 pp. $2.45 (paper). A European Problem Studies volume in which the editor provides a sampling of significant points of view on many aspects of the Soviet experience in order to assist the student to come to his own conclusion about it. The various opinions expressed cover such topics as Soviet economic development, social transformation, cultural change and political evolution.

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1930 to 1945. By Anthony C. Sutton. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971. 410 pp. $12.50. In the second of a three-volume series, the author continues to produce an elaborate case for the chronic inability of the Soviet economy to grow without large infusions of Western technology. He concludes that a prime explanation for Soviet growth is the Western technological transfer.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

V. Middle East and Africa

Central Africa: The Former British States. By Lewis H. Gann. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Spectrum Books, 1971. 180 pp. $5.95 ($2.45, paper). Rhodesia, Malawi and Zambia are the subject of this recent contribution to the Modern Nations in Historical Perspective series. Against a background devoted to the lands and peoples, the author assesses the impact of the West, the struggles for independence and the existence of competing racial factions as they shape the contemporary makeup of these three African states.

Economic Productivity in Israel. By A. L. Gaathon. New York: Praeger, 1971. 281 pp. $10.00. This volume in the Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development series examines the effect of human and investment factors on Israeli productivity. The period 1950-1965 is covered in detail and some attention is given to the years 1965 to 1969, especially to the dislocations of the Six Day War and other impediments to progress. The author provides two models designed to assess the long-run effects of resource use on economic capacity.

Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics. By R. Hrair Dekmejian. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971. 368 pp. $10.00. A comprehensive and detailed analysis of Egyptian politics from the 1952 revolution through the death of President Gamal Abdel Nasir in September 1970. The forces of militarism, dictatorship, charisma, ideology, pan-Arabism and Arab socialism are examined with regard to their influence on the policies of the Egyptian President and his power elite.

Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy. By Robert L. Hess. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970. 272 pp. $8.95 ($2.95, paper). Ethiopia is an atypical African state in that it has had a legacy of independence. As a result, its political development has not been patterned along anti-colonial lines. This tradition and its effect on the nation's modernization provide the underlying theme. The book is the most recent release in the Africa in the Modern World series, under the general editorship of Gwendolen M. Carter.

Middle Eastern Oil and the Western World: Prospects and Problems. By Sam H. Schurr and Paul T. Homan. New York: American Elsevier Publishing Company, 1971. 209 pp. $16.00. An assessment of the current status and projected developments in the international oil trade between the Middle East (and North Africa) and the major oil consumer countries. The study, under the joint sponsorship of the RAND Corporation and Resources for the Future, Inc., focuses primarily on the economic perspective. Analyzed are the degree of Western dependence on Middle East oil, the effects of supply interruptions, Middle Eastern dependence on Western markets, and relationships between companies and host governments. Substitutes for Middle Eastern petroleum are also considered.

The Middle East Supply Centre. By Martin W. Wilmington. Edited by Laurence Evans. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971. 248 pp. $10.00. Dr. Wilmington, whose thoroughly edited doctoral dissertation this is, provides a detailed view of the workings of the Middle East Supply Centre. The focus is not merely on the functioning of a wartime agency; rather, the examination treats the organization as one of the earliest attempts at meaningful regional economic integration.

Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927. By Joseph L. Grabill. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971. 395 pp. $13.50. The role played by American missionaries in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Middle East and their influence on U.S. policy is examined in relation to the growth of American involvement in the Middle East and the effects these religious pioneers had on subsequent efforts such as the Fulbright, foreign aid and Peace Corps programs.

VI. East Asia and the Pacific

China and Russia: The "Great Game". By O. Edmund Clubb. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. 578 pp. $12.95. Edmund Clubb, for twenty years a U.S. foreign service officer in the Far East, has written a comprehensive history of Russian-Chinese relations, with main emphasis on their interaction since the middle of the nineteenth century. There are chapters on the Kuomintang period, the Kuomintang-communist civil war, the rise of Mao Tse-tung to power, and the origin and evolution of the Sino-Soviet rift. Clubb tends to the view that the Soviet Union and China will "probably find compelling reasons to sustain a measure of collaboration in Asia," that Japan and the Soviet Union will draw closer to each other, and that the United States will remain China's main foe in Asia.

China in Ferment: Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution. Edited by Richard Baum, with Louise B. Bennett. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 246 pp. $6.95 ($2.75, paper). This collection of articles and documents provides perspectives on the origin, progress and aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. Included are contributions by Lin Piao and the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China relating to the Cultural Revolution. There is also a short chronology of events from 1957 to 1970.

China Trade Prospects and U. S. Policy. By Jerome Alan Cohen, Robert F. Dernberger and John R. Garson. Edited by Alexander Eckstein. New York: Praeger, 1971. 330 pp. $10.50. On the premise that trade either can be an avenue for the normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations or can take place in the absence of diplomatic relations, the authors examine the effects of the American trade embargo against China, issues regarding Chinese law and Sino-American trade, and the prospects for trade between the United States and China.

The Chinese Road to Socialism. By E. L. Wheelwright and Bruce McFarlane. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970. 256 pp. $7.50. Two Australian economists assess the economic aspects of the Cultural Revolution in terms of the role of ideology and the human factor in Chinese development.

Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization. (Revised edition.) By Arthur J. Dommen. New York: Praeger, 1971. 454 pp. $12.50. As Saigon Bureau Chief for the *Los Angeles Times,* Arthur Dommen speaks from wide experience in Southeast Asian affairs. Updating his earlier work on the history of Laos, its French colonial period, the events of the Second World War and the postindependence movement, he now traces the erosion of the 1962 Geneva agreement from the coup of April 1964 to the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos in February 1971. It is his contention that the neutralization of Laos by international accord, to which China would be a party, presents the only possibility of peace for that nation. Such an accord must be accompanied by a settlement in Viet Nam and Cambodia.

Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968. By Martin E. Weinstein. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. 158 pp. $7.50. A compact review of an increasingly important topic, the Japanese military effort. The author concludes with a concise and timely forecast of Japan's defense policies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. By George McTurnan Kahin. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970. 490 pp. $3.95 (paper). A paper edition of a work originally published in 1952 which remains valuable to an understanding of contemporary Indonesia. The author reviews the emergence of independent Indonesia and the role nationalism played in the eventual termination of European control in the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese occupation, the post-war revolution, the attempts by the Dutch to reassert their dominion, and the attendant United Nations involvement are assessed in detail.

Pakistan and the Great Powers. By Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri. Karachi: Mirror Press, Ltd., 1970. 140 pp. $3.25. This well-documented book surveys Pakistan's relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and China during the past decade and analyzes the circumstances that led her to change the course of her foreign policy from an initial pro-Western alignment to independence. The difficulties faced in this change of posture and the factors influencing the successes and failures of the new policy are described. A fresh interpretation of the Kashmir conflict is presented in an appendix.

Remaking China Policy: U.S.-China Relations and Governmental Decision-making. By Richard Moorsteen and Morton Abramowitz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. 138 pp. $5.95. An overview of the China policy of the United States which contains suggested approaches to the solution of several problem areas. The conclusion reached is that a "one China, but not now" policy will best serve the interest of Sino-American accommodation. The scope of the issues discussed and the relevant documents included belie this volume's slimness.

The Taiping Rebellion: History and Documents (Volumes II and III, Documents and Comments). By Franz Michael in collaboration with Chung-li Chang. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971. Volume II, pp. 1-726. Volume III, pp. 727-1818. $30.00 each. These two books are documentary companions to the first volume, published in 1966, which presented an analytical history of the Taiping Rebellion of 1850-1864. The documents are arranged in accordance with the six phases outlined by the authors in the main study. Each document is described and its relevance to the study is highlighted.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Monographs and Reports Received

Agriculture in the Mekong Basin: Goals, Priorities, and Strategies. By the Staff, Resources for the Future. Washington: Resources for the Future, Inc., distributed by The Johns Hopkins Press (Baltimore), June 1971. 108 pp. $2.50.

An Analysis of the Draft of the Revised Constitution of the Chinese Communist Regime. Taipei, Taiwan: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, January 1971. 137 pp. $1.20.

Die Baath-Partei: Portrait einer panarabischen Bewegung. By Horst Mahr. Munchen: Gunter Olzog Verlag, 1971. 181 pp. DM 22,—.

Disarmament: Twenty-Five Years of Effort. By William Epstein. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1971. 97 pp. $3.00.

European Security in the Seventies: Views on Europe, II. A Report of a Conference on European Security in the Seventies, May 27-29, 1970. 's-Gravenhage, Netherlands: Oost-West Instituut, *Civis Mundi,* February 1971. 36 pp. f4.50.

International Big Business, 1957-1967: A Study of Comparative Growth. By Robert Rowthorn with Stephen Hymer. New York: Cambridge University Press, Department of Applied Economics, Occasional Paper No. 24, 1971. 108 pp. $6.00 ($2.95, paper).

The Kennedys & Vietnam. Edited by John Galloway. New York: Facts on File, Inc., July 1971. 150 pp. $2.95.

The Law in Political Integration: The Evolution and Integrative Implications of Regional Legal Processes in the European Community. By Stuart A. Scheingold. Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs No. 27, June 1971. 59 pp. $2.25.

Pacific Islands and Trust Territories: A Select Bibliography. Prepared by The Army Library, The Adjutant General's Office, Department of the Army, Pam 550-10, January 1971. 171 pp. n.p.

Population. By Valerie K. Oppenheimer. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 206, June 1971. 95 pp. $1.00.

Project MAX: A Proposed Computer-based Study of International Policy. By David C. Phillips. Santa Monica, Calif.: System Development Corporation, SP-3589, March 1971. 48 pp. n.p.

Raymond Aron: Musings from an Irrepressible Optimist. By David C. Phillips. Santa Monica, Calif.: System Development Corporation, April 1971. 26 pp. n.p.

Religion and Resistance to Nazism. By Beate Ruhm von Oppen. Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 35, March 1971. 74 pp. $3.00.

Rhodesian Independence. By Robert W. Peterson. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1971. 142 pp. $2.95.

Russia's Rulers: The Khrushchev Period. Edited by Lester A. Sobel. New York: Facts on File, Inc., June 1971. 394 pp. $5.45.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Security Through SALT? By Colin S. Gray. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Behind the Headlines Series, April 1971. 16 pp. 75 cents.

The Shaky Maoist Regime. By Chin Ta-kai. Taipei, Taiwan: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, February 1971. 106 pp. $1.10.

Soviet Military Trends: Implications for U.S. Security. By William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Washington: American Enterprise Institute and Foreign Policy Research Institute, Joint Monograph, June 1971. 50 pp. $3.00.

Struthonianism and the "Moral Dilemma" of Safeguard. By David C. Phillips. Santa Monica, Calif.: System Development Corporation, SP-3506, March 1970. 10 pp. n.p.

World Military Expenditures, 1970. Washington: Government Printing Office, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 58, December 1970. 37 pp. 65 cents.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Contributors to this Issue

Victor Basiuk, Adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy; currently on leave from the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University; author of the forthcoming book, *Technology, the Future and American Policy.*

Henry R. Nau, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Williams College. He recently completed his Ph.D. dissertation at the Johns Hopkins University, entitled "Technological Politics: Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation in Western Europe."

J. H. Kahan, Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Studies Program at The Brookings Institution; formerly served with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of Defense.

Roy M. Melbourne, Foreign Service Officer, currently Chairman, Department of International Relations and Area Studies, National War College. He has been deputy chief of mission at four diplomatic posts, and was the deputy and acting staff director of the former Operations Coordinating Board component of the National Security Council.

Sidney I. Ploss, Research Fellow at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University; editor of *The Soviet Political Process: Aims, Techniques and Examples of Analysis* (Ginn and Company, 1971).

Paul A. Smith, Jr., a Washington-based observer of Soviet affairs; contributor of articles on Soviet dissent to *Foreign Affairs* and *Problems of Communism.*

Barbara Jancar, Executive Director of International Science Exchange, a consulting firm; author of *Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power: A Study of Political Power in a Communist System* (Praeger, 1971).

Dennis L. Bark, National Fellow, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, California. He received the Ph.D. degree from the Free University of Berlin in history and political science and resided in Berlin from 1966 to 1970.

W. Raymond Duncan, Associate Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Brockport.

Ann L. Hollick, member of the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; formerly, Research Fellow at The Brookings Institution, where this article was written.

Arthur P. Whitaker, Emeritus Professor of History, University of Pennsylvania; member of the Editorial Board, ORBIS.

Vladimir Petrov, Professor of International Affairs, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, The George Washington University; author of *A Study in Diplomacy: The Story of Arthur Bliss Lane* (Regnery, 1971).

Ronald R. Pope, Ph.D. candidate in international relations, University of Pennsylvania; research assistant, Foreign Policy Research Institute.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Politique Etrangère

la grande revue des questions internationales

SOMMAIRE

No. 3 — 1971

Maurice COUVE de MURVILLE	Un voyage en Chine
Normand LESTER	Les conditionnements de la décision politique au Canada

PROBLEMES JURIDIQUES ET POLITIQUES DES UTILISATIONS MILITAIRES DE L'ESPACE:

Simone COURTEIX	Le traité de 1967 et son application en matière d'utilisation militaire de l'espace
Jean KLEIN	Le traité sur l'espace et la règlementation des armements
Rapport de synthèse	
Violette GRAFF	Les élections en Inde
Henryk BIRECKI	Le monde triangulaire et les relations Est-Ouest en Europe

---

Prix de l'abonnement:

France ..... 48 F

Etranger ..... 64 F

Le numéro: 9 F

Publiée tous les deux mois

Adresser les abonnements au **Centre d'études de Politique étrangère,** 54, rue de Varenne—Paris 7ème—C.C.P. 1865-41 Paris

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

William R. Kintner, Director

Research Monographs

No. 6. *Aggression and Self-Defense: The Legality of U.S. Action in South Vietnam.* By Stefan T. Possony. $2.50. September 1966.

No. 7. *The British Common Market Decision and Beyond.* By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. $1.50. March 1966.

No. 8. *To the Twenty-third Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.* By Sidney I. Ploss. $2.00. October 1965.

No. 9. *New Trends in Soviet Policy and the 23rd Party Congress.* By Sidney I. Ploss. $1.25. August 1966.

No. 10. *A Scale of Events Along the Conflict-Cooperation Continuum.* By Alvin Richman. $1.75. March 1967.

No. 11. *The Political Dimensions of Foreign Aid.* By Karl von Vorys. $2.00. August 1967.

Special Analysis. *Soviet Military Trends: Implications for U.S. Security.* By William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. $3.00. June 1971. (Published jointly with the American Enterprise Institute.)

Recent Books

Peace and the Strategy Conflict. By William R. Kintner. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 264 pp. $6.95.

The Treaty Trap. By Laurence W. Beilenson. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1969. 344 pp. $7.00.

Politics and the International System. Edited by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1969. 514 pp. $4.95 (paper).

The Atlantic Community: A Complex Imbalance. By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969. 216 pp. $2.45 (paper).

Britain Faces Europe, 1957-1967. By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969. 228 pp. $6.00.

Safeguard: Why the ABM Makes Sense. By William R. Kintner. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1969. 413 pp. $6.95.

Contending Theories of International Relations. By James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1971. 415 pp. $9.95 ($6.25, paper).

Copies of Institute monographs may be obtained from The Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Institute books may be obtained from the publisher or from your local bookstore.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PACIFIC COMMUNITY

An International Journal of Asian and Pacific Affairs

A NEW QUARTERLY PUBLISHED IN AUSTRALIA COVERING THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS, ETHNIC AND MILITARY PROBLEMS OF ASIA

No. 8 **AUTUMN 1971**

The Origins of the Second Indo-China War, *Jeffrey Race*
The New Left in Europe and the United States, *Ruth Bevan*
China and the New Reformation, *Carlton Culmsee*
Economic Development in Sikkim, *Pradyumna P. Karan*
Soviet Policy Toward the New Order in Indonesia, *Rodolfo Severino Jr.*
A Note on the Soviet Union and Burma as Revealed Through Certain Communist Sources, *Frank N. Trager*

Editorial, Documents, Book Reviews

Annual subscription: Australia: $A4.00
Overseas: $US5.50 (surface) $US13.00 (air mail)

THE PACIFIC INSTITUTE, P.O. Box 2043 S, Melbourne, Australia, 3001

ÖSTERREICHISCHE
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
AUSSENPOLITIK

keeps you informed on Austrian foreign policy and international relations. Recent issues contain articles by:

Erich Kussbach, Die Weiterentwicklung des Völkerrechtes—eine friedenserhaltende Funktion der Vereinten Nationen

Luzius Wildhaber, Die Mitgliedschaft dauernd neutraler Staaten im UNO-Sicherheitsrat

Documents on Austria and the EEC

Chronicle of Austrian foreign policy

Reviews

Annual Subscription $9.50—six copies a year.

Published by:

ÖSTERREICHISCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR AUSSENPOLITIK UND INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN
A-1010 VIENNA, JOSEFSPLATZ 6, AUSTRIA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE WORLD TODAY

The monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs provides the general reader with up-to-date and authoritative information on current world problems.

Recent numbers include articles on:

BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET: THE POLITICAL CASE *by George Thomson*

FROM TRIPOLI TO TEHERAN AND BACK: THE SIZE AND MEANING OF THE OIL GAME *by J. E. Hartshorn*

WILL NATO SURVIVE DÉTENTE? *by Manlio Brosio*

EGYPT AFTER NASSER *by Peter Mansfield*

THE UF GOVERNMENT IN CEYLON: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES *by Urmila Phadnis*

Annual Subscription: £3.25 post free (U.S.A. and Canada $10)
28p per copy

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents, or to the Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London N.W. 10 ODD.

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
CHATHAM HOUSE, 10 ST. JAMES'S SQUARE, LONDON S.W.1

TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS
and
WORLD POLITICS

The special issue of International Organization for 1971

Volume 25 Number 3

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
editors

Eighteen eminent political scientists, economists, historians, and sociologists examine the importance of nongovernmental actors in world politics and the implications of increases in transnational interactions between societies.

World Peace Foundation
40 Mount Vernon St.
Boston, Mass. 02108

$10.00 per year
18.00 two years
25.00 three years

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

An international journal for the study of China

JULY-SEPTEMBER 1971 **ISSUE NO. 47**

The Wuhan Incident: Local Strife and Provincial Rebellion During the Cultural Revolution — Thomas W. Robinson

Chinese Communist Images of Invasion and Resistance — John H. Weakland

Political Offences in Taiwan: Laws and Problems — Ming-min Peng

Mao Versus Liu? Policy Towards Industry and Commerce: 1946-49 — Kenneth Lieberthal

The McMahon Line — Karunakar Gupta

Sino-Soviet Exchange Rates — Kang Chao

COMMENT BOOK REVIEWS QUARTERLY CHRONICLE AND DOCUMENTATION

Editorial Office: 24 Fitzroy Square, London W1P 5HJ

Subscription Agents:
Research Publications Ltd., Victoria Hall, East Greenwich, London S.E.10 ORF

Subscription rates: £3 or U.S. $7.50 a year
For full-time students: £2 or U.S. $5.00
Individual copies: 75p or U.S. $2.00

ISI THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW

Contributors to recent issues:

Raymond Aron
William C. Bark
General Andre Beaufre
Louis I. Bredvold
Yale Brozen
Lev E. Dobriansky
M. Stanton Evans
Lawrence Henry Gipson
Ernest van den Haag
Will Herberg
William R. Kintner
Russell Kirk
Wm. Oliver Martin
Ludwig von Mises
Gerhart Niemeyer
Stefan T. Possony
Leo Strauss
Robert Strausz-Hupe
Frank N. Trager
Eric Voegelin
Simon N. Whitney
Francis G. Wilson

A journal of scholarship and opinion publishing articles in the fields of philosophy, political science, economics, literature and social criticism. THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW is made available free of charge to faculty and students four times during the academic year by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute. Subscriptions are invited from those outside the academic community: one year, five dollars; two years, eight dollars; three years, eleven dollars. Subscriptions and inquiries should be addressed to: ISI, 14 South Bryn Mawr Avenue, Bryn Mawr, Pa. 19010.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

USSR and Third World

a regular survey of
Soviet and Chinese relations with
Africa, Asia and Latin America

USSR and Third World, issued 10 times a year, provides a unique service of information on the development of Soviet and Chinese relations with the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. It covers Soviet, Chinese and also Western and Third World reports and comment on the subject, and gives particular attention to developments in critical areas such as the Middle East, Vietnam and the Indian Ocean and Sub-Continent.

All aspects of Soviet and Chinese policies of the Third World—political, military, economic, cultural, etc.—are covered in this comprehensive research publication, which is systematically arranged for easy reference.

USSR and Third World is sent to Foreign Ministries, diplomatic missions, universities, libraries and interested individuals and organizations in all parts of the world.

CENTRAL ASIAN RESEARCH CENTRE LTD.
1B Parkfield Street,
London, N.1.

Subscription rates (10 issues per year): £15.00 or £17.00 by airmail
USA: $40.00 (air freight) from International Publications,
114 East 32nd Street,
New York, N.Y. 10016

The FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE announces:

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION— NATION-STATE INTERACTION
An Annotated Bibliography

Edited by: DAVID BURTIS
FARID LAVIPOUR
STEVEN RICCIARDI
KARL P. SAUVANT

With an Introduction by
PROFESSOR FRANKLIN R. ROOT
Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania

A bibliographical compilation, with paragraph-long annotations, covering all areas of interaction between MNC's, nation-states and unions. The bibliography, which is a derivative of the FPRI Multinational Corporation Project, provides a comprehensive overview of the literature in this field since 1964.

Available October 1971

Foreign Policy Research Institute
3508 Market Street, Suite 350
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED